

A Political History of the Songea Ngoni  
from the mid-nineteenth century  
to the rise of the  
Tanganyika African National Union.

Patrick M.Redmond



ProQuest Number: 10752648

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10752648

Published by ProQuest LLC (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

### Abstract

This thesis is a study of autocratic rule among the Ngoni of Songea district, Tanzania. Two royal families and their associates, with some hundreds of followers, immigrated into Songea in the mid-nineteenth century and there built two large and powerful states over which they ruled until 1962. Though rank and privilege distinguished the immigrants from their East African adherents, the two accepted and followed a common life style for their mutual benefit. The leaders were factious and, within thirty years, had produced some major divisions within the states as members of the royal families and some of the more important military leaders moved towards isolated independence. The Germans entered at this point and, taking advantage of disunity, gained the submission of the Ngoni. The changes brought by submission led to a rebellion in 1905 which failed, due to various factors including political division. The leaders then adapted to colonial life and consolidated a new type of control. British takeover and the subsequent implementation of Indirect Rule facilitated the consolidation of autocratic control through its support of traditional leaders. This power began ebbing during the 1940s and 1950s under the impact of changes pushed by colonial administration, though only after Tanzanian independence is it removed completely and the rule of the royal families brought to an end.

## Table of Contents

Lists	page 4
Maps	5
Acknowledgements	8
Abbreviations	9
Introduction	10
Chapter 1. The Migrants and their State	33
2. A Spirited Growth, 1860s- early 1880s	69
3. The Height of Empire, early 1880s-1897	115
4. A Rough New World, 1898-1905	182
5. Maji Maji and the Rejection of Subjugation	222
6. The Transition to Administrative Control, 1907-1925	278
7. Indirect Rule and the Apex of Royal Family Control, 1925-1939	316
8. Democracy and Ndendeule Nationalism, 1940-1954	354
Appendix A. Age-Regiments	399
Bibliography	400




Lists

1. Gama Clan: Selective Succession List.	page 6
2. Tawete Clan: Selective Succession List.	7
3. Leaders of Ungoni in 1930.	326
4. Ndunates and Manduna, 1926-1939.	333
5. 1949-50 Njelu Succession: known supporters and opponents of Fusi Gama	376
6. Ndunates, 1954.	391

## Maps


1. Ngoni Migrations into Southern East Africa, according to Read.	page 40
2. Revised Map of Approximate Routes of Ngoni Migrations into Southern East Africa.	41
3. Approximate Locations of Settlement Groups in Southern East Africa, 1800.	47
4. Early Nineteenth Century Immigrations into Southern East Africa.	50
5. Approximate Routes of Ndendeule and Nindi Migrations, 1863-1868	66
6. Ngoni Kingdoms 1870, and Military Expansion.	70
7. Approximate Locations, Njelu and Mshope Settlements, 1872.	87
8. Estimated Tribute-Paying Neighbours, 1877.	96
9. Hehe Wars in Ungoni, 1878, 1881.	104
10. Mshope and Njelu Military Expansion, 1878-1897.	116
11. Approximate Locations, Major Settlements of the Njelu, c.1885.	127
12. Approximate Locations, Major Settlements of the Njelu, c.1895.	146
13. Estimated Tribute-Paying Neighbours, 1895.	157
14. Songea District, 1898: Surrendered Regions Noted.	183
15. The Maji Maji Rebellion: Region and Peoples.	224
16. The Maji Maji Rebellion: Advance Against Upangwa.	263
17. The Maji Maji Rebellion: Advance Against Mgende.	268
18. Location of Sultanates, 1922.	305
19. Approximate District Divisions and Ngoni Ndunates, 1926.	321
20. Boundaries Between Kingdoms, 1928-1937.	350
21. Ngoni Ndunates, 1954.	392

1-1517



UNSUCCESSFUL  
RIVAL  
CANDIDATE

2



### Acknowledgements

Many have offered me encouragement, advice and assistance in my researches of the past four years and without their help this thesis could not have been written. I am indebted to all of them for the time and effort they spared for me. Deserving particular mention are the following: the Commonwealth Scholarships Commission and the Canada Council, which supported me for three years in London and one year in Tanzania respectively; the Central Research Fund of the University of London, which provided funds with which to buy research materials; the staff of the Tanzania National Archives, who were friendly, co-operative and competent. Deserving particular mention is Mr. J. M. Karugila, who arranged for me to read the Early Series group of Secretariat files; the members of staff, particularly Dr. John Iliffe, of the Department of History of the University of Dar es Salaam, who made available useful data, and were always willing to provide advice and assistance; Fr. Elzear Ebner, whose researches and willing provision of information have been invaluable; my supervisor, Professor Roland Oliver, who first suggested a study of the Ngoni, then gave assistance and advice whenever it was needed during the first two years, and finally, provided the stimulus which was needed for serious work to be produced; Dr. Michael Twaddle, a hard-working lecturer who spent countless hours reading and correcting my work and whose stimulating flow of ideas brought a firm direction to loosely-organized data; and finally, my wife, Irene Jones, who tirelessly corrected my English to turn an ambiguous work into something readable and who was always around to encourage me.



## Abbreviations

A.A.	African Affairs.
A.S.	African Studies.
A.R.D.L.M.	Annual Report of the Department of Land and Mines (Tanganyika Territory) (henceforth TT).
A.R.C.D.	Annual Report on Co-operative Development. (TT).
B.I.A.L.I.	Bulletin of the International African Labour Institute.
C.A.	Central Africa.
D.A.A.R.	Department of Agriculture, Annual Report. (TT).
D.E.A.R.	Department of Education, Annual Report. (TT).
D.L.A.R.	Department of Labour, Annual Report, (TT).
D.K.B.	Deutsches Kolonialblatt.
D.O.A.R.	Deutsch Ostafrikanische Rundschau.
D.O.A.Z.	Deutsch Ostafrikanische Zeitung.
E.A.Agric.J.	East African Agricultural Journal.
H.G.E.A.	A Handbook of German East Africa, (London, 1916), HMSO.
J.A.H.	Journal of African History.
J.Afr.S.	Journal of the Africa Society.
J.Afr.Soc.	Journal of African Sociology.
J.Afr.Sw.C.	Journal of the African Swahili Committee.
J.E.A.Sw.C.	Journal of the East African Swahili Committee.
J.Man.G.S.	Journal of the Manchester Geographic Society.
J.R.A.I.	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
J.R.A.S.	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society.
J.R.G.S.	Journal of the Royal Geographic Society.
Kol.Rund.	Koloniale Rundschau.
M.D.A.	Mahenge Diocese Archives.
Missbl.	Missionsblätter.
M.M.R.	Maji Maji Records, Research Project, UDSM.
M.a.d.S.	Mitteilungen von Forschungsreisenden und Gelehrten aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten.
M.S.O.S.	Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische-Sprachen.
Nyasaland J.	Nyasaland Journal.
P.A.	Peramiho Archives.
P.C.A.	as R.K.A.
P.R.G.S.	Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society.
P.R.O.	Public Records Office.
R.H.	Rhodes House.
R.K.A.	Deutsche Zentralarchiv, Reichskolonialamt, (Potsdam).
R.L.I.J.	Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Journal.
S.O.A.	St.Ottilien Archives.
T.A.N.U.	Tanganyika African National Union.
T.D.B.	Tanganyika District Book.
T.N.A.	Tanzania National Archives.
T.N.R.	Tanganyika (Tanzania) Notes and Records.
U.M.C.A.	Universities Mission to Central Africa.
U.S.P.G.	United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.
U.D.S.M.	University of Dar es Salaam.

## Introduction

## The Argument.

"The feared Wangoni consisted, in fact, of a small group of élite troops of Kaffir, Tonga and Kalanga blood around whom were grouped thousands of native slaves who quickly became imitators of the Wangoni".(1) When making this statement, John Booth estimated that this élite comprised approximately one and a half percent of the total population of the Ngoni. This thesis is a study of that élite, of its formation of two kingdoms from a conglomeration of loosely-organized peoples and then of its hundred years of rule over these kingdoms.

The first serious study which was made of this élite, and particularly, of the royal families which led it, which were of Kaffir, otherwise known as Ngoni or Swazi(2), blood, was that by a British colonial government sociologist, P.H.Gulliver, in 1952-3. His study, *An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Songea District*, had been undertaken partly to explain why government schemes for the implementation of 'Local Government' and for faster economic development were getting nowhere in the district. Gulliver lay much of the blame on the royal families who, he felt, needlessly resisted all change. He strongly criticized their right to have power, stating that they were leaders merely because the British colonial policy of Indirect Rule "formalized a dying system"(3),

(1) John Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) in Deutsch Ostafrika", *Globus*, lxxxviii, (1905), pp.197-201, 222-6.

(2) Their southern African name, Nguni, changed to Ngoni during their migration northwards, see J.A.Barnes, *Politics in a Changing Society*, (Manchester, 1967), 2nd.ed., ManUP, p.9; They refer to themselves as Swazi, see Elzear Ebner, *History of the Wangoni: Revised Edition*, (1968), typescript, SOA,9-10.

which lingered on in Ngoni country until the 1950s because the "deadweight of inoperative tradition" hung "especially heavy" there.(1)

The aim of my research was, initially, to test this thesis. Even to begin with, Gulliver's reasons for the survival of the rule of such a small group in the present century seemed to be superficial. Moreover, his evidence suggested alternative explanations for its survival. For example, the conservative leadership which he condemned for maintaining the backwardness of the kingdoms, was not the dying one he claimed it to be but, on the contrary, was very much alive and responsive to the conservative will of the people. Data accumulated in the course of research in Tanzania, England and Germany, as well as that available in the writings of the German missionary, Elzear Ebner, confirmed this. Gulliver does seem to have erred in disparaging the adaptability of successive Ngoni leaders. He also erred in disparaging their legitimacy. Evidence assembled for this study confirms that the members of the Ngoni royal families, as well as a few close associates among those who immigrated into southern East Africa, were accepted by the majority of the Ngoni people in 1950 as legitimate. Moreover, the data accumulated during the present study suggest a variety of alternative reasons for the survival of autocratic rule.

The most important of these is based on the implications of the ethnic composition of the Ngoni. Booth was correct when

---

(3) P.H.Gulliver, "An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Songea District", typescript, Cory Papers, U.Dar es Salaam library, p.115; see also p.vi for his recommendations for future policies of the government.

(1) Ibid., p.v.



writing, in 1905, that the Ngoni comprised an élite dominating a mass of imitators. Moreover, it is felt that unless this ethnic composition is understood and appreciated, it is not possible to present a feasible interpretation of Ngoni history. This has been shown in many studies which have been one-sided historically because of their omission of material which is often critical to the explanation of events. Examples of such omission include: Gulliver's work, in 1954(1), which failed to appreciate the interaction between the military and political leaders in Ngoni society during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; Ebner's, in 1959(2), which underestimated the importance of rank within Ngoni society; and those of John Iliffe, in 1967, Igor Kozak, in 1968, and O.B.Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara, in 1969,(3) which all underestimate the local nature of political life.

In short, there has been a general failure to appreciate the particular ways in which the migrant Ngoni adapted to their exotic environment in East Africa. Once these are appreciated, it becomes possible to explain Ngoni political history more intelligibly. For example, the interaction between the military and political leaders, which Gulliver wrote about, was one of co-operation, as it had been in southern Africa, rather than of competition as he imagined it to be. Again, Ebner depicts Ngoni society as it was in the present century rather than as it had been before colonial rule, when the emphasis on rank, brought from southern Africa, was still strong.(4) Finally, Iliffe, Kozak, Mapunda and Mpangara underestimate the

---

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey.

(2) E.Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), Mission Press.

(3) John Iliffe, "The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion", JAH, v.8, (1967), n.3; Igor G.Kozak, Two Rebellions in German East Africa: Their Study in Microcosm, (Howard U., 1968), MA thesis; O.B.Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara, The Maji Maji War in Ungoni, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), EAPH, Maji Maji Research Paper, n.1.

(4) Hilda Kuper shows the importance of rank in An African Aristocracy. Rank Among the Swazi, (London, 1947), OUP.

complexity implicit in rule by the royal families as well as the means by which this southern African 'élite' and their East African 'imitators' accepted the maji in their rebellion of 1905.

The Ngoni migrants adapted to their environment in East Africa by retaining some aspects of their southern African culture and way of life while adapting others to the ones of their East African captives. Those which they retained included the political structure and organization of rule by royal families, aspects of the military structure, their name and certain aspects of their culture and economy. Those which changed included political organization on the village level, much of the military organization, the language, many aspects of religion and most of the culture and economy. Because leadership continued to be restricted to members of royal families who, in southern African style, fought it out amongst themselves to decide who would succeed each time one leader died, in time these rivalries led to the emergence of royal factions which reacted differently to events. This created a fluidity in politics which complicated Ngoni reactions to events such as the rebellion of 1905 and the succession of 1952-4. On the other hand, the fact that the Ngoni migrants adopted the East African culture of their East African 'imitators' in so many other respects helps to explain why their rule survived the imposition of colonial rule.

The 'political' emphases of this study were also adopted for other reasons. One was that research materials proved available. Moreover it is in political life that the one certainty in Ngoni history seems to be. This certainty was the recognition, if only by default, of the existence of autocratic rule among all sections of Ngoni society, and the moulding of perceptions of political life in terms of this acceptance. Autocratic rule, in this case, meant the rule of two royal families over the kingdoms the Ngoni built in

southern East Africa: the Gama family for the Njelu kingdom and the Tawete family for the Mshope kingdom. Political life within the two kingdoms was a matter of manipulating this social fact. Thus, various branches of the ruling family could dispute who should hold the top positions, important leaders could dispute the powers held by the ruling family, and other sections of the population could dispute the extent to which other groups in the kingdom could dominate them and, consequently, whether they wished to remain in either of the kingdoms.

Thus this thesis is essentially a study of the rule of two autocratic royal families in the Ngoni country of southern East Africa and the way in which they built their kingdoms and preserved their rule over them.

It opens with an analysis of the founding of the two kingdoms. Ngoni migrants from southern Africa brought with them to the lands east of Lake Nyasa<sup>(1)</sup> their centralized political structures with royal families, a military sophistication they had acquired from Shaka and others, and an openness towards state-building acquired by the need to assimilate captives during their migrations. In the lands east of Lake Nyasa, three Ngoni migrant groups met. The Maseko, Njelu and Mshope first met in unfriendly circumstances, then went to war against each other. The Njelu and Mshope won and thereafter had the land to themselves.

Then we analyze the early growth of the two kingdoms. To begin with, their numbers were small and the leading members within each kingdom were often independent-minded. As Ngoni military policies proved ever more successful and both kingdoms increased in size, new groupings emerged with greater powers under the somewhat loose tutelage of royal families. In the 1870s there arose the Hehe

---

(1) It is now known as Lake Malawi.

challenge. The Mshope bore the first brunt of contact, though the Njelu were quickly dragged in as a result. Two wars followed, after which the Mshope kingdom underwent a traumatic succession crisis and the Njelu state relocated itself and began segmenting.

Next comes the period when the Ngoni establish an empire.

Both kingdoms acquired distinctive military reputations, large subject populations and considerable wealth. Political structures in both kingdoms became increasingly differentiated. Mshope developed as a very centralized state following its leader's successful destruction of internal political opposition. In Njelu the growth in population accentuated segmentation. More factions arose there as young leaders among the 'true Ngoni' - as the migrants called themselves - set to carve out their own spheres of influence. A succession crisis in 1889 brought severe conflict between two branches of the royal family. This remained unresolved throughout the 1890s, and the kingdom acquired two rival leaderships and some very independent leaders at lower levels. First coastal peoples and then the Germans arrived during these years and found various niches in the complex and badly integrated political structure in Njelu. Then a German military force entered the kingdoms and received unexpectedly easy submission.

Chapter Four studies the decline of Ngoni power. The Germans introduced many changes in Ungoni, including the ending of military activity and the restructuring of administrative lines of authority. The 'true Ngoni' in both kingdoms were severely affected by these, though for many Ngoni subjects - the so-called 'sutu' - limited change took place. In the midst of decline, Njelu underwent another succession crisis, which kept the royal family as divided as ever.

Then came Maji Maji with its promise of a return to pre-German conditions. The Mshope leaders, still under the strict control of

their pre-1897 chief, Chabruma, entered wholeheartedly into rebellion. A disunited Njelu was unable to resolve differences among the leadership and a number of 'true Ngoni' abstained from rebellion. The 'sutu' were forced into rebellion by those of their leaders who participated. The rebellion was crushed, and the leaders and people were severely punished.

Chapter Six studies the beginning of a new and very different period in Ngoni political history: the replacement of the military basis of 'true Ngoni' control by an administrative one. The leaders who had not participated in Maji Maji now assumed control over the kingdoms. After World War One, the British took over as the colonial power. They decided first to retain the existing leadership, then actively to support it. The leaders reacted favourably to this policy and began reasserting authority over subject groups the Germans had removed from their control. There were odd byproducts. In Mshope, the Palangu branch of the Tawete family, kept under control by Chabruma since the 1880s, now rose to a position of considerable power.

With the advent of the policy of Indirect Rule, the royal families in both kingdoms reached an apex in their administrative control over Ngoni society. The Ndendeule(1) of Likuyu, independent since 1897, came under Ngoni control once again. The Njelu kingdom made gains in new areas. When the British sought to modify Indirect Rule, the leaders resisted unwelcome changes and gradually stopped their implementation. Internal feuding in Mshope reached new heights as the Palangu and Chabruma branches of the Tawete clan quarrel in 1925-6, 1930-1 and 1938. In Njelu, the leaders appointed

---

(1) This spelling will be used in preference to the Ndendeuli one favoured by Gulliver because it appears to be the more commonly used one.

after Maji Maji consolidated their control. Various 'sutu' groups dissented from time to time, though without much success.

After the Second World War, the British colonial government sought to introduce far-reaching political and economic changes, only to be met by frustration. Succession crises occurred in both kingdoms, ensuring years of sustained local political activity. In Njelu, in 1941 and again in 1949-50, non-ruling branches of the royal family bid for power using new criteria of colonial interference, administrative competence, seniority and education to advance their causes. Widespread resistance to colonial administration brought victory for supposedly unpopular rulers as far as the British were concerned. In Mshope, a 1952 succession was contested by the Palangu and Chabruma families amidst a powerful bid by the Ndendeule to secede. The Chabruma faction won, and the Palangu group allied with the Ndendeule who thus achieved their aim.

Since the mid-1950s political life in the district has been very complex. During the 1950s, Ngoni leaders resisted encroachment of their lands by former subjects, while they passed the last years of colonial rule in general opposition to colonialism. The movement for territorial independence, spearheaded by the Tanganyika African National Union, first received a favourable response from Ngoni leaders who hoped for increased powers as a result. But this hope was ultimately frustrated when chiefly rule was abolished after territorial independence bringing the end of royal family rule among the Ngoni. The Ngoni population now began adapting to political life as Tanzanians rather than Ngoni.

These, then, are the main emphases of this study. It will be noticed that the more recent years are covered more fully by

the evidence gathered during research than are the earlier ones, but in order to sustain balanced argument as well as to satisfy the restrictions on word length imposed by a doctoral dissertation, these later years are covered more briefly than the evidence warrants. The interest of this thesis is thus not only the intrinsic one of examining intricate political transformations but also an empirical one. It is a contribution to recent Tanzanian history at the district level, offering what I believe to be a more accurate and detailed interpretation of Ngoni history than are existing ones, as well as clearing up some anomalies in published data dealing with the Ngoni. It also shows that reaction to colonial rule is a more complex matter than romantics of either the colonial persuasion or the nationalist one normally allow. Finally, it sheds further light on some of the results in Tanzania of one of the most crucial developments in nineteenth century Bantu Africa, the Mfekane.

#### The Sources.

The sources used in this thesis fall into three general categories: oral, unpublished and published.

The collection of oral materials has, unfortunately, been a very minor aspect of my research. The main reason for this was a government rejection of my application to visit Songea, the area under research. Songea, in Ruvuma Region, borders both Mozambique and Malawi and, at the present time, has considerable strategic military significance for Tanzania. Because of this, the Government of Tanzania, a few years ago, restricted general travel in Ruvuma and its two neighbouring regions. Then, in 1970, it restricted entry for the purposes of research. When I arrived in Tanzania in 1969, the government attitude towards field research in Songea was

still undecided. I had hoped, as a citizen of a friendly government, to be given permission to visit at least Peramiho, the large Roman Catholic headquarters in the district. But this proved to be impossible. Clearance for field research was not given, and my research was restricted almost exclusively to Dar es Salaam. There I was able to conduct very few interviews as the rejection of research clearance severely hampered the contacting of possible informants even in Dar es Salaam.

Some collecting of traditions and oral evidence was done outside Tanzania. In Britain, through the kind assistance of D.B.Dudbridge, I established contact with a number of individuals who had once served as British colonial officials in Songea. These men included Messrs. A.H.Pike, G.T.Scott, A.S.Stenhouse, G.Guise-Williams and D.C.Hill. They were an extremely interesting and helpful group of men who provided me with considerable data on aspects of their administrations and on general life in Songea from the late 1920s until the late 1950s. I also met, independently, Mr. Ralph Ibbott, the British adviser to the Ruvuma Development Association from late 1962 until 1969. He provided some extremely valuable information on the workings of Tanzania's most fascinating ujamaa project. In Germany, I had the opportunity to meet and interview Fr.Elzear Ebner, a remarkable missionary, forty-one years resident in Songea, who has known and collected historical information from many of the leading Ngoni of the past forty years. More is said about Ebner below and it is safe to say that were it not for the materials he collected and for his constant, willing assistance, both made available to me, this thesis would not have been possible.

Although I was restricted in collecting oral traditions and evidence in Tanzania, I nonetheless was most fortunate



in having at my disposal the extremely rich and varied body of oral traditions collected by Ebner, by various students at the University of Dar es Salaam, by students from the Peramiho Secondary School, and also by sundry other individuals.

Elzear Ebner's collections were undoubtedly the most valuable of all these sources. In 1959, Ebner published a History of the Wangoni. The materials contained in this history comprised the single most important source of materials available to the writer. It contains exhaustive details on most known major events in the nineteenth century history of the Ngoni, based on traditions collected by Ebner since 1930. It follows a thematic approach in having sections which cover most major events in known Ngoni history. Ebner did not attempt a political analysis of the data as a whole, though he did offer explanations for many isolated events. In 1968, he completed a revision of this history in which he modified some explanations given in 1959. An example of this was the omitting of the age of Hawaii, the ruler of Njelu from around 1864 until the early 1870s, upon his ascension to the chief<sup>tan</sup>ship. He appears to have doubted the information given by an informant. A copy of this revised work has been deposited at the Benedictine archives at St.Ottilien. Because he lacks the time to prepare the work, Ebner does not intend to publish this edition. In addition to the History, he has assembled a mass of data<sup>on</sup> the social and cultural life of the Ngoni. These have been written up as two unpublished volumes entitled: Texts in New-Kingoni with Translation: (vol.) 1. Narratives, Fables, Riddles, Proverbs, and (vol.) 2. Manners and Customs in the Land of the Ngoni. Copies of both volumes are deposited at the Benedictine archives at St.Ottilien. The above materials

provided the most important sources of data on nineteenth century life among the Ngoni. Finally, whenever I had queries on details of Ngoni history and sought information from Ebner, who still lives in Songea, he interviewed former Ngoni leaders and informed me of their opinions.

Something should be said here about the data collected by Ebner. His works can be considered primary data almost entirely in that they involve a selection rather than an interpretation of the materials collected by the author. Ebner selected those materials which he was able to verify through having had them received by two or more independent sources or which correlated with published materials he read. Those instances where data on the Ngoni has been interpreted, as, for example, the migration of the Mshope Ngoni, are considered and treated as secondary materials. They are limited in number. As regards use of primary data, I have been able to check many of Ebner's traditions with independent written sources, and have thus been able to work out suitable controls for his data as a whole.

Less important to my research than the works by Ebner have been the materials collected by students. These have tended to be of varying quality and value. That collected by students of the history society at Peramiho Secondary School and published in the society's journal, Our Past, have proved of little relevance. Most of the traditions published relate to aspects of Matengo and Nyasa history, while those dealing with the Ngoni add little that is not known. The man behind much of this student research is Lambert Doerr, another German missionary. He was the first to recommend to me the many possibilities of a study on relations

between the Ngoni migrants and their subject peoples. The materials collected by the students at the University of Dar es Salaam proved to be of much greater value. They provided information on two important periods in Ngoni history: the Maji Maji rebellion and relations between the Ndendeule and Ngoni between 1945 and 1968. The materials on Maji Maji were collected as part of a university project to prepare a complete study of that rebellion. Copies of these materials are available from the university library. Two of the students involved in the project, O.B. Mapunda and G.P. Mpangara, analyzed the materials relevant to Ungoni and, in 1969, published this analysis as The Maji Maji War in Ungoni. A study of relations between the Ndendeule and the Ngoni was made by J.B.M. Nwa, as partial fulfillment of his B.A. degree requirements. Nwa supported the Ndendeule and wrote a polemical report on the Ndendeule separation from the Ngoni and subsequent participation in TANU. Nonetheless, it is an extremely useful document and provided considerable data on events for which little information has been available elsewhere.

The other contributions to oral information utilized further the histories collected by colonial officials. The most important was the history of the Ngoni written by Dominikus Missoro Mbonani Tawete in the 1930s, a copy of which he gave to B.J. Dudbridge, who later deposited it at Rhodes House. Missoro was leader of the Mshope Ngoni kingdom and his history reflected the views of his people in their relations with the Njelu and with various subject peoples within and neighbouring the Mshope kingdom. His detailed history provides an excellent complement to the work by Ebner. A second, very interesting group of traditions, collected by the same official

were an autobiography and a biography of Palangu Tawete, a very important leader in Mshope from around 1880 until the late 1930s. The biography was written by Palangu's arch-rival Dominikus Mis<sup>s</sup>oro Mbonani Tawete. The contrasting versions give a useful insight into the rivalries within the Mshope royal family. Finally, a history was collected from two Ndendeule Jumbes which offers valuable information on Mshope in the 1880s and 1890s.

The principal sources of unpublished written materials were the Tanzania National Archives, the East Africana section of the library of the University of Dar<sup>e</sup>s Salaam, the Potsdam archives, the Public Records Office, the mission archives of the Universities Mission to Central Africa (now <sup>part of</sup> the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel), the Benedictines of St. Ottilien and the Italian Cons<sup>u</sup>lata Fathers, ~~X~~ and Rhodes House.

Of these sources, the Tanzania National Archives were undoubtedly the most useful. They contained an unexpected, though most welcome, mountain of data on Songea district. In the course of a year in Dar es Salaam, I looked through an estimated two hundred linear feet of material. A considerable amount of this was of little or no value. Still, that which was useful has become the basis of my analysis of Ngoni history during the present century. The materials read come under four categories: German, District, Provincial and Secretariat.

The materials in the German files were few in number and limited in value. Some twenty files had material of relevance to Songea, though only nine of these contained anyway useful information. Relevant data comprised: 1905 district statistics and notes on development; settler schemes for the district; lists of traders 1905-8; details of the economic loss to

traders caused by the Maji Maji rebellion; 1908 annual report; and isolated information on mission activity. In all, they provide some insight into German rule but leave a considerable amount unexplained.

The materials contained in the Songea district files were of much greater use. For one thing, these were much more voluminous: some 207 files plus various records and books. Among the most useful data was that contained in the oft-denigrated District Books. Of major interest were the varied comments on Indirect Rule. Many parts of these books appear to have been written in 1925, when Indirect Rule was being implemented, and many parts in the late 1930s, when the Ngoni Federation broke up. So, in one instance, they showed the colonial impression of the faults and the good sides of the men who were to assume power among the Ngoni and, in the other, they give much information on why the government failed in its attempts to evade the implications of Indirect Rule through the Federation. In addition, they had interesting material on internal trade, the trade conducted by the missions, government facilities and the extent of government involvement in the district. The files themselves contained scraps of information on practically every aspect of colonial rule in Songea between 1926 and 1955. In many instances, information was inadequate or incomplete. But, at other times, some highly useful data were collected. These included: early 1930s monthly reports; Palangu-Chabruma conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s; succession troubles of 1949-54; various annual reports; handing-over-the-district notes; Native Treasury annual estimates and budgets; 1940s agricultural reports; the rise of TANU in Songea district; union development; development of tobacco, wheat and coffee as cash crops;

schools in the 1920s and 1950s; mission conflict; reports on exploration for minerals. In all, they were helpful for the entire period between 1926 and 1955, but particularly useful for the 1926-39 period.

The Provincial files were of limited value. Some forty-seven that appeared to have materials dealing with Songea were reviewed. In the event, most contained nothing of value. References which were found to be useful included data relating to: the abolition of the Ngoni Federation; district handing-over-notes; the Mchapi benevolent witchcraft movement of 1933; labour; agriculture, with particular reference to tobacco production; missions and schools. They supplemented district materials covering the 1926-55 period, though only when dealing with tobacco and schools are they of considerable value.

The Secretariat files fall into two categories: the Early Series, containing the four-digit files covering the period from 1919 until 1926, and the remainder, the five-digit files. The Early Series, which I saw through the kind assistance of Mr. Karugila, contained the extremely useful annual reports from Songea district. Because these annual reports came direct from the district, <sup>rather</sup> than through provincial authorities who summarized them, as after 1926, they are considerably more detailed than annual reports of later years. Furthermore, being the records of the first years of British administration, when much had to be learnt of the country, they tended to be far more comprehensive than those of later years. They are the main source of data for Ngoni history from 1919 until 1926. The files covering the years after 1926 are not too useful. I looked at some fifty-three files whose titles suggested that they might have materials on Songea, but found

limited data on only a few subjects. These were: settler land alienation; a 1927 economic report; taxation; tobacco, wheat, and a 1943 report on cash crops; labour and mission conflict. The data on the missions and on agriculture were the most useful.

In all the Tanzania National Archives provided considerable thesis material for the 1897-1959 period, with particularly valuable data for the years 1919-1939.

The German colonial archives at Potsdam in the German Democratic Republic have not been visited. I applied to use the archives but was turned down for political reasons. The government of the German Democratic Republic feels that the attitude of the Canadian government towards it is unfriendly and until Canada "ceases opposing membership of the German Democratic Republic in international cultural and scientific organizations, the German Democratic Republic will not offer reciprocal conditions".(1) Disappointing as this is, however, it should have little effect on the thesis for it appears that these archives contain few materials on Songea. A fellow researcher, Mr. Lorne Larson, who has been there, informs me that there is a Songea file which contains only one safari report of 1904 and this has been published and read. In other files, there is some data on taxation and various tour reports but this also appears to be largely available in published form. There is some data of territorial importance on events such as the Maji Maji rebellion. Fortunately, a third researcher, G.C.K. Gwassa, who has also been at Potsdam, has microfilms of this material and has kindly permitted me to see these. As Mr. Gwassa is writing a thesis on Maji Maji, it is to be expected that he has seen all the material available on Songea until 1905 at least. Accordingly, I am confident that my failure to visit Potsdam will be of minimal adverse effect on my thesis.

At the Public Records Office, the records of the War Office and Colonial Office were consulted. In the War Office records, the diaries of

---

(1) Ministry of Interior, DDR to Redmond, 85/55/07Rst of 10.5.1972.

Brigadier-General E. Northey were looked at. The materials in the Colonial Office were only briefly consulted, after it was decided that territorial correspondence of the type available there contained very little information on districts. One important series of materials, noticed by a fellow researcher, Lorne Larson, were noted. These answered the Secret Circular MP 024/14 of 1919, regarding the collecting of information on the position of natives under German rule. It contained a number of documents on the position of people in Songea during German rule. This source, moreover, notes that "no German records of any value are in existence here (Songea)"(1), suggesting that the few available records at the Tanzania National Archives and believed to exist in Potsdam may, in fact, be all the German government records on the district to be found anywhere.

The archival materials at the University of Dar es Salaam were very helpful. They comprised: the papers of P.H. Gulliver and other data in the Cory collection; newspapers, particularly of the German period; government reports, circulars and other documents; and university research papers. Of the holdings in the Cory collection, the works by Gulliver were the most important. Chief among these is his above cited Administrative Survey. In this work, Gulliver studied aspects of Ngoni political history as late as the 1950s, analyzed recent Ndendeule nationalism, gave valuable details on each Ndunate, or administrative unit, in the two kingdoms, then studied the political life and economic development of the Ngoni and Ndendeule. The facts he presents are most useful; his analysis, as suggested earlier, is less satisfactory. Gulliver conducted research in Songea during 1952 and 1953, immediately after ✓

---

(1) PRO/CO/691/29, 8917, DFO to Secretary, 21.2.1919.



the succession crisis in Njelu kingdom had been resolved and during the height of the Mshope kingdom's succession dispute. As part of an administration determined to push political change and economic development from above, he was highly critical of the Ngoni, yet sympathetic towards the Ndendeule; the principal reason presumably being that the former were rejecting government policies while the latter were more receptive. Tanzanian government, and other, documents in the library were also most useful, particularly for a study of developments during the past decade.

Mission archives varied in the importance of their holdings. The Benedictine archives at St.Ottilien had few materials on Songea. The archivist informed me that there were few unpublished materials relevant to Songea. Some district materials were lost during the Maji Maji rebellion, others during the First World War and, apparently, some may have been destroyed during the Second World War.(1) The archives at Peramiho appear to contain a good amount of data. Some of this was made available to me by John Iliffe, who spent some time at these archives. The mission materials were useful for information on the 1897-1916 period.

Kwiro mission at Mahenge, now run by the Swiss Capuchin Fathers had, before 1916, been a Benedictine mission. A considerable amount of information on the years of Benedictine administration remain there. Some of this is relevant to

---

(1) Franz Szczypior, "Die Sozialwirtschaft von St.Ottilien für auswärtige Missionen in apostolischen Vikariat Daresalam, seit der Gründung daselbst bis zur Ausweisung durch die Engländer, 1888 bis 1920", (Julius-Maximilians U., 1923), pp.36-7 states that a number of records from Songea were lost during the First World War; Lorne Larson, who also worked at the archives at St.Ottilien, found very little on Songea. I am grateful to Larson for showing me his copy of Szczypior's work.

Songea. The archives at Mahenge were recently researched and catalogued by Larson, who kindly showed me all those files which were of relevance to Songea. These included: the 1912 and 1916 letters of Emil Blohm, a planter-trader in Songea during these years; select issues of Rafiki Yangu and Ostafrikanische Zeitung; <sup>various issues of The Peramiho and Kigonsera Chronicles;</sup> and a few letters on mission activity. The Blohm files, which give a valuable insight into the thinking of a third party actively involved in the colonial experiment in Songea from 1911 until 1916, were particularly useful.

A final mission archive consulted was that of the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA, now part of USPG) in London. The UMCA had been in southern East Africa and by Lake Nyasa from the 1870s onwards, and its missionaries had had regular contact with the Ngoni between the 1870s and 1897. The many reports they wrote on Ngoni raids and on the Njelu kingdom, known through visits there in 1882, 1886, 1887 and later, proved particularly valuable in complementing Ebner's work and in supplying insights he was unable to obtain in the traditions he collected. Of the missionaries who wrote on the Ngoni, three - W.P. Johnson, W.C. Porter and C. Maples - provided consistently valuable information.

Rhodes House, Oxford, houses a collection of records of colonial officials. the records relevant to Songea were looked at. They, few in number, provided information on: D.M. Mtawete's valuable History of the Wangoni, referred to above, a few reports, financial statements and other data on the district from 1926 onwards.

Three other archives and collections were consulted. One was that of the Royal Commonwealth Society, which possesses many documents and magazines on German East Africa which cannot be

found elsewhere. Another was the archives of the Tanganyika (now Tanzania) African National Union in Dar es Salaam from which, through the kind assistance of John Iliffe, a "history of TANU in Songea", written in 1964, was obtained. This history is in actuality a response to a questionnaire on aspects of TANU's district history. Its value is limited as it tends to concentrate on Ndendeule participation and general government reaction - possibly because those completing the questionnaire were Ndendeule, or because that was where the action was. The third collection consulted was that of O. Guise-Williams. This contained: district notes; safari diaries, various economic data, and a few brief histories.

The third main category of sources consisted of published materials. Four distinct types of data can be delineated. They follow a chronological pattern: pre-1894, 1894-1916, 1916-1950 and 1950 onwards.

The works published prior to 1894 were reports by people who had contact of sorts with the Ngoni. They include the works of general travellers and missionaries, such as David Livingstone, Joseph Thomson and William Beardall, and of the missionaries of the Universities Mission to Central Africa, such as W.P. Johnson. (1) Johnson's works are perhaps the most valuable in the quantity and quality of information provided on the Ngoni in the late nineteenth century.

After 1894 came the reports and works of German visitors, scholars, missionaries and government officials. The Germans tended to be highly thorough in seeking out information and the many works they published proved to be extremely valuable. They contain the earliest collections of oral traditions

---

(1) The titles of their works and the works of authors mentioned below can be found in the bibliography.

evidence along with considerable information on contemporary political, economic and social life in the two kingdoms. The major sources include Tom<sup>von</sup> Prince, G. Lieder, Lt.von Behr, Paul Tüchs, Alfons Adams, Friedrich Fülleborn, Graf von Gotzen and the Englishman John Booth, while minor sources include Walter Busse, H.a.d.Richter, Simon Trossman and Johannes Häfliger. These works are the main source of information on the history of the Ngoni between 1894 and 1916.

From 1916 until 1950 very little was published on the Ngoni. What was published tended to comprise short articles in Tanganyika Notes and Records, on matters such as utani relations and Ngoni raids during the nineteenth century. Authors included Eberhard Spies, R.deZ.Hall, G.W.Hatchell, R.E.Moreau, Meinulf Kusters and A.S.Stenhouse. Their publications supplemented archival material and occasionally offered some useful information on issues not covered elsewhere. While research on the Songea Ngoni languished during these years, that on the Ngoni in Malawi was flourishing in works by Read and Chibambo.

In 1954, the date of Gulliver's first work on the Ngoni, began the fourth and most productive period of research on the Ngoni. Gulliver completed two very useful works that year and another in 1955. This was followed in 1959 by Ebner's seminal History of the Wangoni and James J.Komba's interesting God and Man, a study of Ngoni religion. Since independence, research has been undertaken with a renewed vigour and among interesting and informative works to come out recently are a religious study by Cosmas Haule, a cultural study by Hans Stirnimann, and works on Maji Maji by John Iliffe, Igor Kozak, O.B.Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara.

Though considerable, it must be admitted that these sources are not exhaustive. For the reasons which have been explained, I have neither been able to work in the field nor to visit the archives at Potsdam. However, enough material has been collected to challenge existing interpretations of Ngoni politics during the past hundred years and to suggest some plausible alternative ones.

## Chapter 1

## The Migrants and Their State

## I

The Mfekane, or the wars and disturbances which accompanied the rise of Shaka's Zulu state(1) in the early nineteenth century, revolutionized many societies in Bantu Africa. Besides radically changing the lives of Nguni and other peoples of southern Africa, it changed those of many others in Central and East Africa, as those more northerly lands were devastated by groups fleeing from Shaka's grasp. This thesis is a study of two migrant groups, the Maseko and the Njelu-Mshope, and the state they established east of Lake Nyasa.

All the migrant societies shared much in common. They had been formed from loosely-organized and fluid societies, each usually comprising a leading clan and various lineages from diverse clans which chose to affiliate with it. Segmentation and fission were common, as lineages became dissatisfied with one leader and moved off to join another.(2).

Heading each society or state was a chief, selected from a particular agnatic lineage within a leading clan. Usually he was called an inkosi. Various officials assisted him in ruling. One was an induna, usually a commoner of ability, loyalty and

---

(1) J.B.Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, (London, 1966), Longman, p.5.

(2) Paragraph based on N.J.vanWarmelo, A.W.Hoernle and I.Schapera in I.Schapera, ed., The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa, (Cape Town, 1953), Maskew Miller; A.T.Bryant, The Zulu People, (Pietermaritzburg, 1967), 2nd.ed., Shuter & Shooter, pp.460-1; J.A.Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society, (Manchester, 1967), 2nd.ed., Man.UP.

trustworthiness, who lived at the capital and acted as the inkosi's right-hand man. In addition to him, there was a tribal council, made up, as a rule, "of the Chief's private advisers, some of his more distant relatives, all sub-Chiefs and headmen of local divisions and portions of the tribe, and various influential commoners appointed because of their ability".(1) This council was the effective governing body of the society. A hierarchy of subordinates managed administration on a lower level.(2)

By the late eighteenth century, the structures of these societies appear to have been coming under increasing pressures. Omer-Cooper comments that by this time "the general conditions which favoured small-scale political organization and encouraged fissile multiplication had been reversed. Lack of space and the demands of more serious warfare dictated larger units and the process of aggregation began".(3) Increased warfare also changed aspects of social organization. The circumcision ceremonies, which helped to bind societies together, were replaced by the formation of age-regiments among the youth. The regiments, formed every few years, were seconded to royal homesteads. Though regiments were not active throughout the year, most states now had a stable and effective military-force.(4)

Using improved military techniques, a few states were already rising to positions of considerable importance within Nguni society by the early nineteenth century. By the 1820s, the Zulu section of one of these states was acquiring mastery throughout south-east

---

(1) Schapera, op cit, p.182.

(2) For further details see Hoernle and Schapera in Schapera, op cit.

(3) Omer-Cooper, op cit, pp.26-7.

(4) Ibid., p.28.

Southern Africa, and the powerful Zulu empire was being born.

The Zulu state rose through the mastery of its inkosi, Shaka, a reckless, though masterful, warrior who radically altered the fighting techniques of his followers and, as result, crushed all opposition.(1) These techniques, later adopted by the societies under study, included making the regiments permanent, rather than part-time, fighting forces, modifying weapons, for example by shortening the throwing-spear into a stabbing spear called an assegai, and changing the frontal style of attack into a cow-horn one.(2)

As the more successful military states expanded, many small groups living in their vicinity were faced with the choice of fighting or fleeing. Among those to flee were the people of the Maseko clan, who left with a neighbouring people, the Msane, who had fought against, and been defeated by, Shaka. Another 'state' which preferred fighting to fleeing was the Ndandwe, a powerful people which sought to challenge Shaka's control. When it in turn was defeated, however, one of its sections, led by the Jere(3) clan, did flee. Aspects of the subsequent history of these peoples form the basis of this study: two of them eventually ended up east of Lake Nyasa.

During the migrations, each people led the life of the despoiler, moving in on one people after another, capturing individuals and

- 
- (1) Shaka's rise to power has been written about by many authors, eg. Omer-Cooper, op cit, ch.II, so will not be dealt with here.  
 (2) Ibid., pp.29-33; Bryant, op cit, pp.504-7.  
 (3) Y.M.Chibambo, My Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1942), USCL, p.13; J.B.Lancaster, "Tentative chronology of the Ngoni", JRAnthS, v.Lxii, (1937), pp.77-90; E.Ebner, History of the Wangoni: Revised Edition, (1968), typescript, SOA, p.13.



plundering the wealth of the land before deciding to move on again. These predatory migrants, while retaining many aspects of their southern African social organization, such as a centralized political structure, the age-regiments and the military system they had acquired from the Zulu, made some modifications in answer to the demands of constant movement. Barnes, who has studied the Jere migration(1), identifies three such changes. First, the men in military regiments lived with the rest of the population rather than separately, presumably for convenience and improved defence. Secondly, captives were integrated as individuals rather than as groups. Thirdly, the traditional tendencies to segmentation and fission that had led to the very formation of the two migrant groups with which we are principally concerned, were controlled. There were at least two reasons for this. One was self-preservation. The two migrant groups appear to have been quite small at the beginning: the Jere numbering about a thousand according to Barnes(2), and the Maseko probably still fewer, and unity helped ensure the successful conquest of enemies. A second reason was the power of the leadership. An effective, strong-willed leader retained pride in his own rule and punished attempts to discard it. Once self-preservation on the long march northwards was no longer a problem and no strong-willed leader was in control, segmentation and fission quickly reappeared.

In addition to the changes demanded by the life-style of a migrant society, there were changes associated with ethnic integration. The most important of these changes resulted from the constant assimilation of captives. In the military sphere, non-Nguni adherents

---

(1) Barnes, op cit, pp.6-7.

(2) Ibid.

who proved themselves to be successful warriors rose to positions of leadership. One of the most important examples of such warriors among the people under study was the Kalanga captive, Songea Mbano, who was to become the single, most-renowned leader east of Lake Nyasa in the late nineteenth century.(1) However, the process of devolving authority appears to have remained largely restricted to the military sphere, apparently because captives accepted the restricted royal clan basis of rule. Newcomers were able to exert considerable pressure in the political sphere as they themselves acquired influence within the society. For instance, at a late stage in the Jere migration, the society's leaders heeded the warnings of recently captured Chewa religious leaders to punish another segment of the assimilated population which was suspected of disloyalty.(2) Captives may also have modified certain Nguni political rules. For example, they appear to have modified Nguni succession laws among one section of the Jere. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Two. In the cultural sphere, it was the captives who apparently brought about the change of the very name Nguni to 'Ngoni', a change which seems to have been effected by the time the migrant societies reached the Zambezi River.(3) The modified name, Ngoni, is used henceforth as it is the one used by the people themselves.

Both the Maseko and the Jere moved in a north-easterly direction, following the coast into Portuguese East Africa.(4) The Jere settled

---

(1) Further details on his life are given in chapters 2 to 5.

(2) Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), Mission P., p.33; Chibambo, op cit, p.23.

(3) Ebner, Revised History, p.10 has comments on the change.

(4) Details of migration can be found in: Barnes, op cit, for the Jere and M.Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1970), 2nd.ed., Cass; see also Ebner, Revised History, pp.12-8.

behind Laurenço Marques and plundered the Thonga while the Maseko passed on to the Sabi River where they raided among the Ilozi. Within a short while, the Jere came into conflict with a third Nguni group, the Gaza, by whom they were defeated. They then moved north-west and plundered the lands of the Karanga. From there, they moved into the region of the Sabi River where they met and defeated the Maseko. In a second battle the Maseko defeated the Jere who then moved on to the Zambezi River which they crossed on 19 November, 1835.(1) Meanwhile, the Maseko moved to the Busi River where they plundered the Venda. There they met and fought the Gaza, who were also moving northwards. In defeat, the Maseko pushed north to the Zambezi, which they crossed at a point just below Tete, on a date estimated by one author as 1839.(2)

After crossing the Zambezi, the Maseko entered Kalumbi. By this time, their first inkosi, Ngwane, had died and been replaced by a brother who acted as Regent. This brother died in the land of the Kalumbi and was replaced by another brother. Under his leadership, the Maseko moved on into the land of the Ntumba, at the bottom of Lake Nyasa, where they settled and began plundering. While they were here, the chieftainship passed to Mputa, the son of Ngwane, who had now come of age.

Shortly after Mputa took over, the Maseko decided once again to move on.(3) They moved up the east side of Lake Nyasa, passing through the countries of the Yao(4) and Nyasa(5), many of whom they

- 
- (1) Date noted in A.T.Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, (London, 1929), p.463.
  - (2) Gerhard J.Liesegang, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im südlichen Mosambique, 1820-1895, PhD, Köln U., 1967, p.49.
  - (3) M.Read, "Native standards of living and African culture change...", Africa, v.11, (1938), n.3, supp., p.31 notes why they moved.
  - (4) Tom von Prince, "Geschichte der Magwangwara nach Erzählung des Arabers Rashid bin Masaud und des Fussi...", MadS, v.VII, (197), n.3, p.214.
  - (5) W.P.Johnson, Nyasa, The Great Water, (Oxford, 1922), OUP, pp.102-3.

captured and integrated, and around 1845(1), they reached the Ruvuma(2) River. On the other side lay the land, which we shall call southern East Africa, in which they decided to settle.

Meanwhile, the Jere Ngoni had crossed the Zambezi and moved into the land of the Senga, whom they subdued with little difficulty. After a four years long stay, they moved north-east into the land of the Chewa and captured many Chewa and Tumbuka. After leaving here, they journeyed north-west, following the borders of the Kamanga country, eventually reaching Ufipa, below Lake Tanganyika. At Ufipa, Zwangendaba, the great inkosi of the Jere died. The year of his death is given by some as 1845, by others as 1848.(3)

After Zwangendaba's death, the Jere Ngoni split up due to inability to agree on a successor. This inability was due to factors both particular to Jere society and general to Ngoni society. Three particular factors stand out. One was the pressure brought by the integration of so many peoples(4), a pressure which had shown itself on the march in the Chewa-Thonga troubles. A second was the power vacuum which Zwangendaba had left as no one group could overwhelm the many forces which Zwangendaba appears to have played against each other. A third was the complexity of this particular succession. Zwangendaba had chosen a certain Loziwawa to be his 'Great wife' and she bore him a heir named Mpezini. But Zwangendaba once found cause to suspect her of treason and disowned the heir though, according to some traditions he later restored the heir. During the period of

---


(1) Ebner, History, pp.61-3 has 1844.

(2) Ruvuma is the current spelling and is used henceforth.

(3) Chibambo, op cit, p.25 has 1848; Barnes, op cit, p.16 prefers 1845.

(4) Barnes, op cit, p.87.


NGONI MIGRATIONS INTO SOUTHERN  
EAST AFRICA, ACCORDING TO READ



SEE NEXT  
MAP,  
REVISED  
SECTION OF  
ROUTE

SOURCE. M. READ THE NGONI  
OF NYASALAND,  
(LONDON, 1970) 2nd ed  
GASS, p 207





REVISED MAP OF APPROXIMATE ROUTES OF NGONI MIGRATIONS INTO

## Southern East Africa

0 100 200 300  
MILES

— ROUTE OF  
NJELU AND  
MSHOPE NGONI  
- - - ROUTE OF  
MASEKO NGONI

disgrace, a second 'Great wife', Munene nzima, was appointed and bore another heir, Mbelwa(1). When Zwangendaba died, apparently without having resolved in his own mind whether he preferred Mpezini or Mbelwa to succeed him, the Mpezini faction refused to recognize the Mbelwa one and vice versa.(2)

The more general factors producing fission in Jere society arose from the very nature of Ngoni society. Ngoni society had been a continually segmenting one prior to the rise of militarism in the late eighteenth century when segmentation was restricted for a time. Its capacity for expression remained, however, and as the Jere state expanded and its constituent lineage segments increased in number and power, it reasserted itself as pressures to separate became proportionately stronger.(3) Consequently, when one segment became unable to live with another, as it did after Zwangendaba's death, fission became inevitable. Secondly, the custom of nominating a heir only late in the leader's life, to prevent usurpation, necessitated the appointment of interim leaders, or Regents,(4) who then could push the claims of their groups.

Ntabeni, a brother of Zwangendaba, became Regent after the latter's death. He recommended that Mpezini succeed, but the Mbelwa faction rejected this and nothing happened. When Ntabeni died, his son, Ngodoyi, split off from the state and moved off northwards along the eastern side of Lake Tanganyika. Others tried to stop him but failed to. A second brother of Zwangendaba, called Mgayi, then

---

(1) Also spelt Mwambara.

(2) Chibambo, op cit, pp.26-9; Barnes, op cit, pp.19-23.

(3) Read, The Ngoni, pp.52-4 notes that the appointing of a Regent was integral to the Ngoni political system. It gave time for the selection committee to decide on the suitability and legitimacy of the heir.

(3) Barnes, op cit, p.12.

became Regent. When he died a few years later leaving the succession as unresolved as ever, the Mpezini and Mbelwa factions broke away from each other, the former going westwards, the latter towards the south-east.

Among the izinduna who had been with Zwangendaba during the migration was Zulu Gama, the eventual founder of the Njelu(1) Ngoni. He is described as a military adviser to Zwangendaba, to whom he became related through marriage,(2) while his clan is remembered as the one which found a suitable crossing point at the Zambezi River(3). He is further mentioned in connection with his eventual break from the Jere migrants.(4) A second of Zwangendaba's izinduna was Mbonani Tawete, the founder of the Mshope(5) Ngoni. He, unlike Zulu Gama, has received no mention from historians of the migration. This has led to some speculation on independent march and/or entry. Spiss in 1904, Cameron in 1925, and Ebner in 1959 have all mentioned it.(6) <sup>Sources and</sup> Their reasons, however, are dubious and, as all other authors who have written extensively on the Ngoni claim that Mbonani migrated with Zulu as part of the Jere Ngoni, the latter interpretation is followed here.

When the Jere Ngoni broke up following Zwangendaba's death, Zulu and Mbonani appear to have followed Mbelwa.(7) They became fairly important leaders within his state and, after a period of

- 
- (1) Njelu is the name of Zulu's father. Zulu's state was known by both his and his father's name.
  - (2) J.B.Lancaster, "Tentative chronology of the Ngoni", JRAnthS, v. lxii, (1937), p.80.
  - (3) Ebner, Revised History, p.15.
  - (4) Omer-Cooper, op cit, p.73; Barnes, op cit, pp.21-3.
  - (5) Mshope is the name of Mbonani's father. Both names were also used to identify his state.
  - (6) C.Spiss, "Kingoni und Kisutu", MSOS, 1904, p.2; Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and some Nigeria, (London, 1939), pp.59-60.
  - (7) Ebner, History, p.71; P.H.Gulliver, "A history of the Songea Ngoni", TNR, n.41, (1955), pp.19-20.



tension between them and the inkosi, Mbelwa, due possibly to the threat posed by their power, they split off and moved away on their own. Mbelwa sent an army against the dissidents, only to be defeated and forced to retreat.(1) Zulu and Mbonani then moved eastwards, crossing over Ukinga and Usafwa at the north end of Lake Nyasa and heading down into Upangwa.(2) Within a short while they were to come into contact with the Maseko Ngoni, who had by then settled to the south-east of them. x

## II

The lands east of Lake Nyasa and north of the Ruvuma into which the Maseko and Njelu-Mshope Ngoni had migrated have a widely varying physical environment. Topographically, these lands comprise four distinct zones. Beginning in the east is a coastal plain, mostly less than 300 feet above sea level, which continues ten to fifteen miles into the interior, except along the Ruvuma River, where it continues for about 100 miles. The coastal plain merges into a lowland plateau, some 650 to 1600 feet in height, which extends for another 100 to 250 miles inland. The third zone is a still higher plateau, of 1600 to 3000 feet, which stretches in part as far as Lake Nyasa. Where it does not, it is broken by the Livingstone, Matogoro, Matengo and other Mountains, which rise to well over 3000 feet.(3)

Natural vegetation varies from the thick evergreen bush and forest of the coast and the dense bush of the Makonde Plateau to

- 
- (1) Read, The Ngoni, p.71; Barnes, op cit, pp.19-22; Chibambo, op cit, p. 26-9.
  - (2) Ebner, History, pp.63,72-3, he gives one date of entry as 1856. J. Stirnimann in an interview (2.1970) suggested they bypassed Upangwa. All other sources state otherwise and are accepted.
  - (3) International Map of the World. Series 1301, sc-36 Songea, sc-37 Lindi.

the savanna grasslands of the far west, the north-west and parts of the south-east. Most of the region, however, is covered by a small bush and grassland mixture, commonly known as 'miombo'.(1)

Soil types vary, though a few types predominate. The most widespread soils are those of catenary associations, in which a red soil occurs in admixture with other types. The western third of the region contains soil of a red to non-calcareous sequence. The central third has red soil on Karroo sediments, giving predominantly grey, silty soils. The eastern third has red soil on undulating topography, giving sharp transition from red to black soils.(2) The red, often sandy, soils are difficult to cultivate with traditional implements. Crop yields vary considerably from year to year. The water retention rate within the soil is very low. Moreover, in some of these soil formations, fertiliser is of little use in raising crop production.(3) The exceptions to the generally poor soils are found in the highlands in the west and in the southern parts of the central and eastern areas.

An extensive network of rivers and streams covers most of the region, the exception being the central area. However, the river flow is seasonal for the most part and, during the dry season, from May to November, the water levels are low, if existent at all. These semi-arid conditions have affected settlement patterns, and concentrations of people have tended to occur where water is most easily available.

The wet season comes between December and May. Rainfall averages between thirty and fifty inches per annum, though wide variations

---

(1) E.W. Russell, The Natural Resources of East Africa, (Nairobi, 1962), maps.

(2) Tanganyika Atlas, soils, (1946).

(3) The Economic Development of Tanganyika, (Baltimore, 1961), John Hopkins P., IBRD, pp.18-9.

occur from year to year. The average amount of rainfall is above the minimum required for intensive arable cultivation(1), though there is also a high failure probability rate in the eastern parts of the region.(2)

These environmental conditions sustain several endemic diseases. The easternmost three-quarters of the region favour the tsetse fly, which spreads trypanosomiasis among cattle and sleeping sickness among men. The prevalence of tsetse restricts cattle-keeping to the western quarter and to small pockets of land in the south-east. This ecological fact was very important X to the cattle-minded Ngoni.


On the whole then, the region is a challenging, though reasonably favourable one. Three areas - the west, south-centre and south-east - enjoy good soil, rainfall and vegetation conditions. During the past two hundred years they have been the only areas of known permanent, intensive settlement. Of the three, the Ngoni were to select the finest for their settlement: the western one.

As regards existing clusters of population, there were probably three discernible north of the Ruvuma by 1800. The first was in the west, in the valleys of the Matogoro and other and mountains, branching out along the shores of the more permanent, smaller rivers that flow into the Ruvuma and Ruhuhu. A large population group, later called the Ndendeule, lived west of the Matogoro Mountains. To their south-east were a cluster later known as the Matengo, while to their north-west were the Pangwa. A few population clusters were scattered near rivers, for example,


---

(1) Russell, op cit, states this level is 30 in.p.a..

(2) W.A.Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa, (New York, 1964), map 72.



APPROXIMATE  
POPULATION GROUPS IN  
**Southern East Africa** 1800



- |             |          |              |
|-------------|----------|--------------|
| 1. PANGWA   | 5. MANDA | 8. MWERA     |
| 2. NGINDO   | 6. NYASA | 9. MAKONDE   |
| 3. NDEDEULE | 7. NINDI | 10. MATAMBWE |
| 4. MATENGO  |          |              |

the Ngindo were along the Luwegu, the Njalila were along the Njalila and the Nindi were along the Msanje.(1)

A second population cluster lived in the south-central part of the region. These were the Mwera and they inhabited many of the shores of the large tributary streams of the Ruvuma that cover this region.(2) Small groups of Mwera were apparently pushing eastwards around 1800.

The third cluster, that of the Makonde and related peoples, lived in the south-east. Adams suggests that by the early nineteenth century the Makonde had spread out from the Mbemkuru River to the Makonde Plateau and lands further south. The Makonde occupied most of the land north of the Ruvuma while the Matambwe, a related people, lived along the Ruvuma. Elsewhere, north of the Ruvuma, there were few inhabitants.

East of the lake and south of the Ruvuma lived four groups: the Mawia, a people related to the Makonde, lived in the east on and near the Mawia Plateau, the Makua and Yao lived in the central region, east of and along the Lugenda River, and the Nyasa lived along the lakeshore.

The peoples north of the Ruvuma who were the more affected by the Ngoni and are, consequently, of greater interest to us had an administrative organization around 1800 about which we know very little. Their political organization appears to have been clan-based(3), with some having religious leaders over wider groupings.(4)

---

(1) Ebner, History, and Gulliver, "A history" have further details.

(2) G.A.Adams, Lindi und sein Hinterland, (Berlin, 1902), pp.46-9.

(3) TDB, v.4 names many of these, albeit for a later period, eg.p.227 has Ndendeule ones; see also TNA/SDB, v.2, p.D.

(4) The Matengo, as will be shown below, had religious leaders by 1840.

Military organization was comparatively unsophisticated. Warfare appears to have taken the form of raiding and isolated fighting, and no effective military organization or structure appears to have developed. Economic life was based primarily on agriculture, though hunting, fishing and pastoralism were also practiced where conditions were favourable.(1)

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, various political and economic changes took place throughout the region, indicating that the region, though backward, was not in any sense static. One of the most important of these changes was a series of ethnic migrations into the region north of the Ruvuma. Here it is important to realize that the Ngoni were not to be the only immigrants to disrupt life in southern East Africa at this time. Both before and contemporaneous with the Ngoni entries were immigrations from three other areas: west and north of Lake Nyasa and south of the Ruvuma. The movement from west and north of the lake was the result of wars and dispersions, particularly those of the Jere Ngoni moving up from the Zambezi, of population expansion and famine, and of the desire to find better land for cattle-keeping, hunting and trading. Among those who entered from these areas were the Henga, Mwera, Sisya, Tumbuka, Sokile, Mapapyi, Bena and Nyakyusa.(2) The main immigrants from south of the Ruvuma were the Makua and the Yao. Both were part of larger complexes of peoples that themselves became involved in wars of conquest and in conflicts of trade during the 1820s and 1830s.(3) These struggles pushed large sections of both Yao and


---

(1) Further details on life in southern East Africa before 1850 are available in a separate paper written by the author.

(2) Gulliver, "A history", p.29; Ebner, History, p.93; TDB, v.4, p.223.


(3) E.A. Alpers, The Role of the Yao in the Development of Trade in East-Central Africa, 1698-1850, PhD, London U., 1965; Adams, op cit, p.48.





EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY IMMIGRATIONS INTO

## Southern East Africa



Makua north of the Ruvuma into the south-central and south-eastern parts of the region.

These immigrations had several effects. Politically they appear to have increased the pressures for group consolidation, while economically, they helped change patterns of livelihood.<sup>(1)</sup>

The complete picture in the early nineteenth century, then, was one of considerable flux among the peoples east of Lake Nyasa.<sup>(2)</sup> It was into this fluid world that the Ngoni entered around 1845, in search of cattle and other scarce resources. They were now to sweep the peoples of this region into a new world and to alter radically the lives of many others in East Central Africa.

### III

The exact details of the entry and rule of the Maseko Ngoni are difficult to establish as they were later expelled under difficult conditions which caused many of the events of their reign to be forgotten in oral traditions. Yet some attention must be paid to their rule, as they began the Ngoni presence in southern East Africa which was to last for a century. Moreover, their rule influenced events that happened long after their departure. The following analysis of the Maseko state is based on the few extant reminiscences of their years in southern East Africa and on deductions from their changing patterns of integrating the Nindi, subjugated in the 1840s, the Ndendeule, in the 1840s and 1850s, and the Njelu-Mshope, around 1858.

After crossing the Ruvuma, the Maseko moved through the settlements of the Nindi, whom they plundered and absorbed. No resistance is remembered as having been offered by this people.

---

(1) Further details, again, are available in an unpublished paper written by the author.

(2) Omer-Cooper, op cit, p.83 is incorrect in suggesting otherwise.



Those who could, fled, many of these going to the Matengo Mountains in their north-east. Before long, the Maseko pushed on to the area of the Matogoro Mountains where lived the Ndendeule. They decided to settle here and built a place they called Mngongoma, near the Hanga River.(1) From here they began to set up a new state.

The Ndendeule offered almost as little resistance as did the Nindi. The general picture of the invasion represented in subsequent traditions is one of shock and inability to react effectively. Indeed, traditions recall that the Ndendeule acquired their very name at this time, when their frequent, forlorn utterance of 'what are we to do?', in their language something akin to 'ndendeule', was applied to them by the conquerors.(2) Unable to resist effectively, many Ndendeule fled towards the east and north-east.

After the Mngongoma area had been pacified, the Maseko plundered the peoples of neighbouring regions. To the east, they raided among the Ngindo, forcing those who escaped further north and east. To the south-west they plundered the Matengo who, as a result, began withdrawing into the Matengo Mountains. To the west, they raided the Nyasa, Manda and other small population groups. By the late 1840s, the Ndendeule, Matengo, Nindi and other peoples of the lands bordering the eastern side of Lake Nyasa had experienced their first stage of political interaction with the Ngoni intruders.

- 
- (1) Ebner, History, pp.61-3; F.Fulleborn, Das Deutsche Njassa und Ruvuma Gebiet, (Berlin, 1906), p.133; Prince, op cit,p.214 called the settlement 'Ngongoma'.
- (2) Gulliver, "A history", p.29; Ebner, History, p.49 translates it as 'how should I do it?'.

They had been captured or dispersed(1) and had already seen considerable disruption of their existing life-styles.

A second stage of interaction now began. It started immediately after capture and involved integration into Maseko Ngoni society. At first, integration was mostly a passive reaction in which people were given new styles of life and forced to adopt them. In time, reaction became more active, as people saw advantages to the new life, and worked to benefit from them. The political, military and economic aspects of this integration can be noted here, though only briefly and sketchily.

The main change in the political sphere clearly concerned participation in the well-organized and centralist Maseko state. In the early years, captives appear to have joined the clans of the people who had seized them, or to whom they had been given after seizure. One example are the Matengo, who later followed the Maseko to the southern end of Lake Nyasa. As the state expanded, this pattern of particularistic assimilation appears to have changed. Soon the relatively small numbers of Maseko Ngoni apparently became unable to absorb further newcomers as before. Group

---

(1) Lieder, G., "Reise von Mbampa-Bai nach Kisswere am Indischen Ocean - nach dem Tagebuch des Geologen...", MadS, v.X, (1897), p.101 notes the dispersion eastwards of the Nindi, Gindó, Mvera and Ruanda.

assimilation then appears to have become the main method of integration. Examples of this kind of integration appear among the Ndendeule groups incorporated within the Maseko state. With the change in methods of integration, came a change in manner of political expression. Captives integrated as individuals could exert little influence in Ngoni society relative to their numbers. Those integrated as a group, however, had the chance to acquire some political power, if only in a consciousness of separate identity. This appears to have gradually become a serious problem in the Maseko state as groups schemed against existing political structures, as described below.

The integration into Ngoni military life was a second important aspect of the formation of the new Maseko state. Initially, captives were absorbed into the army in much the same way as they had been on the march. Young men were placed in age-regiments under an induna selected by the inkosi. There they were trained in Ngoni war methods, particularly in the use of weapons and in battle tactics. By the 1850s, however, these military methods appear to have undergone some change. Though age-regiments did remain, units within the army came increasingly to reflect the composition of the population, and it appears that there were various regiments comprising almost entirely subject peoples of one society or another. For example, when the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni were subjugated in the late 1850s, their military organization appears to have

remained intact. Again, an Mshope tradition mentions some Njalila subjects of Mputa who were undertaking military expeditions.(1) Thus, by the 1860s, subject groups had military units which were capable of building new states independent of the Maseko Ngoni one. Perhaps local captives appreciated the opportunity to develop militarily like their Ngoni masters.

The adoption of Ngoni economic life also appears to have brought many changes to traditional patterns. In agriculture, both distribution and organization were affected. Captives who formerly had worked in small, isolated and communal groups, now had to work in large ones, cultivating the fields of their masters, as well as tending to their own plots. Moreover, these plots came increasingly to be communally worked, as people abandoned small settlements to live in large communities. The pattern of large settlements may also have brought some modifications in traditional slash-and-burn methods of cultivation, though no information on this was found. Other economic activities underwent varying changes. Fishing probably declined in many areas, as those who lived by fishing either had to flee from easily accessible rivers or were captured and brought back to Mngongoma. Specialized economic activities probably declined, as local trade became increasingly hindered by Ngoni raids.(2)

---

(1) Tawete, op cit, section 30.

(2) Rangeley, op cit, p.13 notes that the Maseko stopped the Yao lake trade.

Cattle-keeping, as an economic activity, probably expanded, as captives came to know of and appreciate the Ngoni interest in cattle. For example, by the 1860s, some Nindi who had formerly not kept cattle, now owned and used them.(1)

Probably the most important economic impact of the Ngoni entry was the awareness it brought to local peoples of the importance, ease and value of plundering. During the years of Maseko Ngoni rule, the local peoples themselves benefited little from raids, as captured goods and people were almost exclusively the property of the leaders.(2) But undoubtedly, they came to appreciate the value of this activity, for when later some of them became independent again, they were quick to turn to plundering as a major economic activity.(3)

Through the regular influx of captives and goods acquired by plundering expeditions, the Maseko state was becoming successful and well-established by the 1850s. Its confident armies travelled ever further to seek spoils and greater glory.(4)

As it increased in size, the Ngoni state gradually became more complex. The political structure remained centralized. Mputa, the apparently talented and able

---

(1) Waller, op cit, pp.30,43,63.

(2) Though some did acquire some goods, as, for example, the Nindi noted in Waller, op cit, pp.30,43.

(3) Beardall, W., "Exploration of the Rufiji River under the orders of the Sultan of Zanzibar", PRGS, v.III, (1881), n.11, p.652 talked of Mawanda and Gangi who were in the habit of putting on Ngoni costume and harrying their neighbours.

(4) Prince, op cit, p.214 states they attacked Kondeland for cattle; They did not, however, attack Kilwa as Omer-Cooper states in Aftermath, p.75, for they had left southern East Africa by this time.

ruler from the early 1840s until about 1860, seems to have taken care of that. He restricted settlement to the area of the capital, removed rivals to himself, and, at least with the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, supported military rather than royal clan leadership at lower levels. But there were limits to centralism. For one thing, Mputa's policies did not always ensure his sole control. For example, restricting settlement patterns and controlling rivals appears to have been an important factor in permitting various subject groups to develop and consolidate separate identities and eventually to scheme against Maseko Ngoni rule itself. Had the various rivals to the inkosi been given more control over sections of the population, they would very probably, have been able to restrict the development of separate identities by subject groups.(1) The example of the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni in later years, described below in chapters two and three, brings this out clearly. A second limitation to the policy

of centralism was posed by the very expansion of the state. Growth fostered the rise of factions within Ngoni society and there appears to have been an increasing competition among groups within the ruling class as military leaders acquired more and more followers.

By the 1850s, it seems that the Maseko Ngoni society had factions among its leaders similar to those already described for the Jere Ngoni at the time of Zwangendaba's

---

(1) Chapter Two, sections two and three; Chapter Three, sections two and three.

death. There also appears to have been factions among the subject population. After Mputa's death, factionalism became a critical problem.

In all, by 1858 the Maseko Ngoni had gone a good way towards establishing their empire in southern East Africa. They had subdued most of the indigenous inhabitants in their region of settlement and were on their way towards turning these captives into 'new-Ngoni', of a lower order than themselves but espousing their values. They were also laying firm economic foundations to their state, particularly through increased plundering of wealthy neighbours. However, there were problems arising from state formation. Integration was becoming a process having variable success, and internal political life seemed bound for trouble after the death of Mputa, when a successor would have to be chosen. But these problems were, to some extent, only to be expected. Integration of peoples is often a difficult process, while Ngoni successions were frequently unnecessarily complicated affairs. Internal troubles could have been resolved granted the absence of other problems. But this was not to be. The Maseko Ngoni state was not to endure. Some fifteen years after the Maseko had crossed the Ruvuma, a second Ngoni migratory group, the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, whose migration has already been referred to, settled on the fringes of the expanding Maseko state. Soon they were to expel the Maseko.

## IV

Traditions describing the initial contact between the Maseko and the Njelu and Mshope vary. Some say that the Njelu and Mshope had come to join the Maseko, whom they had known at one time during the migration(1), while others say they did not know the Maseko(2). Whether contact came through accident or intent is of little importance. The Maseko Ngoni do not appear to have been interested in friendship for its own sake. In any case, Upangwa, where the Njelu and Mshope had settled, was becoming a profitable raiding area(3) and it is unlikely that they would have surrendered it to a newcomer out of charitable feeling. Traditions relate that Mputa first investigated the strength of the Njelu and Mshope and, finding that they were weaker than he, demanded that they should submit and accept his authority.(4) Having no feasible alternative, the newcomers did so.

After the Njelu and Mshope submitted, Mputa took steps to ensure their continued subordination to Maseko rule. He required them to transfer their settlement to Mngongoma, apparently so that they could be observed more closely and kept under control. However, proximity alone soon seemed an inadequate safeguard, as the compliance of the new group had preserved its corporate identity from destruction and made feasible a delayed struggle for power. So inkosi Mputa appears to have determined to prevent this by destroying the leadership.(5)

---

(1) Ebner, History, pp.75-6.

(2) John Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulu-kaffern (Wangoni) in Deutsch Ostafrika", Globus, lxxxviii, (1905), p.198; RH, s.585, Chief Mbonani (D.M.M.Tawete), Account of the Wangoni, Tanganyika, section 14. The author was inkosi of Mshope from 1926 to 1952.

(3) Prince, op cit, p.214 notes an attack on Kondeland.

(4) Ebner, History, pp.75-6; Tawete, op cit, sections 15-7.

(5) Tawete, op cit, section 18 notes that Mputa planned to exterminate them.



Accordingly, on three occasions, once a banquet, the second time a dance and the third, an isolated poisoning, Mputa succeeded in killing a number of the senior leaders and various warriors of Njelu and Mshope.(1) Their numbers included Zulu's only brother, Nganyane, and, apparently, the Mshope inkosi, Mbonani(2).

In fear for their lives, a number of the royal Gama family decided to flee from Mngongoma to west of Lake Nyasa. Their numbers included Gwaserapasi, Zulu's eldest son and the one who had succeeded to the inkoship following Zulu's death in or en route to Upangwa in the late 1850s(3), Zulu's other sons Mkuzo, Fusi, Mpofu and Mpofu's son, Mkulayedwa.(4) The sons of Zulu and Mbonani who remained near Mngongoma then went into seclusion. While the royal families remained in the background, Regents assumed the leadership. Chikuse, a leading military induna of the Njelu, took command of that section, while Mdongomani, and then Mandati, also leading military induna of their people, directed the Mshope.(5)

The disruptions among the leadership of the Njelu and Mshope affected all the Ngoni groups in southern East Africa. It assisted the Maseko by lessening any immediate internal threat posed by the Njelu and Mshope. It affected the Njelu by removing a large section of the Gama ruling family from contention for the inkoship for a

- 
- (1) These killings are described in detail in Ebner, History, p.77; Gulliver, "A history", p.20.
  - (2) Gulliver, "A history", p.20 and Tawete, op cit, section 21 state Mputa killed him though Prince, op cit, p.214 states he died independently.
  - (3) Booth, op cit, p.198 states he died in Usafwa; Ebner, History, pp.75-6 states he died in Upangwa.
  - (4) Prince, op cit, p.214; Ebner, History, p.77.
  - (5) Tawete, op cit, section 24 incorrectly claims Mdongomani led both groups.

while, a development which facilitated two successions but made later ones extremely complex. Moreover, it helped weaken the powers of the Gama family over some of the leading izinduna, such as Chikuse Nanguru and Songea Mbano. In Mshope, the killings appear to have weakened the hold of the ruling branch of the Tawete family over non-ruling branches. As these were all to show themselves later, they are discussed in detail then. Finally, the killings may have helped to reinforce the determination of the Njelu and Mshope to be free of the Maseko.

For a few years after the killings, the Njelu and Mshope participated quietly within the Maseko state according to various traditions, taking part in wars, ceremonies and other activities. However, they also studied Maseko techniques and learned their weaknesses.(1) These weaknesses seem to have manifested themselves most in the policies of assimilation and, based on their later actions, the Njelu and Mshope became aware of the varying degrees of assimilation among the subjugated peoples and, particularly, of the fact that some groups longed for separation from the Maseko. Accordingly, they appear to have talked of a military alliance between themselves and these dissatisfied subjects with the aim of overthrowing the Maseko.(2)

An opportunity for rebellion arose following an unsuccessful war waged by the Maseko against the Manda(3), around 1862 or 1863(4).

---

(1) Chibambo, op cit, p.31.

(2) Ebner, History, p.81; Tawete, op cit, section 12; TDB, v.4, p.213.

(3) Booth, op cit, p.198; Ebner, History, p.78; Tawete, op cit, sections 30-2 states merely that they fought the Nyasa.

(4) This date allows two to three years for the Maseko expulsion and the subsequent Nindi (Mazitu) migrations which Livingstone met in 1865 by the mid-Ruvuma.

The Njelu and Mshope had participated as a reserve force in operations against the Manda and when Mputa, fleeing from defeat, sought refuge in their camp, they killed him.(1) Despite such good fortune, they seem to have been unprepared to challenge the Maseko just then, for they told the Maseko that Mputa had died of natural causes and they participated in the general mourning. It may have been that the Njelu and Mshope only fully grasped the possibility of takeover at the time of the killing. Either way, they quietly took advantage of the situation. As the mourning went on, they prepared for war by reaffirming their alliance with subject groups such as the Ndendeule and by preparing their warriors.(2) When all was ready, they attacked Mngongoma and defeated the Maseko.

It remains unclear how the Njelu and Mshope were able to defeat the more powerful Maseko as Maseko traditions recall few events of this period, while those of the Njelu and Mshope merely note that they routed the enemy. However, three suggestions can be made in explaining the Maseko defeat. First, the Maseko may have been weakened by a troubled succession. Evidence for this comes from conflicting reports as to who succeeded(3) and from the fact that not all the Maseko fled together - some remained with the Njelu and Mshope while others allied with various subject groups then set out to build their own empires(4). Secondly, the defeat of the Maseko may have been due to surprise.

---

(1) Tawete, op cit, sections 30-3; Chibambo, op cit, p.32 states that the Njelu and Mshope did not receive cattle from the raid and were annoyed.

(2) Tawete, op cit, sections 36-8 has many details on the alliance.

(3) Read, The Ngoni, p.95 and Prince, op cit, p.214 state that Cidawonga was made Regent, while Booth, op cit, p.198 and Tawete, op cit, section 38 state Mputa's son succeeded. Cidyawonga's faction later opposed Mputa's son in a succession issue, see Read, The Ngoni, p.55.

(4) Fülleborn, op cit, p.135 states the Mbunga were led by one of Mputa's izinduna.

If later successions of the Maseko are any indication, then the mourning period was one when military units could prepare and march on the capital, without being suspect in any way, as part of the manifestations of grief.(1) Tawete suggests this occurred when writing that the Njelu and Mshope went on a military expedition to get cattle for the mourning then, in the course of raiding, prepared for war.(2) Thirdly, the Maseko may have been weakened by the defection of Ndendeule and other subjects who allied with the Njelu and Mshope. Weakness is suggested, though not really explained, in a Maseko tradition which states that when Cidyawonga was selected as Regent, the people said to him: "We are at war. You must help us".(3)

When defeated, the Maseko were driven from Mngongoma. They and their subjects split into a number of groups and moved away in different directions. The largest body, comprising most of the original Maseko immigrants, pushed southwards and crossed the Shire River at the southern end of Lake Nyasa. Traditions of the Njelu and Mshope state that they followed the fleeing Maseko as far as the Shire River before returning northwards again.(4) They stayed at Mngongoma for a while "to make sure that Mputa's power was completely destroyed"(5), then returned to their old home in Upangwa. They did this, according to Gulliver and Ebner, because they had only been interested in eliminating the oppressor and in allowing local peoples to regain their freedom, according to their earlier agreement.(6)

---

(1) Read, The Ngoni, p.55.

(2) Tawete, op cit, sections 34-6.

(3) Ibid., section 38; Read, The Ngoni, p.55.

(4) Booth, op cit, p.198; Ebner, History, p.81; Chibambo, op cit, p.32.



The leave-taking from the Mngongoma region, however, did not last long. The newly-released peoples, according to some traditions, were unable to live peaceably among themselves, but instead began fighting against each other for control over the now leaderless state. The Ndendeule, in particular, are pointed out as the culprits in these troubles. Some traditions go so far as to say that they used guns to achieve their aims(1), though this seems highly unlikely given the negative attitude of the Maseko towards guns(2) and the absence of any known trade between this area and the coast in the 1860s. It seems likely that the traditions are spurious or refer to later developments in the area. As groups such as the Ndonde, Manda and Njalila(3) despaired of the Ndendeule threat, they went to the Ngoni for help. Apparently willing to have more captives, the Ngoni moved down once again from Upangwa, this time to Seluka, by the Hanga River, whence they proceeded to reconquer the region.(4)

Though the Ndendeule were unable to replace the Maseko state by one of their own, their first major reaction to conquest was certainly an impressive one. They had become sufficiently proficient in military organization to become allies of the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni in overthrowing the Maseko and their failure to set up their

---

(5) p.48 Tawete, op cit, section 38.

(6) p.48 Ibid., section 38 states they stayed at Namkumula, later called Mangua; P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni of Songea District, 1954, UDSM, typescript, p.9; E.Ebner, Texte in Neu-Kingoni: (vol.1) Erzählungen, Fabeln, Rätsel, Sprichwörter, (1969), SOA, pp.59-61.

(1) TDE, v.4, p.218; Ebner, History, p.86; Tawete, op cit, section 38.

(2) Read, The Ngoni.

(3) Tawete, op cit, sections 38-46.

(4) Ibid.; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, pp.9-10.

own state may have been more the result of insufficient time to perfect the techniques of the Ngoni, than of lack of spirit or determination. Though the Ndendeule were unable to set up their own state, they were able, like other people, to take advantage of the disruptions of the time, either to improve their defences against the Ngoni or, more spectacularly, to move off to set up their own kingdoms in new lands.


The most notable example of groups who set up better defences was that of the Matengo and some Nindi. During the Maseko raids of the 1850s, many Matengo had begun leaving the more exposed valleys and hills of the Matengo Mountains to move into the isolated and defensible Litembo valley and hills. After the Maseko expulsion, a number of Nindi subjects of the Maseko, led by Makita Kayuni, left the Mngongoma region and moved into the Litembo valley where they allied with the Matengo. Within a few decades, the Nindi had been given political control over the Matengo-Nindi complex(1), a transfer of power which was to have considerable repercussions in and after the 1930s.

Those who moved away from the Mngongoma region to set up their own independent military states undertook what was to be the most successful imitative reaction to Ngoni contact by peoples east of Lake Nyasa for almost a hundred years. Three major groups(2) are known to have left the Mngongoma region during these years of disruptions. One led by the Nindi, possibly with Ndendeule admixture, appears to have set out when the Maseko pushed south. They were the dreaded 'Mazitu' whom David Livingstone encountered in his journey up the Ruvuma River in 1865.(3) They plundered everything in their

---


(1) TDB, v.4, p.221; Ebner, History, p.122.

(2) A fourth, Ndendeule, group is mentioned by Tawete, op cit, section 55, to have moved south of the Ruvuma.



APPROXIMATE ROUTES OF NDENDEULE AND NINDI  
MIGRATIONS, 1863-1868

## Southern East Africa



path and, when reaching the east, plundered the Yao, Makua and Makonde till they mobilized to expel them. Some then settled in impoverished communities along the Ruvuma while others pushed south of the Ruvuma where they continued plundering until they faced Ngoni expeditions.(1)

The second and third groups to leave the Mngongoma region were Ndendeule ones and it appears they only left after the wars against the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni fought for supremacy over the Mngongoma region. One group moved in a northeasterly direction, eventually settling in the Kilombero valley. There they became known as the Mbunga and, to this day, form a separate community in that region. They successfully made use of the military proficiency they acquired from the Ngoni to establish a state of their own from which they plundered neighbouring peoples.(2) The other group moved towards Kilwa and they, or the Mshope who pursued them, appear to have been the most likely group to have fought and defeated the Kilwa detachment of the army of the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1868.(3) They were unfortunate in the end, for the Mshope caught up with them, then fought and defeated them and brought many back to the Mngongoma region as captives.(4) The impact of their incursions in the Kilwa region was sufficiently powerful to have devastated an area of hundreds of square miles in the Kilwa hinterland and left it uninhabited for decades afterwards.(5)

- 
- (3) p.50 H.Waller, The Last Journals of David Livingstone in Central Africa, (London, 1874), v.1, pp.33, 41-3, 52-3, 63.  
 (1) H.Clarke, CA, v.1, n.12, 12.1883 distinguishes the Nindi and Ngoni and describes their hostility towards each other.  
 (2) Fülleborn, op cit, p.135; Ebner, History, pp.83-4; TDB, Mahenge District Book; K.Johnston, "Native routes in East Africa from Dar es Salaam towards Lake Nyasa", PRGS, v.1, n.7, p.418; J. Thomson, "Notes on the route taken...to Uhehe...1879", PRGS, v.II, (1880), n.2, p.110.  
 (3) Described in R.Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, (London, 1968), pp.66-7.



## VI

After gaining control over the former subjects of the now defunct Maseko Ngoni state, the Njelu and Mshope settled down to build their own states. Their first step towards doing this was the separation of the Njelu and Mshope into two kingdoms. No mention has been found of conflict having precipitated this separation and it seems likely that it was merely an expression of the traditional Ngoni tendencies to segmentation and fission. There never had been one man ruling the two kingdoms. Rather, each had its own inkosi with his military and administrative network, as will be described below. Consequently, the alliance they had till the split was presumably one of convenience which was no longer necessary once the kingdoms had secured their positions and faced no external threat.(1)

Each kingdom was henceforth to enjoy independent political and economic status and to have separate spheres of military expansion. Each would co-operate with the other in the rare instances of major external challenge that were to face them later. They were also at times to quarrel with each other, but their peace and lasting friendship was never to be irrevocably compromised.

It was now some forty years since the Njelu and Mshope had left southern Africa. During that time they had grown from being a small segment of a migrant society to two states which successfully challenged another migrant society and which absorbed a captive population many times their size. Now they began an era of expansion which was to culminate in damaging contact with the powerful Hehe state also growing up to their north.

---

(4) p.52 Tawete, op cit, sections 47-54.

(5) p.52 C.S.Smith, "Explorations in Zanzibar Dominions", JRGS, supp.1887/9, p.103-4

(1) Tawete, op cit, sections 59-62; Prince, op cit, p.215.

## Chapter 2

## A Spirited Growth, 1860s-early 1880s


## I

Many of the details of the military expansion of these years of early state-building are unknown. However, general patterns can be discerned. They indicate that the Mshope Ngoni concerned themselves with consolidation in the region of the Hanga River, then with expansion to the north-west. Njelu, on the other hand, turned increasingly to the south, south-west, then west.

Why the Njelu pushed south from the Hanga River to the Lumecha River where they established a capital at Ngalanga is not clearly known.(1) The move meant abandoning the Ndendeule population which lived there and to the north in favour of a region that was apparently sparsely populated. Possibly the Njelu Ngoni wanted to move some distance away from the Mshope where they could have adequate room to expand and felt that movement southwards, offered better prospects than movement in other directions.

One of the first targets of the Njelu military leaders was the Nindi and Matengo settlements in the Matengo Mountains. By the 1870s a good many of both groups had acknowledged their inability to withstand constant attacks and had submitted to the Ngoni.(2) While the conquest of the Matengo was going on, the Njelu began plundering in the west and parts of the north-west. In the north-west, they appear to have concentrated on Upangwa and the lands, such as Ukinga,

- 
- (1) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Songea District, 1954, UDSM, typescript, p.10; Ebner to Redmond, interviews, 17-21.10.1971.
- (2) E.Ebner, Texte in Neu-Kingoni: (vol.1) Erzählungen, Fabeln, Rätsel, Sprichwörter, (1969), SOA, typescript, pp.68-72.



NGOWI KINGDOMS 1870 AND MILITARY EXPANSION

## Southern East Africa



behind it. The plundering of Upangwa appears to have been intensive. Recollections by the Pangwa indicate that Ngoni, not specifically Njelu, raids were very damaging. As the Pangwa were later to constitute a much larger percentage of the population of Njelu than of Mshope(1), it seems likely that the Njelu Ngoni were responsible for most of the raiding among them. For the Pangwa, the memories of the raids during the 1860s and 1870s so surpassed recollections of the Njelu and Mshope settlement in their lands during the 1850s, that many recall the later attacks as the first contact with the Ngoni.(2) One tradition of the raids noted that the Ngoni took so many cattle, captives and foodstuffs in their raids that the people were on the verge of losing their separate identity. Accordingly, those still free came to a compromise with the Ngoni, by which they accepted a tributary status, agreeing to supply foodstuffs to Ngoni forces marching further north and north-west, on the condition that the Ngoni did not take everything but allowed them at least some means of livelihood.(3) By 1880, most of the Pangwa appear to have accepted this tributary status and only small groups remained independent in poor, isolated communities in the forests and hills of Upangwa.

Little information was found on raids undertaken to the north-west of Upangwa. As the above traditions suggests, however, they were not irregular. One of the few references to Ngoni

---

(1) E.Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), p.92 states they are the largest group in Njelu, the third largest in Mshope.

(2) This led J.Stirnemann to doubt that the Njelu and Mshope entered from the west (interview, 2.1970), as noted above, p.44.

(3) Stirnemann to Redmond, interview 2.1970.

attacks, again whether Njelu or Mshope is not specified, is from a UMCA missionary who travelled through Usokile and commented on the many burnt-out villages and deserted lands which lay in the wake of the Ngoni.(1) Ebner records another from a Sokile captive who states that both the Njelu and the Mshope made many raids into Usokile, between Lake Nyasa and Tukuyu, because this region was rich in cattle.(2)

To the west, most of the lakeshore appears to have come under attack. This region contained an easy source of captives, foodstuffs, such as fish, and in certain areas, cattle. Much is known of the Njelu raids in this region from the writings of various UMCA missionaries who were actively proselytizing along the lakeshore by the late 1870s. Njelu raids were frequent and damaging, and gradually forced the Nyasa to leave small, open settlements and move to swamps and other inaccessible areas or to amalgamate into large settlements where they could defend themselves. A UMCA lay worker, <sup>Bellingham</sup>, described the restricted life-style that had to be practiced in these new settlements:

"The people here (near Mbamba Bay) do not get out of their villages till about ten; then at four PM they are off back in again for fear of the Magwangwara(3). Their dress and language is different to any we have seen. They are Wangindo and Wanindi. The Magwangwara are constantly about here."(4)

The Njelu appear to have had only limited interest in the lands south of the Ruvuma during the 1860s and most of the 1870s,

---

(1) W.P. Johnson, My African Reminiscences, 1875-1895, (London, 1924) UMCA, p.102.

(2) Ebner, History, p.93, tradition of M.Chungu.

(3) W.P. Johnson, Nyasa, The Great Water, (London, 1922) OUP, p.110 gives as origin of the word Magwangwara: "a name of terror meaning meaning 'the crows'...given them because their warriors wore crow's feathers stuck in a band over their heads and on a band hanging down their backs."

(4) J.C. Yarborough, The Diary of a Working Man in Central Africa, nd, p.111-2.

apparently because the west and north-west offered sufficient diversion for the rather small Njelu armies. They did raid some. Mtengula's, a town lying towards the southern part of the lakeshore, for example, was attacked in 1876.(1) However, on the whole, little was done there. Evidence to support this statement comes from the fact that a number of Yao settlements were scattered throughout this region in the 1870s, yet were dispersing in the 1880s, when Ngoni raids were known to be taking place.

The lands east of Njelu appear to have been ignored as well, again for the same reason that one can advance for lack of interest in the south. In addition to this appears to have been the physical barrier of the Matogoro Mountains which lay between Ungoni and the east. Only when the Njelu induna, Songea Mbano, moved near these hills, was there incentive to cross them and go east.(2)

The Mshope spent some time conquering the Ndendeule in the region of first, Seluka, then Mkutano, in both of which places they settled. This brought some involvement on their part in the lands of the north-east, as many Ndendeule fled in that direction to avoid capture. The raid on the Kilwa hinterland mentioned in the previous chapter appears to have been part of the consolidation of the Mshope control over the Ndendeule in the Hanga region where Mkutano was.

Following the conquest of the Ndendeule, the Mshope appear to have devoted some attention to peoples in the north-east.

---

(1) Yarborough, op cit, p.119.

(2) W.H.Rangeley, "The Ayao", Nyasaland J., v.XVI, (1963), n.1, p.23 is incorrect in stating they did - the Nindi (Mazitu) were.



The Ngindo and those Ndendeule who still remained free began pushing east and south-east to avoid the Ngoni grasp. Their movement, and those of the Yao and the Nindi to the south, seem to have initiated a series of migrations which were eventually to leave bare a considerable region in the centre of southern East Africa.(1)

Once the land which was to be their homeland was secured, the Mshope appear to have turned their attention towards the north-west, a region whose cattle and human resources were to hold their interest for at least a decade. On the plateau lands to the north-west of the Mshope state lived the peoples collectively identified today as the Bena-Sangu-Hehe complex. All appear to have been cattle-owning at the time. Many were not politically centralized to any great extent, though a number had begun consolidating into three state entities. The less-organized groups were preyed upon by both their better-organized neighbours and the Mshope Ngoni who, by the early 1870s, were making regular expeditions into the region. By that time, the Mshope had become involved in a complicated series of interrelationships among the three states in the region. As this involvement led to the Ngoni-Hehe wars of 1878 and 1881, which in turn radically changed Ngoni society, they will be dealt with in greater detail when the wars themselves are discussed. Suffice it here to say that this involvement with other states seems to have kept the Mshope preoccupied for a decade.

The lands in the west received some attention from the Mshope though exactly how much is not known. An analysis of the ethnic

---

(1) Some traditions of migration are given in TDB, v.4.

composition of the Mshope population at this time, after suitable fieldwork, might provide an answer. On present evidence, it seems probable that Mshope, as the northern kingdom, was as involved as Njelu in the plundering of Usokile and its neighbouring lands, which has been noted above in the comments on Njelu expansion.

In all, the military expansion of these years culminated in the effective consolidation of two state entities in Ungoni, both of which had established firm orientations in expansion. The Njelu expansion was geographically more dispersed. To some extent this was because the Mshope interests in the north-west were sufficiently attractive to preoccupy the leader and his people. Yet there was another important reason. Njelu was evolving a more decentralized political structure than Mshope and this evolution was closely associated with greater individual independence of action in the military sphere. This, in turn, affected other aspects of the organization of the two states. It is to the character of political organization in these two states that we now turn.

## II

The military and administrative structures of the Njelu and Mshope kingdoms in the early 1860s were similar in the sense that both were based on the ones brought from southern Africa. But, by 1878, these structures had changed somewhat from each other and the kingdoms were



well on their ways to becoming two distinct entities. The most crucial factors bringing this about involved the allocation of power to the constituent segments within each political community. One of the very few scholars to comment on the development of this differentiation is P.H. Gulliver. He remarks, when describing Njelu and Mshope political systems of the nineteenth century, that in Njelu, the inkosi sought to strengthen the hand of the royal family at the expense of that of the military izinduna, while in Mshope, the inkosi did the reverse.(1) To some extent, this statement is correct. The inkosi in each kingdom did work to retain his control over the state he ruled, and challenges to this control did come from other members of the royal families, known as the wantwana, and the military izinduna to a much greater extent than any other group. However, it is important to note that the challenges offered by the two groups were of two quite different orders. The military izinduna could and did try to gain increased powers from the inkosi. However, they did not try to replace the inkosi as his position was hereditary and restricted to a royal family recognized by all members of the state. On the other hand, the wantwana, in addition to wanting increased powers, were also eligible to attempt usurpation. Gulliver fails to make this clear. Yet it is essential in adding a new dimension to Ngoni political life during these years. Consequently, an

---

(1) Gulliver, "A History", p.24-5; and see Ebner, History, p.25.

analysis of political life must consider two types of challenges offered. It will be shown that the political challenge offered by the wantwana throughout Ngoni history was always the more serious one.

A number of factors determined the changing fortunes of each of the three interest groups: inkosi, wantwana and military izinduna. One was the personality of the inkosi. A strong and determined inkosi was better able to preserve his powers than a weak or indecisive one. Secondly, the numbers of wantwana or military izinduna helped to determine the amount of challenge an inkosi would face. Thirdly, the quality of wantwana and izinduna determined the likelihood of their successful opposition to an inkosi. Finally, a verity of external factors were important. These included the type and orientation of expansion undertaken by the state, the enemies it encountered, and its success in integrating captives.

Three amankosi had reigned in the two kingdoms by 1878. Njelu had two of them. The first was Hawai(1), who ruled from around 1864 until 1874.(2) Little is remembered of this ruler. There are at least two reasons for this. First, little of any significance is known to have happened during his reign. The kingdom just expanded without meeting any notable opposition. Secondly, in

---

(1) Also spelt Hayawa.

(2) 1864 is estimated as it is not known when exactly the takeover of the Maseko was complete and an inkosi installed; 1874 is noted by Gulliver, "A History", p.21. However T<sup>vo</sup>Prince, "Geschichte der Magwangwara nach Erzählung des Arabers Rashid bin Masaud und des Fussi...", MadS, v.VII, (1894), n.3, p.215 has 1872.

later years the kingdom experienced considerable change, and peoples' memories tended to be dominated by this, resulting in details of Hawai's reign being forgotten. This is most notably shown in the first Njelu history to be written, that by Tom von Prince in 1894, in which virtually nothing on Hawai is recorded though it was written only twenty years after his death. But political life in 1894 was so complicated(1), that perhaps Hawai's reign was considered insignificant. What can be suggested about the man is that he appears to have been a reasonable ruler who guided his kingdom competently during its earliest years of expansion. He may not have been too forceful, for during his reign some military izinduna were able to consolidate reasonably strong positions of power.

In 1874, Hawai was succeeded by Mharule, the senior surviving son of Zulu. Mharule's lineage segment was apparently more eligible than Hawai's(2), and his non-selection around 1864 seems to have been due to his youth(3). The succession appears to have been resolved without difficulty. Hawai's sons were too young to contest it, while Mharule had few brothers who were in a position to dispute matters. Most had fled to the west of Lake Nyasa in the early 1860s. One known possible contender seems

---

(1) See below Chapter Three, section II.

(2) Gulliver, "A History", p.21. It may not be so. Ebner says (interview, 16.10.1971) that Hawai was a son of naJere and Mharule of Malinu Moyo, a Kalanga. As naJere was Swazi, according to Booth (op cit), then she was likely to be the more eligible.

(3) Gulliver, "A History", p.21.

to have been Putire, a second cousin once removed of Mharule. He had a reasonably strong segment to support his claims and is known to have often been at odds with Mharule in later years. But no data whatsoever was found to indicate that he presented himself as a candidate, and it must be concluded that he did not.(1)

Mharule was one of the greatest rulers the Njelu Ngoni ever had. A capable and successful man, he managed to maintain effective control over all segments of Njelu political society during its years of greatest expansion. He unified the Zulu family that Mputa Maseko had split in the late 1850s, then used it to his own political advantage. One European observer was told in 1904 that Mharule, who died in 1889, had been a great and prudent ruler who knew how to keep the tribe together while at the same time remain popular.(2) Ebner later added to this praise:

"Old people who had seen Mharule, said that he was of a yellowish skin 'like a European' and of a tall stature. They said also that he was generous and on many occasions he entertained his people with splendid meals and plenty of beer. He was fond of the nchuwa game (played with little stones) and spent hours with his friends at that game. They ascribed him also the gift of prophecy."(3)

By the time of his death in 1889, he had built Njelu into

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.218 states that there was no trouble over the succession.

(2) C.Spiss, "Kiongi und Kisutu", MSOS, 1904, p.2; this is quoted in Ebner, Revised History, p.73.

(3) Ebner, Revised History, p.73.

a much greater power than Mshope, while leaving a legacy of internal conflict that was only to be resolved in the disastrous Maji Maji rebellion of 1905.(1)

Mshope had only one inkosi before 1878, this being Chipeta.(2) He, unlike Hawai, has lived on in Mshope traditions as one of the most powerful and forceful rulers Mshope ever had. During his rule, his people feared no one. Time and again they challenged the Hehe and other powers to the north while becoming rich on cattle and captives. He appears to have been an intelligent leader with an ability that matched his determination to control his society. The military men who had acted as Regents before he came to power never achieved the powers that those who had been Regents in Njelu were to do,(3) mainly because of the personalities of the amankosi within the two kingdoms. Chipeta's interest in controlling his society more than that evidenced by Hawai, along with his remarkable military policies, were in the end to bring the political community he commanded to a different end in the Hehe wars than that of the Njelu state.

One of the responsibilities accruing to each inkosi as the head of the state was the running of the military organization. Each inkosi was responsible for heading the army, for forming regiments when this was suitable, for

---

(1) See below, Chapter Five, section III.

(2) Also spelt Kipeta.

(3) See below, Chapter Three, section II.

deciding the time and place for war and plundering, and for controlling the economic benefits of plundering. Marked differences evolved in the two kingdoms from the mid-1860s onwards over how each inkosi fulfilled these responsibilities. This differentiation partly explains Gulliver's analysis of the need for each inkosi to manipulate power in Ungoni in different ways. Differing military policies were observed by the amankosi in two aspects of their power. First, while both were heads of their respective armies, only the Mshope inkosi appears to have participated in wars and plundering expeditions. To some extent, however, this participation was irregular. Among the Swazi Nguni - the people from whom the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni claim their origins(1) - the inkosi rarely participated in any actual fighting.(2) This policy had evidently changed during the migrations when all Ngoni leaders apparently fought. Once permanent settlement was resumed, the Njelu inkosi apparently preferred to return to the older custom of non-participation in actual fighting. Gulliver suspects that this non-participation was a reason for the Njelu inkosi's declining to exercise absolute power over his people.(3) This seems possible, though it seems more likely that an inkosi could just as easily preserve power by alternating authority among military units, as he could through fighting. In any

---

(1) Ebner, Revised History, p.9; many writers refer to them by this name.

(2) H.Kuper, An African Aristocracy, (London, 1947), OUP, p.123.

(3) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, pp.21-2 is quite definite about the loss of power through non-participation.

case, no alternating of power appears to have been done by the Njelu inkosi. Secondly, authority varied, in that while theoretically both amankosi decided when war was to be waged, in actuality only Chipeta appears to have exercised his control firmly. Two pieces of evidence suggest this. First, Chipeta's dogmatism is recorded in two instances of fission within his society. In one case, a lineage head went on a raid without Chipeta's permission and, for this, was banished from the kingdom by Chipeta, who then took the offender's wife.(1) In a second case, some dissident members of the Tawete royal clan(2) left Mshope for Njelu when dissatisfied with Chipeta's rule. As they were a military section which later became reasonably important in Njelu, their departure may well have been due to Chipeta's restrictions on their military freedom.(3) There are no known instances of fission or separation due to military dissatisfaction in Njelu. Secondly, independent waging of war appears to have developed in Njelu following the rise of separate military settlements in the 1870s under leading military izinduna. In Mshope, no separate military settlements are known to have been formed, indicating a much closer control over politics by the inkosi.

- 
- (1) TNA/SDB, v.2, p.124, Palangu's biography, as told by Missoro; for further details on the power of the inkosi, see the comparative studies in Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1970), 2nd.ed., Cass, pp.47-77 on the Maseko (Gomani) and Kuper, op cit, p.54 on the Swazi.
  - (2) Muyamuya and his brother Masaramani Tawete, Nkawirani Makukula and Masiwanyoni Magagura and his son Msukumbi. see Ebner, Revised History, pp.67-8; in History, p.119 he states that they left before the second Hehe war.
  - (3) They established a separate settlement and seem to have been quite important from then on. The Magagura family were leaders at colonial independence in 1961.

In adopting different approaches to military control, both amankosi appear to have been influenced by the division of authority within their societies. In Njelu, there appears to have been very little threat offered by the non-ruling branches of the royal family, the usual main opponents to an inkosi's control. Zulu's only brother had been killed by the Maseko Ngoni while many of Zulu's sons had been forced to flee. Those who remained behind appear to have been too young before 1880 to pose any political threat to either Hawai or Mhanule. In Mshope, on the other hand, there appears to have been some threat from them. Mbonani's brother, Mnyukwa, led a strong segment of Mshope society.(1) As it did become a threat in the early 1880s, it is possible that it was at least a challenge during the 1860s and 1870s. None of Chipeta's brothers appears to have been a threat, however, as neither oral traditions nor written histories mention their power. Members of the Tawete clan, who were not of the royal family, may have provided some opposition. The aforementioned Tawete segment which moved south to Njelu seems to have been in this category. Consequently Gulliver appears to be correct in stating that Chipeta wanted to restrict the power of the royal family and clan, while the Njelu nkosi wanted to enhance it. But one doubt must be expressed. The Njelu amankosi appear to have been unlikely, before 1880, to have thought of enhancing the power of other members of the royal clan as there were very few eligible for this power. Moreover,

---

(1) See below, section IV, pp. 111 . According to traditions collected from the people of Mpepo, son of Mnyukwa, Mnyukwa and Mbonani were equal chiefs of the Mshope, thus making the former at least equal with Chipeta, TDB, Mahenge notes.



those who were, such as Mbemisa, appear to have remained politically less important than the leading military izinduna.

Thus, it appears that, before 1878, the military structure in Mshope was more complex than that of Njelu. In Njelu, only the inkosi and very few other royal clan members had izinduna to manage their military expansion, while in Mshope, the inkosi and at least two other members of the royal clan were managing military expansion with izinduna.

Of the military advisers used by each inkosi, the religious leader was one of the most important. This was at least the case in Njelu where he is known to have advised the inkosi before major battles.(1) This individual in Njelu was Chikuse Nanguru, the man who acted as Regent during the troubled years of Maseko domination. It is not clear how important the religious leader was in Mshope. It has not been possible to ascertain who held this position before 1880, an indication perhaps that he was not too important. As Chipeta seems to have been a strong ruler, perhaps he preferred to use the services of the religious leader to implement rather than assist the formulation of his decisions. Along with seeking advice on wars, religious leaders were responsible for conducting ritual purifications and other ceremonies to ensure the success of campaigns and wars.

---

(1) See below, section IV, pp. 103.

The wantwana constituted a second class of military adviser. Only a few examples are known of the role they played in the making of military decisions. One in Njelu occurred during the Hehe wars, when a brother of the inkosi persuaded the inkosi to reverse a decision.(1) One in Mshope, though less clear, seems to have been the takeover by the inkosi's uncle of military leadership in 1878.(2) There are indications that before 1878 the wantwana were less important in Njelu than in Mshope. The reason for this, already previously mentioned in another context, was that the two successive amankosi of Njelu had few immediate relatives and these appear to have been young. Mshope, on the other hand, had the strong Mnyukwa segment to assist and possibly counteract Chipeta's power.

A third class of adviser was the military induna. As the military izinduna conducted the campaigns decided upon, their advice was probably critical. There were not many izinduna in the two kingdoms before 1880, as the population of both states was still small.(3) Those remembered as important in Njelu include Chikuse Nanguru, Chombera Masheula, Mpambalioto Soko and Songea(4) Mbano, and in Mshope, Mandati.(5) It is possible that fewer are remembered in Mshope because they were overshadowed there by the wantwana, but this is only surmise. The

---

(1) See below, section IV, p. 103.

(2) See below, section V, p. 108.

(3) For population estimates, see section III, p. 93-4.

(4) Johnson, op cit, p.110, Nyasa and Yao use Songela, coast men and Europeans use Songea. Songea became the more common spelling and is used henceforth.


(5) Ebner, Revised History, pp.56, 68; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.12.

military izinduna appear to have been more important in Njelu than in Mshope throughout these early years of state-building. In Njelu they were experienced and capable men, who assumed a considerable proportion of the responsibility of leading society during the Maseko purges of the Zulu Gama family. During the reigns of Hawai and Mharule, they remained important advisers. Indeed, Booth wrote in 1905 that Chikuse Nanguru, Hawai's leading induna had so much power that people in Njelu, when he was there, were confusing Chikuse with Hawai.(1) Mshope had suffered less at the hands of the Maseko, so the izinduna there appear to have had fewer demands made on their advice. A few manifestations of the greater power of the izinduna in Njelu over their contemporaries in Mshope may be mentioned. One was their apparent freedom to conduct campaigns on their own. It is not known whether they always sought permission or not before conducting a campaign. However, it appears some did not. For example, it is unlikely that the Tawete group which broke from the Mshope and joined the Njelu would have felt the compulsion to ask permission all the time. In Mshope, permission apparently had to be asked. Secondly, the leading izinduna in Njelu were able to establish separate settlements of their own by the 1870s. Two are known to have been built: one by Songea, some distance east of the inkosi's capital at Ngalanga, and one by

---

(1) J.Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) in Deutsch Ostafrika", Globus, lxxxviii, (1905), p.198.

APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS  
SETTLEMENTS OF THE  
WELU AND INSHORE c1872



Mpambalioto, west of the Luheraha River, at Mkwera.(1)  
 It is probable that in their own areas these two  
izinduna began independently conducting wars. No  
 separate settlements are known to have existed in  
 Mshope by the 1870s, at least under military izinduna.(2)  
 There appear to have been some settlements of captives,  
 and over these there were administrators. For example,  
 a Mt'wanga was appointed over a known Ndendeule  
 settlement by Chipeta.(3) Thirdly, it appears that  
izinduna in Njelu conducted military campaigns in  
 different areas at the same time.(4) In Mshope, on the  
 other hand, traditions of expansion suggest that only  
 one region was attacked at a time and, thus, that  
izinduna were politically more controlled by the inkosi.

The armies in both states, according to Ebner,  
 continued to be organized in age regiments.(5) All  
 young men, upon reaching the ages of 18-20 were enrolled  
 in a regiment with their age-mates. There were from 200  
 to 300 men enrolled in a regiment, writes Ebner, who lists  
 some ten formed by the Ngoni - no specific kingdom  
 mentioned - after their arrival in southern East Africa.  
 Warriors assembled together during the fighting season,  
 which followed the main harvest in late summer, to  
 practice the arts of war and prepare for expeditions.

- 
- (1) Ebner, History, p.99; interview, 17-21.10.1971.  
 (2) DMM Tawete, Account of the Wangoni, typescript, RH,  
 section 65 identifies only Mtukano, which he states  
 was a very large town "the size of Tabora".  
 (3) TNA/SDB, v.2, p.B.  
 (4) As suggested above, section I, pp. 69-73 .  
 (5) Ebner, History, p.189.

The men appear to have remained unmarried until their regiment was given a general dispensation, although an individual could be exempted through some distinguished action.(1)

While little information in addition to that of Ebner's was found during the present study, the army does not appear to have been as organized as he suggests. Though there were regiments (noted in Appendix A), because the population was small, there were not 200 men from 18 to 20 years of age available every three years to form a regiment. Consequently, regiments were either formed less frequently than every three years or consisted of men from a larger age-grouping than 18-20.(2) Secondly, regiments may not have been the only form of military organization in Ungoni. They certainly were not by the 1880s, at which time there were village groupings of various leaders serving as distinct units.(3) It is probable that Mpambalioto's people at Mkwera fought as a unit undifferentiated by age <sup>rather</sup> than as sections of national age regiments. It also seems certain that the Tawete group which joined Njelu had group forces rather than a number of sections of age-regiments.

The administrative structure in the two kingdoms appears to have been considerably less developed than the military one during these years of state-building in southern East Africa.

- 
- (1) Y.M.Chibambo in Read, op cit, pp.29-33 gives a good description of this; Prince, op cit, lamented its passing.
  - (2) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.18 compares the Njelu and Mshope to the Ngoni west of Lake Nyasa and states that the former had a less-complex system of sub-chiefs, regiments and war parties nor were impis especially based on age-groups.
  - (3) See below, Chapter Three, section II. Read, op cit, p.31, quoting Chibambo notes that the Maseko Ngoni also had area and national units.

The most obvious reason for this was the small population. This meant there were few settlements which, in turn, lessened the number of administrators needed. The inkosi was the head of the administration.(1) As such, he assumed a leading role in the management of the society. For example, in financial matters he controlled a considerable portion of the wealth of the society. All booty taken in plundering expeditions belonged to him, to distribute as he wished. Most of the cattle in the society were entrusted to him as head of the state, though many in the community helped care for, and eventually benefited from, these herds. His fields were among the largest and to work in them, he could demand labour on a much larger scale than other people. In the judicial realm, he was the final arbiter and handled appeals from lesser authorities. Moreover, he alone could theoretically pass the death penalty. In general administration, he decided national policies towards neighbouring states as, for example, Chipeta did with the Bena and Sangu, he approved settlement patterns and, in a word, he had the final say in most matters that were of importance to the society.

A council advised the inkosi. It comprised the leader's senior relatives, including his mother and brothers, and his senior izinduna. Elders, called lidoda (pl. madoda)(2), chosen from the ranks of aged warriors or heads of large kin-groups, assisted the council. In later years, as the two states expanded, the

- 
- (1) TNA/SDB, v.2, p.124, Palangu's biography as told by Missoro; for comments on the power of the Maseko inkosi, see Read, The Ngoni.  
 (2) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10.1971. He does not recognize the lidoda as military lieutenant, which Gulliver, Labour Migration in a Rural Economy, (Kampala, 1955), p.iii and J.Komba, God and Man, PhD, Pontifical U. of the Faith (Rome), 1959, pp.21-2 do. There was a leadership category below induna, though they may also have been recognized as minor izinduna.



inkosi, at least in Njelu, appears to have used members of his council, specifically his brothers, as representatives in various parts of his kingdom. This was not done before 1880.

An independent and less formal cog in the administrative network was provided by the wives and other female members of the inkosi's household, a number of whom were installed in 'houses' set up near the various settlements of izinduna.(1) They were responsible for passing instructions to and information from the izinduna.(2) It is not known if 'houses' were established near the settlements of izinduna before the 1880s in either kingdom. However, as Songea's and Mpambalioto's settlements in Njelu had 'houses' later, it is probable that they had them in the 1870s.

There was probably a tribal induna, or nduna ya nkosi, fulfilling the functions forebears did in southern Africa, though no data was found on any during these years. If villages were established, they would have been under mulumuzana (pl. alumuzana)(3), who would have been selected from senior members of Ngoni or other clans as well as from leaders of local kin groups.

- 
- (1) It is not clear whether izinduna were appointed to various 'houses' or 'houses' set up at military settlements. In the 1880s it was the second, before then it may have been the first. Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.18 says it was the first.
- (2) Ibid., p.18; TDB, v.4, p.218; for Maseko equivalent, see Read, The Ngoni, p.14.
- (3) Also spelt mnumzane, alumzana, Ebner to Redmond, correspondence 2.3.1970, 10.6.1970; Ebner, Revised History, p.128: "'madoda' took part in discussions at the court of the chief; when they were put at the head of a village, they were called mnumzana, umnumzana."



Despite their similar administrative structures, effective power in the two kingdoms appears to have been based on different officials mainly because Njelu was more decentralized than Mshope. Though little information was found on the details of this difference, a few seem clear. One was that military izinduna, who were not part of the administrative network, nonetheless exercised administrative powers in Njelu, though not in Mshope. One such power was the right to retain bounty and captives, which induna Songea seems to have been exercising by the 1870s. Secondly, because Njelu was segmenting more than Mshope, the 'house' system there was probably more developed.

Inevitably the diverging military and administrative structures and practices of the two kingdoms in turn had their effects on the constituent societies. First, a loose central rule probably improved loyalty to the state, as segment leaders had opportunities to exercise some power, thus less reason to be dissatisfied with the status quo and to secede. No secession is known to have occurred from Njelu before 1878, while there was at least one from Mshope, as noted above. Secondly, the decentralization in Njelu appears to have facilitated the integration of captives as individual leaders found it in their interest to collect and integrate as many followers as possible. There was less interest in assimilating captives in Mshope, as captives were identified with the inkosi.

While military and administrative structures diverged, the two kingdoms nonetheless pursued a common aim in the integration of captives. It is to this critical aspect of state-building that we now turn.

## III

Integration remained as important to the Ngoni in settlement as it had been to them on the move. To illustrate this, it is useful to give some idea of relative numbers in the two kingdoms. The earliest attempt to identify constituent groups among the Ngoni was made by John Booth in 1905. Booth was a planter and trader who entered Ungoni around 1902. He was fascinated by the people among whom he lived, and sought to learn more about them and their way of life. In the course of doing this, he analyzed the population to determine the origins of the Ngoni. He calculated that, in 1904, there were only some 340 Ngoni having southern African origin: 140 members of the Gama clan, 40 of the Tawete, and some 150 of other Nguni clans. Then there were some 200-300 Ngoni whose origins lay south of the Zambezi River. These included Thonga, Kalanga and Msuto. Thus, there were some 500-700 Ngoni of pre-Zambezi adherence in 1904. Of this total, Booth estimated that over half were children.(1) Using these statistics as a basis, it is possible roughly to estimate the numbers in the kingdoms in the 1860s and 1870s. Thus, removing two generations and taking into account the rapid growth in Ngoni population: Zulu Gama had at least twelve sons, who in turn had over one hundred children, and losses in the wars against the Maseko, the Hehe and other groups, one may conclude that there were fewer than 200 Ngoni of pre-Zambezi origin in Ungoni

---

(1) Booth, op cit.

around 1858. Added to these were the Senga and Sukuma captured north of the Zambezi but before the movement to the east side of the lake. These may have numbered the same as, or slightly more than, the Ngoni of pre-Zambezi origin, that is 200 to 400. When this number entered Upangwa around 1858, they may have doubled their numbers. This seems a reasonable computation, since the Pangwa are now the single largest ethnic group within Ungoni. After the two kingdoms of Njelu and Mshope were established in the early 1860s, these 2000 or so appear to have increased considerably. Prince estimated that by the early 1880s, (1) there were some 8000 Ngoni in Mshope. As the Njelu state appears to have been larger, it may have had a few thousands more. Thus, there appear to have been 16-20,000 Ngoni in southern East Africa by the early 1880s. Though this number must be taken as only a rough estimate, it does give some idea of the significant role that integration of captives played in building up the two states. Numerically, the Ngoni increased tenfold in less than twenty years.

Methods of integrating peoples changed during settlement from what they had been on the march. For one thing, not only the young of both sexes were taken. Adults were also brought back as they could be useful for working in the fields of the Ngoni, as well as for providing other services. Secondly, the Ngoni did not require everyone to move near them once they had submitted. Instead, they allowed peoples to accept a tributary status, and then to stay in their own

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.216.


homelands while providing regular services and goods for the Ngoni. The Pangwa are a good example of a group that stayed in their own lands. However, by adopting a more complex system of integrating peoples into their states, the Ngoni achieved a much more variable degree of success as regards the integration of captives. This later had an effect on the stability of the kingdoms.

The most unstable form of integration was that of peoples who remained within their own communities and paid tribute to the Ngoni. These peoples included those whose homelands lay outside the boundaries of the two Ngoni states and even some groups which lived within the state and were near actual Ngoni settlements. The Matengo settlements appear to have fallen into this category, which we may call that of 'tribute settlement', within the state.(1)

Prior to 1880, a village could accept tributary status through acknowledging a leader appointed by the Ngoni or through sending some of their number as hostages to Ungoni.(2) Though no examples of tribute settlements with Ngoni-appointed leaders were found for the 1870s, so many are known for the 1880s(3) that it is very likely that the practice dates back at least to the late 1870s. The earliest documentary reference to the taking of hostages as a sign of submission is that of a report by the UMCA missionary, W.P.Johnson, in 1883:

- 
- (1) Details of these settlements are given below, Chapter Three, section III, as the dates of their being mentioned are all of the 1880s.
  - (2) W.P.Johnson, CA, v.I, 5.1883, notes that some go to Ungoni. There some are taught to fight while others become slaves.
  - (3) See below, Chapter Three, section III.

map 8



ESTIMATED  
TRIBUTE - PAYING  
NEIGHBOURS  
1877

"...their system was and is to insist, if a chief submits to them, that he or a number of his people should come and settle in the neighbourhood. Some of these, as well as the actual captives of war, are taught to join in raids, others simply work as slaves."(1)

Tributary villages were responsible for supplying foodstuffs to Ngoni in transit and for giving occasional tribute and labour.(2)

Though tributary status caused economic, political and social upheaval and deprivation, it permitted the retention of a considerable amount of independence. Tributary communities continued to think of themselves as being separate from the Ngoni. Villagers pursued their traditional life as far as possible, while responding to the new demands made upon them by their overlords. Their affiliation with the Ngoni was a militarily-forced one, and when this went, few bonds remained between the two.

A more permanent form of integration was obtained with peoples brought back to Ungoni as captives. There they were attached to an Ngoni or a captive family, or sometimes placed in a separate community near an Ngoni one. As part of the Ngoni state, they were integrated into Ngoni life and culture. They adopted many Ngoni customs and practices and, for most purposes, considered themselves Ngoni in life-style. For instance, the men participated in the cattle economy as herd boys when young and possibly as owners themselves when older; they performed the same agricultural tasks as the Ngoni; they became part of the army and fought in the manner of their captors, and eventually could expect to reap some of the benefits of raiding. Female

---

(1) W.P.Johnson, CA, v.1, n.5, 5.1883.

(2) A.S.Stenhouse, "Agriculture in the Matengo Highlands", EAAgriculture, v.X, n.1, (July, 1944), p.22 describes Matengo tribute-giving.

captives were brought up in households similar to Ngoni ones, and performed the same tasks and enjoyed much the same benefit as most others in the society. Eventually they married Ngoni or other captives.(1)

Still, there were differences between the immigrant Ngoni, called 'true Ngoni', and their captives. The most important one was in status. All Ngoni who had been integrated once settlement east of Lake Nyasa began were called 'sutu', meaning serfs or slaves.(2) Everyone knew to which of the two sections he belonged and the rights and powers this brought him. For example, the military and administration were controlled by the 'true Ngoni'. The only known example of a 'sutu' becoming an important leader was in a case of adoption, an act by which he was recognized as a 'true Ngoni' anyway.(3) Economic life favoured the 'true Ngoni'. The 'sutu' rarely had the right to demand assistance in the cultivation of their fields and not many owned cattle. Finally, social life placed restrictions on the 'sutu'. He could not marry a 'true Ngoni' woman, and when a 'true Ngoni' male married a 'sutu' woman, he did not marry her by lobato, as he would a 'true Ngoni' woman.(4)

However, integration was not entirely negative for the 'sutu'. They became part of the military society and, through being successful

---

(1) Ebner, History, p.37 has notes on this.

(2) Ibid., p.8; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.19 writes that the Chingoni words were 'mufu'(pl.'wafu'), Spiess, op cit, p.119 agrees; for the word's use in Swazi Nguni society, see Kuper, op cit, p.113.

(3) This was Mgendera, the son of the 'slave' Magodi who married the widow of the Ngoni leader, Mawaso. Mgendera was considered Mawaso's heir.

(4) Booth, op cit, p.222 has notes on marriage attitudes.



warriors, could achieve fame and prestige for themselves.

Many identified with their captors as a result and it was not uncommon for captives to participate in Ngoni expeditions against their former communities.(1) They were allowed some economic independence. For example, Amakita, the Matengo leader of a large tribute settlement, carried on a considerable trade with peoples on the lakeshore, exchanging Indian corn for dried fish.(2) Again, the 'sutu' were permitted to retain many aspects of their life and culture. For instance, though they welcomed 'true Ngoni' pre-war religious ceremonies for the good luck they could bring, they kept their own faiths.(3) Furthermore, they could and did bring about some changes in 'true Ngoni' society. Probably the most renowned of these changes was in language. When the 'true Ngoni' entered the lands east of Lake Nyasa, they spoke their southern African language, Chingoni. However, new adherents to their states, integrated in large numbers and from many ethnic groups, continued to use their separate languages. As these 'sutu' overwhelmed the 'true Ngoni' in numbers, Chingoni was gradually replaced by a new language which was an amalgamation of local languages. As the Pangwa were the largest ethnic group among the 'sutu', their tongue contributed considerably to this new language, called 'Kisutu'. By the late nineteenth century, this new language

- 
- (1) Ebner, History, p.112; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.114 states the 'sutu' embraced their masters' ideology with enthusiasm.
  - (2) W.Y.Campbell, Travellers Records of Portuguese Nyasaland, (London, nd (pre-1899)), quoting W.P.Johnson, p.61.
  - (3) J.Komba to Redmond, interview 2.1970. The writer did not learn from whom His Excellency, Bishop Komba, had learnt this. He did question many elders in his research for his thesis, op cit.

had all but replaced Chingoni.(1) Chingoni itself was modified. Ebner writes that grammatical forms were simplified and shortened and new words were added.(2) Important examples of word changes were the very names inkosi (pl.amankosi) and induna (pl.izinduna) which became nkosi (pl.mankosi) and nduna (pl.manduna).(3) These modified forms, now dominant among the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, are henceforth used in this study.

Gradually a new society was evolving in Ungoni, one having a unique culture and way of life that, in the end, had its basis in an individual's considering himself a part of the Ngoni state, while at the same time remaining either a 'true Ngoni' or one of the 'sutu'. This process was inevitably a slow one and, by the 1880s, there were still probably only limited ways in which the mass of the captives identified with their Ngoni masters. Yet, unlike among the Ngoni living west of the lake, there appears to have been no major instances of overt rebellion by captives.(4)

By 1878, two large and increasingly successful states were thus firmly established in southern East Africa and were on their way to a new era in their histories, that of contact with a powerful, outside world. Because the Ngoni had met no worthwhile opponent in over a decade of expansion, they were initially unprepared for the change which, thus, came rather more abruptly than expected with the Hehe wars.

---

(1) Booth, op cit, pp.224-6 was disparaging about Kisutu; Spiss, op wrote the first grammar and dictionary of Chingoni and Kisutu.

(2) Ebner, Revised History, p.115.

(3) Ebner to Redmond, correspondence 17.12.1970 writes: "The southern African pronunciation appears not to have suited local language structures and may have been modified accordingly in daily usage."

(4) Ebner, History, p.38 notes the Kamanga and Henga rebelled in 1875 and 1879 respectively against Mbelwa's Ngoni.

## IV

By the 1860s the Hehe, who had earlier observed and begun adopting the military tactics of the Jere Ngoni(1), were coming into contact with the Mshope Ngoni, who were at the time pushing north and north-west under the capable leadership of Chipeta. The lands to which both peoples were directing their attention were the wealthy cattle and agricultural lands to the north-east of Lake Nyasa. The eastern half of these lands comprised Ubena, at that time under the leadership of Mtengera, an unloved relative of the Hehe leader, Myugumba. The Hehe were interested in integrating Ubena into their expanding state, while the Ngoni were interested primarily in plundering the wealth of its people.(2) So the Hehe entered into direct military conflict against the Bena, while the Ngoni, interested in preventing a Hehe takeover, assisted the Bena.(3) However, the Ngoni appear not to have been too committed in this matter, for their support proved indecisive and, by 1874, Myugumba had expelled Mtengera from Ubena and had annexed this land.(4) Mtengera and his son Kiwanga fled eastwards into the Ulanga plain where they settled after fighting and defeating the Mbunga.

After conquering Ubena, Myugumba moved against Usangu, the western half of this region, which at the time was ruled by Merere.(5) Once again, Myugumba was successful in war and drove Merere from

- 
- (1) Roland Oliver in J.Vansina ed., The Historian in Tropical Africa, (London, 1964), OUP, p.306.  
 (2) Ebner to Redmond, correspondence 2.2.1970 comments on different policies of conquest.  
 (3) Fülleborn, op cit, p.134; Ebner, History, p.97; MMR/6/68/4/3/6.  
 (4) W.Arning, "Die Wahehe", MadS, v.IX, (1896) and v.X, (1897), p.60; A.Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes, (St.Ottilien, 1899), p.43.  
 (5) Arning, op cit, 1897, p.60.

Usangu into Usafwa, then annexed the eastern part of Usangu. However, Merere was not prepared to surrender his lands just then, and he entered into a military alliance with the Mshope nkosi, Chipeta, who was by then interested in hindering the Hehe. Thereupon the two forces entered Usangu and defeated the Hehe. However, the victory was a short-lived one, for Myugumba returned in 1877(1) with his army to defeat Merere and conquer all of Usangu.

The Hehe appear to have been angered by the Ngoni interference in their military expansion, for a year after taking Usangu, the Hehe army marched down into Ungoni. Chipeta and the Mshope were quite unprepared for the attack as they appear to have been unable to accept that another people would be so brave or, to them, so foolish, as to enter their land. According to so traditions, they were surprised in the midst of celebrations.(2) Ebner writes they had time to mobilize quickly(3), though they were heavily defeated. The capital was burned, a number of senior leaders, including the nkosi Chipeta, were killed and those remaining were forced to flee for their lives.(4) The Hehe then prepared to push on to Njelu.

- 
- (1) Arning, op cit, 1897, p.60; Fulleborn, op cit, p.134; Ebner, History, pp.97-105, gives detailed reasons for supporting this date. A. Redmayne, The Wahehe Peoples of Tanganyika, PhD, Oxford, 1965, p.140 mistakes this for the first Hehe-Ngoni war.
- (2) Prince, op cit, p.215; Fulleborn, op cit, p.134; Tawete, op cit, sections 67-8, he states the Ngoni fought poorly because they were drunk; TDB, v.4, p.213.
- (3) Ebner, History, pp.98-105. Much of the following presentation of the Hehe wars is based on Ebner and Tawete, op cit, sec.65-82.
- (4) Palangu's brothers, Mshope and Chibamu, also died then, RH, s.585, History of nduna Palangu as told by nduna Palangu.

In the interval between the attack on Mshope and that on Njelu, the latter appears to have been indecisive in mobilizing. The Mshope, who informed the Njelu of the onslaught, later claimed that the Njelu did nothing to assist them.(1) Njelu traditions tend to confirm this. One notes that Mharule sought advice from his religious adviser, Chikuse Nanguru and when the latter forecast an Ngoni defeat, he decided to do nothing.(2) This lack of response, though galling to the Mshope later, was quite understandable. The two kingdoms had been apart for some fifteen years, plundering in separate regions, following their different types of political life and generally minding their own affairs. The Njelu appear to have believed that they would not be drawn into this Mshope war(3) and so must have felt they had good reason to stay out. Moreover, a request for co-operation, which was an unusual request, must have required close deliberation. The lack of an offer of immediate assistance shows well how separate the two kingdoms now were and how fluid local relations between them were, with local interests predominating.


However, Njelu neutrality was soon broken. Though Mharule was reluctant to act, some of his leading officials were not. His brother, Mbemisa, a relative, Ndembo Gama, and the Sukuma, Kanyoka Ntara, all requested permission to lead their forces north against the Hehe. Mharule, though reluctant, agreed and

---

(1) Ebner, History, p.152 writes that Chipeta's son, Chabruma referred to the Njelu Ngoni as children and not warriors.

(2) Ibid., pp.97-105.

(3) Ebner to Redmond, interview 18.10.1972; Spiss, op cit, p.2 wrote in 1904 that the Hehe attacked Chipeta. He makes no mention of their effect on Njelu, thereby suggesting the war was an Mshope affair. Ebner, Erzählungen, p.62 tradition of P.Nanguru.



# HEHE WARS IN UNGONI 1878, 1881

KEY. 1878 WAR —  
1881 WAR —

and they went forth. They met the Hehe somewhere between the Mngongoma Mountains and Mkutano. In the ensuing battle, the Njelu army was virtually annihilated. Mbemisa escaped only to die shortly afterwards.(1)

Not knowing of the disaster which had struck their army, the remainder of the Njelu political community were unprepared for the next move of the Hehe, the onslaught of Mharule's capital at Ngalanga. The capital was burned and the fleeing Ngoni hotly pursued. Among the many who were killed while fleeing was Malinu, the Queen Mother.(2) When the Hehe had chased the Ngoni as far as the Mngaka River, they turned back.(3)

Shortly after the Hehe departure, the surviving Ngoni began preparing to revenge the humiliation their people had suffered. An Njelu army, led by Songea Mbano and Mpambalioto Soko, marched north to join an Mshope one led by Mnyukwa Tawete, Mandati and Mavimba(4) and together they pursued the homeward bound Hehe. They encountered the Hehe in northern Mshope and defeated and put them to flight. They then took the offensive and marched into Uhehe where they ravaged much of the land and dispersed many people. A Hehe force led by Myugumba attacked them but was on the verge of defeat before his son, Mwawa's, reconstituted force resumed the offensive and rescued it.(5)

---

(1) Ebner, History, pp.98-103; Prince, op cit, p.216; Gulliver, "A history", p.23.

(2) W.P.Johnson, who visited Njelu in 1882 wrote that nduna Songea lamented to him that "the old Wangoni have all been killed off", CA, v.1, n.4, 4.1883.

(3) Gulliver, "A history", p.24; Ebner, History, pp.99-100.

(4) Arning, op cit, 1897, p.47-8 states that the Mshope were saved from annihilation by the Njelu. Ebner, History, p.100.

(5) Tawete, op cit, section 77.



In a further battle, Mkwawa drove the Ngoni from Uhehe.

Tension remained strong between the two powers for the next three years. However, there were no major wars because, following the first series of wars in 1878, both powers were involved in difficult succession crises. In Uhehe, Myugumba died after dividing his kingdom between two sons and these then fought for exclusive control. Mkwawa won. In the Mshope state, Chipeta's sons and relatives engaged in a bitter struggle for the throne, described in detail below. After Mkwawa took the throne in Uhehe, he made plans for a second, decisive war against the Ngoni.(1)

In 1881(2), Mkwawa marched his army down into Ungoni for the second time. But the Ngoni had expected further hostilities and had prepared themselves by uniting in a military alliance.(3) The two armies met at Ngalanga, where they fought a bitter and costly battle. The Ngoni lost and retreated into the Lupagaro Mountains. The Hehe pursued them there and a second battle was fought. This time the Ngoni defeated their enemy.(4) The Hehe retreated into their own country hotly pursued by the Ngoni. In Uhehe, the Ngoni began plundering and collecting booty and cattle. However, the Hehe were by no means crushed and, mobilizing again, they met and fought the Ngoni and drove them from Uhehe..

---

(1) Adams, Dienste, p.44; Ebner, History, p.102.

(2) Ebner, History, p.103 prefers 1881 to the 1882 date given by Nigmann in Die Wahehe, (Berlin, 1908). He gives detailed reasons, one being the fact that the Ngoni raided in the east in 1882. His reasons and the 1881 date is accepted by the author.

(3) Prince, op cit, p.216 states Mlamilo was commander; Tawete, op cit, section 73 states an Mshope nduna, Ikulu Mandati was. This is unlikely.

(4) Tawete, op cit, section 81 states that the manduna Ikulu Mandati and Mavimba died in this battle.

Both wars ended inconclusively and the two powerful and equal peoples agreed to postpone any further conflict until the next generation had grown up.(1) They delineated boundaries and areas of influence that each subsequently adhered to. From then on, the two powers retained a healthy respect and fear for each other(2), while at the same time increasing an enmity that, a decade or so later, prevented their co-operation to expel a third enemy, the Germans.

## V

The wars against the Hehe brought many changes to Ngoni society. Some were immediate and of little consequence, others lasting and very destructive. The kingdom which suffered the most was Mshope, whose lands bordered Uhehe and whose leaders had shown an active hostility towards the Hehe for many years.

One of the most important results of the Hehe wars in Mshope was the killing of the nkosi, Chipeta. Since Chipeta's death came prematurely, the succession had probably not been planned for. This need not have been a problem, at least according to precedent in other Ngoni societies. For example, the Swazi considered it reasonable to select an heir after an nkosi's death(3)

- 
- (1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.13; Ebner, History, pp.104-5; TDB, v.4, p.213; J.Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, (London, 1965), p.23 incorrectly claims a victory for the Hehe.
  - (2) W.P.Johnson, CA, v.I, n.7, 7.1883,p.108; Fülleborn, op cit, p.135 and Arning, op cit, 1897, p.48 all have comments on mutual fear; R.Cornevin in Gann & Duigan, Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, (Cambridge, 1969), p.408 incorrectly claims the Hehe were the only kingdom in "the southern quarter of the German colony" around 1880.
  - (3) H.Beemer, "The development of the military organization in Swaziland", Africa, v.X, (1937), p.64.

while the Maseko, or Gomani, Ngoni had seldom decided on the successor before the nkosi's death(1). However, succession did become a problem in Mshope. This was due, to an important extent, to the pressures on the Mshope to select a strong successor to counter the Hehe threat. Complicating the issue was the general structure of Ngoni society and the ever present dichotomy between the need for unity in a military society and the ever present tendency towards segmentation and fission.(2) This problem was intensified by the particular type of leadership which had been exercised by Chipeta, one in which a powerful leader had preserved control over his people through preventing the rise of powerful factions that could take over in his place. The result was severe internal disruption.

While the succession was being resolved, Chipeta's ageing uncle, Mnyukwa, was appointed Regent.(3) Two claimants offered themselves initially. Both were sons of Chipeta, one, Chabruma, born of a Thonga woman, the other, Palangu, born of a Swazi woman.(4) Though Palangu appears to have been the more legitimate in terms of blood(5), the throne went to Chabruma(6). He was older and better trained in military tactics and appears to have taken part in the campaign against the Hehe.(7) These were

---

(1) Read, The Ngoni, p.53.

(2) See M.Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society, (Oxford, 1963) pp.xxi and 141 for comments on kingship conflict.

(3) Gulliver, "A history", p.23 states he was Regent for four years.

(4) Booth, op cit, p.223; TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.124.

(5) Gulliver, "A history", p.23; for blood as a qualification among the Swazi, see Beemer, op cit, p.64.

(6) RH, s.585, Palangu's autobiography names the elders selecting him.

(7) Arning, op cit, 1897, p.48.

apparently welcome credentials to a people who feared

the Hehe.

Palangu and his faction refused to accept the new nkosi and tried to break away. Chabruma sent his forces against them and, according to a tradition related by his grandson, he killed a number of Palangu's supporters, captured his wives, and claimed booty from Palangu.(1) Palangu was captured but his life was spared, apparently because senior advisers within the kingdom felt his murder would be needlessly divisive.(2) Relations between the two men appear to have improved later and Palangu appears to have accepted his subordinate status. However, his faction did not forgive the injustice done to them completely and, one tradition notes, the house of Palangu's mother, Nakikonde, became a centre of intrigue against Chabruma.(3) It was to be only with Chabruma that Palangu and his faction accepted inferior status, and in almost every subsequent succession to the nkosiship in Mshope, they were to claim the throne.

Following the resolution of the conflict between Chabruma and Palangu, a second, much more damaging, conflict arose. After the Regent, Mnyukwa, died, his son, Mpepo, made a bid for the nkosiship. Mpepo's claim bore a close relationship to that Ntabeni had made against Zwangendaba's sons some thirty-five years earlier.(4) The basis to this bid needs some discussion. As Mpepo

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.124, Palangu's life as told by Missoro; TDB, v.4, p.225 states that Palangu fled to Mharule's.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.124, Palangu's autobiography adds that he was given Likuyu and Mbunga, the eastern regions of Mshope, to rule; TDB, v.4, p.225 states he was given Kitanda, a section of the east.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.A; DKB, v.X, n.19, 1.10.1899, p.658 talks of the brothers being rivals.

(4) See above, p. 42.

was a 'brother' of the dead nkosi, Chipeta, it is possible that the 'brother' versus 'son' claim arose here. Though a most unlikely form of accession for the Ngoni, that through 'brothers' was later to spring up in succession issues in the two kingdoms, and consequently merits some comment here. According to Ngoni laws of succession, the eldest son of the 'Great wife' was the heir. If he were not of age, a brother of the late nkosi acted as Regent in his stead until he was an adult. The Zwangendaba Ngoni appear to have observed this practice sufficiently to dismiss the possibility of a 'brother' being preferred to a 'son'. However, the Njelu and Mshope could not claim to observe the laws so closely. Indeed, as late as the 1950s, individuals were claiming that 'brothers' had prior rights over 'sons'.(1) Ebner suggests an answer for this modification of an important principle in writing that the Njelu and Mshope absorbed many Thonga, who practice succession by 'brother', and that perhaps Ngoni custom changed under their influence.(2) However, it seems more likely that succession by 'son' was the accepted principle but that, if a son was unacceptable or a brother in a strong position, then the latter could become nkosi in preference to the son. The opportunity of acting as a Regent appears to have been a useful stepping stone to the throne, in that it permitted an outside, usually a brother, to consolidate power.(3) Mpepo's faction appears to have done this.

If a faction within a ruling clan failed in its bid for the

- 
- (1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.iii; Komba, op cit, p.17 called it a 'deviation from the Zulu'; TNA/155/SDB, file C, v.4, p.E.
  - (2) Ebner to Redmond, correspondence 2.2.1970.
  - (3) Beemer, op cit, p.64 states that among the Swazi, brothers often sought to gain the position of highest power.

111

nkosiship, it could segment as was the practice in southern Africa during the eighteenth century, if the nkosi accepted this, or it could break away altogether from the kingdom. In this particular dispute, the unsuccessful claimant preferred fission.

According to one interpretation, Mpepo rebelled because he was jealous.(1) Another states this jealousy was based on dissatisfaction at being denied the cattle he felt himself entitled to under Ngoni laws of succession(2). As Palangu himself had earlier expressed the same grievance(3), Mpepo's complaint may have signified a bid for the nkosiship. Traditions of his people state definitely that he bid for the nkosiship.(4) Mpepo rebelled against Chabruma and a civil war began. Palangu supported Chabruma in this war because, according to him, he was offered spoils and the control of his own area afterwards.(5) A possible added inducement was the fact that he was part of the family branch which Mpepo was seeking to overthrow. In the bitter war which ensued, Chabruma defeated Mpepo. However, he was unable to bring Mpepo's strong force under submission and the latter broke away from the Mshope kingdom and moved off on his own(6), with some two thousand adherents, comprising one-fourth of the Mshope kingdom(7).

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.216.

(2) Gulliver, "A history", p.23 states that property and rank could be inherited separately and that Mpepo did not claim the nkosiship.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.124, Palangu's autobiography.

(4) TDB, Mahenge District Book; TNA/155/SDB, v.2,p.B, an Ndendeule history, agrees as does TDB, v.4, p.218.

(5) TNA/155/SDB, v.2,p.124, Palangu's autobiography.

(6) Ebner, History, p.151 gives 1883 as the date of the move.

(7) Prince, op cit, p.216.

Mpepo marched into Ulanga in the north-east. There he met Mtengula's Bena who had fled from the Hehe in the 1870s. His arrival ascerbated Ngoni involvement in the aftermath of the difficult succession crisis the Bena had just gone through after Mtengula's death. Mtengula's two sons, Kiwanga and Sakamaganga had fought for the succession. The former had won and driven the latter south into the Ifinga area. There, Sakamaganga allied with Chabruma, whose support he used to renew his struggle to regain Ubena. Chabruma's support of his opponent had angered Kiwanga so when Mpepo entered his kingdom, the two made a military alliance and prepared for war against Chabruma. They led an army down into Mshope, only to be defeated by Chabruma. After this, overt hostilities ended between Mpepo, Kiwanga and Chabruma. Mpepo settled in the country of Mkasu, in the Kilosa area.(1)

The Mpepo fission was to be the second instance of fission among the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, though it was not to be the last nor the most damaging.(2) Prior to that fission and in most later disputes, the Ngoni were able to resolve successions through force persuasion without there being any need for fission.

A second major result of the Hehe wars for the Mshope was the imposing of limitations on its military exapnsion. More is said about this in the following chapter. The reorientation in military expansion was marked by the transfer of the nkosi's

- 
- (1) A.T.Culwick, Ubena of the Rivers, (London, 1935), pp.43-7; Prince, op cit, p.216; Fulleborn, op cit, p.135; A.M.West in Songea Annual Report, in TNA/SEC/1733/22; Ebner, History, pp. 151-2; Gulliver, "A history", p.23; TDB, v.4, p.86.
- (2) This dubious honour was to be held by the 1952-4 succession in Mshope, for which see Chapter Eight, section IV.

capital from Old Gumbiro to Usangila to its south-east.(1)

In Njelu, one effect of the Hehe wars was an increase in the decentralization which had been going on since the 1870s. This occurred when the Njelu nkosi, Mharule, decided to move his capital further south to Mtunduvaro.(2) When he did this, some manduna who had previously lived with him moved away to live on their own. One tradition suggests that this was done in order that the Ngoni might not be defeated in one fell swoop again.(3) Though this is plausible in that unaffected communities could mobilize while one of their number was attacked, it seems more likely that decentralization was the result of increased population and the natural inclination to segment which followed the change of capitals.(4)

A second result of the Hehe wars in Njelu was the changing in direction of military expansion. Njelu, as well as Mshope, was now restricted in its plundering to the north-west and, accordingly, it turned east and south to a greater degree. This reorientation brought, in its wake, some changes in the economic benefits of military expansion. These included a probable decline in interest in cattle as there were no cattle in the south and east. It brought political change as well, for in the lands they were now to raid, the Ngoni were to find coastal peoples and Europeans, and gradually both were to bring considerable change to Ngoni society.

---

(1) Ebner, History, p.152.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid., p.102.

(4) This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, section II.



One noticeable difference between the disruptions caused by the Hehe and those which followed the Maseko expulsion was the absence of any major reaction by subject groups. In the 1860s, these peoples had used the opportunity of the death of an nkosi and the subsequent disruptions to try and establish their own military states. However, in the troubled times during and after the Hehe wars, nothing was done. The main reason for this seems to have been the absence of powerful allies. In the 1860s, dissatisfied subjects could join with the Njelu and Mshope in overthrowing the Maseko, but in the 1880s there was no available ally. Secondly, the Njelu and Mshope probably integrated their subjects more successfully than had the Maseko, mainly because they had more time in which to do it, many subjects having been under an Ngoni influence since the mid-1840s.

After the Hehe challenge had been met and successfully dealt with, the two kingdoms entered what were probably the greatest years in their history. In the course of expansion and growth from around 1880 onwards, the Ngoni were to meet two new forces, the coastal peoples and the Europeans, who were to have a far greater impact on them than the Hehe had ever had.

## Chapter 3

## The Height of Empire, early 1880s-1897


## I

The years from the time of the first Hehe war in 1878 until 1897 were those of greatest expansion for the Ngoni. The peoples of both states had been set back for a while by the Hehe, but after overcoming this, they met no further trouble for two decades. New lands were found to replace those cut off by the Hehe, and in these lands further populations and goods were available in ever greater quantities.

Of the two kingdoms, Njelu became by far the more important during these years. It had been restricted in the north-west by the Hehe, but soon found new lands in the south-west, the south and the east which more than made up for the loss. The reorientation was marked by a general movement of the Njelu people towards the south. The nkosi, Mharule, set up a capital at Mtunduvaro, then at Magomero. (see map, page 127 ). The two leading military manduna followed him southwards, Songea to Mzamara Hill and Mpambalioto to the Mtopesi River, then to Lilawala near Zomba. Other manduna who had been living with the nkosi, now separated and established<sup>e</sup> their own settlements.(1) The location of these new settlements altered raiding patterns. Songea's settlement in the east looked out on to the wealthy Yao lands to the south as well as the vast region to the east where lived considerable numbers


---

(1) Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), mission press, pp.96, 102, 115-6, 131, 227.



M'SHOPE AND NJELU MILITARY EXPANSION, 1878-1897

## Southern East Africa



of people. Mharule's, Chikuse's and Putire's settlements opened to the south and the west. Mpambalioto's settlement in the west gave him greater opportunities there and to the north-west.

Little information was found on raiding undertaken in the north-west. Fülleborn notes Ngoni attacks on the Konde(1), Wright mentions that the Kinga and other peoples welcomed missionaries in 1891 as a defence against the Ngoni(2), while Spies talks of a war between Mharule's people and the Sokile(3). These suggest that the Njelu continued to have considerable independence of action in the lands at the north end of Lake Nyasa, possibly because the Hehe did not consider them integral to their sphere of influence. No references to any raids among the Bena or other northern groups were found, and it appears the Njelu were not active in these sensitive lands.

Military expansion in the West completed the subjugation of the Matengo by the mid-1880s.(4) Some of the people captured were brought to Ngoni settlements, while others were set up in satellite communities to the west of Ungoni. The most famous of these satellite

- 
- (1) F. Fülleborn, Das Deutsche Nyassa und Ruvuma Gebiet, (Berlin, 1906), Reimer, p.303-4. He does not specify Njelu.
  - (2) M. Wright, German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-1941, (Oxford, 1971), OUP, pp.38-9, 46-7. Njelu not specified.
  - (3) E. Spies, "Observations on Utani customs among the Ngoni of Songea District", TNR, n.16, (1943), p.29.
  - (4) Ebner, History, p.125 has some good accounts of the wars against the Matengo and the Matengo version of how they started; TDB, v.4, p.221.

towns was Amakita's, which lay astride one of the major routes from the lakeshore to Ungoni and was visited by most European travellers to Ungoni. The Matengo tribute settlements appear to have belonged to numerous Njelu manduna, including Songea(1), Chikuse(2), Putire and the nkosi, Mharule(3).

Interest in the lakeshore grew considerably after 1880, particularly in the lands south of Mbamba Bay. By the mid-1880s most Nyasa communities north of Chiteji's had either learned to protect themselves from the Ngoni or had submitted. One missionary wrote in 1885:

"We saw the evil results of the terror of this tribe (Ngoni) all along the coast (of Lake Nyasa), for long distances there is not a house, all the people are collecting into a few great towns close to the water's edge. They have chosen the most unhealthy situations, each town having a marsh or water behind it."(4)

Those who submitted did so to improve their lot wrote one missionary who explained that a group from Mbamba Bay going to pay tribute to nduna Songea in 1886 did so "that they might leave the rocks and caves where they were living in fear and come out and cultivate the land and build houses in more convenient places".(5) By the late 1890s most of the land between Njelu and Lake Nyasa was inhabited by Ngoni and tribute-paying communities of Nyasa.

By the 1890s, the Nyasa had become pawns in a powerful struggle between the Njelu Ngoni and some of the leading Yao chiefs living south of the Ruvuma. These chiefs, in their quest for slaves, were moving in on lakeshore communities and the Ngoni, determined to

---

(1) C.A.Smythies, CA, v.V, n.49, 1.1887; Smythies, (1885), p.27.

(2) C.A.Smythies, A Journey to Lake Nyassa and to the Magwangwara and the Source of the Rovuma in the year 1886, (Zanzibar, n.d.) p.26.

(3) Ebner, History, p.149 has the history of a Matengo captured by Mharule.

(4) C.A.Smythies, CA, v.III, n.36, 12.1885, p.167.

(5) USPG, A1.V, Box B, letters n.170-316, C.A.Smythies, n.d. (c.7.1886)

protect their subjects and their raiding lands, were allying with semi-independent Nyasa chiefs in attacking the Yao.(1) The struggle bore resemblance to the contests between the Hehe and the Mshope Ngoni during the 1870s, though this time the Ngoni were in a superior position and by the 1890s had the upper hand.

While some Yao were challenging the Ngoni, others were in fear of them. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, one Ngoni military expedition after another marched south of the Ruvuma to plunder isolated Yao communities, to disrupt trade and to force a general shifting of population. Small Yao communities responded to the Ngoni threat by amalgamating into larger units or by moving to safer locations near the lake or further south or east. Larger communities which suffered incursions moved to more favourable locations. For example, Makanjila moved from the Ruvuma to near the lake(2), while Mataka moved to the edge of a mountain ridge(3). The impact of Ngoni raiding was considerable, given the size of some of the affected communities. For instance, Chiteji and Makanjila, both of whom submitted to the Ngoni, were reported to have 6,000 men each in 1882.(4) By the 1890s, according to Ebner, those who had submitted included "Mataka...the most important of all Wayao chiefs...Kalanji...Kwisombe...Makanjila".(5) By the

---

(1) B.H.Barnes, Johnson of Nyasaland, (London, 1933), p.114.

(2) Smythies, A Journey, p.18 and p.9, Mataka moving.

(3) Ibid.

(4) W.P.Johnson, "The Rev.W.P.Johnson's journeys in the Yao country, and discovery of the sources of the Lujende", PRGS, v.IV, (1882), n.8, p.484.

(5) Ebner, History, p.107; USPG, A1.VI, Box 1, misc.letters n.1160-1998, Swinny to Penny, 15.5.1886. A Yao informed Swinny that Mataka submitted after the Sultan of Zanzibar had enjoined him to

abstain from war as far as possible; Ebner, Texte in Neu-Kingoni: (vol. 1) Erzählungen, Fabeln, Rätsel, Sprichwörter, (1969) SOA, p.73 has an interesting description of an attack on Zomba.

1890s, there were pressures in Njelu to annex part of Yaoland.(1) Nduna Songea was the most determined plunderer of the Yao and a large percentage of his subjects were Yao by the 1890s. Among others who attacked them were nkosi Mharule, and the manduna Chikuse and Mgendera.

The lands east of Njelu came under systematic attack after the first Hehe war had pushed the Njelu southwards. The plundering of this region was initiated by the spectacular attack on the UMCA mission station and freed-slave settlement at Masasi in 1882.(2) One missionary was told that Yao and other coastal peoples had persuaded nduna Songea to attack it.(3) It seems likely that Songea was looking for new regions into which to send his armies and looked upon the east as a good one. By attacking the missionaries first, he may have sought to neutralize the most obvious threat to his expansion in the east. The missionaries chose not to resist and seven of their people were killed while twenty-nine were taken as captives to Songea's.(4) The missionary, W.C.Porter, was forced to go to Songea's and bargain for their release. While there, he concluded an agreement whereby the mission was freed from further attack, apparently upon the payment of a regular tribute.(5)

Though the missionaries were freed from attack, their neighbours were not and, from 1882 onwards, the Ngoni plundered Yao, Makua and Mwera communities in the east with impunity. Their devastating

---

(1) MMR/6/68/3/3/1, tradition of L.Fusi Gama.

(2) USPG, A1.VI, Canon Porter, Memorials of Masasi 12.1880 to 12.1904, p.28; R.G.P.Lamburn, "The Angoni raid on Masasi in 1882", TNR, n.66, (1966), pp.207-13.

(3) Porter, Memorials, p.54.

(4) Ibid., p.29; Lamburn, op cit, pp.207-13.

(5) Porter, Memorials; Porter, "The Magwangwara", J.Manchester GS, v.II, (1886), pp.265-82.

attacks forced many peoples to find new and safer settlements. For example, the Makonde, who had been withdrawing into the Makonde Plateau before the 1880s, hastened their withdrawal and effectively cut themselves off from foreign influences.(1) The Makua and Yao built settlements on mountain ridges.(2) Places that were very vulnerable were deserted and, by the mid-1880s, the entire region between Masasi and Ungoni lay barren and largely empty.(3)

People in the east reacted to the Ngoni threat in much the same way as those elsewhere. A number submitted and began paying tribute, such as, for example, the important Yao chief Matola.(4) Some continued to hide and remained subject to attacks into the 1890s.(5) Very few resisted overtly. One who did was the Yao leader Machemba, who defeated an Ngoni force in 1888 and thus preserved his independence.(6) The main Ngoni protagonist in the east was nduna Songea. It was largely through his dominance in this important area of expansion that he later came to be so well known to coastal peoples.

Njelu expansion in the south-east, that is the lands below the Ruvuma and east of the Lujenda, went on contemporaneously

- 
- (1) Smythies, CA, v.IX, (1891), p.132 describes some of their defences; see also G.Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political Developments in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde, (Evanston, 1971), chs.2 and 3.
  - (2) Smythies, CA, v.V, n.51, 3.1887; Fülleborn, op cit, p.53.
  - (3) G.Lieder, "Reise von der Mbampa-Bai am Nyassa-See nach Kisswere am Indischen Ocean...", MadS, v.X, (1897), p.110.
  - (4) Farler, CA, v.XIV, n.161, (1896), p.83 describes him paying tribute of goats, cloth, etc; for a claim that he did not pay tribute, see Liebenow, op cit, p.48.
  - (5) The Mwera were attacked quite late, eg. USPG, letters from Africans, A5, n.5644. I wish to thank Terence Ranger for noticing and showing me this reference.
  - (6) USPG. A1.VI, Box 1, Porter to Penney, 11.6.1888; Ebner, History, p.113-4.



with raids in the east. The peoples who lived in this region included the Makua, Mawia, Yao and the Nindi(Mazitu). The Nindi were major targets for the Ngoni who despised them as inferior imitators. As early as 1882, a British consul in Mozambique, while condemning Ngoni and Mafiti(Nindi) activities, was nonetheless grateful for their enmity towards each other as it often preoccupied them and lessened the threat to others.(1) Ngoni attacks on the Nindi continued well into the 1890s. The Makua were attacked from time to time(2), though the more isolated Mawia appear to have been left alone.

While the Njelu state found many new and populous lands to plunder after the Hehe wars, Mshope appears to have become spatially more restricted than before. This was because it lacked new regions into which to expand as the lands to their north were controlled by the Hehe and to the south by the Njelu. Moreover it lost the important raiding lands of the north-west. Finally, the state never fully recovered from the damaging civil and external wars of 1878 and 1881 against the Hehe, 1881-3 against Palangu, then Mpepo, then around 1886 against Kiwanga and Mpepo and failed after 1886 to make any remarkable military initiatives leading it to fall steadily behind Njelu in size and importance.

To the west, the Mshope appear to have raided, like the Njelu, the Konde, Kinga and other peoples at the northern end of Lake Nyasa.(3) They attacked the Bena frequently. One Bena tradition records that the Ngoni came "to catch cattle, goats and people" and that people reacted by moving to the forests and building small houses.(4) A

---

(1) H.R.O'Neill, "Journey in the district west of Cape Delgado", PRGS, v.V, (1883), pp.393-404.

(2) USFG, A1.VI, misc.letters, 1424-1608, J.Hainsworth to Travers, 23.11.1894.

(3) As noted on p.116, fns.1 and 2.

(4) M.Sankichi to S.Mwalongo, Our Past, (Peramiho), 1.11.1966.

number of Bena gradually accepted tribute-paying status under the Mshope. One of these, the Bena leader, Pangamahuti, submitted to the Mshope, according to Tawete, "for his own safety", apparently against Hehe attacks.(1) By 1897, the Mshope had a substantial settlement complex in the north-west, apparently comprising mainly Bena. Other peoples from the west and north-west to suffer Ngoni incursions included the Pangwa and Matumbi.(2)

In their attacks in the north-east, their second major region of military expansion, the Mshope plundered the lands of the Rufiji River, its tributaries and the lands to its north and south. Ngoni raids had considerable impact in the southern part of the region where they were at their most frequent. The Ndendeule, Ngindo and Rufiji(3) living in the region of the Luwegu and lower Rufiji were forced to flee to swamps and other inaccessible areas(4) or to vacate the region altogether. A Benedictine missionary, travelling through the country in 1897, offered an exaggerated picture of the impact of Ngoni raids when writing: "Hundreds of burnt villages, whole regions lying devastated, thousands of dead and captive people accrue to him (Chabruma)".(5) In some lands north of the Rufiji, the Ngoni

---

(1) D.M.M.Tawete, Account of the Wangoni, Tanganyika.

(2) Fülleborn, op cit, p.178; A Handbook of German East Africa, Admiralty, (London, 1916), I.D.1055, pp.51, 62.

(3) The Rufiji were a mixture of population groups, see W.Beardall, "Exploration of the Rufiji River under the orders of the Sultan of Zanzibar", PRGS, v.III, (1881), n.11, p.645.

(4) G.Lieder, "Zur Kenntnis der Karawanwege in südlichen Thiele des Ostafrikanischen Schutzgebietes", MadS, v.VII, (1894), n.4, p.272. He found little lowland cultivation as people were moving to safer places near the coast.

(5) M.Hartmann, Missbl., v.II, (1898), p.29.

forced the reorganization of settlement. The German traveller, Lieder, found this in 1894 when writing that some people carried on agriculture in large settlements, while being very much on guard against Ngoni incursions.(1) Others stayed out of the way of the Ngoni. Beardall wrote, in 1881, that the Mbunga feared and avoided them.(2) The nkosi Chabruma and nduna Palangu were responsible for the raids in the east.

Taken as a whole, the two Ngoni kingdoms east of Lake Nyasa experienced considerable expansion from 1878 onwards. By 1897 the Ngoni were known and feared from Kilwa to Delagoa Bay to both ends of Lake Nyasa. As before 1878, their expansion had many effects. It dislocated the peoples of a large region in East Africa and forced them to change their life-styles that they might accommodate themselves to a power they could not overcome. It affected long-distance trade, through both disrupting communications and preventing the accumulation of trade goods.(3) It complicated the European presence in East Africa in ways as diverse as burning European buildings and disrupting European religious and educational efforts.

Behind Ngoni expansion and motivating it to take the direction it did was the political system of the two kingdoms. As will now be seen, it was these that helped made Njelu expansion so varied and spectacular and caused the Mshope growth to be quieter and less effective.

## II

The political differences which had emerged between the two kingdoms before 1880, persisted after the Hehe wars. Events past, such as the Hehe wars, those to come, such as contact with neighbours, and the personalities of leaders involved

---

(1) Lieder, "Zur Kenntis", p.272.

(2) Beardall, op cit, p.652.

(3) O'Neill, op cit, p.397;

in military expansion and internal political life, all helped to determine this distinction. Both events and personalities played differing roles within each kingdom which are therefore treated separately. Of the two kingdoms, Njelu appears to have had the more complex military and administrative life between 1883 and 1897. This seems to have been largely because of the many bases of power comprising its political structure. This enlisted a more continuous and livelier participation in the affairs of the state from all sectors of the political community than did the centralized bureaucracy in the period following the Hehe wars. This popular participation was to be shown in both military and administrative life.

In military life, participation was increasingly shown in three ways. The first was in the formation of various fighting units. In this, the national age regiments, which had been decreasing in importance during the 1870s, were gradually replaced by territorial units, organized and commanded by the manduna in their areas of operation. Not much is known about the age regiments during these years. According to Ebner and Tawete(1), they continued to be formed on a regular basis. Possibly they assembled and fought in wars undertaken by the nkosi. These anyway appear to have been few in number and available information indicates that military men were waging most wars with their immediate followers rather than as part of any national regiment.(2) According to the evidence of extant

- 
- (1) As shown on the chart on age regiments, p.399. A.H. Pike to Redmond, interviews, 13.9.1971, 22.9.1971.  
 (2) Ebner, Texte (vol.1), pp.64-6 describes one such war related by Petri Nanguru in 1936.

traditions, the waging of wars by local rather than national forces was a common practice during Mharule's reign in the 1880s. After his death and the serious split in the kingdom which followed it, described below, local rather than national waging of war seems to have become almost the exclusive method of military organization.

A second aspect of military localization was the consolidation of an independent command structure. During the 1880s this was most evident in the case of the leading military manduna, such as nduna Songea, who had many lieutenants and a large army.(1) Lesser manduna were not so independent during Mharule's rule. Traditions indicate that a number of them, including Towatowa Gama, Mgendera Gama, Msukumbi Magagura and Manjoro(2), sought Mharule's approval before waging wars. At times, Mharule managed to constrain even his leading manduna. For example, in 1886, after the Njelu Ngoni had lost many men in a smallpox epidemic, he forbade Songea to allow an expedition and threatened him with an attack if he disobeyed.(3) Songea seems to have acceded to his wish. In the 1890s, after Mharule's death, the independent command structure advanced considerably as uncertainties over state leadership

- 
- (1) According to the son of one of Songea's leading lieutenants, Songea had ninety-nine companies of fifty men each, and one company of veterans, called makesa, in O. Guise-Williams papers, tradition of Kazipiga, son of Mfaranyaki. This may be an exaggeration. According to a German estimate on the Ngoni population in 1904 - which is questioned in Chapter Five, section IV - the Ngoni kingdoms had 34,000 people. This would give Songea probably no more than 6,000 followers, of whom 1,000 to 2,000 would have been in the army. The German estimate, however, appears to be an underestimate.
- (2) Ebner, Texte (vol.1), pp.4-8, 72-3, traditions of Petri Nanguru.
- (3) Smythies, A Journey; and USPG, A1.V, Box B, letters 170-316.

MAP II APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS  
MAJOR SETTLEMENTS OF THE NIELU C. 1885



led military men to plunder and wage war with little restraint. Independent military activity had its effects. For example, various manduna are known to have plundered groups who had already submitted to one nduna elsewhere.(1) Again, it became difficult for the Njelu state to present a united front to outsiders. This was to be clearly shown when Europeans began entering Ngoni country in a hostile manner.(2)

The third aspect of localization was the growth in the numbers of military settlements after 1878. The first major stage in segmentation followed the Hehe wars, when the nkosi and the leading manduna decided to establish their communities further to the south. These settlements, already noted above, comprised that of nkosi Mharule at Mtunduvare, then Magomero, then Mbinga, and those of the manduna Songea at Mzamara Hill, Mpambalioto at the Mtopesi River, then Lilawala, Chikuse at the Mkurumusi River near Mpitimbi and Chombera at Zomba. Other manduna who had been living with, or near, the nkosi, gradually moved further away. Masiwanyoni Magagura moved to the Namakinga River near Maposeni, then Mbunga on the lower side of the lower Mgugusi, Mlamilo moved to the left bank of the Mgugusi River, Putire went to the Mtopesi River, then to the Lihongwe River and Ngungu Nqumayo settled near Mgazini.(3) A third stage in segmentation appears to

---

(1) Johnson, Nyasa, p.113.

(2) As shown below, second half of section IV.

(3) T.von Prince, "Geschichte der Magwangwara nach Erzählung des Arabers Rashid bin Masaud und des Füssi, Bruders des vor drei Jahren verstorbenen Sultans der Magwangwara", MadS, v.VII, (1894), p. 218; Leider, "Reise", map; Ebner, History, pp.96, 102, 115-6, 131, 227; Revised History, pp.66-7.



have come in the late 1880s, after a number of the nkosi's brothers returned from the west side of Lake Nyasa whither they had fled in the 1860s.(1) In these new settlements, Mgendera settled apparently by the Luhira River near the Lupagaro Mountains and Fusi, first by the Mhangasi River, then near Luyangweni. A fourth phase in segmentation followed Mharule's death in 1889. Known to have moved around this time was Zamchaya, who moved to Maposeni on the Namakinga River, Magagura, who moved to near Mount Mara, and Zambangeya Gama who moved to the southern part of the Litenga Mountains.(2)

In their separate settlements, many Ngoni manduna were free to act quite independently and, through this, to gain considerable prestige and influence. As the size and populations of their sectors grew through wars, they became powerful and sometimes wealthy. The most notable example of a successful nduna was Songea Mbano, probably the most powerful man in Njelu in the 1890s. The son of a Kalanga captive, Songea rose to a position of power which completely overshadowed that of the Ngoni family which had originally captured his father. He appears to have been a highly intelligent and capable leader, and one possessed of excellent fighting abilities. In the 1860s, he had helped in the struggles against the Maseko. Later he was in the forefront in the wars against

---

(1) This is discussed further later in this section.

(2) Ebner, History, pp.115-6, 131-2; Prince, op cit; Leider, "Reise", map and p.102 states that Mlamilo's town had 1,000 to 2,000 huts in 1894, suggesting that some of these towns were quite large.



the Hehe. By the 1880s, he had built his army into what was probably the most effective force in the Njelu kingdom, and one which contained one-third of its total numbers. With his power, he was able to set himself up as a largely independent force within Njelu. His prestige and fame spread well beyond Ungoni. Among the many comments on him is the following by a UMCA missionary, W.C.Porter<sup>1</sup> made in 1882:

"He is not an unpleasant looking man, of about middle age, with a certain amount of dignity and self-possession, and rather inclined to be merry and free withal, and generally, I should say, superior in his intelligence, and approach to right feeling to most of his people. He was muffled in a large coat of kaniki (dark blue muslin) lined with bright coloured shiti (printed calico); when excited he had what was, I suppose, a Kaffir click."<sup>(1)</sup>

By the 1890s, when the royal family could not agree on a successor to the deceased Mharule, Songea apparently felt sufficiently important to reject subservience to any single faction within the royal family. He accordingly rejected the title of nduna and insisted that people accord him the greeting 'bayete', which was traditionally reserved for the nkosi.<sup>(2)</sup>

The other manduna in Njelu had less power and influence than Songea. Some appear to have been as competent militarily as he. These included Mpambalioto, Chikuse and Magagura, all mentioned as major leaders of the four geographic region of Njelu in 1894.<sup>(3)</sup> These, generally, had

---

(1) Porter, "The Magwangwara", pp.13-4.

(2) Prince, op cit, p.218; noted in Ebner, Revised History, p.9.

(3) Lieder, "Reise", p.219, he had the three in the western, northern and southern regions respectively; however, Ebner, History, pp.115-6, has Chikuse in the southern, Putire in the western and Chombera in the northern. Both are approximately correct, eg., Mpambalioto, Putire and Chombera all fought in the western and northern regions.

some reason for being less powerful than Songea. For example, Mpambalioto had a less favourable settlement than Songea. Songea's settlement was the easternmost one in Njelu and had access to the vast lands stretching to the Indian Ocean and down into Moçambique. Mpambalioto, on the other hand, lived in the north-west where he was restricted by the Mshope kingdom, the Hehe state, and three other Njelu manduna. Consequently, he had a much smaller territory from which to collect followers.(1)

Military decentralization in Njelu after 1880 therefore presents a varied picture. The population as a whole had been steadily increasing, encouraging the expansion into new areas. By the 1880s, the Njelu kingdom was probably three times the size it had been in the 1870s.(2) Secondly, the few military manduna reigning in the 1870s were now, in the 1880s and 1890s, being supplemented by their sons as well as captives who had proven themselves in war. One notable example of a son becoming powerful during these years was Chabruma Gama, son of Hawai. By the 1890s, he was carving out his own sphere of influence in southern Njelu.(3) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, decentralization was a logical progression from pre-1880 politics in Njelu. The growing control of the manduna over military matters that we have already noted, and the ineffective efforts by the

---

(1) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10.1971.

(2) As shown on the maps on pp. 87 and 127.

(3) This sector is shown in map. German East Africa, GGD.4, 1:500,000, Songea.

nkosi to limit this control, inevitably led to the gaining of considerable powers by the manduna.

Military decentralization had certain advantages. First, it permitted a rapid and sustained growth of the state, as its constituent members all saw personal advantage in growth. Secondly, the existence of independent centres of authority appears to have facilitated the integration of captives. This was because such centres diffused the 'true Ngoni' among the 'sutu', thereby permitting a closer and more sustained contact than would have been possible had all 'true Ngoni' lived together. Furthermore, it was to the advantage of independent 'true Ngoni' groups to make as many people as possible into Ngoni like themselves to increase their power.

Moreover, some problems attributed to decentralization are not strictly its result. For example, the German visitor, Prince, wrote in 1894 that the divided Njelu society, uncertain in its political leadership and having semi-independent sections, was declining in many ways. He wrote that the training of warriors was declining, that military practices, such as late marriages, were being relaxed, and that military units were no longer kept separate.<sup>(1)</sup> However, while Njelu society was admittedly divided and changing its military practices, it is hard to accept that it was in decline. Military expansion was at its height during the 1890s, hardly likely if it were

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.220. He wrote that the slave trade and the abundance of women and beer helped the decline.

disintegrating. Again, the changes in certain military practices were probably desirable in the decentralized form Njelu expansion had taken.

While fission may have resulted from continued military decentralization, and separation actually seems to have been considered by at least nduna Songea, as noted above, neither actually occurred. This appears to have been because the tendency towards fission and separation was offset by forces within the state which worked to unify the people. One of these was the status of the nkosi and the royal family. The state was identified with the royal family and the nkosi, as representative of that family, was the much-needed symbol of the state. Military men, no matter how important, lacked this aura. Secondly, the nkosi bound himself to the military manduna in ways such as marrying his daughters to them and their sons(1), while the manduna themselves identified, presumably, with the royal family with whom they had built a state, in the course of which they had shared so many experiences. Finally, the nkosi had various means to push unity. These means included the use of military force, as for example, the one made by Mharule against Songea. There was also administrative power, which we consider next.

While military life in Njelu fostered decentralization, administrative life could do the opposite. Indeed, while

---

(1) J.Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) in Deutsch Ostafrika", Globus, lxxxviii, (1905), has a good discussion of this; Swinny stated that Songea married Mharule's sister, CA, v.IV, n.43, 7.1886.

the Njelu state functioned effectively, that is, while all sections of society accepted the structures and the holders of positions within it, it could control the possible effects of military diffusion. Had there been no administration, the Njelu state would have been little more than a fighting force held together through fear or advantage, yet bound to disintegrate when these feelings had vanished.

After 1878 the structure of administration in Njelu became more complex than it had been before. This was largely due to the expanding size and ever-growing population of the kingdom. The components of this structure were the same as they had been prior to 1880, though it appears that now there were more having greater duties.

On a senior level in the administration and representing the nkosi in some of the larger settlements were the immediate relatives of the nkosi, called the wantwana. As far as is known, only one group of wantwana was appointed during these years. This group comprised the nkosi's brothers and other sons who had fled west of the lake in the 1860s and returned in the 1880s. When they returned, Mharule sent some to live with or near the settlements of various leading manduna.

Two explanations have been given for the appointment of the wantwana to various parts of the kingdom. One by Gulliver states that Mharule wanted to increase the power of the royal family vis-a-vis that of the military

manduna, who were becoming an increasingly independent group.(1) He gives an example in the sending of Mkuzo to live near Chombera and Mpambalioto. Within two generations, Mkuzo's family was to take over power from Mpambalioto's descendants, and Gulliver sees this takeover as an example of the determination of the royal family to control the military manduna. However, this is to make three mistakes. First of all, it is unlikely that a royal family appointee could have claimed the loyalty of an nduna's followers given the Ngoni system of loyalty to the captor. Thus, the reasons for the transfer are

likely to have been exceptional.(2) Secondly, the wantwana, being representatives of the nkosi, would not have needed to replace the military manduna as their status was above that of the manduna.(3) Thirdly, the case Gulliver cites appears to have been the only one of its type while the takeover that occurred was very much in line with traditional customs: the nduna waged war and the nkosi's representative - say administrative nduna - administered. When war ended, the representative was the only one left with something to do.

A second explanation for their return and appointment to the settlements of various manduna is given by Ebner. He asserts that an issue of prestige was at stake. Mharule,

- 
- (1) P.H.Gulliver, "A history of the Songea Ngoni", TNR, n.41, (1955), p.22.
  - (2) As will be noted below, Mpambalioto's son allied with the Germans after 1897 and became a powerful Sultan. This may well have made him unpopular, see Chapter Six, section I.
  - (3) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Songea District, typescript, UDSM, p.ii recognizes this himself.

according to Ngoni law and tradition, had become the 'father' of the people in being nkosi and it was a boost to his prestige to have his 'children' west of the lake return to him. Their distribution throughout the kingdom would then manifest this prestige to all.

To some extent, both explanations are correct. The presence of numerous wantwana at the capital and throughout the kingdom helped both the prestige and the power of the nkosi. This seems to have been because it gave the nkosi the allegiance of more important members of Njelu society than that enjoyed by other leaders.

In addition to Mkuzo, the wantwana who returned from west of the lake included Mgendera, who lived near Songea's; Fusi, who set himself up in the west by the Mhangasi River, then near Luyangweni, and who apparently achieved pre-eminence over the settlement of Namkwawa Mligo and Mtakati Maseko(2); Zamchaya, who lived with Mharule; and Mkulayedwa and his son, Mtazama, who moved in with Putire(3). The return of Mkulayedwa is interesting, for he apparently did not consult Mharule before going to join Putire(4). Moreover, his return would have helped to strengthen the influence of the non-ruling Mapipu branch of the royal family.

Little information was obtained on the effectiveness of these representatives, though what was obtained suggests

---

(1) Ebner to Redmond, interview 18.10.1971; Ebner, Revised History, p.68.

(2) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10.1971; Ebner, History, pp.120-1.

(3) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10.1971.

(4) Ibid.

that it was slight. At least this is so for Mkuzo who, though a better administrator than Chombera, only really seems to have consolidated his power during the colonial period.(1) A second example, that of Mgendera, further suggests limited influence. Mgendera appears to have had no influence on Songea and to have spent his time trying to establish his own sphere of influence.(2)

The increasing numbers of wantwana in Njelu were eventually to have a far greater impact on the nkosi's succession and on the way in which his power would be divided than they appear to have had on increasing either his prestige or his power.

On other rungs of administration were various other officials. At the national level, there were two important officials we should mention. One was the religious leader, Chikuse Nanguru, then, after his death, his son, Kapungu. The powers of this leader have already been described.(3) A second official was the nduna ya nkosi. Mharule had a man named Nahwayira occupying this office. According to Ebner, among the known duties of this official were representing the nkosi, as he did when travelling west of the lake to persuade the nkosi's brothers to return, and settling major disputes, as when he persuaded Putire not to leave Njelu after the latter disputed with Mharule.(4) Administration at the village level was carried

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.34.

(2) Ebner, Texte (vol.1) pp.64-6 shows one example of this independent state-building by Mgendera.

(3) See above, Chapter Two, p.84.

(4) Ebner, Revised History, pp.68-9; History, p.121.



out by alumuzana. Their duties have already been described.(1) Their numbers appear to have increased considerably during these years, as the major settlements acquired more and more satellite villages.

The informal 'house' network of the nkosi existed during these years. It is not known exactly how many 'houses' there were at all times after 1880. The only information on numbers is provided by Prince, who said that in 1894, nkosi Mlamilo had three: his mother, Nalino, at Songea's; the deceased Mharule's wife at Magagura's; and his wife, Nyassere at Mpambalioto's and Chikuse's.(2) These women appear to have enjoyed considerable influence and seem to have been very helpful to the nkosi as political intermediaries.

Within the administrative network, the powers of the nkosi were theoretically considerable. For instance, judicially, he alone could pass the death penalty. This was apparently because the loss of a man was seen as a loss for the whole nation. Financially, he received a part of all spoils and, as guardian of the nation's cattle herds, was one of the wealthiest individuals in the state. Finally, in general administration, he determined most national policies as, for example, foreign relations. In actuality, his powers were not so considerable. As segmentation increased, so did the manduna's authority, and they assumed some powers

---

(1) See above, Chapter Two, p. 91.

(2) Prince, op cit, p.219.

hitherto reserved for the nkosi. For instance, Mpambalioto took for himself the power to pass the death penalty on his subjects.(1) Again, Songea began deciding some aspects of national politics, such as admitting Europeans without concern for the nkosi's decision to exclude them.(2) While the decentralization pushed by the military manduna and some factions of the ruling clan was the major characteristic of Njelu political life during the 1880s, it was not to be the most important characteristic of political life in the 1890s. This honour was to be held by dissension within the royal family which resulted from the bitterly disputed succession which followed nkosi Mharule's death in 1889. The dispute was to intensify decentralization, and to create a problem where none had been openly evident before as segmentation turned to fission.

It is possible that the military decentralization of the 1880s played some part in causing the succession crisis. This would be so if one accepts that nkosi Mharule brought back his long-absent relatives from west of Lake Nyasa in order to bolster his position vis-a-vis that of the military manduna. If this was his plan, it failed, for the returnees and the resident members of the royal family soon started fighting amongst themselves. The succession dispute arose when two factions of the Gama clan disputed the nkosiship. One represented

---

(1) J.Häfliger, "Land und Leute von Ungoni", Missbl., 1901, n.1, pp.158-9.

(2) See below pp. 170-1.

Zamchaya(1), a second son of Gwaserapasi, who had held the nkosiship for a short while in the late 1850s before fleeing west of the lake. The other claimant was Mlamilo, a younger brother of Mharule, and one of those who had not fled west of the lake in the 1850s/1860s.(2)

It is not clear who supported which faction. Prince, who visited Ungoni in 1894, offers some clues.(3) His main informant was Fusi, another of the family of Zulu who had returned from west of the lake. Fusi appears to have been a supporter of Zamchaya, an alliance strongly suggested by his testimony to Prince. A second clue comes from the names of those who opposed the leadership of Zamchaya's group a decade later. Two opponents were Chabruma, a son of Hawai, and Putire.(4) Both these men were part of Zulu's family which had not fled to the western side of the lake in the 1850s/1860s. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that Mlamilo was supported in this crisis by the branch of the royal family which had not fled from the Maseko in the late 1850s or early 1860s, while Zamchaya received the backing of the branch that fled, then returned in the 1860s.

The position of the military manduna is less clear.

---

(1) Also spelt Chem Chaya.

(2) According to Gulliver, "A History", p.21, Mlamilo, like Hawai, was from a junior branch of the Gama family.

(3) Prince, op cit.

(4) MMR/6/68/3/1.

The most powerful, nduna Songea, may have remained neutral. Prince suggests this when writing that Songea was becoming very independent and was even considering himself subservient to no one. In 1897, Songea was identified with Mlamilo(1), while eight years later he offered support to the ruling Zamchaya faction(2). Thus, his willingness to identify with both factions and his independence in the 1890s both suggest lack of enthusiasm for either candidate. Nothing is known of the position of lesser military manduna. However, some suggestions can be made. Military leaders, Mpambalioto's family in particular, are known to have sat on councils which selected later mankosi(3), and it is probable that they sat on the one which determined the 1889 succession. The council selected Mlamilo in the end, so it appears that some military manduna favoured Mlamilo with whom they had fought for many years, over the newcomer, Zamchaya.(4)

The only other interested parties were the coastal peoples and the Arabs. They were divided in their support. Rashid bin Masoud, a powerful and successful Arab trader in Njelu in 1889(5), supported Mlamilo. A major competitor of his, the Swahili, Kitunu, is known to have later supported the Zamchaya group.(6)

---

(1) See below, pp. 180.

(2) See below, Chapter Five, p. 252 has one example.

(3) See below, Chapter Eight, pp. 343.

(4) Prince, op cit, p.218 states that all manduna had to approve the successor, and so suggests this.

(5) A.Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes, (St. Ottilien, 1899), p.122 praises him; other German writers said much the same.

One possible issue in the succession struggle was the conflict over the legitimacy of 'brother' over 'son'. It is not certain, however, how important the issue was in 1889. According to two references, it seems to have been important. Spiss wrote in 1904 that Mlamilo became nkosi because 'customary right' was for the next eldest brother to succeed, (1) while Prince, who was much more involved in the same issue went so far as to say that Mlamilo was the next entitled because that branch of the Ngoni accept succession by brother. (2) Neither author provides further information on the sources of their information or on the possibility of of their having been conflict over this. What is most interesting about the laws of succession stated by these authors is that the Njelu Ngoni could have so fully adopted a variation on their kinsmens' succession principles within so short a while after separate settlement.

Yet how accurate and correct were Prince and Spiss when accepting that the 'brother' was more eligible than the 'son'? It is possible that both were told the brother was the more eligible because he was the one, in fact, who succeeded and in the turmoil which followed establishing this principle of 'brother' before 'son' may have been an important way of justifying their retention of power. Doubts are supported by the fact that Zamchaya could present such a formidable application though being quite young, inexperienced and only resident among the

---

(1) C.Spiss, "Kingtoni und Kisutu", MSOS, 1904, p.3.

(2) Prince, op cit, 217-8.

Njelu Ngoni for a few years. It seems highly likely that his bid was a strong one because of his blood: he was the son of Zulu's eldest son. The brothers of the eldest son - Hawai and Mharule - could possibly be seen as Regents who guided the kingdom for an unusually long time had Zamchaya been given the nkosi-ship.

Two issues must be seen as having been equally important to, if not more important than, that of 'brother' versus 'son'. The first is that of legitimacy. Theoretically, Zamchaya was the most eligible heir in the main line established by Zulu through his wife, Nyassere. Prince noted that this was in Zamchaya's favour.(1) However, in fact, the qualifications for eligibility had changed. It appears that the branch of Zulu's family which remained on the east side of Lake Nyasa when the others fled and which then assumed the leadership, felt that Gwaserapasi group, by fleeing, had relinquished its right to the nkosiship as regards both Gwaserapasi and his successors. It seems reasonable to expect the branch which remained east of Lake Nyasa and which built up Njelu to wish to retain control over the kingdom. The second issue is that of suitability. Here neither had perfect qualifications. Mlamilo was a sickly man who would be unable to rule well, while Zamchaya was young, apparently only twenty-two years old, inexperienced, troublesome in assemblies and indecorous.(2)

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.218.

(2) Ibid.

It is not clear how much emphasis can be placed on suitability. According to Kuper, who studied the Swazi - from whom the Njelu claim their origins - "in systems governed by the hereditary principle, character is a subordinate factor".(1) However, Read, who studied another migrant society preferred the opposite and held that suitability was a very important issue.(2) Because it was an issue stressed to Prince, it seems to have been somewhat important in the 1889 succession.

In the end, the council selected Mlamilo to be nkosi. Zamchaya reacted bitterly to his failure. He and his supporters refused to acknowledge the suzerainty to Mlamilo. Instead, he appears to have made himself an nkosi, and established his capital at Mbinga-Litenga.(3) Zamchaya did not go to war to gain the throne, possibly because his faction, comprising only recent arrivals in the district, were not as strong as the Mlamilo faction. Nor did he lead his group away from Njelu in fission, possibly because he hoped to eventually gain the kingdom by staying within it.

The succession crisis, besides creating two mankosi within the Njelu kingdom, also helped to increase the independence of the military manduna. If the hereditary rulers could not agree among themselves about who was to rule, then the military leaders could do much as they

---

(1) H.Kuper, An African Aristocracy, (London, 1947), OUP, p.103.

(2) M.Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1970), 2nd.ed., Cass, p.

(3) Ebner, Revised History, P.74; Lieder, "Reise", p.102 referred to Zamchaya as Mharule's successor; Fülleborn, op cit, p.137 said he did as he liked.

pleased. Prince indicated this in 1894 when stating that it was because of internal dissension that nduna Songea began dropping his title nduna and opting for signs of independent leadership.(1) Spiss agreed with the same in 1904, when writing that the internal dissension in Njelu gave opportunities for 'sutu leaders' (sic) such as Songea and Mpambalioto to gain sufficient prosperity and authority for them to threaten to surpass their captors in power.(2) Gulliver is not correct when stating that the nkosi and royal family sought to keep power from the military manduna - they gave it to them through their inability to resolve family differences.(3)

The troubles brought by the 1889 succession issue in Njelu were exacerbated in 1894 when Mlamilo sought to resign his nkosiship. Little information was found on the reasons for this. It seems that poor health was one. Those who <sup>a</sup> had supported him then apparently now gave their support to Chabruma, the son of Hawai (nkosi from around 1864 until 1874).(4) Zamchaya opposed him again. However, the candidates and their supporters were unable to reach any compromise and so Mharule decided to retain the nkosiship. Fülleborn<sup>e</sup> stated, from his 1897 visit, that he had not been earnest in his abdication.(5) Mlamilo was nkosi in 1897 when Lt. Engelhardt entered Njelu.(6)

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.218.

(2) Spiss, op cit, p.3.

(3) Gulliver, "A History", pp.24-5; see Chapter Two, pp.107-9.

(4) Prince, op cit, p.217. He states Chabruma was eligible.

(5) Fülleborn, op cit, p.137.

(6) See below, pp. 180.





The continuous crisis of leadership in Njelu had its effects. The group led by Zamchaya now considered itself independent of Mlamilo. Secondly, various manduna now began acting very much on their own. For example, Songea, by 1897, was beholding to no one(1), while Mpambalioto was acting as an independent leader as well(2). Military life was highly segmented and the kingdom lacked overall policies and general direction throughout the important decade of the 1890s. Dissension and internal independence then, were the components of Njelu political life. In 1894 when Prince described political life as being one of anarchy.(3) His statement was an exaggeration. The people were still obedient to their leaders and the leaders could, if the situation demanded, co-operate with each other.(4) Still, it was indicative of a complex political life.

Much less is known about the military and administrative history of the Mshope kingdom from around 1883 until 1897 than can be ascertained about Njelu. There are at least three reasons for this. First, Mshope was more isolated than Njelu so few Europeans visited it during the 1880s and 1890s, hence leaving much less data from which a history can be reconstructed. Secondly, Mshope was smaller than Njelu in size and population, factors which seem to have facilitated a

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.219.

(2) Ebner, History, p.131.

(3) Prince, op cit, pp.217-20; Adams, Dienste, p.120; for comments on the improbability of fission, see Kuper, op cit, pp.110-1.

(4) As they were to when the Germans entered in 1897, for which see below, section IV.

a simpler style of political life than that which existed in Njelu during these years. Finally, as far as we know, Mshope experienced little trouble during these years. The difficult and damaging succession crisis of 1878-1883 had been resolved considerable tension within the kingdom. Any tension that remained appears to have been carefully controlled by Chabruma.

Despite lack of data however, it is possible to discern a general pattern of military and administrative development in Mshope during these years. This pattern is the continuance of a strongly centralist state, a very different pattern from the one dominant in Njelu during the same period. There are various reasons for this pattern. First, there was no succession crisis during these years to upset the balance which had been established by Chabruma when he expelled Mpepp and fought and defeated Palangu in the crisis which lasted from 1878 until the mid-1880s. Secondly, nkosi Chabruma successfully managed to pursue a policy of political centralism. He wanted to avoid any further rivalries in the royal family and to keep the state prepared for fresh hostilities with the Hehe. Both could be done by keeping a firm control over Mshope. This he did because he was intelligent, determined, and fearsome enough - his nickname was 'the Thunderer'(1) - to control his people and prevent anyone from opposing him.(2) Finally, a tendency towards

---

(1) A.M. West in the Songea Annual Report 1922, TNA/1733/22.

(2) He was to show how well he could control opposition in the Maji Maji rebellion, see below Chapter Five, sec. IV.

political centralism seems to have already existed within the society. Chipeta seems to have ruled his people with a tight rein and, presumably, his son saw the advantage of doing the same himself.

The fact of centralized rule was shown in the direction and organization of the military as well as in the allocation of powers in the administration. The direction of military life seems to have been very much Chabruma's prerogative. Though the evidence for this is sparse, it appears that Chabruma planned and directed the execution of most campaigns. An indication of this is given by an Ndendeule tradition which describes how some 'sutu' in eastern Mshope participated in six campaigns against the Ngindo, in each of which they were led by a different general(1), presumably appointed by the nkosi. Only two Mshope manduna are known to have conducted independent military campaigns. But these two, Palangu and Sakamaganga, were exceptional anyway. Palangu appears to have been in a special position after the resolution of the succession dispute, while Sakamaganga was a Bena ally, not an Ngoni subject, of Chabruma's. Yet even in the case of these two, it was Chabruma who was often considered the mastermind behind their actions. For example, in 1894 when the Mshope raided Kilwa, an action credited by traditions to Palangu(2), it was

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B,

(2) Fülleborn, *op.cit.*, p.136; DKB, v.V, n.11, 1.5.1894.

Chabruma who was blamed and had to suffer the consequences.(1) Again, in the late 1890s, when Sakamaganga attacked Kiwanga, who was, by then, allied with the Germans,<sup>(2)</sup> Chabruma again received some criticism. Chabruma's success in keeping all his subjects under his control was to be shown most forcefully in the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905.

The organization of the army was similar to that in Njelu. There were both age regiments and area units. But here, age regiments seem to have remained proportionately stronger than in Njelu. A list of Mshope age regiments, given by Chabruma's grandson(3), is larger than a comparable one which emphasises Njelu(4). Again, it is known that new regiments were formed as late as 1905 in Mshope(5), while the same is not confirmed for Njelu. Finally, as Mshope was more centralized than Njelu, it would seem logical that its rulers placed greater emphasis on age regiments where control remained at the capital than on area units where it was dissipated. A second organizational distinction between Njelu and Mshope seems to have been with regard to the ties between area units and the nkosi. In Njelu, the nkosi seems to have had very little control over area units. However, in Mshope, according to the above/noted Ndendeule tradition, his influence seems to have been considerable if he was able to order different manduna to lead the same group in various campaigns.

---

(1) See below, section IV.

(2) M.Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2, p.28.

(3) See above, Chapter Two, p. 399.

(4) Ibid.

(5) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interviews 13.9.1971; 22.9.1971.

The numbers of military settlements in Mshope are not known precisely. This is due to the limited data presently available on the kingdom. A German missionary, M.Hartmann, passing through the kingdom in 1897, noted only one large complex. He wrote that for three hours before reaching Chabruma's capital of Usangila, he passed 1,500 huts, while in the capital itself there were some four hundred.(1) Because he travelled north to south, he could not have seen the Ndendeule and Ngindo satellite villages in the east and the Bena and Pangwa ones in the west. Settlements in these two regions outside the capital appear to have been governed by the appointees of the nkosi, with the exception of Palangu's. No royal family or military nduna, besides Palangu, is remembered as having been the effective leader of either area. Palangu was credited with leadership of an area. Adams went so far as to identify he and Chabruma as rulers of the northern kingdom.(2) Various leaders who are identified in traditions, particularly that of the Ndendeule collected in the 1930s, appear to have all been local Ndendeule notables under Chabruma's control.(3) The absence of military settlements in Mshope provides a considerable contrast with the ever increasing numbers of those in Njelu during the same period.

Renowned military manduna in Mshope, such as Chilembo, appear to have lived at or near the capital and to have

- 
- (1) M.Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2, p.29; Ebner, Revised History, pp.82-3.  
 (2) Adams, Dienste, p.123.  
 (3) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B. names at least five; see copy at RH, s.585.

handled military units at the direction of the nkosi rather than having their own units and living independently.(1) This seems not to have been because they were of lower calibre than men like Songea or Putire. Rather they appear to have lacked the time, freedom of action and areas of expansion needed to enable them to emerge as successful independent leaders.

General administrative structures appear to have been the same in Mshope as they were in Njelu, though the powers held by the different rungs of administration and by individuals within these appear to have been different. The immediate advisers of the nkosi were the same here as in Njelu. There was a religious leader, whose name was King'anda, who "guided the people and gave them the necessary confidence when they undertook major wars".(2) The nduna ya nkosi, whose name was not learned, presumably handled many of the everyday matters of administration. Finally, an advisory council, comprising the nkosi's relatives and senior military manduna, assisted the nkosi in the making of decisions. Very little information was obtained on its deliberations and it is not known how often it met or how important it was. If Gulliver is correct in stating that Chabruma wished to increase the power of his military manduna in relation to that of the royal family(3), then Chabruma may have preferred seeking advice from only a part of the council, that is, the military men, or made limited use of it. One action

---

(1) Gulliver, "A History", p.24; TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B.

(2) O.B.Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara, The Maji Maji War in Ungoni, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), EAPH, p.10.

(3) Gulliver, "A History", p.25.



suggests this. In 1894, Chabruma established favourable contact with the Germans only to have this disrupted by Palangu. As such contact could not have been made without the advice or support of senior leaders in Mshope, it appears that Chabruma was selective in seeking advice and omitted his brother Palangu for one.<sup>(1)</sup> However, a later action, that of the decision-making building up to the Maji Maji rebellion, involved members of the royal family.

To administer the various parts of his kingdom, Chabruma appears to have made no use of the administrative manduna, other than possibly the compromised one with Palangu. No reference to any other was found. However, he does seem to have used alumuzana. It appears that these men were often local leaders who were made responsible to the nkosi. This seems to have been the case in north-east Mshope. The fact that an nkosi would be more removed than an nduna, seem to have allowed the alumuzana to acquire greater power in Mshope than their counterparts did in Njelu. This power seems to have increased in the 1890s in the north-east as the 'sutu' moved further east and the nkosi remained in the central region.<sup>(2)</sup> When the Germans took over in 1898, they considered the peoples in north-east Mshope to be independent of the rest of Mshope because it was so cut off from it.

---

(1) This is discussed further below, pp. 174-5.

(2) According to Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.13, Chabruma planned to move east to Mbunga Hill as his people were doing, but a full brother died in the process of removal. He took this as a bad augury, so returned to Nanungu River, then Magingo.



The informal network of 'houses' was used in the administration. It is not known exactly what the role of the women in it were, as there were no powerful manduna to be watched. They may well have been authorities in their own right. An Ndendeule tradition which noted that the 'sutu' in at least one area were responsible to a female member of Chabruma's household(1) suggests this. Moreover, in 1898, when the Germans arrived, two female representatives - Mhomakilo and Namabengo - were identified as leaders of sections and indeed, recognized by the Germans as such.(2) Thus, it is possible, though irregular in terms of traditional Ngoni structures, that Chabruma used his 'houses' as an important part of his administration.

The end result of the different policies pursued in the evolving of political life in the two kingdoms was the formation of two quite different states by 1897. Thus, Mshope was united, while Njelu was on the verge of splitting, though Njelu was expanding faster and over a much wider area than Mshope. The people in Mshope were identified with the nkosi and his policies, rather than with a kingdom, as was the case in Njelu.

There appears to have been little contact between the two kingdoms during these years. The Njelu kingdom moved steadily/southwards, while Mshope pushed a/little towards the east. The land between the two kingdoms was virtually uninhabited. There appear to have been

- 
- (1) TNA/155/DDB, v.2, p.B, the Ndendeule of Mabukusera's and Hangahanga's were of the house of Nakiwa binti Makolewa.  
 (2) MMR/6/68/4/3/10, I.N.Fusi and H.Ndunya say this was done because the Ngoni did not wish to introduce a male leader to the Germans.

few political contacts. Each kingdom conducted its own military campaigns and followed its distinctive administrative policies. Some economic contacts are known to have existed. According to Prince, these were not of a friendly nature. He stated that some ivory was stolen in disputed land between the two kingdoms and that ill-feeling which resulted from it seemed likely to lead to a war between the two powers.(1) It did not, however, and in 1897 both kingdoms were still on good terms, though isolated, with each other. The intensive contact with the Germans seemed, by that time, to be initiating some change. Adams, for one, noted in 1898 that there were new settlements springing up between the two kingdoms as efforts were being made to improve contacts.(2) The societies over which the royal families and their associates were evolving more complex and distinctive political structures continued to expand and change during these years. More and more captives joined an increasingly varied 'sutu' population which gradually adopted differing attitudes towards its leadership. We now turn to a study of this emergence.

### III

The varying ways of integrating captives which the Ngoni had followed before 1878, continued to be the basis for state-building after that date. Only now,

---

(1) Prince, op cit.218.

the ways had more complex effects as the numbers being integrated became ever larger. Many neighbouring peoples agreed to pay tribute. Their numbers included the Matengo, the Nyasa, the Yao(1), the Makua, the Bena and the Pangwa. When a community submitted, its members were sometimes relocated for the convenience of the Ngoni. For instance, when the Yao chief, Chiteji, submitted, a number of his people were moved to a new area with better soil, called Pamanda.(2) Johnson, who passed a few of these relocated villages in 1882 commented: "we came to small villages of subject peoples that had been established as if by miniature Babylonian conquerors, here a Gindo village, there a Yao village, peopled by natives from these tribes."(3) Usually communities which submitted sent hostages to Ungoni as a guarantee of submission.(4) Thus, when some given to nduna Songea escaped, Songea considered submission ended and prepared to attack that town.(5)

Villages in submission were ruled either by an Ngoni-appointed foreigner or by a local chief who was trained by the Ngoni for the position. An example of a chief trained by the Ngoni was the Nyasa leader, Mpoma. He had been brought to Ungoni when young and was brought up as an Ngoni. He learned to speak fluent Chingoni, to sing Zulu songs and to dress and arm like the Ngoni.(6) When he reached adulthood, the Ngoni sent him back to his region,

---

(1) Most are noted above in section I; for Yao, see also C.A.Smythies, A Journey from Matope on the Upper Shire to Newala on the Rovuma, (Zanzibar, 1885).


(2) Smythies, A Journey from Zanzibar, p.15.

(3) W.P.Johnson, My African Reminiscences, 1875-1895, (London, 1924), p.94.

(4) W.P.Johnson, CA, v.I, n.5, 5.1883, p.74.


(5) USPG, A1.V, Box B, Smythies report of visit to Songea's, n.d., (app.7.1886); Porter, Memorials, p.80.

(6) Prince, op cit, p.220; Lieder, "Reise", p.98, on Nyasa imitative behavior.



ESTIMATED TRIBUTE - PAYING NEIGHBOURS, 1895

## Southern East Africa



Luhagare as an Ngoni representative. A second example of an Ngoni representative was noted among the Donde of southern Njelu by the UMCA missionary, Smythies:

"In such cases (of subject incorporation into the Ngoni kingdom) one sees a stout, well-to-do man, evidently living on the fat of the land, dressed like a Magwangwara, who struts about and gives himself airs, but he is usually a Mdonde, or one of some other subject tribe who has been trained by them."(1)

The Ngoni-appointed administrators appear to have been quite impressive men at times. For example, the Nyasa captive, Komawantu, was frequently praised by Johnson for his astuteness, fairness and intelligence.(2)

The people in tribute settlements were required to supply the Ngoni with various tribute-goods. Usually the goods demanded were those available from local resources. For example, the Makua were required to give a portion of the salt they processed.(3) The UMCA missionaries, who had access to European goods, were required to give cloth. The Yao chief, Matola, had to give goats, cloth and other goods.(4) Many villages around Ungoni gave food. Two examples have been noted above. A third was noted by a UMCA missionary in south-west Njelu:

"When we stopped at midday (beyond the Mkulamazi River) we found one of Sonjela's (Songea's) headmen, whom we had seen with him, collecting food from the people, principally mshanga, a grain grown here very largely, from which they make pombe, a great deal of which is consumed at Sonjela's."(5)

---

(1) USPG, A1.V, Box.B, Smythies, A Journey from Zanzibar, p.16.

(2) See below, p.160. Johnson, Nyasa, pp.111-2.

(3) Lieder, "Reise", p.118; Porter, Memorials, pp.44,128.

(4) Farler, CA, v.XIV, n.161, 1896, p.83.

(5) C.A.Smythies, A Journey from Zanzibar to Lake Nyasa in the year 1887, (Zanzibar, n.d.), UMCA, p.25; Ebner, in his History and Revised History has underemphasized the number and importance of these satellite villages. There were many and they were important. Komba, op cit, p.6 called this system of tribute settlements "Indirect Rule".

The food was carried by porters who went along with the Ngoni or otherwise by the villagers themselves. The amount of food taken appears to have been considerable, at least if the comment by a 'true Ngoni' to Johnson was accurate: "We, like you (missionaries) do not cultivate the ground but 'take' the food from other people".(1)

The many people who gave tribute were under varying degrees of subjugation. At one end were those such as the Nyasa who meekly followed Ngoni authority and adopted many of their customs. At the other end were groups such as the Yao under Matola who asserted their independence at times and maintained uncertain relations with the Ngoni. For example, on one occasion Matola moved his town to a new location then built an internal water supply and even considered buying a cannon to protect himself, only to merit the comment from nduna Songea: "Very well then, if Matola thinks he can fight me, I'll certainly give him the opportunity".(2)

In return for receiving tribute, the Ngoni protected their subjects and ceased their raids upon them. For instance, in 1891, they assisted the Makua of Meto who were being troubled by the Nindi(Mazitu).(3) Again, in 1895, they attacked some Yao and Swahili traders who were ransacking the Masasi area for food. A UMCA missionary who visited the battleground wrote: "We saw a terrible sight. Some (Yao and Swahili) were groaning and dying, some were crying with pain caused by the bullets and spears of the Angoni from Songea who had come to the aid of the people from Masasi".(4)

---

(1) W.P.Johnson, Nyasa: The Great Water, (Oxford, 1922), p.18.

(2) C.Maples, CA, v.VI, n.63, 3.1889, p.36; CA, v.IV,n.48,12.1886,p.180.

(3) Smythies, CA, v.IX, 1891, p.132.

(4) Kilekwa, Slave Boy to Priest, (London, 1937), p.30.



Although the Ngoni were willing to accept a tribute-offering status from various peoples while allowing them to remain in their homelands, they usually preferred to bring those they subjugated back to Ungoni with them to increase their numbers and enhance their powers. Accordingly, large numbers were brought back.(1) The constant increase in the population led to changes in the methods of integrating them. These changes were the effect of the ever diminishing percentage of 'true Ngoni' in relation to the 'sutu'. Some captives continued to be integrated into Ngoni communities and became very Ngoni in life and outlook. Johnson knew one well:

"Komawantu was carried off with the other captives (from Msumba along the lakeshore)...He was taken to Songela's village and there trained as a warrior. He tells of how he was drilled and taught to despise and mock at any man who ran away or had wounds behind. 'If you can see men, they can be smitten' was a maxim he learned....Komawantu rose in life and became a man of some position. He was employed as a warrior up north and was wounded in the stomach; 'but I killed two of their men', he adds. Later on he was sent to collect the small tribute from the lake villages of Chisanga and the neighbourhood, from which he had himself come."(2)

Yet increasingly, the 'sutu' came to live by themselves in satellite villages, only visited by the Ngoni when tribute of one sort or another was demanded. One such village was Amakita's in south-west Njelu. In 1894, it was estimated to contain over 1,000 huts.(3) In these villages, many 'sutus' found it possible to retain their identity for the most part, while still fulfilling the role of 'sutu'. One group which maintained its identity was the Ndendeule of north-east Mshope. The Germans

---

(1) It is difficult to know exactly how big the Ngoni population was in 1897. German statistics around the turn of the century appear to be unreliable. A 1904 estimate, noted in Fülleborn, op cit, and Ebner, History, pp.156-7, stated that there were 34,000 Ngoni that year. However, other estimates are higher. One source stated that there were some 50,000 in Mshope alone, while another gave the district population (of which Ungoni was one-third to one-half) as 175,000 to 200,000. It is unlikely that the population of Ungoni was less than 40,000 by 1897 and it could well have been a half again.

(2) Johnson, Nyasa, p.111-2.

(3) Liedtke, "Reise", p.99.

considered them sufficiently independent in 1897 to merit separate recognition.(1) Prince doubted the 'Ngoniness' of some of these 'sutu' and commented on the dubitable transformation made by "putting a lion's skin on a hyena".(2)

The life of the 'sutu' in Ungoni varied according to how closely integrated they were. For example, some 'sutu' boys watched cattle and goats and trained to fight while others did little. Some men trained to be warriors, while others merely offered their labour as porters or farmhands when needed. Some women married 'true Ngoni' or well-assimilated 'sutu' and lived in their households, while others married somewhat independent 'sutu' and only provided occasional work to their masters.(3)

In many ways, the life of the 'sutu' compared favourably with that of the 'true Ngoni'. These ways - the sharing of a culture and way of life and many of the benefits which went with it - have been mentioned above in Chapter Two and need not be reiterated.

Yet the disparity between 'sutu' and 'true Ngoni' probably became more accentuated during these years as the kingdoms grew in size and wealth, and as new contacts, such as that with coastal peoples, brought new opportunities. For example, the distinction in economic status seems to have been accentuated as new goods entered the society. The 'sutu' were not allowed to wear certain types of beads,

---

(1) See below, Chapter Four, section I.

(2) Prince, op cit, p.220.

(3) Some of these duties are described in the Ndendeule history, TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B.



fine feathers and skins, cloth of certain colours, or materials from certain animals. Those who did could be accused of boasting and 'living above their status' and be killed.(1) Again, when trade with coastal peoples expanded, it was apparently the 'true Ngoni' who had the best possibilities for trade. They seem to have had a monopoly on the trade in ivory, while that is slaves could not damage them though it could those 'sutu' who were sold.(2) In social life, as numbers of 'sutu' in the societies increased and contact between them and the leaders lessened, alienation seems to have increased. This was expressed in various ways, from the resentment of a 'sutu' girl who had to marry a 'true Ngoni' to the distaste held by 'sutu' of the sometimes abrupt behavior of their 'true Ngoni' masters.(3)

It was probably the distinctions between the 'true Ngoni' and the 'sutu' that led European visitors to Ungoni to portray the lives of subjects as poor and hard. For example, the missionary Johannes Häfliger wrote in 1901:

"The lot of the captured slave was rather hard. First of all, he had his ear pierced, or simply had an ear lobe cut off, that they ['true Ngoni and leading 'sutu'] might know him to be a slave...In the plundering expeditions, they [slaves] had to carry the booty, to cook, above all, to be servants. In addition to this, they had to do all the field work while the Wangoni went celebrating every other day.(4)

The 'sutu' continued to have an impact on Ngoni life and culture. Aspects of the Ngoni economy underwent some

- 
- (1) Ebner to Redmond, interviews, 18-21.10.1971; Revised History, pp.83-4, 92-3; J.Hafliger, "Land und Leute von Ungoni", Missbl., v.V, 1901, 14-7, 43-8.
  - (2) See below, the section on the slave trade, section IV.
  - (3) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 18-21.10.1971; Revised History, pp.83-4, 92-3; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p20.
  - (4) Häfliger, "Land", pp.14-7, 43-8.

change because of the presence of the 'sutu'. For example, the importance of the cattle economy appears to have declined as an ever-increasing percentage of the Ngoni population comprised peoples who knew little, if anything, about cattle. Social life continued changing. The language of the immigrants continued to decline in use. Johnson was given the impression it was a minority language when commenting on the Ngoni reaction to two missionaries who spoke Zulu (Chingoni) to them: (they were) much edified...though they admitted that only two or three of them understood it; many more of them, however, recognized it as the lingo of their masters"(1). In addition to the Kisutu which emerged in its place, there emerged a variety of local languages. For example, the missionary Maples found that nduna Songea had so many Yao adherents by the late 1880s, that their language would be the most useful one for proselytism in his area.(2) The dress of the people changed in ways. For example, Johnson saw people wearing clay mouldings round the head when he visited in the 1880s(3), though by the end of the century they seem not to have been worn any longer.

One final note on the integrating of captives into the two kingdoms. The more diffused political structure

---

(1) Johnson, Reminiscences, p.143.

(2) CA, v.VI, n.63, 3.1888, p.37; Spiss in Missbl., 3.1899, p.81 comments on the many dialects spoken; for further information on language change see Spiss, Kingoni; for information on the languages, see Ebner, "Stammessprachen und Glaubensverkündigung in der Diözese Songea", in F.Renner, Der Fünfarmige Leuchter, (St.Ottilien, 1971), v.2.

(3) Johnson, Reminiscences, p.95; Porter, "Magwangwara", p. 227 mentioned Zulu hair rings.

in Njelu appears to have allowed a more thorough integration than could the centralism in Mshope. This is indicated by the fact that <sup>though</sup> there were never many more 'true Ngoni' in Njelu than there were in Mshope, by 1900 the former kingdom had a considerably larger portion of people that considered itself Ngoni than did Mshope.(1) Two reasons for this can be identified. One has been mentioned earlier. Semi-independent manduna in Njelu found it more in their interest to build up loyal factions among the 'sutu' than did the more closely controlled manduna in Mshope. Secondly, the Njelu Ngoni had more lands to raid than did Mshope and consequently contained peoples of more ethnic origins. This appears to have facilitated integration. Where individuals of many ethnic origins lived together they tended to find a common identity as 'sutu'. Where on the other hand, people of one ethnic origin lived together, it was probably that origin rather than a new 'sutu' status that they would identify with. The present day composition of Njelu kingdom and the distinction of the Ndendeule and Matengo areas, where one was diverse and the other homogeneous, shows this.

On the whole, the Ngoni kingdoms of southern East Africa proved remarkably successful in integrating peoples and thereby sustaining their existence.(2) Yet there

- 
- (1) The distinctive identity of the large Ndendeule population in Mshope has been a major reason for this.
  - (2) The feat is all the more impressive when one considers the variety of peoples integrated. The General African Census, 1957, Tribal Analysis, Part 1, lists twenty-five tribal groups with more than one hundred members in Songea district. These include such groups as the Sukuma and Pimbwe.

were some people who could not be integrated, either because they had no wish to be 'Ngoni', or because they themselves wished to dominate. With these peoples, the Ngoni had to reach some compromise. As has been shown, they reached a compromise with the Hehe in the early 1880s. Now they were to reach one with two new groups, the coastal traders and the European missionaries. But a third group, the European military power, was to force the Ngoni to compromise then to bring a radical change to the political structure of Ngoni society.

#### IV

Prince was told in 1894 that the Ngoni made their first contact with the Arabs in 1878, when the former met the latter hunting elephants south of the Ruvuma.(1) As this was at the time of the first Hehe war, after which the Ngoni moved southwards away from the Hehe, the date is a likely one. No contact between the Ngoni and Arabs or other coastal peoples is known before this date and as the Ngoni stayed in the west and were unfriendly to outsiders, contact seems to have been unlikely.

Relations with coastal peoples developed in a piecemeal manner after 1878. The Njelu Ngoni were highly receptive. In 1882, nduna Songea was carrying on involved trade with the coast(2), while in later years, European visitors noticed Arabs and Swahilis in most parts of Njelu.(3) Why Njelu was receptive is not clearly known. The economic advantages of trade is the most obvious and probably most likely reason. The internal political situation may

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.217; a detailed study of coastal trade with Ungoni, 1878-1897 has been done by the author and is available as an unpublished paper.

may have been a second reason. Njelu manduna tended to act somewhat independently and it is possible that once a few, such as Songea, established a profitable contact with coastal traders, others saw it to their advantage to do likewise for political and economic reasons. During the 1880s, nkosi Mharule abolished the tariff on incoming caravans.(1) In 1889, the first coastal settlement was established in Njelu, this at Mangua by the Arab, Rashid bin Masoud. A few years later, he built a second at Kikole. Then Litunu, a Swahili trader, established one at Mitomondo. A fourth was set up at Ruanda by the Mngaka River.(2)

While Njelu was establishing extensive contacts with the coastal traders, Mshope was being more reticent. It was more isolated than Njelu so established contact somewhat later than the latter. Furthermore, under the more centralized political structure in Mshope, nkosi Chabruma appears to have been able to control contact to his benefit. This is suggested by the fact that his main political rival, nduna Palangu attacked a caravan in 1891, an indication of his lack of direct, beneficial contact with the coast.(3) No settlements were established in Mshope by coastal peoples.

The coastal peoples had various effects on Ngoni society. Politically, they came to play a role in the sectarian political life of Njelu, a role made more complex by divisions among the

---

(2) p.164 Porter, "Magwangwara"; W.C.Porter: Biography, anon., (London, n.d.), p.15.

(3) p.164 eg. USPG, A1.VI, misc.letters, 1299-1423, G.H.Swinny to Penney, 27.9.1886.

(1) Fülleborn, op cit, p.136; Ebner, History, p.154: Prince, op cit, pp.217, 220.

(2) Ebner, History, pp.120, 154-5.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.124, Palangu's life as told by Nasoro.

the newcomers themselves. Rashid, the most influential of all the coast people in Ungoni, was an Arab and a member of the 'Shia' sect while Litunu, his major rival, was a Swahili and a member of the 'Sunni' sect.(1) Rashid appears to have become friendly with nduna Songea(2), an action which may have cost him his close ties with Mharule, who allied with Litunu. Rashid also became friendly with Mlamilo, while Litunu became a close ally of the Zamchaya faction. The Rashid/Litunu conflict may have reflected a conflict between Mharule and Songea. It certainly did reflect the conflict which was to emerge in the late 1890s between Mlamilo's group and Zamchaya's people. In the 1889 succession, Rashid came out strongly in support of Mlamilo, possibly for economic reasons. His persuasive character and economic power were to convince visiting Europeans that Mlamilo's rival, Zamchaya was unsuitable for the nkosiship. Zamchaya himself retaliated by leading an anti-Arab campaign in Njelu during the 1890s.(3) This appears to have had little effect. In 1894, Rashid's mediation in support of Mlamilo was to convince a visiting German army that Mlamilo was the legitimate nkosi of Njelu. Rashid himself was honoured with the status of German Consul in Ungoni.(4) Rashid's involvement in Njelu external politics during the 1890s was to foster very friendly contacts between the Ngoni and British missionaries and also, of much greater importance, was to persuade the Njelu to be friendly with visiting German forces in 1894, 1895,

---

(1) Ebner to Redmond, interview 18.10.1971.

(2) W.C.Porter: A Biography, p.15.

(3) Prince, op cit.

(4) Fülleborn, op cit, p.136 states that Governor von Schele appointed Rashid akida, or representative.

and 1897(1), a reaction which was to be to their ultimate disadvantage.

In economic life, coastal peoples introduced new means of economic livelihood through fostering the trade in slaves, ivory and rubber. Manifestations of these means included the emergence of an Ngoni trading group(2) and the reorientation of aspects of military policy, particularly raiding which became oriented towards slave-catching.(3) They changed economic values through the goods introduced into the society through, apparently, fostering the replacement of cattle by goods such as cloth as a major indicator of economic wealth within society. These changes, moreover, had greater effect on some sectors of the society than on others. Specifically, they increased the distinctions between the 'true Ngoni' who controlled this economic life and the 'sutu', who participated in it in minor ways.

In intellectual and religious life, the coastal peoples made the Ngoni aware of an entirely new approach to life, one which was very complex, powerful and successful.

In all, the Arab and Swahili presence offered an instructive force for change in Ngoni society, one which helped to prepare the way for that to be brought by the Europeans.(4) It helped to prepare on the economic and cultural level what the internal

---

(1) Mlamilo's contacts with the European missionaries are well noted in Johnson, *Reminiscences*; Fulleborn, *op cit*, p.130; Smythies, *CA*, v.IX, (1891), p.132.

(2) USPG, A1.VI, misc.letters, 1160-1998, G.H.Swinny to Penney, 15.5.1886 notes one case of entrepreneurship.

(3) Gulliver, "A history", p.24; Fulleborn, *op cit*, p.118.

(4) Fulleborn, *op cit*, p.130.

political situation was to facilitate on the political level - the takeover of Ungoni by the Germans.

# V

The first contact between the Ngoni and Europeans in East Africa came only after the establishment of the station of the Universities Mission to Central Africa at Masasi in 1876. The first missionary to visit Ungoni was W.P. Johnson who journeyed here in early 1882. His establishment of contact was soon followed by an attack on Masasi conducted by two of nduna Songea's lieutenants. The attack indicates that the Ngoni initially looked upon the missionaries as a military foe, whose strength they were determined to assess.(1) The easy defeat of the missionaries, described above, and their subsequent willingness to accept a tributary status marked them out as minor powers militarily.(2)

Still, missionaries had potential in other ways and these made them worthwhile contacts. First, the missionaries had some economic value. They were benefactors, in that they could give goods, particularly salt and cloth to those with whom they were friendly. In addition, they could be useful as traders. For example, Songea was willing to use the missionaries as middlemen between the Makua salt producers and himself(3) or, on another occasion, as brokers in helping him to find a beautiful, white wife.(4) The Ngoni,

---

(1) Porter, Memorials, p.54.

(2) This was disillusioning to subject groups who hoped the missionaries could be allies, eg. J.C. Yarborough, The Diary of a Working Man in Central Africa, (London, n.d.), p.93.

(3) Porter, Memorials, p.102; "Magwangwara", p.272.

(4) Maples, Journals, p.145.



according to Prince, had developed a trade with the UMCA missionaries by 1894.(1) Second, and more important, was the European's spiritual power. This the Ngoni could not afford to dismiss. They were aware of the strange power right from the earliest contact of 1882. When Johnson visited Songea that spring he wrote that "the usual way of speaking of me amongst the Gwangwara on this trip was as makoka, ie, some kind of spirit"(2). Shortly afterwards, when attacking Masasi, the Ngoni stated they wished to be friends with the Europeans who, they said, could not be killed.(3) When the missionaries began expanding their areas of operation and entered upon the lands near Ungoni, a decision had to be made by the Ngoni on the way of dealing with this religious power. Influencing the Njelu and Mshope in coming to a decision was advice from Mbelwa's Ngoni west of the lake. The Mbelwa Ngoni had found their contacts with the Scottish missionaries working in their lands a destructive one because of medicine practiced against them, and they warned the Njelu and Mshope not to admit any missionaries. The Mshope had little difficulty in discarding missionaries as they were isolated and had no contact with the UMCA. They appear to have made no steps to change this while the missionaries, for their part, appear to have been too concerned with the Njelu kingdom to think much of the one further north. In Njelu, the reaction to the missionaries was more complex. Nkosi Mharule appears to have wanted to avoid missionaries and for some years refused to allow

---

(1) Prince, op cit, p.219.

(2) Johnson, Reminiscences, p.97.

(3) Porter, Memorials, p.24.

any to visit him. One missionary was told that he feared he would die if he saw the missionaries.(1) However, he gradually changed his mind and, in 1886, informed the missionary G.H.Swinny, that he had decided to no longer "hide himself from the eyes of the white men".(2) One reason for his change appears to have been political. Though he refused to see any before 1886, nduna Songea did not and, from 1882 onwards, Johnson, Porter and Smythies visited him. Smythies believed that he could not see Mharule in his visit of 1886 because Songea wished to monopolize any benefit resulting from contact(3), though another missionary was told by Chisoma, a Yao chief subject to the Ngoni that this was not true and that they were not rivals(4). If Smythies were correct, Mharule may have decided it was necessary for him to allow visits if lesser officials did. Secondly, he may have allowed them in because he felt he could control them better by admitting them. In any case, the missionaries had little impact. He authorized them to build a school in Ungoni but they were unable to find anyone to staff it and had to abandon such plans.(5) The Berliner 1 mission also tried to establish a station there, in 1895, but their attempt came to naught.(6) Though the Ngoni had been willing to accept missionaries in their land, they disapproved of contact between their subjects and the missionaries. As a result, mission efforts to

---

(1) Smythies, A Journey to Lake Nyasa, p.37.

(2) G.H.Swinny, CA, v.V, n.53, 5.1887, p.73.

(3) USPG, A1.V, Box B, letters 170-316, report on visit to Songea's, n.d. (probably 7.1886) this view was also held by Maples, in CA, v.VI, n.63, 3.1888, and Johnson, in Campbell, op cit, p.67.

(4) USPG, A1.VI, Box 1, C.A.postscript, Charles Janson, 8.3.1886.

(5) USPG, A1.V, n.53.

(6) Chief Merere of the Bena may have dissuaded the Ngoni, see Wright, op cit, pp.46-7, 67-8 on Merere's attitudes.

expand their influence throughout the lakeshore were severely restricted during the 1880s and 1890s by the fear subject and tribute-paying peoples had of allowing a regular mission presence.(1)

While the religious, economic and military challenges offered by one type of European were not to prove much of a threat to the Ngoni, those offered by a second type were to. This type was the German colonial power and the first contact by the Ngoni with it was to be a military one which was to have considerable effect.

The very earliest German activity in East Africa affected the Ngoni. This activity was the annexation of the coast and the towns with whose inhabitants the Ngoni traded. However, though the coastal peoples rebelled against the German action, the Ngoni remained neutral(2), presumably because they considered their interests were not sufficiently affected to justify action. Soon however, more involving contact followed. After defeating the coastal peoples, the Germans began moving inland. Their presence attracted the interest of peoples living in the lands which the Ngoni raided and by the early 1890s some were going to the Germans for military assistance. One such one was the Ngindo leader, Mpinga from Barikiwa, to the north-east of Mshope. He requested assistance and the Germans happily sent a garrison to his area and there built a fort and made him their akida.(3)

---

(1) G.H.Swinny, CA, v.IV, n.46, 10.1886; USEG, A1.VI, Box 1 C.A. postscript Charles Jangon, entry 8.3.1886.

(2) Their distant kinsmen, the Mbunga, participated.

(3) M.Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2, p.57; Adams, Dienste, p.144.

In the early 1890s, Yao and Makua living in the Masasi area asked the Germans to mediate between them and the Nindi (Mazitu), which they did.(1) Then, the Bena leader, Kiwanga, living to the north of Mshope, went to Dar es Salaam and there concluded a defence agreement with the Germans.(2) - The contacts being made by various raided and tribute-paying peoples do not appear to have seriously bothered the Ngoni. In 1894, some Ngoni expressed some concern<sup>to Prince</sup> about the German presence at the north end of Lake Nyasa though they told him that they considered the Germans trivial foes.(3) They appear to have felt that as long as they remained neutral and did not bother the Germans, there was little to worry about.(4) This longing for neutrality, possibly tested at the time of the coastal rebellion had also been tested when the Arabs went to war against the Scottish Lakes Company in 1887. The Arabs apparently asked for Ngoni assistance, only to have it refused.(5) A further test of neutrality came after 1890 when the Hehe, who went to war against the Germans after abortive peace negotiations, asked the Ngoni to join them in expelling this new enemy.(6) The Ngoni refused, presumably because they wished to remain neutral - possibly with Rashid's advice, but also because they could not forget the legacy of fear and hatred which dominated their relations with the Hehe.(7) The Hehe-German wars were to have considerable cumulative effect on the Ngoni, both in controlling the German desire to take Ungoni

---

(1) C.A.Smythies, CA, v.X, 1892, p.57.

(2) M.Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2, p.27.

(3) Prince, op cit, p.221.

(4) Ibid.

(5) W.P.Johnson, CA, v.VI, n.67, 7.1888, p.95.

(6) W.Arning, "Die Wahehe", MadS, 1896, pp.233-46, 1897, pp.46-60; Ebner, History, p.105.

(7) Ebner, History, pp.105-6.

and in making the Ngoni aware of the powers of this new enemy.

While the Hehe were fighting the Germans, the Ngoni made their first peaceful overtures. In 1894, the Mshope nkosi, Chabruma, sent a peace delegation to Kilwa to negotiate a treaty similar to the one which Kiwanga had arranged.(1) There appear to have been three reasons for this move. First, Chabruma must have been aware of the Hehe reverses and possibly thought that it would be to his advantage to ally with the winning side. Secondly, he probably knew of the benefits Kiwanga had gained from his treaty. Finally, he had been recommended to negotiate by Lt. von Wissman, who headed the German post at Alt Langenburg.(2)

Chabruma apparently hoped to negotiate an agreement whereby the Mshope Ngoni would retain their valuable raiding grounds by the Rufiji while not bothering the Germans.(3) Had such an agreement been possible, Chabruma would have been in a good position. The Hehe enemy to the north was weakened, and with an alliance formed with the only other power they might have to face, the military, political and economic power of the Ngoni of Mshope would be assured. However, the hopes for such an alliance were to prove futile from the beginning. For one thing, there is little likelihood that the Germans would have agreed to an alliance in which they were equals rather than

---

(1) Fülleborn, op cit, p.138; DKB, 1893, p.452; 1894, p.110; Ebner, History, p.155.

(2) Ibid.; Ebner, History, p.225.

(3) Prince, op cit, p.221-2.

superiors. But more immediately important, the Mshope made a mistake. While the peace-delegation was in Kilwa, an Mshope plundering expedition attacked a number of villages in the hinterland of Kilwa. The expedition, according to some historians and traditions(1) was conducted by Palangu, unknown to Chabruma. This seems reasonable, as Chabruma hardly would have risked the loss of a desired treaty with the Germans by annoying them with such an attack on their villages. Chabruma, moreover, may have been conducting negotiations without Palangu's knowledge. In any case, the German governor, von Schele, cared little about who led the raid. Convinced that he had been betrayed, he jailed the delegation, then rerouted a planned expedition against the Hehe through Ungoni. Chabruma decided not to offer resistance to the expedition. Von Schele entered his capital and conducted a military display to show the Ngoni what they could expect if they bothered the Germans again. He confiscated booty of cattle, then moved on.(2) He appears to have neither demanded the surrender of those who had conducted the expedition nor the submission of the Ngoni, probably because he feared pushing the Ngoni into war, a development which would have seriously complicated German military plans in much of their new colony.

---

(1) DKB, v.V, n.11, 1.5.1894 states that Mhomakilo conducted the raid. Mhomakilo was Palangu's military name; Fülleborn, op cit, p.138 agrees; TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.124, Palangu's life as told by Nasoro also agrees; Ebner, History, p.158 states that Chabruma permitted the raid.

(2) DKB, v.V, n.11, 1.5.1894, p.227-8, "Bericht über die Expedition des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Ostafrika in das Gebiet des Rufiji und Ulanga, am Nyassasee und in das Hinterland von Lindi"; Fülleborn, op cit, p.138; Prince, op cit, pp.221-2.

Chabruma's unsuccessful bid made him extremely wary of establishing any further contact with the Germans. His careful reaction to the expedition, for reasons not known, had preserved his state and he determined to ensure his independence by controlling the military activities of his people and keeping away from the expanding German presence.(1)

The lesson learned by the Mshope was slow to be heeded in Njelu, which next had its own adverse contact with the Germans. One reason for this was the complex political situation. Because the leadership was divided between two factions of the royal family and because various manduna acted quite independently, it was not possible to establish a common policy towards the Germans. Rather different groups acted in their own ways. The first manifestation of this came shortly after the von Schele expedition when a German soldier, Lt. Tom von Prince<sup>n</sup> asked permission to visit Njelu. Mlamilo was unwilling to see the Germans and refused him permission. This then led his rival, Zamchaya, to invite him, and in the spring of 1894, Prince was in western Njelu.(2) He was a very perceptive and intelligent man who soon analyzed many of the complexities of Njelu society. He concluded, in an interesting and informative study(3), that the kingdom was in a state of anarchy and very weak, and would be ripe for takeover at any time. It is very likely that Prince's study paved the way for the annexation which was to follow.

---

(1) As shown below, Chapter Four, section II.

(2) Prince, op cit, p.212; Prince, Gegen Araber und Wahehe, (Berlin, 1914), p.266, he suggested that Zamchaya make a treaty with the Germans, but the latter did nothing about it.

(3) Prince, "Geschichte".

Zamchaya's receptiveness towards Europeans did not last long. In 1895, one of his lieutenants met and killed the UMCA missionary, G.W. Atlay, when the former was returning from an expedition south of the Ruvuma. According to W.P. Johnson, who had fairly close contact with the Ngoni through Rashid, thought the killing had been a revenge by the Ngoni for the German interruption of their slave trade and for the growing German presence along the lakeshore which was severely restricting Ngoni military policies in that region.(1) Adverse British reaction forced the Germans to revenge the killing and Baron von Eltz with seven officers and a large Sudanese force marched down into Ungoni.(2) The Njelu Ngoni did not resist, apparently because Rashid's recommendations of moderation prevailed upon Mlamilo. Mlamilo's neutrality could also have been due to the fact that <sup>it was</sup> Zamchaya's <sup>who</sup> Ngoni were in trouble. Finally, the Njelu Ngoni probably remembered and appreciated the light retribution which had resulted from the Mshope moderation in 1894. Von Eltz visited Zamchaya and demanded the immediate surrender of Atlay's murderers. Eleven men were identified as the guilty party and Zamchaya surrendered these. They were then taken off. No compensation is recorded as having been paid.(3) Again the Germans had reacted very lightly, possibly because they felt no further lesson was needed by the Ngoni.

---

(1) J.S. Wimbush, CA, v.XIV, 1896, p.4; Ebner, History, pp.141-2; Hine, op cit, p.141; J.P. Farler, CA, v.XIV, 1896, p.86.

(2) W.P. Johnson to H. Waller, 18.3.1896 in CA, v.XIV, 1896, p.114.

(3) Ibid; CA, v.XIV, 1896, p.86; Ebner, History, pp.141-2.



It was now the turn for the Njelu Ngoni under nkosi Mlamilo and nduna Songea to have adverse contact with the Germans. After the Germans had taken over the coast, both these leaders had cut down the numbers of their expeditions to the east.(1) However, it was difficult to stop entirely the activities that had been so profitable there for over a decade, and determined young warriors continued to move off in military expeditions. So, the lands in the east and the Germans at the coast frequently came into hostile contact with the Ngoni. Aside from the raids mentioned above, there were three large expeditions which cumulatively provoked the Germans a third time. In 1894, an Ngoni army marched into the lands south of Masasi to plunder the Mafiti. In the course of the expedition, they troubled a German mission expedition under M.Hartmann. The missionary, who had to pay a ransom to escape, wrote a graphic report on the terror of the Ngoni.(2) A year later, another force, this time under nduna Mgendera, entered the east to attack the Yao and trouble much of the Lindi hinterland.(3) Then in 1896, a large army plundered the Ruvuma and the hinterland of Lindi and Mikindani. Many villages were burnt and a considerable number of captives taken. The German Governor, Herr Liebert, visited Lindi to inspect the damage. He decided that the time had come to bring the Ngoni under submission and ordered Lt. von Engelhardt to lead the

---

(1) Fülleborn, op cit, p.138.

(2) Ebner, History, pp.134-9.

(3) Höffliger, Land, pp.65-8 noted the attack and wrote that they might be the victims next.

8th Company into Ungoni and conquer it.(1) He may have condoned the takeover only now rather than in previous years because the Hehe threat was all but over and forces could be spared for new ventures.

The expedition reached Ungoni in July 1897. No military resistance was offered by the Njelu Ngoni, according to one source, because they feared the Germans(2) but, according to others, because they consulted both the spirits of their ancestors and the trader Rashid, and both advocated peaceful contact.(3) The Ngoni may also have expected the German force to leave Ungoni after exacting some tribute as the two previous forces had done.

After marching through part of Ungoni, the force stopped by the Mfaranyaki River, near Songea's, and there built a fort.(4) Upon its completion, Lt. Engelhardt invited the Njelu leaders to a conference. Possibly anticipating little more than a heated discussion prior to the arranging of compensation, a number of important leaders accepted the invitation. Mapunda and Mpangara quote a description of subsequent developments given by an eye-witness:

"Before the Ngoni elders were invited into the new boma (fort), first the Germans made a demonstration to show the effectiveness and strength of their firearms...After this the leaders were invited into the wooden boma...The assigned group of Ngoni ...

- 
- (1) DKB, v.VIII, n.21, 25.10.1897, "Expedition der s. Kompagnie... von Lindi und Mikindani"; Fülleborn, op cit, pp.138-9. He accompanied the expedition; Ebner, History, pp.136-7.
  - (2) J.P.Farler, CA, v.XIV, 1896, n.161, p.86.
  - (3) MMR/6/68/4/1 notes they consulted religious leaders; MMR/6/68/4/1 also notes talk of resistance; Fülleborn, op cit.
  - (4) Most of the following discussion based on sources as fn.1.

"...

leaders agreed to enter the boma. Their entrance was made according to rank. Nkosi Mlamira Gama went in first. Then came Nduna Songea Mbano, followed in succession by Ndunas Mgendela Gama, Kapungu, and Putire Gama. The war generals came last. As soon as they were all in the boma they found themselves arrested and chained in wooden fetters. The Nkosi and the four Ndunas were seized first. When the war generals attempted to escape by jumping over the wooden fence, the Germans opened fire and five of the generals were shot dead. The victims of the massacre included Chakoma Mbano, Chapwanya, Mtiwula, Mahengu, and Tawula."(1)

In the discussion which followed, the leaders were asked to accede to three demands: to cease their raids; to return the captives who had been taken in the 1896 raid; and, most difficult of all, to submit to the Germans. They refused to do so initially and were confined to the fort. After a while, faced with no alternative, they acquiesced.

After handling a complaint made against a lieutenant of nduna Mgendera's by heirs to a caravan leader whom he had killed by executing the lieutenant, Lt. Engelhardt left Njelu to engage the Hehe. He left a permanent, occupying force at the boma under Lt. von Kleist. On his way north, he passed through Chabruma's captial but did not seek the latter's submission. Chabruma offered Engelhardt assistance against the Hehe and though the latter welcomed it, none materialized.

It is not known whether or not Zamchaya and his allies acknowledged and accepted Mlamilo's submission or whether they were put down separately. One source mentions that Ngoni in western Ungoni continued raiding for a year before a German

---

(1) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, pp.11-2.

force stopped them(1), but this may refer to Chabruma, against whom an expedition is known to have been sent, rather than Zamchaya, about whom nothing is heard.

Chabruma and the Mshope Ngoni remained independent until 1898. In that year, one of Chabruma's military manduna, Chilembo(2), conducted a border raid on some Njelu villages. The offended group complained to the Germans and von Kleist sent an expedition into Mshope, executed Chilembo, and demanded and received the submission of the Mshope Ngoni.

So, in 1898, some thirty-five years after they had ousted the Maseko Ngoni and begun setting up their own military states, the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni became integrated into a much larger military state. But all was not yet over for the Ngoni military kingdoms. The Germans had won the first match relatively easily. In the process, they had left the two kingdoms intact and, as the Maseko had learnt in the 1860s, this was a mistake. The Ngoni tolerated only eight years of submission before they, once again, took the offensive.

---

(1) G.Meinecke, Die Deutsche Kolonien in Wort und Bild, (Leipzig, n.d.), p.59.

(2) He was known as Manjoro to some; MMR/6/68/4/3/14 has a full description of the Mshope submission, given by L.Moyo, a Kalanga.

Chapter 4  
A Rough New World, 1898-1905

I

Submission was the first reluctant, but inevitable, acknowledgement of the advent of a new world. But it was only a beginning. The entire military and administrative structures and organization of Ngoni society, as well as their institutions and way of life, were now to undergo considerable change. The reaction by the Ngoni to these changes was to be a complex one which fully brought out the differing political and class levels in Ngoni society. The first aspect of life in the two kingdoms to be affected by German takeover was military life. It was radically changed to the evident dismay of many sectors of the Ngoni community. By agreeing to stop their raiding and plundering of neighbours, the Ngoni relinquished control over the vast region which had fallen under their military sway. This lost empire contained all those people whose only bond with the Ngoni had been subjugation based on fear of military retaliation. Once this threat was removed, these people saw no reason to continue their disadvantageous tribute-paying relationship with the Ngoni. So they ended it. Their numbers were many and included the Yao under Chiteji in Portuguese East Africa, the Yao of Mataka in the same country, the Makua in the newly-formed Lindi district, and the Manda by Lake Nyasa.





The Germans assisted the process of cutting the Ngoni off from their tribute-paying lands by establishing boundaries. The lands to the east of Ungoni were formed into the districts of Mikindani, Lindi and Kilwa. Lands to the north became part of the district of Iringa, while those in the north-west and west joined Langenburg district. All the lands south of the Ruvuma River became part of Portuguese East Africa. After cutting the Ngoni off from their raiding lands, the Germans then separated integral parts of the kingdom which they considered to be isolated or distinct from the remainder of the kingdom. For instance, Ngende, a large region in north-east Mshope, was joined to Iringa(1), while parts of north-west Mshope were joined to Iringa and Langenburg. The Nyasa littoral became part of Langenburg. When this change was made, nkosi Mlamilo was forced to call back some Ngoni he had sent there to set up an administrative post.(2) The remaining parts of the two kingdoms were now joined into a district called Songea, after the name of Njelu's famous nduna; presumably to his satisfaction and probably to his surprise.(3)

Loss of contact with, and control over, raiding and tribute-paying areas represented a considerable economic setback for the Ngoni. Plundering had been a mainstay of

- 
- (1) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Songea District, typescript, UDSM, p.24.
  - (2) TDE, v.4, p.237.
  - (3) T.von Prince, "Geschichte der Magwanguara nach Erzählung des Arabers Rashid bin Masaud und des Fussi," MadS, v.VII, (1894), n.3; Gegen Araber und Wahehe, (Berlin, 1914), Mittler Sohn. p.261 said, of his 1894 visit, that the capital of Njelu was Songea. The Germans who named the district may have retained his mistake.

their economic life, and the adaptations which now had to be made to the closure of the regular influx of captives and goods were difficult ones. Within Ngoni society, it was the 'true Ngoni' that had to make the greatest adaptation. Their economic loss was particularly great in that they were the ones who had benefited most from raiding. They had become accustomed to having a steady influx of captives to till their fields and perform myriad other tasks. The loss of status and power was also considerable. The 'true Ngoni' largely controlled economic wealth within the society through receiving and dispersing the proceeds of war. They now lost this. The 'sutu' also suffered as a result of the military changes. Those who had been well integrated into Ngoni society and had benefited from their state's military power lost the captives and goods they stood to obtain through war. They lost as well any status which had been associated with their identity as Ngoni. Those who had not been integrated into Ngoni society appear to have lost little. On the whole, the disadvantages of German takeover were not as severe for the 'sutu' as they were for the 'true Ngoni'.

Social and other changes accompanied the ending of raiding. First, there appears to have been some decline in military proficiency, due to the absence of need to make and train in weapons and to be proficient in war. Secondly, there was a general transition in society from a military to an agricultural life. This surprised and impressed the Germans who often praised the apparent



ease with which the Ngoni settled down to a diligent and hard-working agricultural life.(1) This was a considerable change for those who had done little more than pursue a military life once(2), as well as for those who had benefited little from military life and were now given an opportunity to concentrate on independent food production.

A further, and probably the most severe, of the changes brought to military life by the Germans was the need to pay rather than receive tribute. This tribute was a tax of three rupees to be paid on each hut(3), as well as taxes on various other things such as rifles and beer. The Germans appreciated that the tax was a tribute to them as conquerors(4), as were the Ngoni to. For the 'true Ngoni', particularly those who had been important leaders, taxation was a severe economic and political setback. Economically, they lost the tribute in labour, food and goods which had been received from subjects before 1897 and which had made them well off to the Germans who demanded it for themselves. Moreover, they now had to pay a tribute themselves. Politically, they lost much status as they now became the same as those who had once paid tribute to them. What must have been very galling about the change was that it had been meekly conceded.

- 
- (1) M.Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2, p.30; DKB, v.XVIII, n.13, 1.7.1907, "Ackerbau und Viehsucht in Ungoni", pp.632, 637; DOAZ, 5.7.1902.
- (2) F.Fulleborn, Das Deutsche Nyassa und Ruvuma Gebiet, (Berlin, 1906), p.146 stated slaves did the field work in 1897.
- (3) DOAZ, v.IV, n.24, 14.6.1902.
- (4) RKA, 2A n.2 5ix AzKA1 GR 28 Bd.2 Hauser und Huttensteuer in DOA, 1902-4, General von Gotzen, Report on Taxation. I am grateful to G.C.K.Gwassa of the History Department of the UDSM for allowing me to read his microfilm copies of this and other RKA manuscripts.

For the 'sutu', taxation was primarily an economic burden. It seems unlikely that many had suffered the psychological loss of prestige which their leaders had. Most had paid rather than received tribute before 1897, so whether payment was made to the Germans or Ngoni leaders must have made little difference. The economic burden of taxation was considerable in that the 'sutu' usually lacked or had in short supply the goods that were demanded by the Germans. Initially people were allowed to pay in kind (grain, goats), cash, labour, or natural resources, such as rubber and beeswax. Most offered their labour. For example, in 1899, the first year in which taxes were collected, cash payments amounted to rps.1,651, payments in kind to rps.706 and payments through the offering of labour to rps.21,209(1). This meant that some 7,273(2) people gave free labour to the Europeans. As this quantity of labour was not always needed, the Germans increasingly demanded payments in kind or cash. To meet the demand, more and more people had to accept the economic livelihoods being introduced and fostered by the Germans. This acceptance, which was considerable, judging from the increase in cash payments from rps.1,651 in 1899 to 38,045 in 1903(3), had further repercussions, discussed below.

Taxation was to be remembered by the 'sutu' as the greatest burden imposed by the Germans on them.(4) They resented having to give free labour, to go collecting rubber and beeswax, and to sell grain and goats. If any single issue united the 'sutu' against the Germans, it was probably taxation and the difficulties caused by it.

---

(1) DKB, v.XII, n.11, 1.6.1901, pp.389-90, DOA Bezirksämter und Stationen im Berichtsjahre 1899/1900, Songea.

(2) An estimated number based on an individual's tax being 3 rps.

(3) DKB, v.XVI, 1905, n.11, 1.6.1905, p.351.

(4) As shown in most traditions in the MMR/6/68/... series.

The Germans, though knowing African feeling(1), saw it in a different light. For example, Booth wrote in 1904 that the obligation to pay taxes drove the people out of their indolence and laziness.(2)

While the most thorough changes made by the Germans were those made in military life, it was those made in administrative life which manifested Ngoni disillusion with German rule most poignantly and which eventually brought rebellion.

The first administrative change made by the Germans after submission was a realignment of the power structure in the Ngoni kingdoms. The pre-1897 structure of nkosi - wantwana/manduna/royal 'houses' - alumuzana was now considerably modified. Replacing the nkosi at the top was the German representative in the district, called the Station Chief till 1905, then, after civilian rule was introduced, the District Officer (Bezirksamtman). Assisting him were a few administrators and a military force whose numbers varied between fifty and one hundred.(3) Below him came, not the nkosi, but rather a representative of all the leaders. This representative was nduna Songea, probably the most powerful individual in Ungoni in 1897. Little information was found on this appointment so little

---

(1) H. Wehrmeister, Vor Dem Sturm has notes on resentment of taxation quoted in I.G. Kozak, Two Rebellions in German East Africa: Their Study in Microcosm, MA, Howard U., 1968, p.137.

(2) J. Booth in P. Fuchs, "Die Wirtschaftliche Erkundung einer Südbahn", Beihefte Tropenpflanzer, v. VI, (1905), p.264.

(3) In 1903 there were two officers, three 2nd.Lts., and 100 men in the detachment, DOAZ, v. V, n.49, 5.12.1903.

can be said about it. Songea seems to have been preferred to a representative of the ruling royal families because of his military position and status. Possibly he was more receptive than other leaders - if Prince's comments are to be credited with any accuracy.(1) According to one tradition, Songea was appointed as an assistant in administrative affairs(2) and handled all matters that the leaders wished to see the Germans about. His position does not appear to have given him financial and judicial superiority over the mankosi. Below Songea were placed the mankosi and other officials from a number of other levels of administration. These levels included: the wantwana, such as Fusi Gama; the military manduna, such as Mpambalioto; the administrative manduna, such as Mkuzo; headmen of the more important subject villages; and various independents, including local traders and foreigners. The more important appear to have become Sultans or akidas while the others were relegated to a lower level of recognition. The process of selection, if any existed, is not known. Indeed, the allocation of the names themselves was not noted on any official documents. It merely occurs in references to various leaders. Below the Sultans and akidas were appointed Jumbes. This class of leader appears not to have existed prior to 1897, despite some claims to the contrary.(3) The Jumbes appear to have been made the main administrative class by the Germans, though

---

(1) Prince, "Geschichte", p. 219.

(2) MMR/6/68/4/3/13; Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10. 1971 agrees.

(3) J. Komba, God and Man, PhD, Pontifical University of the Propagation of the Faith, (Rome), 1959, pp. 21-2.

again, the only indications of this come not from official documents but, rather, from references to their use in German administrative and other files. The Jumbes were selected from among alumuzana and local subject chiefs as well as from the categories noted above from whom Sultans were selected.

After the structure was changed, the allocation of power within each was also modified. The Station Chief assumed most of the powers which had formerly been held by the two mankosi. He had the final say on the district level on all administrative policies. This meant that he decided everything from deciding who would be allowed to hunt ivory to approving the selection of the Jumbe of an area. In the financial realm, he handled the budget for the district, which included, among other things, collecting then reallocating the tribute, or taxes, received from the people. In the judicial realm, he had the final say in the allocation of judicial responsibility and kept for himself the role of arbitrator in criminal cases. Powers which he did not hold were held by his superiors.

The representative, Songea, had considerable administrative powers, though apparently lacked financial and judicial responsibilities. He was made superior to all other leaders in Ungoni. However, the powers he had in this respect were considerably below those which he had formerly exercised over his followers. For example, he had the power to report judicial complaints but lacked the authority to give sentences - such as the death

penalty which he could have given before 1897.(1)  
 Again, in finance, he may have had to ensure that others paid their taxes. But these taxes did not go to him. Because the powers Songea enjoyed were less than those he had exercised over his people before 1897 and, though more than those he had formerly exercised over other leaders, still not for his benefit, other leaders appear not to have been jealous of his exercise of power. This is indicated by the fact that he seems to have been a close ally of both mankosi (now unofficial titles) in 1905, something quite unlikely had he felt superior to them or they, angered by him.(2)

The mankosi and lesser officials who were now classified as Sultans or akidas now appear to have had roughly the same powers and responsibilities as each other and, apparently, as the Jumbes. Those who had recognized followers appear to have retained control over them. Where it seems to have been felt that some followers should not be under a leader's control, these were removed. For example, Chabruma Tawete lost control over Liwale and Likuyu, both of which were now placed under the control of aliens, who became akidas.(3)  
 Putire Gama lost control over parts of Umatengo, which were now placed under Amakita, a former subject chief who now became a Sultan.(4) Songea Mbano lost control over that part of southern Njelu which he controlled.

---

(1) MMR/6/68/4/3/13, B.M.Mpangala's tradition.

(2) The alliance in rebellion is shown below in Chapter Five, section I.

(3) According to TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B, the akida, Yusufu Kirobo replaced Chabruma's murdered military nduna, Manjoro (Chilembo) at Liwale. However, P.H.Gulliver, "A History of the Songea Ngoni", TNR, n.41, 1955, p.24 states that he headed Likuyu.

The Yao who lived there were placed under the control of their own local leaders who, at least after 1905, were known as Sultans.(1) Zamchaya Gama lost control over the Nyasa region, which was placed under the control of alien akidas.(2)

In administering for the German government over the followers they were allowed to keep or were given anew, the Sultans and akidas had to follow certain guidelines. In administration, all were required to submit day-to-day reports to the German boma(3) and to attend general meetings(4). They had to pass on orders from the boma and see that they were obeyed. They collected men for labour. Those who given the responsibility, saw that taxes were paid.(5) They were required to show friendliness to Europeans, a willingness to co-operate in the changes that were being made and a readiness to perform a number of duties they cared little for.(6) In

- 
- (4) p.256 PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 11.8.1905. I wish to thank John Iliffe for allowing me to see the notes he has taken on the Benedictine Chronicles at the Peramiho Archives.
- (1) These Sultans were, in the later years of German rule: Mariumba at Mitomoni; Isa at Msawizi; Halifa at Matimbuka; and Mkupeni at Sawasawa, see TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.218.
- (2) His control during the 1890s is described above, Chapter Three, p. , while his loss of it is suggested in the general removal of Ngoni representatives from the region, suggested on p.248.
- (3) DKB, v.IX, n.12, 15.6.1898, p.349, "Bericht über die Reise des Hauptmanns von Kleist in Bezirk Songea"; DKB, v.XII, n.11, 1.6.1901; TNA/1733/1920 Annual Reports, Songea, 1919/20.
- (4) DKB, v.XV, n.18, 1.9.1904, p.565.
- (5) Not all had this responsibility, M.Wright, German Missions in Tanganyika, 1891-1941, (Oxford, 1971), OUP, pp.75-6 writes that tax collections in north-west Songea in 1903 were a serious grievance of the people and that the Berliner missionaries complained of it to the government. The taxes were collected by askari (soldiers) and the missionaries wanted the chiefs to do it.
- (6)

...

justice, they were now restricted to handling civil cases under traditional law. Moreover, decisions could be appealed if either claimant wished.(1)

The Jumbes appear to have been allotted much the same responsibility as the Sultans and akidas. They appear to have been responsible for handling court cases at the local, often village, level, for seeing that taxes were paid, for collecting labour and, generally, for ensuring law and order. There were eighty-four Jumbes in Songea district by 1904(2), a considerably larger number than appear to have been Sultans, suggesting that the Germans appreciated and made much use of this level of administration.

The ways in which power was allocated among the various levels of administration, involved a considerable loss of power for much of the Ngoni leadership. The mankosi probably lost the most. Before 1897, they controlled their kingdoms. After 1897, they officially did not. Their subordinate officials were no longer responsible to them. The Station Chief made his demands and the officials had to respond to these. The mankosi surrendered their administrative powers over their kingdoms. For example,

---

(6) One leader who had little interest in the duties demanded of him was Fusi Gama. For comments on his attitudes and the results of these, see C.Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 3.1901; Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), mission press, pp.158-9; for general statements on the duties of chiefs under German rule see R.Cornevin in L.H.Gann & P.Duigan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, (Cambridge, 1969), CUP, p.412.

(1) DKB, v.XII, n.11, 1.6.1901, pp.389-90; J.Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, (London, 1965), Chatto & Windus, p.51 incorrectly claims there was no legal security in the country.

(2) DKB, v.XV, n.18, 1.9.1904, p.565.



they no longer could decide who could enter the kingdom or how people could act when in it. This had its effects. For example, in 1903, a zealous Benedictine missionary decided to burn the Ng'anda ya Nasele, or Mahoka Hut, where the Njelu nkosi prayed to his ancestors. The nkosi complained to the Station Chief and the latter fined the missionaries rps.15 and ordered them to pay the nkosi rps.3. Though given official satisfaction, the nkosi had been badly humbled by being unable to revenge this desecration and insult the way he would have done before German takeover.(1) His only recourse was to withdraw his support from the missions.

Judicially, the mankosi no longer had complete powers. They could no longer handle criminal cases, while in civil cases, such as marriage violations, they could only give limited punishment. This led to considerable resentment. For example, the Mshope nkosi once sentenced one of his subjects, named Mgayi, to death after the latter had committed adultery with one of his wives. Mgayi escaped and fled to the boma where he told the Station Chief of his sentence. The Station Chief summoned Chabruma to the boma then, because Chabruma had no proof of the deed, reprimanded and fined him.(2)

- 
- (1) Komba, op cit, pp.13-4; TNA/G9/6, Albinus to Govt., n.68 of 15.2.1904, The missionaries put up a strong complaint against the fining and the matter ended up in Berlin. In this letter, Albinus justifies his action. He denies ordering the payment and states that the missionaries had agreed to make it. He states that he does not even believe the Hut had been burnt in the first place. and see Govt. to Bishop Spiss, n.1x930 of 21.3.1904; Missbl., v.VIII, n.3, pp.33-5.
- (2) MMR/6/68/4/3/4, tradition and evidence of M.Nchamo; and see analysis ny Mapunda and Mpangara, MMR/6/68/4/1.

Financially, the mankosi lost their effective control over the society. Theoretically, before 1897, they had controlled all plundering expeditions and received their share of the proceeds; they controlled the greatest wealth in the society, having the most followers - and consequently, labour reserve, the largest cattle herds, and the biggest fields; and they controlled trading.(1) Now, much of this was taken away. When warfare ended, they lost the revenue it produced. They relinquished exclusive control over their followers, who now had to respond to German demands. They no longer had the power to approve the entry of traders. Their trade goods became the property of either the Germans, as with ivory(2), or of the 'sutu', or anyone else who wanted it, as with rubber and beeswax. The mankosi were cut off from their traditional sources of wealth and excluded from the new ones, described below, which the Germans were bringing in.

In all, the mankosi were very adversely affected by the imposition of German rule. Indeed, their decline after German entry was probably greater than that of any other individuals or group within Ngoni society. Their fall from power and wealth was a long and hard one which, by 1905, seemed nowhere near ending.

- 
- (1) This control has been described in detail in the previous two chapters, which see.
  - (2) The German colonial authorities passed a law restricting much of the hunting of elephants to professional hunters. It is not known how closely this decree was followed in Songea. R.W.Beachey, "The East African ivory trade in the nineteenth century", JAH, v.VIII, (1967), n.2, p.285 states that the professional hunters were required one tusk of every pair to the district station.

The manduna and other categories of leaders who had become Sultans or akidas suffered to varying degrees. Those who had the greatest powers before 1897 lost the most, those who had least, gained. For example, in administration manduna like Songea lost control over peoples who had formerly been under them.(1) In justice, the same leaders suffered. Songea is remembered as having become quite bitter at being unable to prevent others from interfering with his wives.(2) Mpambalioto could no longer act as authoritatively with his followers as he had before 1897.(3) In finance, the senior manduna lost almost as much as the mankosi with regard to plunder from raids, use of subject labour, and benefits from trading. The manduna and other leaders who gained in status and power appear to have been few in number. In administration, they included leaders such as Amakita in Umatengo, who was raided from being a subject leader of the Ngoni, and Jusufu Kirobo, a foreigner who seems to have risen from nothing to being a quite powerful akida. In justice and finance, it included the few who stood to benefit from the German presence. One among these appears to have been a son of Mpambalioto's, who became an interpreter.(4) The Jumbes appear to have

---

(1) In addition to losing part of the south, Songea lost the western part of his region, which was taken over by the liwali appointed at the boma. This man was a certain Hassani in 1902, see PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 26.5.1902.

(2) MMR/6/68/4.3.13, tradition and evidence of B.M.Mpangala.

(3) J.Häfliger, "Land und Leute von Ungoni", Missbl., 1901, n.1, pp.6-8, n.3, pp.65-8.

(4) M.Read, "Tradition and prestige among the Ngoni", Africa, v.IX, (1936), n.4, p.479 notes a parallel in Maseko Ngoni society: "Instead of one big chief in the country, many small ones were now recognized who dared to give themselves airs because they knew the Ngoni could not compel allegiance to their Paramount (nkosi)."

gained power on the whole, particularly where they had been alumuzana or less before 1897.

## II

A number of changes now took place within the structurally reorganized Ngoni society. These, which gradually affected most spheres of life, accentuated the transition brought by German rule. Generally they were less favourable to the 'true Ngoni' than to the 'sutu'. One of the major adaptations to German rule was made in labour, its availability and use. The numbers of workers increased as many who had only been warriors before joined the labour pool to obtain money for goods and taxes. The people making use of this labour became more varied as Ngoni leaders and traders were supplemented by German government officials, missionaries and additional traders. They wanted labour for new uses, such as the building of permanent houses and other buildings, the construction and repair of roads and for skilled work as cooks, messengers and clerks. Occupations engaged in before 1897 also came into increased demand. For example there was close to a fivefold increase in the demand for porters between 1899 and 1903.(1).

Among the effects of the changes in labour availability and use was a decline in the numbers of people ready to work for the leaders of the Ngoni. This decline was accentuated by the apparent abolition of the obligation on 'sutu' to give free labour to their masters.(2) A second effect was a modification in the

---

(1) Shown in caravan statistics in Fuchs, op cit, pp.227-8.

(2) At least such is the impression given by a reference to the end of 'sutu' use as 'unpaid servants' in MMR/R/S/1/69, tradition and evidence of Kawahili.

in the function of labour. While before 1897, people had offered labour as a form of identification with their fellows or masters, after 1897, it was usually offered in return for money. This money was kept by those who performed the work unless they were slaves.(1) This change in the function of labour was one aspect of the change from a barter to a cash economy. The changes in labour offered greater variety of occupation and increased independence of action to many of its 'sutu' participants. Admittedly the Germans had compelled them to adopt new occupations. However, once the benefits of these were appreciated, the need for force appears to have given way to a general willingness to work. At least, this is the impression given in German reports on Ngoni labourers, many of which were extremely favourable and praising.(2)

In agriculture only a few aspects of activity underwent change. In resources of agriculture, a few new food and cash crops were introduced. One cash crop, cotton, is of note. It was introduced into the Nyasa area in 1903 after that area had been identified as favourable for the crop by the Colonial Economic Committee.(3) Experiments that year were successful so, in 1904, a larger area was brought into production. After a second good crop, greater schemes were planned for 1905. However, by 1905, the number of Africans participating was small and, unlike further east, where cotton-growing became

- 
- (1) That slaves were not paid is suggested by their being allocated a separate status in references such as Hendle, Missbl., 1902, p.87.  
 (2) C.Spiss, Missbl., 1898, p.103; TNA/G8/130, Lt.Frank to Govt., n.534 of 18.8.1900.  
 (3) Booth in Fuchs, op cit, p.275; DKB, v.XV, n.10, 1.5.1904, p.296 and v.XIV, n.23, 1.12.1903, p.639; G. von Götzen, Deutsch-Ost-Afrika im Aufstand, 1905-06, (Berlin, 1909), p.81.

a major source of discontent, in Songea it had not developed sufficiently to attract much attention.(1)

Methods of cultivation underwent a few changes. One was in the methods used by those who grew cotton. However, as this did not affect the cultivation of other crops, it was of minor importance. Another was in the methods demanded at plantations. There were very few plantations in Songea by 1905 and the methods of cultivation they required must have had little direct or indirect effect on the people. This was not expected to remain the case. Songea had been recognized very early on as a very favourable region for European settlement.(2) As it was distant from the coast and lacked suitable communications - the tsetse fly made the horse impractical and bulky produce could not be exported economically by portage - the Germans decided to build a railway from Kilwa to Lake Nyasa going through Songea. In 1903, a hydrographical and geological survey was conducted to determine the physical feasibility of a railway.(3) This was followed by an economic survey undertaken to determine whether or not the proposed railway in the south could be financially

---

(1) It is not mentioned as one of the causes of the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905 in Songea. Indeed, the areas where it was introduced remained loyal to the Germans. There is a common belief that there was no cotton grown in the district, see MMR/6/68/4/3/10.

(2) Fuchs, op cit, pp.259-60; Fülleborn, op cit, pp.131-2; G.Lieder, "Zur Kenntnis der Karawenwege im südlichen Thiele des ostafrikanischen Schutzgebietes", MadS, v.VII, (1894), n.4, p.272.

(3) F.Tornau in Bericht, p.128.

solvent.(1) Both surveys answered in the affirmative, so in 1905, a surveying team went south to plan the route.(2) Until the railway was completed, few settlers were willing to move into Songea. In 1899, the German trade, R.Peter, started a small coffee and rubber plantation in Songea. Neither crop appears to have become productive by 1905.(3) In 1902, a second settler, the Englishman John Booth, applied for land to set up a large plantation in the district. He envisaged making use of the surplus of local labour. To finance his scheme, he applied for financial assistance from the government. This he failed to receive. The government was apparently too poor to support schemes such as his.(4) In 1904, he satisfied himself with establishing a small, twelve-hectare plantation of cotton.(5) By 1905, according to one reference, he had a plantation scheme going with a local chief.(6)

The distribution of labour in agriculture did change to some extent. The availability of free and captive labour for agricultural work declined as raiding stopped and alternative occupations offered themselves to the people. This appears to have reduced the annual output of food from the fields of the mankosi and manduna. It may also have affected the size and output of individual 'sutu' holdings. In all, the major effect of the changes in agricultural production appear to have been a decline in the food produced for local consumption as fewer people were growing food which now tended, in addition, to be sold(7) as well

---

(1) Fuchs, op cit.

(2) TNA/G12/74, P.Holzmann & Cie Baubureau DSM to Govt., 3.1.1907 and following letters.

as consumed internally. This decline affected the leaders of Ngoni society more than it did the mass of the people.(1)

A third change within the society after 1897 came in trade as the goods handled increased in variety and as the sector participating in trade increased. The pre-1897 trade in slaves, ivory and rubber gave way after 1897 to one in ivory, beeswax and rubber. Few statistics were found on the amounts traded, but those which were indicate that the trade increased considerably in total volume and value, primarily due to the increased export of rubber and the newly established export of beeswax. The only available statistics on the ivory trade are a series of references for 1905 in which the volume of ivory exported amounted to 253 lbs.(2). But these appear to be quite incomplete or else not representative as tax returns for shot and ammunition indicate that the

- 
- (3) p.268 DKB, n.16, 15.8.1907, "Nachweisung über die in DOA vorhandenen Privat-Pflanzungen und deren ungefähren Stand am 1.4.1905", pp.813-21, esp. p.818; Peter apparently continued to devote much of his time to trading.
  - (4) p.268 TNA/G8/20, John Booth to Govt., 26.6.1902; 1st.Lt. Albinus to Govt., n.381 of 28.6.1902.
  - (5) p.268 DKB, v.XVIII, n.16, 15.8.1907, "Nachweisung..".
  - (6) p.268
  - (7) C.Spiss, Missbl., 1898, p.106 notes that the Ngoni were selling all kinds of food.
  - (1) Writing in 1907, the DO Richter noted that the Sultans did not have enough slaves to produce sufficient food for themselves and their followers so they laid claim to a natural period of work by their subjects., DKB, v.XVIII, n.13, 1.7.1907, "Ackerbau und Viehsucht in Ungoni", p.632, 637.
  - (2) As found in the report on compensation due to losses in Maji Maji, which is in files TNA/G8/130 and G3/77.



trade was of considerable importance.(1) Rubber became an established export crop from north and north-east Songea(2) as early as 1899, when its exploitation was described as having reached "a remarkable and promising boom".(3) Very few statistics are available on the amounts of rubber exported, though one from Mshope indicates that the trade was considerable. In the first half of that year, some 15,000 kgs. were exported.(4) Beeswax was plentiful throughout Songea, owing to the favourable habitation conditions of the district(5) and, once it had come into demand, people could readily supply it. Few statistics, again, are available on the amounts handled. Some of 1905 suggest that it may have been Songea's most important export crop. In that year, four coast-bound caravans owned by Jaffer Somji, a leading trader in the district, exported goods worth rps.2,876.89 of which rps.1,714.64 was in wax, while two caravans belonging to R.Peter, contained exclusively wax, to the value of rps.1,100.39.(6)

The important thing about the change in the variety of crops produced and sold was that it brought about the participation of a new sector of the population, for whereas the leaders controlled the slave and ivory(7) trade, it was largely the 'sutu'

---

(1) See statistics in TNA/G4/113, H.Richter to Govt., 10.1.1905.

(2) Booth in Fuchs, op cit, p.273.

(3) D.Warburg in DKB, v.X, n.10, 15.5.1899, p.338.

(4) DKB, v.X, n.10, 15.5.1899, "Kautschuk in DOA", pp.337-9.

(5) Miombo vegetation is favourable to bees.

(6) TNA/G8/130 and G3/77, relevant lists.

(7) They had hunters in their employ. Some later participated in Maji Maji.

who benefited from the rubber and wax trade. Accordingly, people who, before 1897, gained little from trade, now stood to benefit substantially. One group who appear to have were the Ngando of north-east Mshope, whom one missionary described as possessing much cloth from their sale of rubber.(1)

The final major change for the Ngoni came in religion. For, although the ancestors of the 'true Ngoni' and the various dieties of the 'sutu' retained their central importance for the vast majority of the population, a new religion, the Christianity of the Europeans, began making inroads into the country. The first missionaries to settle in Songea were the Roman Catholic Benedictines of St.Ottilien, a mission order established in the late nineteenth century.(2) In 1897, M.Hartmann made a journey through Ungoni to look for a suitable site. The following year, after a second exploratory visit by Alfons Adams, two missionaries, Cassian Spiss and Brother Laurenti, entered Songea to establish the first mission there.(3)

The mission made little impact on the Ngoni during its first years, for the people saw little reason to change from their own faiths.(4) Indeed, the community resorted to buying slave

---

(1) G.A.Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes, (St.Ottilien, 1899), p.132.

(2) For details on their history, see F.Renner, Der Fünfarmige Leuchter, (St.Ottilien, 1971), 2 vols.; F.Szczypior, Die Sozialwirtschaft von St.Ottilien für auswärtige Missionen in apostolischen Vikariat...1888 bis 1920, PhD, Julius-Maximilians U., (Würzburg), 1923. I am grateful to Lorne Larson for showing me his copy of this thesis; R.Rios, Benedictines of Today, (Stanbrook, 1946), pp.233-6; Missbl., 1898, p.15.

(3) Missbl., 1898, p.93; 1897, p.307; Ebner, History, pp.163-4, 254; DKB, v.X, n.5, 1.3.1899, p.173.

(4) The missionaries were well aware of the difficulties in converting the people, see F.Leuthner, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, v.IX, 1904, n.11, p.168.

children in order to form the nucleus of its Christian community.(1) Gradually it inculcated its ideas into a number of people and, by 1905, had established a firm basis for future expansion with 472 Christians and 536 Catechumens.(2) But the numbers were less important than it seemed for, of the total, very few were men of any importance. Indeed, only one minor leader, the Jumbe Mchota, had accepted baptism by 1905.(3) Without support from a higher level of authority, Christianity had little chance of making inroads.(4)

However, the missionaries did have greater success in education, through which a future generation could be brought in large numbers to accept European beliefs. By 1904, there were ten schools having 562 pupils in Songea(5) The educational inroads were important in at least two ways. First, schools were established in or near the villages of leading men in Ngoni society. By 1904, both the Njelu and the Mshope mankosi as well as manduna such as Mpambalioto had schools.(6) Secondly, the students, though comprising mainly former slaves and 'sutu' children, also included a number of children of leaders. Chabruma Tawete's son, Dominikus Missoro, and sons of Mputa Gama and Putire Gama were among these.(7) These children were later to become important leaders and were to foster the mission presence in the district. Supplementing the mission schools, was one run

---

(1) C.Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 3.1901.

(2) Missbl., v.IX, (1905), n.10, p.146.

(3) Missbl., v.VIII, (1903), n.3, p.34.

(4) G.J.Liesegang, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Nguni im südlichen Moçambique, 1820-1895, PhD, Köln U., p.153 writes that among the Gaza Nguni people did not join the Church possibly out of fear of the leaders. This may have been a factor in Songea, particularly after the Mahoka Hut burning.

(5) Missbl., v.IX, (1905), p.146.

(6) Missbl., 3.1902, p.71; 1904, p.50, 168. (7) MMR/6/68/4/1.

by the government at the boma. Among the pupils at this school were Mwanawalifa, a son of nduna Songea and, according to some traditions, Usangila, a son of Mharule Gama and the heir apparent in Njelu.(1)

The missions and government were preparing the way for change in the next generation. Some signs of this change were manifesting themselves by 1905. Two students had gone to Dar es Salaam to study in 1902,(2) a former official of nkosi Mputa had foresaken the leader in favour of the missions(3), while various pupils showed scorn for traditional beliefs when helping to destroy the Mahoka Hut. But these were still the exceptions in 1905 and change lay ahead.(4)

The total impact of the German presence then, was one of variable change in the institutions and organization of Ngoni society. Some, such as the military life of the people, underwent considerable change. Others, such as the religious life, were affected very little. The varying changes had a greater impact on some sectors of the society than on others. For example, traditional political leaders were far more affected than the average 'sutu' farmer. This varying change soon had a considerable impact and it is to the buildup of this that we now turn.

### III

Though the cumulative reaction to change was varied two major trends can be discerned: one by the 'true Ngoni' and another by the 'sutu'. It should be noted that the

---

(1) MMR/6/68/4/1; see also Chapter 5, section II.

(2) C.Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 1.1902, p.7.

(3) Rafiki Yangu, v.VI, n.3, 3.1915.

(4) For another view, see John Iliffe in I.N.Kimambo & A.J.Temu, A History of Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), p.130.

distinction was not a totally exclusive one referring to whether the Ngoni immigrated into East Africa or were captured there. Some 'sutu' were well integrated into Ngoni society and thought and acted like the 'true Ngoni'. However, a broad distinction between the two groups can be made. Each is studied separately.

An initial reaction of the 'true Ngoni', particularly those at senior levels of administration, appears to have been one of uncertainty. They had surrendered control over their society to a powerful newcomer. It seemed that they then wondered what effects this action would have. This wondering was shown in the expressing of interest in the stranger and in a willingness to co-operate with his plans. Evidence of this, with regard to the German administration, is found in the offering of assistance in the building of the boma and, once administration began, in acquiescence to the demands made by the Station Chief. An example of acquiescence was the apparent willingness to make regular visits to the boma to discuss local problems with the German officer there.(1) It should be noted that the possibility of having force applied against one must also have played an important role in stimulating compliance. Another indication of receptiveness, appears to have been the willingness to accept advice. Major von Natzmer wrote that in 1899 he was able to arrange a peace between the two hostile leaders, Chabruma and Palangu.(2)

---

(1) DKB, v.IX, n.12, 15.6.1898, p.349.

(2) DKB, v.X, n.19, 1.10.1899.

Missionaries also experienced this interest. For example, in 1897, when Maurus Hartmann visited Mshope, nkosi Chabruma, who was still independent, and who preferred to remain isolated from the Europeans, refused to see him. On the other hand, the politically troubled Njelu was more open and he had a favourable reception from its leaders.(1) A year later, when Alfons Adams made his visit, Chabruma, who by now accepted the inevitability of European contact, welcomed the visitor.(2) Once the missionaries were established in the district, the leaders continued to be friendly with them and a number of leading men in Ungoni allowed schools to be built in their areas.(3)

The openness shown to the missionaries appears to have been due to a number of factors. One was the military. The Ngoni had just been subjugated by the Germans and probably were interested in learning more about them.(4) What better way than through these missionaries who professed friendship and offered to help the people? In this context, it is not clear whether the Ngoni looked upon the missionaries as

---

(1) Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2, p.30.

(2) Adams, Dienste, pp.124, 126.

(3) There are numerous instances of the leaders giving assistance. For example, Chabruma sent them presents when they came to his town in 1899 to build a mission and then ordered hundreds of men and women to assist in the building of the hut, see C.Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 4,1899, p.119.

(4) This seems to have been quite evident in the attentiveness Chabruma gave to Alfons Adams when the latter visited his capital in 1899, see Adams, Dienste, pp.124-6.

religious specialists or another part of the German military establishment. It seems they saw them as religious specialists. Missionaries, such as Adams, certainly sought to give this impression. Secondly, the Ngoni seem to have seen the missionaries as pawns in the internal political situation. This seems to have been the case in Njelu, where the recently-appointed nkosi (an unofficial title then), Mputa, sought to confirm his status among his divided people. Mputa's opponents identified more with the government(1) so may have played this off against the missionaries. There may have been a similar sort of situation in Mshope, where Chabruma sought to monopolize the missionaries to the exclusion of his rival Palangu. But no data was found to suggest this and it appears that Palangu was not sufficiently strong to present the challenge that the dissident group in Njelu offered to its leaders. Thirdly, the people appear to have welcomed the missionaries for the material benefits they brought.(2) This would, initially, have been in the form of tribute given to leaders for the right to build schools among things. Later, it would have been the money received for labour and the selling of food.

---

(1) As evidenced by their actions during the rebellion in 1905, these described below, Chapter Five, section II.

(2) This was shown in the willingness to work for them, see Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 4.1899, p.119, and to sell produce to them, Kigonsera Chronicle, 2.1902, p.47.

Fourthly, according to Komba, Mputa knew of the educational system being set up west of the lake and wanted one himself.(1) Why he should have wanted one is not explained.. Finally, there may have been a fear of missionaries, yet a realization that they could do only limited harm if carefully controlled. On the other hand, the missionaries seem to have used their identification with the boma to compel the leaders to accept them.(2)

While the Ngoni felt uncertainty about the Germans, their interest in them appears to have been counteracted by lack of interest. This is suggested by the continuing preoccupation with internal political life, which, to the Ngoni leadership, was more important than the new forces in their midst. The most important manifestation of this preoccupation was in the 1898 succession in Njelu, following the death of Mlamilo Gama. Though very little information was found on this succession, it seems that, once again, the dissension between the Mlamilo and the Zamchaya groups troubled the kingdom. The Mlamilo group appears to have supported Usangila, the senior son of Mharule while Zamchaya's supporters put forth Mputa, the elder brother of Zamchaya who had returned from west of the lake for this succession.(3) Mputa was older than Zamchaya, he was an experienced fighter and appears to have been a very confident man. There

---

(1) Komba, op cit, p.

(2) As suggested by Adams, Dienste, pp.98-100.

(3) Ebner, History, p.130.



does not appear to have been any formal selection. Rather Mputa seems to have assumed a de facto leadership over the society. Ebner suggests that people recognized he was not the more eligible but could do little about it.(1) It is not clear whom the military manduna supported, though it seems they were willing to accept Mputa. This is indicated by their support for him in the 1905 rebellion, a support not given by the faction which failed in their bid for leadership.(2) Moreover, it seems reasonable that military men, who had no aspirations to the nkosiship themselves would have found it in their interest to support the candidate with the greater military proficiency. This candidate was Mputa. Members of the group supporting Usangila, who included Chabruma Gama and Putire(3), appear to have become alienated from Mputa after 1898(4), and internal rivalries in Njelu appear to have remained a serious problem into 1905. The German authorities tended to be somewhat withdrawn from the whole struggle. Their reaction to the strife that was going on was to abolish the nkosiship in Njelu. Spiss justified this action: when writing that there was so much trouble between royal factions as to who was Pretender and who should succeed that civil war would have resulted had not the Germans abolished the title of nkosi.(5)

---

(1) Ebner to Redmond, interviews, 18-21.10.1971; Ebner, History, p.158.

(2) As shown below, Chapter Five, section II.

(3) MMR/6/68/3/1, analysis by T.W.Turuka.

(4) MMR/6/68/3/3/1, evidence and tradition of Laurenti Fusi.

(5) Spiss, Kingoni, p.3.

It is useful here to comment on Gulliver's claim that the advent of German domination 'was keeping the Njelu kingdom together at a time when it was dangerously weakened in unity by the independence of the leading ndunas".(1) Gulliver is incorrect in this claim. First, the main cause of disunity before 1897 was the rivalry within the royal family, not the independence of manduna. This rivalry was not resolved by the introduction of colonial rule. Rather it was intensified. The German decision to abolish the nkoship involved ignoring, rather than attempting to resolve, the problem. The friction was stronger than ever by 1905, as will be shown below.(2) Again, German administrative policies appear to have been much likelier to foster the independence of manduna than to control it. These policies included the appointment of nduna Songea as their leading Ngoni subordinate official and the reducing of the powers of the nkosi to the level of those of the manduna. If the kingdom was not further weakened in unity after 1897, it was because some leaders, particularly the military manduna, appear to have worked for unity by supporting Mputa.

A second manifestation of lack of interest in the new German rule was the unofficial continuance of some aspects of traditional life. The continuance was unofficial in that the Germans did not recognize it.

---

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.17.

(2) See below, Chapter Five, section II.

An example of such continuance was in aspects of the structure of power. Though the Station Chief had become the ultimate authority in the district, the nkosi in each kingdom continued to be recognized for what he was. This was shown most forcefully in Likuyu, where people who had been given independence from nkosi Chabruma in 1897 nonetheless followed him in 1905, rather than an akida who appears to have given them greater independence.(1) A second example of continuance, also within the structure of traditional power, was the retention of influence within Ngoni society by the women in the nkosi's 'houses'. Fülleborn praised these women in Njelu in 1897: "These women behaved like true princesses; they acted freely and openly towards us, and in their charm, they were noble and wonderful; they were as courteous and energetic as the best of men, whom they also seemed to excel in intelligence."(2) Adams praised their counterparts in Mshope in much the same way a year later.(3)

The fluctuating interest shown by the leaders appears to have begun giving way to a firmer response after a few years of colonial rule. The German rulers demanded attention by their deeds, and the leaders and people had to come to terms with these. The reactions of the leaders were varied. Some pursued a policy of comparative neutrality and isolation for a while. Chabruma Tawete was one of these. Gulliver describes his activities:

---

(1) See below, Chapter Five, section III.

(2) Fülleborn, op cit, p.147.

(3) Adams, Dienste, p.126.

"[He] was far more truculent [than Mputa] and had several brushes with the German officers at Songea boma...in the tradition of the high autocracy of the Mshope Nkosi [he] was far less ready to give way to the white man".(1) But for some, isolation proved to be an unsuccessful approach. Fusi Gama appears to have tried it, but after being repeatedly summoned to the boma to answer for his apparent uncooperative attitudes, he hanged himself.(2) There were a number who, outwardly, were friendly to the Germans. For instance, Songea seemed very co-operative in fulfilling the new duties demanded of him. Mpambalioto was another who was friendly to the missionaries, allowing them to build a school in his area. One missionary seemed to look upon him with disguised respect when writing, in 1901:

"The Wangoni live under chiefs...whose children they are. They settle all quarrels and enjoy great prestige... Above the chiefs are the Sultans, to whom greater [deference] is given...Sometimes these chiefs and Sultans rule very tyrannically. One, for instance, whom I personally know, is Pambalioto, that is to say, "the fire-bringer"...when he is angry with someone, he simply sets the person's house on fire without allowing the person to step outside it."(3)

Yet, while friendly, most of these leaders retained their traditional attitudes, as, for example, Mpambalioto in 1906 who was<sub>A</sub> to scorn Christianity and praise the old military society with its beliefs.<sub>in A few</sub> established close relations with the Europeans. For instance, Mputa became very friendly with the Benedictines, who visited

---

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.17.

(2) C.Spiss, MissBl., Peramiho Chronicle, 3.1901; Ebner, History, pp.158-9.

(3) Hafliger, "Land", pp.6-8, 65-8; see also Adams, Dienste, p.128.

him quite regularly. Indeed, he even attended religious services at times.(1) Putire Gama also became very friendly with the missionaries and, by 1905, appears to have been accepting their ideas, advice and attitudes.(2) Finally, there are indications that members of the Usangila faction identified somewhat with the German government.(3)

Gradually attitudes hardened one way or the other. On one side was assembled the overwhelming majority of the leaders, who were strongly opposed to the intruders. For instance, Chabruma Tawete seems to have accepted that it was not possible to remain neutral if he wished to retain as much of his power as possible, and, from time to time, he came into conflict with the Germans. The most renowned instance, noted above, was when he was taken to task for passing the death-penalty on a follower.(4) Again, Mputa learnt that friendship was not always beneficial and, when the missionaries interfered with his religious beliefs through burning the Mahoka Hut, he stopped all contact with them. There were many general grievances to upset the leaders. They saw power and influence slipping from their hands, as they no longer controlled political life. They felt the ignominy of subjects' of theirs rising to positions of responsibility in the missions and government and showing an impertinence

---

(1) He attended the official opening of the mission at Peramiho, see Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 1899, p.102.

(2) As will be shown below, Chapter Five, section II.

(3) Ibid; MMR/6/68/3/1, analysis of T.W.Turuka.

(4) See above, p.194.

and, worse, acquiring a power and prestige which they would never have had without German backing. They saw others becoming great on their legacy. They experienced a declining economic power, because of labour shortages and the closing of their sources of revenue. They knew they were being forced to accept missions, even if they did not want them. They suffered the indignity of coastal peoples' taking their women. They begrudged paying taxes. So, they longed for a return to the past.(1)

In that small element which apparently saw some advantage in the German presence, there appears to have been a gradual acceptance of the new order. Probably the most important individual in this group was Putire Gama, who became notably receptive to the Christian influence. As a factor motivating this receptiveness one cannot dismiss his generally independent frame of mind.(2) The only other important individuals to acquiesce in the German presence appears to have been a few of Usangila's supporters, who may have seen political advantage in their actions. As their acquiescence is closely tied in with the Maji Maji rebellion, it is discussed in detail in the relevant chapter. Finally, the youth in mission and government schools appear to have begun to accept that there were advantages to the German presence and to learn how to operate under it. The youth, however,

---

(1) The preceding paragraph is a summary of the changes discussed above in section I.

(2) See above, Chapter 3, p. 137.

were a very unimportant force before 1905.

As the general reactions of the leadership appeared to harden, frustration seemed to set in. The leaders, while disliking the Germans, found themselves quite powerless to affect much change. If they were too blatant in ignoring the Germans, they suffered inevitable reprisals. For example, as late as 1901, punitive expeditions were being conducted against chiefs who had refused to come to the boma for conferences.(1) As the reference to these expeditions offers no details whatsoever, it is not possible to say any more about them. This is unfortunate, as it would be very useful to know against whom they were undertaken and, consequently, what influence they had on the Maji Maji wars. A few people talked of military reaction, but they had to be careful. For instance, on one occasion, a rumour had spread to Songea that the Africans along the coast had rebelled. When the Station Chief learnt of the rumour he, determined to suppress any possibility, detained a number of people whom he suspected of spreading the rumour. One of these was Laurenti Fusi, who later wrote that they were put in chains and that he was freed only because the Benedictines pleaded his case.(2) On one occasion, a chief did rebel. Though he was not Ngoni, his action and the German reaction to it, must have made it clear to Ngoni leaders

---

(1) DKB, v.XII, n.11, 1.6.1901.

(2) MMR/6/68/2/3/1.

how futile such action was. The chief was Mandawa, a Matengo leader. In 1901, he had welcomed the missionaries into his area, only to find that, a year later, the Germans were there demanding taxes. He reacted strongly to this by burning the school and refusing to pay taxes. The Germans sent an expedition into his area, which they burned and looted, and took him off to the coast as a captive.(1) The other chiefs were patient. They appear to have been becoming more dissatisfied, but knew that, since the Germans were the stronger power, little could be done.(2) The Germans, themselves, appear to have seen that the era of Ngoni autocratic rule was coming to an end. For instance, John Booth wrote in 1905 that, with the death of the leaders at the time, the centralized political structure of Ngoni society would come to an end.(3) His comment was soon to be shown to be premature, as the Ngoni leaders were to seize, in 1905, an opportunity to preserve their leadership.

While it is reasonable to accept that the 'true Ngoni' were, on the whole, very dissatisfied with German entry, the same cannot easily be said of the 'sutu', or mass of the people. Indeed, contrary to a current emphasis in Tanzanian historiography on this issue, not all local people appear to have been dissatisfied with

---

(1) Kigonsera Chronicle: 9.9.1901; 1.3.1902; 2.3.1902; 3.3.1902; 4.3.1902; 8.3.1902; 18.3.1902; 30.3.1902. These are in the FA.

(2) R.A.Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule, (London, 1968), Yale UP, p.38 wrote of the German inability "to communicate to the local Africans anything more than the immediate superiority of European military force."

(3) Booth, "Die Nachkommen", p.197.



the German occupation at this time. The coming of the Germans brought many changes to the lives of the 'sutu'. The ending of raiding and plundering had adversely affected many 'sutu', as it had the 'true Ngoni'. Many had gained fame, and some wealth, from raids and participation in the military state. But not all. Indeed, there were a good many subjects within the state who benefited little from Ngoni military society. To these, their life had been a disadvantageous one in which they sustained the state by their tribute of goods and men, in return for which, they received little. To such people, the German arrival was not a wholly bad thing. For instance, it seems quite likely that the Natengo in south-west Njelu appreciated having their own leaders and not having to pay taxes to the Ngoni. Again, the Ndendeule of north-east Mshope appear to have appreciated the change. One wrote: "We the Wahamba [Wandendeule] somehow appreciated a number of the German rules because they directly opposed the Ngoni rules, especially of using us as unpaid servants".(1)

Moreover, in many aspects of German-controlled life, there were greater opportunities and more rights for subjects than there had been before. Many found they could participate more in administration, especially in matters such as the selection of Jumbes.(2) They may have had foreign leaders above them, but they had always

---

(1) MMR/R/S/1/69, tradition of Kawahili.

(2) Ibid.

had this, for the 'true Ngoni' too were foreign to them. In economic life, many found new opportunities under the Germans. Individuals could go to the coast to earn money, then return, keeping it.(1) If they were asked to perform free labour, it was something they had done earlier, anyway, for their leaders. Those groups who, formerly, gave part of their produce to the 'true Ngoni', could now keep it. For peoples such as the Matengo, it seems reasonable to suspect that this was a considerable improvement on life before 1897.(2) Moreover, with the new crops on which the Germans were experimenting, they would eventually benefit. In trade, they participated more. The main reason was their freedom to collect and sell, independently, rubber and beeswax which were being demanded by Indian and Arab traders.(3) In the judicial realm, while there were few changes on the lowest level of justice, there were many, generally beneficial, on the higher levels. The main change was that now the Germans, rather than the 'true Ngoni' handled criminal cases, at which they appear now to have been accepted as equals with their former masters.

The above is not meant to imply that there were no grievances: there were some. The 'sutu' found the German soldiers difficult to appreciate, particularly in their roughness and their readiness to take local women.(4) They resented the high-handed attitudes of

---

(1) Money appears to have been given individually now whereas before 1897 it was given to the leaders.

(2) Particularly if full credence is given to the quote, p.132.

(3) As discussed above, p.270, especially fn.4.

(4) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B; The MMR/6/68...series have other instances of complaint.

the Germans. In one case, some Ndendeule refused to relocate their villages to a more accessible area after being directed to do so by the Germans. As a result, they had their villages burnt down and were forcibly relocated.(1) They resented taxation and, occasionally, as in Mandawa's case, rebelled against it. Some resented being told what to do by outsiders.(2) Finally, they lost the prestige of being associated with the 'true Ngoni' once these, as everyone else, became subjects of the Germans.

But, all in all, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 'sutu' were in two minds over German entry. Various traditions and contemporary records indicate this. For example, though a number of traditions collected by students of the University of Dar es Salaam confirmed that many 'sutu' disliked the German presence, others indicate that they were satisfied with it. One researcher commented on the feelings of the people he collected evidence from: "The Wandendeule 'liked' the Germans relative to the Ngoni. After all the rules were not strictly executed; for instance, a person who could run from the clerks who were collecting taxes was not chased."(3)

- 
- (1) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.89 names them as the Jumbeates of Ilonga, Mpigamiti, and Tuliani in Likuyu.
  - (2) As, for example, in forced labour. For one case of this, see Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 4.1899, p.119 which notes soldiers building a bridge with Ngoni they had collected.
  - (3) MMR/R/S/1/69.

Contemporary records also reflected some contentment. For instance, Adams wrote in 1899 that the Nyasa were pleased with German arrival.(1) Again, the government at Songea announced in 1904 that the people willingly held meetings from time to time to meet government officials.(2) Finally, the actions of various important and lowly individuals in accepting and working with the Germans showed some willingness to change the old order.

Thus, by 1905, the Ngoni had reacted in a complex manner to the rough new world of German domination. The 'true Ngoni' included many malcontents, though a few found German rule to their advantage, while the 'sutu', though probably as dissatisfied as ever with their lot, were a little less unhappy than they had been before 1897. It was into this complex society that Kinjala came in the summer of 1905 to bring the news that God would be on the side of the Ngoni if they were to go to war against the Germans.

---

(1) Adams, Dienste, p.129.

(2) DKE, n.18, 1.9.1904, p.565.

## Chapter 5

## Maji Maji and the Rejection of Subjugation

## I

By 1905 many Germans were coming to the conclusion that the Ngoni had made a peaceful transition from their former military life to the peaceful life of agricultural pursuit now being imposed on them. One German writer noted that these formerly much-feared people were now stripped of spirit. He added, showing some foresight: "if this is not all a deception, Ungoni is on the way to a flourishing economic future"(1). The colonial government itself felt sufficiently confident to act as if a new era was beginning. In 1905, it formally changed the official status of Songea from that of a district run by the military to one run by civilians.(2) A District Officer (Bezirksamtman) replaced the Station Chief. The military garrison was reduced. The new District Officer cautioned his superiors against reducing the military presence at Songea lest the people there see this as a sign of German weakness.(3) If such happened, they might exploit it as such. However, confidence was in the air so though the caution was noted, it was disregarded.

- 
- (1) John Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) in Deutsch Ostafrika", Globus, lxxxviii, (1905), p.197.
  - (2) TNA/G4/112, Foreign Office, Berlin to Govt., DSM, KA4645 of 8.4.1905; I.G.Kozak, Two Rebellions in German East Africa: Their Study in Microcosm, MA, Howard University, 1968, p.86 incorrectly states that the change was made in 1904.
  - (3) G.vonGötzen, Deutsch-Ost-Afrika im Aufstand, 1905-06, (Berlin, 1909), p.50 states that there were 68 men in the Songea police force at the outbreak of rebellion.

Any optimism for the future, however, was to be short-lived. By the summer of 1905, trouble had arisen in Songea's neighbouring district of Kilwa. There the pressures of increased government control, of forced cotton production, of taxation, and of uncertainty over the future had led to a powerful religious revival which soon took on political overtones. The revival was manifested by the spread of the beliefs of a respected prophet, or mganga, Kinjikitile Ngwale, among the Ngindo and Matumbi.(1) Kinjikitile offered the people a medicine of sacred water, or maji, which, when taken, would release them from the restrictions of existing beliefs and superstitions by giving them a new and freer life.(2) News of his medicine had been spreading since 1904 and, by 1905, large numbers of people were coming to his residence at Ngalanga to partake of the maji. They were told to administer this medicine to their bodies and to observe certain rituals and rules. In return, they would receive its benefits, one of which was immunity from bullets. Those who took the maji were, thus, to be able to expel the Germans.

By July 1905, some Matumbi, anxious at the continuing delay in the struggle to oust the Germans, began uprooting

---

(1) He was also known as Bokero.

(2) TNA/16/37/29, Hall, "The Maji Maji Rebellion in Liwale District", draft copy, (henceforth, Hall, "Maji Maji"); W.O.Henderson, "German East Africa, 1884-1918", in V.Harlow et al, eds., History of East Africa, v.2, (Oxford, 1965); John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912, (Cambridge, 1969); A detailed study of Maji Maji will be forthcoming shortly from G.C.K. Gwassa who is presently completing research on such for his PhD from the University of Dar es Salaam.



[illegible]

cotton plants at Nandete. Shortly afterwards, they forced their local akida, or area representative, to flee for his life. On 15 August, a neighbouring people, the Ngindo, attacked and destroyed the boma at Liwale.

By this time, the news of an uprising appears to have reached Songea, for tension was in the air. In mid-August, John Booth cabled a warning to the Governor that the Ngoni seemed to be on the verge of rebellion.(1) The tension was soon heightened by more ominous developments. A detachment from Songea boma, under Sargeant Thiede, which had gone to assist the German forces at Liwale, was attacked and annihilated enroute.(2)

After Liwale boma was overrun, rebellion spread quickly amongst the peoples of southern German East Africa. Prophets moved east, north and west to bring to others the promise of the maji. Their success in spreading the word is described by John Iliffe:

"Within a fortnight (of late July), nearly all the peoples surrounding the Rufiji valley, from Kilosa to Liwale, were in revolt. Missionaries, Arabs, Indians, akidas, askari, and all who had contact with the government were threatened. By the end of August the Ngindo had taken the movement into two further regions, southwards into the Lukuledi Valley, where the mission stations were destroyed, and westwards into the Kilombero Valley and the surrounding highlands. On 30 August 8,000 Mbunga and Pogoro launched a desperate assault on the strongly fortified military station at Mahenge, attempting to seize the machine-guns bodily from their operators. They were repulsed with terrible casualties."(3)

---

(1) Gotzen, op cit, p.81.

(2) Ibid., p.95.

(3) Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.19; see also John Iliffe, "The organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion", JAH, v.VIII, (1967), n.3.



By the time of the onslaught on the boma at Mahenge, the maji had been brought to Songea by a prophet named Omari Kinjala.

Kinjala has been remembered as a powerful and moving man with a mission in life. One who saw him described him thus:

"...a young man who was always clothed in a white loin cloth that was kept together by a white girdle. He was the type of man who would not easily communicate with the common people, claiming that he had been sent by God and further alleging that God himself would come after him."(1)

Kinjala made contact with Mkomani, a relative of Chabruma's and friend of Palangu's, and after telling her of the maji, she brought him to see Chabruma.

According to one tradition(2), Chabruma had heard of the massacre of the Songea detachment. Moreover, he seems to have known of the maji. Accordingly, he was attentive to what Kinjala had to say. While one author claims he readily accepted the maji(3), others say he doubted. His son, Dominikus Missoro, writes:

"(He) consulted a diviner, (whose) divination confirmed Mkomani. Chabruma then went to Mgendi to make closer enquiries and sent Palangu's brother Kapungu to Ngarambe Hill, the local headquarters of the aji Maji cult where it was stated that the spirits of their grandfathers would be visible and the God of the Sea (water) would be consulted. Kapungu returned and affirmed that the departed spirits supported the proposed rising."(4)

Chabruma also tested the medicine, first on a dog, then on his recalcitrant subject, Mgayi, and though it failed in both cases(5), he decided to take it. While some traditions say he was pressured into doing so by his manduna, it is likely that he accepted freely.

---

(1) Mapunda & Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.15; Ebner, History, p.168.

(2) MMR/6/68/4/3/14, tradition of L.Moyo, a Kalanga living with nduna Songea in 1905. A grown man at the time, his evidence is probably the finest of all that collected on Songea in the MMR project.

(3) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.15.

(4) Mapunda & Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.15; Dominikus fled Songea in 1905 with the missionaries, see PA, St.Scholastika Chronicle, 8.9.1905.

(5) MMR/6/68/4/3/7, tradition of K.K.Haule, a participant in rebellion.

(6) MMR/6/68/4/3/2; O.Guise-Williams to Redmond, interview 30.9.1971, he was told Palangu persuaded Chabruma to fight.

Headquarters for the administering of the maji were set up at Uwerekwa, near Chabruma's capital, while secondary ablution centres were set up at Likuyu, Luwegu, Namtumbo and Kitanda.(1) The intricate ceremonies associated with the taking of the maji were carried out at all centres. Mapunda and Mpangara describe the ceremony and some prescriptions which went with the taking of the maji:

"The maji was not in fact literally 'drunk' as the word itself implies. Instead a leaf or preferably a feather was used to sprinkle the medicine on each warrior's forehead, chest, knees, feet, elbows and back... Besides the maji itself, the medicine men gave the people a long list of prescriptions which they had to believe, observe and adhere to. Among many other things, it was said that every old medicine should be burned; every red goat, red pigeon, and hen should be killed but be left without being eaten; people should not wash; if anyone saw a snake he had to sprinkle flour on the spot where the snake had been seen passing; women gathering beans should trill; people should not eat cassava; when fighting the Ngoni warrior should always look forwards and shout the words 'Masi, Masi'; greetings should be in the form of 'Saidi, Saidi! Hongo, Hongo! Boma, Boma!'; every soldier should tie little sticks of millet on his forehead. All those who had drunk the maji should not eat simsim or pigeon peas. Under no circumstances should a soldier who had drunk the maji come into sexual contact with his wife. The first German soldiers or servants caught by the Ngoni must be killed by hacking the backs of their necks with a knife. The Maji Maji soldiers had to believe a monkey from the coast would jump on the roofs of the European houses, pour oil on them and burn them, and that after the war had started two spirits (vimulungu)(2) of both sexes would join on the side of the Ngoni to accelerate the defeat of the Germans."(3)

- 
- (1) MMR/6/68/4/1, analysis by Mapunda and Mpangara.
  - (2) For further comments on vimulungu, see Ibid and J.Komba, God and Man, PhD, Pontifical University of the Propagation of the Faith, (Rome), 1959, p.7.
  - (3) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.18; see also, PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 11.9.1905.

A number of the Mshope Ngoni were apparently reluctant to accept the medicine.(1) However, the powerful Chabruma tolerated little dissension and, apparently only one leader later denied having participated. This leader was Namabengo, a female nduna, whose participation is unlikely to have been demanded anyway. The 'sutu' acquiesced rather than face Chabruma's anger. "You could not object to what Chabruma had accepted", one commented.(2) Shortly after he had decided to take the maji and rebel against the Germans, Chabruma sent word to Mputa informing him of the powerful medicine he had and asking him to join in the war. Mputa was interested and went to Uwerekwa to take the maji. As the supply of water possessed by Kinjala was limited, a local river, the Chitaka, was blessed and its water used. This river was later called "Maji ya Mputa".(3) When Mputa returned to Njelu, he had the water distributed to his manduna. Instead of meeting in one place, the manduna seem to have taken the maji in their own areas.(4)

Acceptance of the maji in Njelu was more mixed than it had been in Mshope. Mputa lacked the power and authority of Chabruma and was unable to impose his will on all his people. A number of leaders refused to accept the maji. The reasons for rejection were varied. Probably

---

(1) As suggested in their behavior during the rebellion, see below section III and fn.2, this page.

(2) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.18.

(3) Soner, History, p.170 writes that Kinjala came to Njelu to administer the water to Mputa. Some versions state that nduna Songea received the maji before Mputa, eg, see Iliffe, "Organization", p.511; MMR/6/68/4/3/16.

(4) MMR/6/68/4/3/14, L.Moyo states that Chabruma, Mputa and Songea all took the medicine at their headquarters. "There was no formal meeting for consultation between the three heads"; Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.19.

the most important was the political dissension which had rent the kingdom for some twenty years. It was this which led Chabruma Gama, Putire Gama and Usangila Gama, all opponents of Mputa, to abstain.(1) A second reason appears to have been mission influence, which is noted to have been a second influence working on Putire.(2) An odd leader may have been compromised. An example was, apparently, Kazibure, a son of Mpambalioto, who acted as interpreter for the Germans and was later appointed Sultan.(3) Finally, a few were in no position to participate. People in this category included the youth in mission and government schools. The 'sutu', here as in Mshope, generally had little choice. If their leaders took the maji, they came under heavy pressure to do likewise. Doubts as to the efficacy of the water were expressed in Njelu as they had been in Mshope. For instance, nduna Songea sought the advice of a religious leader, was told defeat was imminent, and entered the war saying "let us 'drink' the maji maji medicine so that we may all perish".(4)

Prospects of success, first weakened by the failure of the Ngoni to unite, were then further harmed by the Ngoni failure to persuade neighbouring peoples to join them. The reasons for this are not too hard to find. One was fear of the Ngoni. Some neighbours, such as

---

(1) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, pp.18-9.

(2) Ibid, p.19.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.87.

(4) Iliffe, "Organization", p.511, Kozak, op cit, p.89 writes that Fr.Leuthner wrote in the Peramiho Chronicle on 29.8.1905 of the Njelu: "the chiefs realize that they are not able to join the war because their own people refuse to join. The news of many deaths of the Ngindo and the measures undertaken by Songea have frightened off the people. Now the chiefs are seeking friendly terms with the government."

the Nyasa and Ruvuma Yao, had been attacked and subjugated by the Ngoni in previous years and, though they disliked the Germans, they appear to have had a still greater fear of the Ngoni. Indeed, both peoples apparently offered some support to the Germans.(1) A second reason for non-alliance was awareness of German might. This seems to have inspired Matengo neutrality.(2) The Matengo had suffered German repression in 1902 and may not have wanted the same again. Awareness of German might certainly induced the Hehe not to join Chabruma. They had been badly shattered by the 1891-8 war and were, anyway, occupied by the Germans shortly after rebellion began.(3) They appear, also, to have held some enmity towards Chabruma Tawete who had refused to ally with them in the 1890s. Enmity seems also to have been an important reason for the neutrality of the Mpepo Ngoni. Mpepo and Chabruma had once fought for the nkosiship of Mshope and, presumably, the legacy of bitterness was not forgotten. Mpepo, moreover, tried the maji and found that it failed.(4) Possibly it was enmity which persuaded the Yao chief, Mataka, not to respond to Songea's reported request for assistance.(5) During the 1880s and 1890s, there had been long and bitter

- 
- (1) RKA, "Politische Zustände in DOA", Johannes Report, notes Ruvuma Yao support; PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 29.9.1905, notes the Nyasa being friendly to Germans.
- (2) Missbl., 1905/6, n.6, p.87-91 states they remained neutral; PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 7.9.1905, states that under intense Ngoni pressure, neutrality was giving way to participation.
- (3) MMR/6/68/3/3, tradition of Albert Tawete, Mshope nkosi, 1954-62.
- (4) Mapunda & Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.24.
- (5) Ibid., p.24 quote Götzen, op cit, p.161 noting the letter. They doubt its validity there, though in MMR/6/68/4/1 they accept it. As the Ngoni had a long-standing contact with Mataka and indeed, sought refuge with him after Maji Maji, the authenticity of the letter deserves to be tentatively accepted.

fighting between Mataka and his father and the Njelu Ngoni of Mharule, Mlamilo and Songea. Fourthly, rejection of alliance could have been due to identification with the Germans as was the case with the Arab, Rashid bin Masoud. Rashid, probably the most powerful man in Songea in 1905, was of crucial importance.(1) He had many well-trained and -armed retainers and his support could have ensured an early Ngoni success. But Rashid had been identified with the Germans since 1894(2), knew their strength and presumably had few doubts that any rebellion would be smashed. So he rejected the Ngoni request for alliance. Finally, rejection of alliance was due to the internal political situation in the kingdoms of some allies. For example, Merere, Chabruma's one-time ally, seems to have wanted to join the rebellion but was outvoted by powerful tribal elders who saw no sense in rebellion.(3) The Germans ensured his neutrality by virtually keeping him a prisoner throughout the rebellion. Of all the neighbours approached, only the Bena under Ngozi Ngozi, Mbeyera's son, agreed to join the Ngoni in rebellion. In the end, with little support from their neighbours, but with determination and some confidence in themselves, the majority of the leaders of the Ngoni led their followers into rebellion.

## II

Why did the Ngoni rebel?

The earliest answers came from the German colonial rulers. In late 1905, Graf von Götzen, the Governor of German East Africa gave the Foreign Office in Berlin thirteen explanations for the rebellion,

---

(1) Götzen, op cit, pp.101, 105, 110-3; TNA/G3/77, Major Johannes to Commander-in-Chief, Kais. Schutztruppe, 13.10.1907.

(2) See above, p.166.

(3) MMR/5/68/1/3/8, tradition of M.M.Merere.

including among them taxation, reaction to cotton growing, communal work and land alienation.(1) In 1909, he published what is the only major contemporary German account of the rebellion.(2) In it, he suggested that the major reasons for rebellion had been the superstitious nature of the people along with the running down, but not complete destruction, of their previous military power.(3) Another analysis was suggested by a committee appointed by the Foreign Office to look into the causes of rebellion and to recommend changes. One committee member was John Booth. He considered rebellion to have been the result both of an attempt by Ngoni leaders to regain their power and of a spreading of the maji.(4)

A second group to offer their views were the Benedictine missionaries. In a report of late 1906, one of their converts described the hopes that the recipients of the maji had of expelling the Europeans from their country.(5) A more 'official' Benedictine

- 
- (1) RKA, "Unruhen in Deutsch Ostafrika", IANZ AzKA1GR15, Bd.3, G.vonGötzen to Foreign Office, 9409 of 10.11.1905. The writer had very limited use of the records of the RKA, so cannot offer a full explanation of the official German analysis of Maji Maji immediately following it. However, it is not necessary for the re-interpretation given below.
  - (2) Götzen, op cit.
  - (3) Ibid.
  - (4) RKA, "Hilfeleistung und Anlage der Unruhen in Deutsch Ostafrika", KA1GR15, Bd.1, IANZ, #728, Colonial Economic Committee to Foreign Office, 23.1.1906.
  - (5) PA, Kigonsera Chronicles, 21.9.1906, 25.8.1905.

report on the rebellion was given by the Bishop of Dar es Salaam: he suggested that the cause for rebellion had been political rather than religious. He termed the rising a nationalist endeavour, and compared it to the struggle of the people of Tirol in 1809 and the Germans in 1813.(1) The Tiroleans had been joined to Bavaria by Napoleon in 1806 but bitterly resented the subjugation and, in 1809, a peasants' army had risen and joined with Austrian forces which, in that year, unsuccessfully challenged Napoleon.(2) The German struggle of 1813 was that of the popular Prussian-organized war against Napoleon in 1813, which succeeded in freeing Germany from the invader.(3)

Until the 1950s, most subsequent studies of the rebellion were composed by British colonial officials who usually saw the rebellion as an expression of grievances against unjust German rule.(4) That by R.M. Bell on Liwale district is one of the most revealing. After analyzing many oral traditions, Bell concluded that the Maji Maji rebellion had been a "national war of independence - a fanatical and desperate fight for freedom"(5).

- 
- (1) PA, "Die Benediktinermission in der Aufstand in Deutsch Ostafrika vom Jahre 1905 oder Stellungnahme der Benediktinermission zur Denkschrift über die Ursachen des Aufstandes in Deutsches Ostafrika und Anderes", unsigned and undated manuscript, unmarked blue file. I am grateful to John Iliffe for showing me his copy of this document.
  - (2) A. Ramm, Germany 1789-1919, A Political History, (London, 1967), Methuen, pp.90-1.
  - (3) Ibid., pp.90-101.
  - (4) Various references in TNA/155/SDB... and TDB.
  - (5) Bell, "Maji Maji".



In the 1950s, further work on the Ngoni was published by sociologists, missionaries and converts. The first of these were by the government sociologist, P.H.Gulliver. In 1954, he wrote that Maji Maji had been a purely political effort which had used the maji for specific ends:

"...it seems clear that the Rebellion was primarily a military one in the Ngoni warlike tradition and in an attempt to regain the old mastery by this tribe of soldiers and marauders. It cannot be said that there was a really unified Maji Maji movement, or that the Ngoni allied themselves with the Ngindo and others - these other tribes were thoroughly despised by the arrogant Ngoni who had plundered them so easily for so long. The Ngoni merely seized the opportunity afforded by the 'magical' 'water' to rise against the white man and to resume their independence and their old way of life and war."(1)

Gulliver commented on other effects of German rule, such as Chabruma/Tawete's loss of followers(2), but gave limited attention to the economic causes of rebellion.

In 1959, the missionary, Ebner, published his major History of the Wangoni. In it, he argued that the main reason for rebellion had been the desire for independence:

"They hoped to regain their independence by this war and to re-establish their former glory and greatness. The main reason for the participation of the Wangoni in the Majimaji war was a revival of Ngoni nationalism".(3)

He identified a few other particular causes as well, one being the burning of the Mahoka Hut.(4)

---

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.16.

(2) Ibid., p.17.

(3) Ebner, History, p.167.

(4) Ibid.

Later in the same year, an African priest from the district, J.Komba, wrote a thesis on religion among the Ngoni in which he reiterated Ebner:

"The proud Ngoni, once the sole masters of the land, could not bear the humiliation of having masters over them. The medicine-men, who went about at this time advertising their newly discovered medicine which would turn bullets into water (maji), offered a welcome opportunity to the bellicose Ngoni to rise against their European masters."(1)

Thus, of the pre-1961 interpretations of Ngoni participation in Maji Maji, 'nationalism' has figured prominently as the main reason for rebellion. This nationalism has been seen as the struggle of the leaders by Booth, while for most others, it has been that of the more general 'Ngoni'. The emphasis on nationalism has varied from being very limited, as with British reports, to quite explicit, as with the official Benedictine report. Other causes mentioned have been general grievances against unjust rule, superstition, violation of religious beliefs and economic deprivation.

Since 1961, some important new contributions have been made. In 1967, John Iliffe synthesised existing interpretations of the Maji Maji rebellion as a composite phenomenon that "originated in peasant grievances, was then sanctified and extended by prophetic religion, and finally crumbled as crisis compelled reliance on fundamental loyalties of kin and tribe".(2) In his view, by the

---

(1) Komba, op cit, p.13.

(2) Iliffe, "Organization", p.495; and see Mapunda and Mpangara's analysis of this in MMR/6/68/4/1, pp.10-11.

time the maji had reached Songea, rebellion had entered its tribal phase. Without citing other causes for the rebellion, Iliffe suggests that the maji made an impact on the Ngoni:

"...not...as a revolutionary and self-legitimizing creed...(But seemingly, it) replaced the ceremony led by Chikusi which normally preceded Ngoni warfare. Apparently the Ngoni saw the maji not as a prophetic anti-sorcery medicine, as had the Vidunda, but as a new and uniquely powerful war medicine, superseding Chikusi's normal ministrations. This interpretation suggests the basically tribal nature of the Ngoni rebellion - perhaps more accurately described as a delayed resistance - whose organization and leadership drew on a functioning military system. What is significant about the impact of the maji is that during the Lumecha ceremony(1) it provided a means for the reunification of the Ngoni people whose last concerted action had taken place in 1882."(2)

Elsewhere, Iliffe also suggests that the rebellion was an attempt to re-unite societies that were breaking up.(3)

Since Iliffe wrote on Ngoni participation in the Maji Maji rebellion, student researchers(4), supervised by Iliffe himself, have discovered that the causes of Ngoni participation were more complex than those he has offered. The students learned that there were a few major general complaints, along with various particular ones, that underlay the support for rebellion. The general ones included resentment of the forced labour that people had to provide for the building of the new Songea boma around 1900; disillusion with taxation and

---

(1) This is described below, pp. 254-6

(2) Iliffe, "Organization", p.511; for a reappraisal of this view, see Mapunda and Mpangara, MMR/6/58/4/1, p.10; see also M.G.Gillebrand, "The Maji Maji Uprising in German East Africa, 1905-1907", MA African History seminar paper, SOAS, 1970/71.

(3) Iliffe in Kimambo and Temu, op cit, p.130-1.

(4) From the University of Dar es Salaam. They were working on an extensive research project on Maji Maji being undertaken by the History Department. Their collected papers comprise the MMR...series.

the demands it made on food and other scarce resources; the general dissatisfaction with the cruelty of the German regime. Individual causes included resentment at the taking of wives and disillusion with the ending of the old system of justice. They also found that the Ngoni responded to rebellion in a variety of ways.

A selection of the data thus accumulated was analyzed by two of the researchers, O.B.Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara and published in 1969 as a research paper entitled The Maji Maji War in Ungoni. They wrote that rebellion resulted from: taxation, unpaid labour, the decline of Ngoni political power, and the dislocation of traditional culture and economy. They doubted the importance of the maji perse, and felt that political considerations were primary. The maji, however, made revolt feasible by providing security and unity with others. They noted the internal disunity in Njelu and the varied reaction to the maji, but the tone of the paper is one of people fighting together to oust a common enemy.

Thus, all interpretations of the causes and course of Maji Maji have made it clear that the Ngoni rebelled for a variety of political, economic and social reasons and that the struggle fought was a common and united one for definite aims.

Any further discussion on Ngoni participation in Maji Maji must start from the work of John Iliffe and the researches that his writings have inspired on the subject. In light of these researches, particularly Iliffe's seminal article on "the Organization of the Maji Maji

Rebellion", the suggestion must be made that the subject is now ripe for some re-examination. An assumption common to Mapunda and Mpangara and many previous researchers is that the Ngoni were a single group. This is a difficult proposition to sustain in the light of actual Ngoni participation in hostilities, let alone earlier Ngoni history. Another common assumption is that rebellions are explained by the grievances of the insurgents rather than the maladministration of the regime rebelled against. This also is a difficult proposition to sustain in the light of the rebellions against colonial overrule, but it pervades the more detailed work of Mapunda and Mpangara as well as the suggestive article of Iliffe himself. Then again, the course of the rebellion itself needs close attention as a factor influencing Ngoni participation in it.

Insofar as any single theme has emerged from the present study it is that Ngoni participation in the Maji Maji rebellion is primarily explicable in terms of social distance between 'sutu' and 'true Ngoni'. This distinction makes more sense of the evidence collected by Mapunda and Mpangara along with German archival materials examined by the present writer. However in itself, this does not take us very far. What must also be considered is the very fluid nature of Ngoni politics, as has been shown in previous chapters, along with the German military reaction to the rebellion in Songea and elsewhere as further

determinants of Ngoni participation in resistance. Further research may suggest further modification to this view, but on present evidence this three-part theme seems to do justice to the behavior of the colonial regime in this matter as well as to the 'mass' grievances of the Ngoni. It also explains why not all the Ngoni fought.

In considering this interpretation, it must first be noted that the distinction between 'sutu' and 'true Ngoni' is not rigid, as some 'sutu' felt and acted much the same as the 'true Ngoni'. But as is shown in previous chapters, two main groups did exist, and two main reactions in rebellion can be discerned.

It has been frequently said that all members of Ngoni society suffered more or less equally by the advent of German administration. For instance, British writers talked of general grievances, while Mapunda and Mpangara stressed the common grievance of the people. However, as has been shown in Chapter Four, the ruling elite of 1897 Ngoni society, suffered a considerably greater loss of power than did the mass of the people.

In political life(1), the 'true Ngoni' lost administrative and military leadership of society; they relinquished judicial independence; they were increasingly excluded from the financial centres of power; and they had to assume numerous humiliating burdens. The 'sutu',

---

(1) The following two paragraphs are a resume of Chapter Four.

on the other hand, never had administrative or military control over their society - indeed, now some had a greater say in local politics through changes such as their being granted the right to elect their own Jumbes; where formerly they had been exclusively dependant on the 'true Ngoni' for justice, now they had options, such as in appeals; and they improved their financial standing vis-a-vis the 'true Ngoni'. They had things to be dissatisfied about. They had relinquished much of their former superiority they had over neighbours; they suffered undesirable cultural changes; and they had to follow some unpleasant administrative practices. But on the whole, German administration had been much less destructive to their lives than to those of the 'true Ngoni'.

Much the same story could be told for Ngoni economic life. The 'true Ngoni' had, before 1897, benefited the most from raiding; had controlled trade and other economic enterprises; had benefited from the labour of their subjects; and always had a satisfying inflow of captives. Under German administration they lost these privileges. In their place, came taxation and numerous other indignities. The 'sutu' also had to pay taxes. But now, unlike before, they had means for acquiring wealth. In some cases, such as among the Ngindo of north-east Mshope, the improvement seems to have been considerable. They had to do forced labour, but this had been demanded before German arrival anyway.

On the whole, many 'sutu' appear to have been little worse off than before. Various traditions lend some support to this. One Ndendeule noted that taxation was not such a burden, for the people could always hide from the tax collector and little would happen.(1) Elsewhere, a student researcher wrote that, though work was hard, people were at least now paid for their labour.(2) They did have resentments. The forced building of the new boma appears to have been one particularly notable one(3), while taxation was another(4). But an independent Ngoni state would not have improved the lot of most by much.

This may explain the various references which state clearly that it was the Ngoni leadership which wanted independence. Booth suggested this in 1906. An Ndendeule clan elder who said that Palangu pressured Chabruma to join because he wanted to regain his kingdom(5), has indicated the same recently. Again, a 'true Ngoni' recently informed a researcher that:

- 
- (1) MMR/R/S/1/69/1b, tradition of H.Mangunyuka.
  - (2) MMR/R/S/1/69/2b, tradition of Mzee Kawalika, a German servant.
  - (3) Many traditions mention this: for detailed ones, see MMR/6/68/4/3/13, tradition of B.K.Mpangala, ten years old at the time of the rebellion, a resident of Songea's town; MMR/6/68/4/3/14, tradition of L.Moyo.
  - (4) See most traditions in the MMR/6/68...series.
  - (5) MMR/6/68/4/3/2, tradition of M.Ngonyani, ten years old at the time of the rebellion, present head of a large clan.



"The main reason why the Ngoni leaders accepted the 'maji maji' movement was that they wanted to get rid of the German domination and thus reprieve their former political position. Before the coming of the Germans, the Ngoni leaders had been enjoying a great deal of power and authority and the privileges of power such as getting a lot of animals and human captives. But under German rule all these privileges were abolished and their sovereign power suppressed."(1)

Very important also is the fact that no indications or references have been found to indicate that the 'sutu' felt they would gain political power by the ousting of the Germans. Indeed if anything, the opposite is the case. Thus, one researcher from the Ndendeule area of Namtumbo, began his analysis by saying "...in the Namtumbo area...we see indigenous people participating in a war to fight the regime which they 'liked'"(2). Another researcher, who analyzed traditions of people from western Njelu had to admit that "it is clear that many people did not much like Ngoni rule"(3).

Consequently, it seems reasonable to state that while most Ngoni, 'true' and 'sutu', found much to complain about in German administration, there seems little reason to believe that the 'sutu' would have rebelled had they had complete freedom of choice at the time. One element of support for this comes from the action before rebellion of numerous peoples living on the periphery of Ungoni, who had become independent

- 
- (1) MMR/6/68/4/3/14, tradition and evidence of L.Moyo, a 'true Ngoni', Kalanga resident of nduna Songea's town, and a grown man at the time of rebellion.
  - (2) MMR/R/S/1/69, analysis of S.S.Musilawe.
  - (3) MMR/6/68/6/1, analysis of X.A.Mhagama.

of Ngoni control after German arrival. Most of these, such as the Ruvuma Yao, the Nyasa and the Matengo, refused to participate.(1) If the 'sutu' within the Ungoni of 1905 participated it was because they had no choice. Numerous traditions confirm this. One 'sutu' from western Njelu who joined said that "no one dared to refuse taking the water because that would have meant the risk of his own life".(2)

Mapunda and Mpangara give a few instances of the use of force to have the 'sutu' participate.(3) Gwassa and Iliffe have a quote showing the pressure used on Christian converts:

"When I [Yusufu Sihaba, a Christian teacher] saw that it was not safe for me out in the open, I slept in the hut of an Ngoni who had not yet taken the medicine... friends of mine...urged me to [take the medicine]... 'If you go there (to the administering centre),' they said, 'no harm will come to you. If you do not, you will be killed. But you need not go yourself; we will bring you medicine.'"(4)

But the success of the rebellion depended on more than just making everyone participate. To have people participate in war is one thing. To have them fight with determination against an enemy known to be more powerful is another. Here, the maji was of crucial importance. People who had little to gain but much to lose in a war had to be convinced that victory was inevitable. The maji apparently convinced them of this. Why it could or did is not clear, possibly

---

(1) See above, pp. 229-30.

(2) MMR/6/68/2/3/2, tradition and evidence of M. Luoga, a participant in the rebellion.

(3) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, pp. 18-9; a contemporary reference on reluctance to fight has been noted above, p. 301, fn. 4, that reference also notes that some of Mputa's people were holding back and that "Songea... started this business (of pushing rebellion)".

because any explanation lies more in the realm of faith than that of reason. Until more is known of the importance of religion to the 'sutu' and other peoples of southern German East Africa, it will be difficult to know why a fearful people acted the way they did.(1) After they took the maji, the people were reborn. Fear gave way to strength and a reluctance to fight to a determination to oust the Germans and to push others to help do the same. One participant stated that the maji imparted a new fighting spirit to the people.(2)

Some facts suggest that the leaders in Ungoni society saw the maji as a weapon on their side in persuading the people to participate well in rebellion. A few leaders who made their people accept it appear to have doubted it themselves. Chabruma Tawete had seen it fail; Songea Mbano recognized that his participation would only lead to his destruction; Putire Gama is said to have scorned it; and Fusi Gama is said to have claimed that it was useless.(3) Moreover, though most

---

(4) p.316 G.C.Kgwassa and John Iliffe, Records of the Maji Maji Rising, Part 1, (Dar es Salaam, 1967), EAPH, p.20, taken from C.Wehrmeister, Vor dem Sturm, (St. Ottilien, 1906), p.186.

(1) A few forthcoming works may provide the answer. These include G.C.K.Gwassa's PhD thesis on the Maji Maji rebellion as well as his article, "The role of religious and other traditional beliefs during the Maji Maji war 1905-7", in I.N.Kimambo and T.O.Ranger, eds., The Historical Study of African Religion, (London, forthcoming); and T.O. Ranger's forthcoming work on the interaction of Christianity with African religion in Southern Tanzania, and on witchcraft eradication movements in E.+C. Africa.

(2) MMR/6/68/2/3/2, tradition and evidence of M.Luoga.

(3) References for the first three are noted above, pp. 224, 229-1; Fusi's is noted in MMR/6/68/2/3/1, his evidence.

leaders took the maji, they made sure they observed traditional and trusted pre-war rituals, such as consulting advisers and having war dances at the same time. Again, the odd informant suggests that indoctrination was an aim. One stated that the leaders kept the local origins of the maji a secret for the people would not have believed in its powers otherwise.(1) Finally, the frequent re-issue of the maji after defeats in battle, and the adding of new prescriptions with its issue(2), showed a determination to keep the people believing and determined to fight.

Once faith in the medicine went, as the 'sutu' suffered military setbacks, and saw the Germans taking their food, dispersing their families and killing their friends, then most people ceased to fight. Everyone began to realize that they had been tricked - by the medicine men who introduced the maji. After belief in the maji had gone, the only way the leaders could get their people to fight was through the use of force or through offering them benefit. The only leader to have notable success in using force was Chabruma, the most feared leader in Ungoni in 1905 and, apparently, the one most determined to reject <sup>Gervau?</sup> Ngoni rule completely. The Njelu military nduna, Masese Mbano, appears to have offered his followers the benefit of raiding once again, though once the possibility of this ended, his force seems to have broke up.

---

(1) MMR/6/68/3/1, analysis of T.W.Turuka.

(2) See below, pp. 255.

Thus, whereas it is reasonable to postulate that the Maji Maji rebellion in most parts of German East Africa was a general rebellion, in Songea it was an élite-inspired and -pushed struggle which gained mass support for reasons of loyalty, obedience and religious fervour rather than for reasons of rejection of German oppression or benefit that independence could bring.

Secondly, it is implied in various writings, such as those of Mapunda and Mpangara and Iliffe, that the Ngoni were united in their struggle against the Germans.(1) However the history of Ngoni society as well as the sequence of events during the rebellion indicate that, for the most part, the rebellion manifested the fluid nature of Ngoni society by being a localized event. It seems reasonable to state that the Ngoni did seek a strong and complete internal alliance. If the Hehe had required this in 1878-81, then obviously, the more powerful Germans required it even more. Indeed, there are numerous indications that unity was sought. One was in Chabruma's sending the maji to Njelu and in Mputa's seeking the support of all his manduna. A second one was in the Lumecha battle. A third was when three leading Njelu manduna united for the onslaught on Rashid's town of Kikole. But there is strong evidence to support the contention that these alliances either fit within traditional

---

(1) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, in their coverage of the war as a common struggle of different stages; Iliffe, "Organization", p.511 in showing the unity of the Lumecha battle.

military patterns or were doubtful occurrences at best. As regards the spreading of the maji, the Njelu and Mshope kingdoms were doing nothing exceptional in passing the maji to each other. They had contacts with each other and over an issue as important as ousting the Germans, co-operation was only to be expected. Again, in the Lumecha battle, there is evidence to indicate that the Njelu participation was limited at best. The German historians, including the forces which fought there, Ebner, and some Ndendeule who participated, say that it was Chabruma's forces which were defeated.(1) A few traditions do claim that Mputa's forces were at Lumecha.(2) Yet the fact that his forces were sufficiently prepared to fight three further battles against the Germans shortly afterwards while Chabruma took some time to reorganize, indicates that if Mputa was at Lumecha, it was not with all his forces. Also, there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of the participation of either Songea's or Mpambalioto's forces at Lumecha. Finally, traditions from Kapunga's people indicate that they were not there.(3) Then, in the Kikole battle, the unity of the three manduna followed

- 
- (1) Ebner, History, p.178; Gützen, op cit, p.124; MMR/R/S/1/69/1b, H.Mangunyuka notes that the Ndendeule fought alone; MMR/R/S/1/69/2b, Kawaliwa, a servant of the Germans, said that the Njelu never showed up.
- (2) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.24; MMR/6/68/2/3/2, analysis of T.W.Turuka; MMR/6/68/8/3/2, A.Haule.
- (3) MMR/6/68/1/3/4, evidence and tradition of Z.Kapungu, nduna of Mkurumusi from the German colonial period until Tanganyikan independence. He notes fighting in only two battles, both in western Njelu.

traditional patterns as all three had, before 1897, considerable interest in the Arabs under attack and all three regarded the area as partially within their spheres of influence.

Along with the above, there are numerous other indications<sup>that Njelu</sup> ~~was as~~ divided as it long had been while Mshope was as united as ever. The odd tradition mentions that dissent did exist among the Njelu leadership. One elder stated that Mputa did not participate with other generals because he "feared that if he succeeded in defeating the Germans with the help of some other Ngoni generals they would share his reign...this was the general feeling of most of the Ngoni leaders of the time".(1) Again, the execution of the rebellion accentuated the basically local nature of action. Thus, the maji was administered in Njelu at the headquarters of the various manduna. Had the leaders been closely united in this important campaign, it seems reasonable to suppose that they would have preferred a common administering session, if only for the therapeutic effect on the warriors. But in their pre-1897 raids they had acted independently, and they did so here. Thirdly, the battles in Njelu appear to have reflected local interests: Songea seems to have been concerned with attacking the Arab Rashid and, apparently, with isolating the German boma; Mputa gave particular attention to the missionaries who had humbled him and to Rashid who had betrayed him; Kapungu showed an

---

(1) MMR/6/68/1/3/4, tradition of Luambano, whose father participated.

interest in all foreign presence in his area.(1)  
 Furthermore the surrender of the leaders appears to have been done somewhat piecemeal and, apparently, as a result of local pressures and despair at local initiative. But probably the most conclusive sign of the inability of the Njelu leadership to transcend pre-1897 dissension was the refusal of Mputa's opponents to go to war. Usangila Gama, Chabruma Gama and Putire Gama, and possibly others, did not take the maji. Indeed, the former two were in the boma during the rebellion. A few traditions have explained that Usangila was studying there(2). But study does not seem to have been his only motive, as one analysis indicates:

"Usangira did not drink the medicine because he was attending school at the time; he had taken refuge at the boma earlier during his quarrel with Mputa on the succession issue; there he attended the school; Mputa had planned to assassinate Usangira."(3)

The tradition, given by a son of Usangila, who heard it from his mother, receives support from other Traditions which confirm that Mputa, indeed, did have negative designs towards the dissident faction. One student wrote that Mputa was not worried by the dissidents, because he hoped the rebellion would succeed and planned to smash them afterwards.(4)

- 
- (1) For Songea and Mputa, see below section III, for Kapungu, see MMR/6/68/8/3/2, 6/68/8/1.
  - (2) That they were in the fort is mentioned in PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 31.8.1905; that he was studying is mentioned by MMR/6/68/4/3/16.
  - (3) MMR/6/68/4/3/16, tradition of S.Usangila, a son of Usangila.
  - (4) MMR/6/68/3/1, analysis by T.W.Turuka.



He also notes that the rivalry between the factions of the Njelu royal family was stronger in 1905 than it had been in 1897. A final historical note on dissidents: factions among the Ngoni royal families had shown before, for example, the Chabruma-Mpepo conflict of the 1880s, and would show again(1), that if they were not able to gain anything from an Ngoni political structure, then they would not be restrained from rejecting and indeed, destroying that structure. It seems unlikely that the Maji Maji dissidents felt differently. By their political moves in 1905, they were to ensure firm control for themselves in 1908.

As far as the Mshope state is concerned, it had long been well-organized and united and where some division appears to have existed, as between Chabruma and Palangu, it was overcome by an apparent agreement on common policy for mutual benefit. The course of the rebellion there completely followed pre-1897 military patterns in that society.

In conclusion, it seems that Maji Maji was the complex product of the existing political structure in the two Ngoni kingdoms, and not the product of a struggle that transcended the old political structure to form a uniquely new one. The following presentation of the rebellion brings out this interpretation.

---

(1) In the 1952-4 succession dispute between the Chabruma and Palangu families in Mshope, for which, see Chapter Eight, section III.

## III

The first action in the Maji Maji rebellion in Ungoni occurred in Mshope, where the Ngoni, apparently under Palangu, attacked and murdered a liwale, a few clerks and some servants who were collecting taxes.(1) The District Officer, Richter(2), when learning of the killings, assembled a force of 31 askari and 25 irregulars, whose ranks included some of Rashid's men, and marched into Mshope to punish Chabruma. As the force reached Uwerekwa, on 3.9.1905, it was attacked by the Ngoni under Chabruma.(3) The battle proved a disaster for the Ngoni who, although numbering some 500 to 600 men, were unable to overcome the superior fire power of the Germans. Richter suffered some six casualties, while the Ngoni lost some 200 men.

By now rebellion was breaking out throughout the district and all foreigners were fleeing for their lives. The most notable of these were the traders who, in August 1905, were scattered throughout the district buying and selling goods. Many fled towards the boma upon learning of the outbreak of war. A number, however, failed to make it. According to a German report on economic losses in Maji Maji, many caravans were looted

- 
- (1) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 2.9.1905; MMR/6/68/4/3/4.
  - (2) He was known as Bwana Yomba Yomba, apparently because of his height, see MMR/R/S/1/69/1b.
  - (3) A.H.Pike informed the writer that he had been told that Chabruma named the impi battalion he formed to attack Richter, 'the witnesses', as a mark of revenge against the District Officer who earlier rejected his case against Mgayi (see p.194) because he, Chabruma, had lacked witnesses, interview 13.9.1971.

while the following traders were killed: 1 at Mgende; 1 at Mbarangandu; 2 in Umatengo; 1 at Matogoro; 1 at Hanga Hanga's; and 1 at Chabruma Hanga's.(1) John Booth's farm by the Luhira River was destroyed.(2)

The Njelu Ngoni launched the next major attack. Their target was Rashid's main town of Kikole. But they also met more than expected. When Rashid had decided to support the Germans rather than those Ngoni who were rebelling, he realized that the Ngoni would attack him in revenge. So he called together his followers, relates Mzee bin Ramazani(3), one of them, and they moved into Kikole where they prepared for onslaught. Strong fortifications were built, food and water was brought in, and military preparations were finalized. They were ready when the Njelu Ngoni forces of Mputa, Songea and Kapungu attacked. Rashid repulsed this attack. The Ngoni later tried again to storm the town, but without success and throughout the rebellion Rashid remained a major thorn in the side of the Ngoni. The German commander who eventually led the resistance to the Ngoni, Major Johannes, was to remark that it was only because of Rashid's action in diverting considerable Ngoni attention that the boma at Songea managed to hold out as long as it did.(4)

---

(1) TNA/G8/130 and G3/77, traders' losses lists.

(2) H.Meyer, Das Deutsche Kolonialreich, v.1 Deutsch-Ostafrika u. Kameroun, (Leipzig, 1909), p.178.

(3) Mzee bin Ramazani, letter, DOAZ, 12.1.1907.

(4) TNA/G3/77, Staff Major Johannes to Commander-in-Chief, Kais. Schutztruppe, 13.10.1907.

Soon after the first unsuccessful attack on Kikole, Mputa and Mpambalioto attacked Peramiho. The Benedictines there had known from the end of August that the Ngoni were preparing for war(1), and, by the early days of September, everyone was in fear. On September 4, the missionaries decided to flee to Lake Nyasa.(2) One European refused to go. He was Fransiskus Leuthner, the man responsible for burning the Mahoka Hut(3), probably the first man who should have left for the Lake. On 9 September, Peramiho was taken and Leuthner and nine African Christians who had remained behind with him were captured. Peramiho was then burned down. A few traditions note that Mputa rejoiced in its destruction as revenge for the burning of his religious centre in 1903.(4) Within a few days, Leuthner was dead. Shortly after this, the mission station of Kigonsera was attacked. On 11 September, a group of Ngoni warriors visited the mission only to be repelled by the missionaries who were still there.(5) Realizing that these warriors were only the vanguard, the missionaries decided to abandon the station. A few days later, the mission was destroyed.(6)

---

(1) PA, St.Scholastika Chronicle, 26.8.1905.

(2) Ibid., 8.9.1905.

(3) See above, Chapter Four, p.260.

(4) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.22; Iliffe in Kimambo and Temu, op cit, p.130, suggests that the actions of Ngoni leaders against the missions and their converts is evidence of an "attempt to re-unite societies which were beginning to break up". This appears to give greater credit to the influence of the missions than was the case.

(5) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 11.9.1905.

(6) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 15.9.1905, 11.12.1905.

(1)

By this time, Songea's forces appear to have begun blockading the boma. After the Uwerekwa battle, Richter had returned to the boma and, deciding that he had insufficient forces to take any further offensive, blockaded himself there to maintain a German presence until reinforcements could arrive from outside the district. His askari made occasional forays into settlements around the boma in search of food. Twice, on 18 then on 27 September, these plundering detachments were attacked by the forces around the boma.<sup>(2)</sup> However, no major attack was launched on the boma during this period.

By the end of September, the Germans had begun to gain control over the military situation in German East Africa. The tensions among the population in Dar es Salaam had subsided after the containment of nearby rebels<sup>(3)</sup>, national assistance had been sought from Berlin, colonial Defence Forces had been assembled and prepared for action, and a few upcountry units had succeeded in calming potentially explosive situations. German units from New Langenburg and Iringa were moving into southern German East Africa from the west while a powerful force under Major Johannes was pushing in from the east.

As the Germans were mobilizing, the Ngoni were

- 
- (1) No confirmation was found that it was Songea's forces which encircled the boma during September. However he was the nduna who controlled this area, and after the Germans took the offensive, they made some brutal attacks on his village, see PRO/CO/691/29, DPO to Secretary, 21.2.1919, evidence from German askari.
- (2) Götzen, op cit, pp.121-2.
- (3) W.O.Henderson in V.Harlow, op cit, p.140 noted that rebel fires had been seen burning from Dar es Salaam.

under Chabruma were making final preparations for a massive attack on the boma at Songea. After his defeat at Uwerekwa, Chabruma had occupied himself in reorganizing his demoralized forces. He directed that a second administering session be held and, this time, had the added assistance of a second prophet, called Selemani. The two prophets decided that the earlier defeat had been due to non-observance of prescriptions, and the explaining and observance of these were improved. Along with the administering of the maji, there appears to have been considerable military preparation and recourse to traditional pre-war rituals. Chabruma sent word to all peoples in his kingdom, telling them to take the medicine and to mobilize for the attack on the boma. By mid-October, a large army of Ndendeule from Likuyu had readied themselves and had marched to Namabengo, en route to the boma, to wait for further instructions. There they were joined by other Ndendeule and Ngindo. Shortly afterwards, Chabruma entered Lumecha with his forces, and bid the others to join him. There, the massed force of some 5,000 men, including 200 with guns, continued their preparations while awaiting the arrival of an Njelu army.(1)

While the Ngoni prepared to attack the boma, some German forces were entering Songea district from the west and north. On 28 September, Lt.Klinghardt left Langenburg for Songea with a detachment of 50 men. In

---

(1) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, pp.23-4; numerous traditions in the MMR/6/68...series.

early October, Captain Nigmann began moving south-east from Iringa. He relieved the Mahenge boma from the Pogoro-Ngindo onslaught, then moved down into Ungoni. He passed through Usangira (Old Gumbiro), where he claimed to have found some mission materials, then continued south to relieve Songea boma.(1)

When the combined forces of Klinghardt and Nigmann arrived at Songea, they learnt of the impending Ngoni attack. Rather than wait for it, they took the offensive. On the night of 21-22 October, the German forces came upon the unsuspecting Ngoni warriors. The encounter was later described by the colonial Governor, General von Götzen:

"The attackers had the unexpected good fortune to approach within 700 metres of the enemy completely unnoticed. Captain Nigmann took advantage of the enemy's carelessness and had the two machine guns open rapid fire from a small hill near the road. The effect was astonishing. Taken totally by surprise, the enemy fled from the camp in all directions without thought of defence...Neither the Iringa company nor Klinghardt's detachment was even brought into action in this unexpectedly easy victory."(2)

The defeat at Lumecha was a heavy blow to the Mshope. The Ndendeule returned to the north-east in dissaray and, on the whole, ended their participation in the rebellion.(3) Chabruma returned to the north: however, he had no intention of giving up.

- 
- (1) RKA, "8th Company Field Notes", in "Politische Zustände in Deutsch Ostafrika"; Götzen, op cit, p.119.
  - (2) Götzen, op cit, pp.124-5; quoted in Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.23.
  - (3) Ndendeule traditions, such as MMR/R/S/1/69... series note that the battle at Namabengo (Lumecha) was the only battle in which they took part.

The German forces pursued the Mshope northwards till reaching Usangira, which they burned. Nigmann then returned north, while Klinghardt returned to the Songea boma.(1) Shortly after reaching the boma, Klinghardt took his force, together with some irregulars(2), and went westwards to attack Mputa and to establish a military base at Liganga to ensure communications with the lake. Mputa learnt of Klinghardt's approach and, on 8 November, he ambushed them by the Lundusi River. But once again, superior weapons told the story and, after a fierce battle, the Ngoni were forced to retreat in disarray. Klinghardt pursued them as far as Mputa's capital of Maposeni, where a second battle was fought. The Ngoni were, once again, forced to flee. The Germans then split up their forces, with a part establishing a base at Liganga and the remainder moving on to the lake. They appear to have misjudged the extent of resistance the Ngoni of western Njelu could put up, for their defences slackened. This was to be to their disadvantage.

On 16 November, the Ngoni ambushed the detachment that was returning to the lake. Caught totally unawares, the detachment, led by Lt.d.h.Schultz, suffered a severe reverse. Schultz was wounded and a South African volunteer, Herr Potgeider, killed. The detachment succeeded in fighting off the Ngoni, then pushed on to safety at the lake. Two days later, the detachment which had set up

---

(1) As p 257, fn.1

(2) His force consisted of: 2 officers, 2 2nd.Lts., 2 volunteers, 59 askari, 18 irregulars, see Götzen, op cit, p.142. The next few paragraphs are based on Götzen, op cit, pp.142-4.



a base at Liganga was attacked. Götzen described the battle:

"(On 17-18 November) the camp was suddenly and violently attacked from all sides and inundated with poison and burning arrows. The troops who, besides Klinghardt, had only one other European, Sgt. Ruffer, nonetheless kept calm. They succeeded in repelling this onslaught with great loss to the enemy." (1)

The outside world learnt of these attacks in the colourful and exaggerated articles written on them by the Songea trade R. Peter for the Usambara Post and which were printed in various German papers. Writing on an undated attack, which appears to have been either the 3 September or 16 November one, he said: "We were totally surprised and outnumbered by the masses of the enemy and came into hand-to-hand combat with him. Fourteen dead, nine wounded, and twenty missing was our loss that day". (2) After the battle of 17-18 November, Klinghardt received word that a second attack was imminent and so on 20 November preempted it by leading a force against the Ngoni and routing them.

The November battles were the last of the first violent phase of the war. The Ngoni had shown their determination and resolve to oust the Germans in some damaging and destructive battles. However, they had not accomplished much. The Germans were still in the district and now were being strengthened. Now, with

---

(1) Götzen, op cit, p.142.

(2) Usambara Post, n.27, 12.5.1906 and 27.7.1906. These are noted in Kozak, op cit, p.91.

the arrival of Major Johannes in Songea on 23 November, the tone of the war changed. The Germans took the offensive and a slow, brutal repression was to begin.

Major Johannes had been sent to Songea to smash the rebellion and to destroy the Ngoni military state once and for all. His first move was to initiate a general offensive against the Ngoni forces. To do this, he divided Songea into two regions, east and west, with a boundary line running north-south between the upper course of the Rutukira River and the Lumecha River. He directed the 13th Field Company to set up headquarters at Likuyu in the eastern half and the 8th Field Company to establish themselves at Mkwera in the western half. The Langenburg police force under Lt. Klinghardt returned to the lake, while the Songea police force remained at the Songea boma. The two army companies were then directed to send out strong patrols throughout their areas of jurisdiction with the aim of finding and smashing all Ngoni resistance.(1)

As the Ngoni had now apparently decided against engaging in open battles against the Germans, however, the task of finding and destroying the enemy became a difficult one. Accordingly, to prevent the warriors from continuing resistance while hiding among the people and, at the same time, to destroy the Ngoni military state, Johannes decided to break their will

---

(1) TNA/G3/77, Major Johannes to Commander-in-Chief, Kaiserliche Schutztruppe, (13.10.1908); RKA, "Politische Zustände in Deutsch Ostafrika"; DKE, issues of 1906 and 1907 contained the reports of Major Johannes.

to resist as well as that of the people by denying all of them all food. Accordingly, he directed his troops to confiscate all food supplies, to prevent the growing of any new crops, and to destroy all villages. The Ngoni would then have the choice of surrendering or of seeing themselves and their women and children starve. In any case, the starving people would inevitably leave the district and thereby deny the fighters the support they needed. Major Johannes found the timing of the rebellion superb for the carrying out of this policy: November to January were the months of planting and cultivation. With the Ngoni prevented from doing either, a severe famine was inevitable.(1)

Ruga ruga, or volunteers, who had been enlisted to assist the police force in the early days of rebellion(2), now offered their help to the army. They comprised traders, particularly a number of Rashid's men, a few Europeans, and various Africans from Songea and neighbouring districts.(3) Some overzealous groups mobilized independently and travelled throughout the district burning, looting and killing. Some of the more vicious, such as the European Knallmeyer, were so destructive that they had to be recalled by the military.(4) Many found their activities

---

(1) RKA, "8th Company Field Notes", in "Politische Zustände in Deutsche Ostafrika".

(2) Götzen, op cit, pp.121-2 has notes on the ruga ruga.

(3) MMR/6/68/4/3/4, tradition of M.Nchamo says that the Hehe and Sudanese soldiers played an important role in repression. They "confiscated and destroyed every food item they could possibly find".

(4) 1st.Lt.Albinus, in Tikuyu recalled him, see PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 10.11.1905.

profitable. For instance, Sangu soldiers returned northwards from the campaign with a good many women.(1) At the end of the rebellion, the Germans thanked the ruga ruga for the important rôle they had played in putting down the uprising.

From November 1905 until the end of January 1906, there were few military encounters in Njelu between the Ngoni and the Germans. Kigonsera appears to have been raided in December(2), and a deserted town of Rashid's was burned down. Otherwise, the main actors were the German forces, which were burning villages, taking food and killing any unfortunate man caught.

As food disappeared and villages were razed, people began dispersing and the desire to continue the rebellion dissipated. Increasingly, the leaders came to accept that the rebellion had failed and that the Germans were in the district to stay. Finally, possibly under some pressure from their people and, very likely, under the realization that further resistance was futile and would only bring more senseless suffering and death to their people, a number of senior leaders began surrendering. By the end of December, among those who had given themselves up were Songea, Mpambalioto, Putire, Chabruma Mpitimbi, Kapungu and Magagura.(3). By the end of January, more had surrendered, while a few others, such as Mputa, had

---

(1) MMR/7/68...series, various traditions.

(2) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.25; Ebner, History, p.180. Mapunda and Mpangara identify this as a period of guerilla warfare, though there does not appear to have been much activity. It may have been more a period of laying low.

(3) Ebner, History; Götzen, op cit; RKA, "Politische Zustände in Deutsch Ostafrika; Reports of Major Johannes in DKB, various issues 1906, 1907.

been captured.(1) The confined leaders, who numbered forty-eight by February(2), were then brought to trial and all were sentenced to death.(3) In succeeding months, more were captured and hanged. On 20 March, fifteen were hanged, while on 12 April, seventeen went to the gallows.(4) Many others were taken to the coast and to plantations in north-east German East Africa to serve periods of forced labour.(5) The three sessions of mass hangings and the deportations decimated the small numbers of 'true Ngoni' and 'sutu' elite, and broke the back of the rebellion in Njelu.

Isolated resistance lingered on for a while in Njelu, as a few minor leaders who escaped capture continued to fight. The most important of these was Masese Mbano who in early 1906 led a few thousand followers southwards into Portuguese East Africa. Once settled in Mataka's land, he made an alliance with a number of elephant hunters and continued the rebellion. In March 1906, he crossed the Ruvuma River and attacked the Ruvuma Yao in revenge for their failure to participate in the rebellion. By this time, Major Johannes was concentrating his army in Mshope and north-west Songea district, and was angered by the need to slow down his plans by sending a detachment south to guard the border.

---

(1) He was caught by one of Rashid's men.

(2) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 27.2.1906; Gwassaand Iliffe, Records, pp.25-6.


(3) Ibid., the account is fascinating, particularly in the militant defiance offered right up to their deaths by leaders such as Mpambalioto.

(4) MMR/6/68/3/1, analysis by T.W.Turuka, he has the months wrong though;

MAP 11

THE MAJI MAJI REBELLION  
ADVANCE AGAINST UPANGWA

Stellungen Mitte März  
und  
Vormarsch gegen Upangwa.



△ Stab, ▢ 8.u.13.Kompagnie, ▣ Polizeitruppe, □ Hilfskrieger.  
△ Postierungen.

GOTZEN (1909), p. 214

He requested permission to invade Portuguese East Africa and destroy Masese's town. However, the government in Berlin appears to have been unwilling to raise the matter with Portugal for, by August 1906, no reply had come to his request.(1) However, by this time the region appears to have quieted down.

The Mshope kingdom was to prove much more intractable than Njelu. The punitive raids and destruction undertaken by the German army from November 1905 until January 1906 had had as much impact here as in Njelu. By the end of January, many groups in central, eastern and north-eastern Mshope appear to have been ready for surrender. But they could not do it, for Chabruma had forbid it and any who defied him were severely punished. For example. Major Johannes was informed in mid-January by some <sup>an</sup>Ngoni that six respected leaders who had attempted to surrender had been hanged by Chabruma. With the firm power that Chabruma held over his people, the Germans decided that isolated, unofficial surrender was

- 
- (5) p.335 Gwassa and Iliffe, Records, quote TNA/III/F/.. 20/1, Governor von Gotzen 'Befehl an die Truppenführer', 11.11.1905 which dictated part of the terms of surrender: "Major Sultans and other influential tribal leaders who declare the submission of the native communities they rule are to be required to provide contingents of several hundred men for punitive and compulsory labour for the government on the coast. The punitive labour will last three to six months for each contingent." The decree also required those who surrendered to pay a tax of three rupees and to surrender all their bows, arrows, and spears. see also, MMR/6/68/1/3/3.
- (1) RKA, 1ANZ S.Blx, AcKALGR15, Bd.2, "Unruhen in Deutsch Ostafrika, 1905", Götzen to Foreign Office, n.10484 of 28.7.1906. Letters were sent till July but no reply seems to have come.



meaningless for, if Chabruma entered a subjugated area, its inhabitants would rise again through fear of their nkosi. Johannes accordingly decided to continue repression until Chabruma was captured, and so rejected pleas for peace throughout 1906.(1)

By the beginning of February 1906, Johannes had decided that Njelu was sufficiently pacified to permit him to move the major part of his army north. The 8th Field Company was thus re-directed to take over pacification in Chabruma's area, Upangwa and Ubena, while part of the 13th Field Company remained at Songea boma and the remainder moved to the north-east to subdue that area and Mbarangandu. A chain of nine military posts was then set up throughout Ubena and Mshope. Military patrols intensified 'search and destroy' missions throughout this region.

At this time, the Germans listed the men whom they knew to be the remaining leaders of the rebellion. The list comprised: Chabruma Hanga, Palangu, Ngozi Ngoni (the Bena leader), some Muslims led by the elephant hunter Kopa Kopa, and Chabruma with his subordinate generals Simtanga, Sanynama, Manjoro, Mansiwia, Ngungungu, Himba Himba, Manyamakuru, Mgumba and Mfunda.(2)

Chabruma, the main combatant, moved throughout Mshope, planning offensive actions and attacking those German

---

(1) RKA, "8th Company Field Notes", in "Politische Zustände in Deutsche Ostafrika"; Report of Major Johannes in DOAZ, v.VIII, n.46, 17.11.1906.

(2) Ibid.



patrols which unknowingly ventured too close to his camp. In late January, Major Johannes received a report that Chabruma had massed his followers on the upper course of the Rutukira River and was preparing to attack the Germans at the military posts of Gumbiro and Mkekenuri. The Major dispatched a force, under Lt. Lindeiner, to attack him but they found nothing. Chabruma had retired north to his old capital at Old Gumbiro. Some time later, a patrol of fifteen men, on their way to the Ruhuhu, ventured too close to his camp and were attacked. After this encounter, Chabruma moved eastwards. Then on 15 February, a second patrol from the Kitanda military post found his headquarters and were attacked, losing two men. Chabruma decided to move on again. This time he went north-westwards. He planned to meet up with the Bena and join them in a major attack on the Germans. Major Johannes learned of this plan and decided to follow him. He directed his forces to encircle a large area in Upangwa and himself went with the army in this powerful bid to entrap Chabruma.

Meanwhile, the central and eastern regions of Mshope had become fairly quiet. Though Major Johannes complained that the "daily harassing by numerous scouts - marches and encampments of patrols sent to destroy surrounding villages have had little effect on the enemy"(1), he felt confident enough to order the

---

(1) RKA, "8th Company Field Notes", in "Politische Zustände in Deutsch Ostafrika"; Reports by Major Johannes in DKB, 1906 and 1907. This entire section is based on these reports.

abandonment of the Nyamtumbo military post in the confidence that Luwegu district had been pacified. His confidence was ill-founded. Palangu and his men had not followed Chabruma to the north-west and, in mid-March one of his elephant-hunters, Magewa, mobilized the people of Luwegu into renewing the fighting. The Germans had to quickly reoccupy Nyamtumbo. 2nd.Lt. Rohde led a detachment against Magewa and forced his people to disperse. In the meanwhile, Palangu had mobilized the peoples of Mgende, Mbarangandu and Njenje and was troubling the region north of the Majimahuhu and Likuyu military posts. By 23 March, he had assembled 300 warriors near Kitanda and was preparing to attack it. Major Johannes was forced to delay the campaign against Chabruma in order to send the 13th Field Company back to the south-east to repulse Palangu. The 13th Field Company was assisted by 1,200 Sangu warriors of Chief Merere(1) in this expedition. The Germans and their allies surprised and dispersed Palangu's forces before they could attack Kitanda.


Shortly afterwards, the attack against Chabruma was resumed by Major Johannes. But the delay appears to have been costly, for the Germans were unable to trap Chabruma, who was, by then, returning eastwards to join Palangu. Major Johannes attempted to stop this union by sending a force under 1st.Lt. Hudemann against

---

(1) MMR/6/68/1/3/8, has notes on the Bena coming to Ungoni.

# THE MAJI MAJI REBELLION ADVANCE AGAINST MGENDE

## Der Vormarsch gegen Mgende



GOTZEN (1909), p. 222

Chabruma. The two forces met on 10-11 April. The battle was inconclusive and Chabruma pushed north-east to the upper side of the Luwegu. Palangu apparently remained in Mgende for a while before removing to Luwegu to join him. In the Luwegu area, Chabruma hid for two months, while the angry and frustrated Major Johannes began the wholesale devastation of the region in a determined effort to uncover him. Massive reprisals were taken out against the people of Mgende, and, by mid-1906, these wretched people were in a complete state of despair and hopelessness. Starving and homeless, large numbers were surrendering to the German forces and giving and selling their wives and children to anyone who could offer them food. As the German army closed in on him, Chabruma moved towards Mageja. Then, on 27 May, a German detachment under Lt. Blumenthal, ventured too close to the Chabruma headquarters and a violent battle ensued. The German force beat off the Ngoni who suffered heavy losses. The German report, which gave no indication of German losses, noted that 436 warriors had been killed, 35 captured and 431 women and children taken from the Ngoni side. Then, on 25 June, another German force, under Lt. von Lindeiner, met Chabruma, with some 800 to 900 people near Ligombe. In the ensuing battle, Chabruma was apparently wounded. The Ngoni lost many men and much food and cattle, but Chabruma and others escaped. A number of Chabruma's dispersed followers, failing to find their leader, surrendered to the Germans.

On 11 July, the Germans proudly announced, one of Chabruma's sons surrendered. Among other leaders captured were Soni, Mkomerangani, Pangatschuma and Kimindi.

Although faced with final defeat, Chabruma nonetheless defied Major Johannes a final time by eluding the entrapment which the latter had intended for him. With his diminished following, the great leader and his powerful ally, Palangu, moved down into Portuguese East Africa, where they sought and were granted refuge with the Yao leader, Mataka.(1)

Repression lingered on in parts of the north for a while. The last leader to be captured was the Bena, Ngozi Ngozi, who was taken in late 1907.(2) But, with the flight of Chabruma, the Mshope Ngoni acknowledged a crushing military defeat. With the Mshope defeat, the formerly powerful Ngoni military society lay in ruins. All the Ngoni leaders were either dead or living in exile, save the ones who had not fought, <sup>and</sup> the people were in the depths of despair as famine reigned throughout the land. This was to be a long and bitter famine and which one <sub>^</sub> those who survived ~~it~~ would not forget.

- 
- (1) RKA, 1ANZ, S.B1x, Az.KA1GR15, Bd.1, #726, "Denkschrift über Verlauf des Aufstanden in Deutsch Ostafrika, 31.8.1906", has a full account of the German campaign in north-east Mshope against Chabruma.
- (2) TNA/G4/114, District Officer Keudel to Govt., 14.1.1909. The cost of the expedition against Ngozi Ngozi was rps.1179,60; and see DOAR, II, n.81, 16.10.1909.

## IV

After the cessation of hostilities and the surrender or flight of the Ngoni leadership and the destruction of their forces, the Germans continued the repression they had been meting out. They had been angered by the rebellion, their unawareness and lack of preparation to face it(1) and the disruption it had caused and they were apparently determined to take revenge. They had also been wary of the powerful Ngoni and somewhat uneasy over their effortless conquest in 1897-8. So they determined, as Gulliver wrote: "once and for all to demonstrate their own strength and to prevent any further chances of a rebellion".(2) Major Johannes had made this clear when justifying why he was continuing the repression so long by saying that in his view the maji had strengthened the resolve of the Ngoni and that unless this was completely smashed there would, again, be trouble in the future. So throughout 1906 he allowed the army, police and ruga ruga to continue confiscating food crops, to prevent cultivation and to burn villages. An Englishman, J.Sutherland, who participated in the repression later admitted to the British that the carnage had sickened him.(3)

The effect on the Ngoni was traumatic. What was probably the most severe famine which the people had

---

(1) The fear that the Europeans had of the Ngoni in August and September 1905 is graphically portrayed in the Kigonsera Chronicle of these months, see PA.

(2) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.17.

(3) PRO/CO691/29, 8717, p.139, evidence of J.Sutherland.

ever known now came upon them, a famine whose impact was to parallel, if not surpass, that of the losses of military defeat. In later years, people were to refer to time in terms of years after the famine(1) and, right up to the present, it has remained probably the most poignant legacy of colonial rule. The people of Songea remember never having suffered more completely and unjustly than during the tragic period from late 1905 until mid 1907.

By mid-1906 large sections of Ungoni lay barren and deserted as the starving Ngoni were dispersing from the region in search of food. Much of Mshope, which had been thoroughly devastated, was empty. The once populous lands around the Songea boma were now almost completely deserted. Throughout the land, villages had disappeared as peoples died or dispersed.(2) One missionary gave some indication of the extent of change when describing the town of Mandawa, which before 1905 had been a flourishing town of some 2,000 people: "Once there was an activity and a noise very much like a small European city: from the distance one heard the drums and the playing of the children - now all is desolate and silent."(3)

- 
- (1) L.Deppe, Mit Lettow Vorbeck durch Afrika, (Berlin, 1919), p.102; TNA/L733/12:84, Annual Report Songea, 1925.
  - (2) Fr.Trossman, Missbl., v.XIV, n.10, p.149; Dernberg, "Berichte", Nov.1907, RK 924/99 in Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.151.
  - (3) Br.Laurentius, Missbl., v.XI, n.10, p.148.

Some Ngoni fled to the north-west(1), but this area, which itself had been severely devastated during the rebellion, could provide only limited respite. More went to the north-east and east, to lands which had escaped the worst tragedies. Once settled here, many were never to return to Songea.(2) Still others, who constituted by far the largest percentage of the total, went south and west. Benedictine missionaries wrote that thousands, both from Njelu and Mshope, had gone south to Portuguese East Africa, where they could be completely free of the difficult and burdening German might. Along with leaders who had been actively involved in rebellion had gone many who, having barely participated, yet feared the general persecution.(3) In the west, Umatengo and the Lake Nyasa region became havens of refuge.(4) Both areas had remained largely neutral in the war and had been spared the ravages of repression. Moreover, in both places, the harvest of 1906 had been good(5) and, consequently, the possibility of survival was good.

In the new-found homes in neighbouring lands, however, food was not readily available. Those who could afford it, paid for what they needed. But even this was hard, as those with surpluses had raised their prices in response to the shortages. For example, in Umatengo, one

---

(1) Gulliver, "A History", p.25.

(2) Ebner, History, p.134 states that Nindi and Mbewe le stayed in Ligera country.

(3) Ibid., p.183.

(4) Br.Laurentius, Missbl., v.XII, n.4, p.52.

(5) Br.Livinius, Missbl., v.XII, n.5, p.67.



load of mtama which before the war had cost  $\frac{1}{2}$  rupee, now sold for 6.(1) Those who lacked money either fended for themselves or accepted servitude. Servitude was a humiliating act for people who had once dominated their neighbours, but little could be done for starving people had no bargaining position.(2)

The pressures of the Ngoni influx into neighbouring lands began to have its effect on food supplies, which were in scarce supply by late 1906. By early 1907 there was a severe shortage of food in the lands west of Ungoni.(3)

Not all people left Ungoni in 1906. Many preferred to eke out their existence in their homeland than to risk starvation in strange lands. For these people life was very hard during 1906. People lived on grass, flowers and what roots they could find.(4) The more fortunate ones found caterpillar nests and rats. One missionary wrote that Germans pigs had a better diet than the poor starving Ngoni.(5)

The famine in Ungoni had various effects. One was a rise in lawlessness, commented on by a missionary: "A panic is spreading among the people, and plundering and robbery is the daily order. For many it is a struggle for survival, for others wandering became inevitable".(6) More devastating was the spread of disease, particularly smallpox, of which, the Governor, von Götzen, wrote:

"A great many of the natives who survived the fighting and the famine succumbed to various diseases because their physical condition had deteriorated so much... There was an epidemic of worm diseases... Badly nourished mothers had no milk for their babies so that in some districts the infant mortality rate reached alarming

...

---

(1) Br. Laurentius, Missbl., v.XI, n.8, p.148.

(2) Ibid., v.XII, n.5, pp.66-7 notes enslavement of Christians.

(3) Br. Livinius, Missbl., v.XI, n.7, p.97; v.XI, n.10, p.148.

(4) Fr. Trossman, Missbl., v.XI, n.8, p.114; J. Sihaba, Missbl., v.XI, p.98.

(5) Ibid. (6) Missbl., v.XI, n.10, p.145.

heights. In short in the early months of this year (1907) the disaffected districts presented an indescribably tragic scene."(1)

When the missionaries returned to Songea, they tried to help the people by giving them food and offering them work.(2) In response to this, hundreds of people moved to the vicinity of Peramiho and Kigonsera. Possibly equally important, they began to pressure the colonial government to stop the repression and, by September 1906, were speaking out against the continuing, utterly unnecessary victimization.(3) One result of this appears to have been the expulsion of a missionary from the district. But, more hopeful, by the autumn the government, too, was providing food, usually in return for one hour's work a day.(4)

The difficulties of the famine were intensified when planting began in 1906, for very few people had seeds. A missionary, travelling through Songea in late 1906, reported that in many places he encountered people crying for seeds so that they could survive.(5) The missionaries provided a lot to the people as did the government. One missionary described the scene when seed was distributed:

"On the 15th of December came the long-awaited rain, and the people flocked to the mission to fetch seed to plant. Each one received 2-3 litres of corn and within a short time some 50-60 loads were distributed. Unfortunately not all that was distributed was planted and some ended up inside starving stomachs."(6)

Complicating the shortage of seed as an obstacle to planting was a shortage of hoes, many of which

---

(1) Götzen, op cit, pp.233-4.

(2) Missbl., v.XII, n.6, p.70.

(3) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 21.9.1906; copied in Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.26.

(4) TNA/G4/114, Keudel to Govt, 10560/07 of 28.8.1907; Missbl., v.XII, n.5, p.70.

(5) Missbl., v.XII, n.6, p.136.

had been lost during the rebellion.(1)

Still, famine was slow to end. The rains came late and were poor, so, in many areas, 1907 was another hungry year.(2) The numbers of people flocking to the mission stations increased, as did those leaving the district. The missionaries reported that everywhere people were destitute.

But the tide was slowly turning. People in a few areas managed to produce sufficient food for their needs in 1907. For example, around the Likwambi and the Luhira Rivers, people have harvested good corn crops, while in many parts of the west, rice had grown well. By late 1907, the missionaries could report that the famine had come to an end in the vicinity of the mission stations. In parts of the east and north, however, it only ended after the 1907-08 harvesting season.(3)

The rebellion and its aftermath had taken a terrible toll in life in Ungoni. The exact number of those who died is not known. No accurate statistics exist on the population of Ungoni before Maji Maji. One official statistic said there were 36,000 in Ungoni and 75,000 in the entire district(4), while another, though giving no numbers for Ungoni, said there were 150,000 to 180,000 in the district(5). The missionary Häfliger said there were 60,000 in Ungoni(6), a number which would approximate that in the second statistic. After Maji Maji, the

---

(6) Fr.Trossman, *Missbl.*, v.XI, n.10, p.145.(p.349)

(1) *DOAZ*, v.3, n.33, 27.4.1910, Br.Laurentius, "Landwirtschaft aus Ungoni".

(2) Fr.Trossman, *Missbl.*, v.XI, n.8, p.115 wrote that many people believed the hanging of a rainmaker during the rebellion and the absence of any effective successor was the reason for the famine.

(3) TNA/G1/6, Annual Report 1908 Songea, p.11 stated that that year's harvest was the first good one after the famine.

(4) Fülleborn, *op cit*, p.132, quoting Jahresbericht, 1903/4.

(5) Booth in *Fuchs*, *op cit*, p.264.

population in Ungoni was estimated as 20,000 by Häfliger, who appears to have been the one expelled from the district for his condemnation of the German repression(1), between 20 and 30,000 by the District Officer(2) It appears that up to half the Ngoni population died in and after Maji Maji, this half numbering anything between 5,000(3) and 30,000.

By late 1907, people were returning to Ungoni. They had been severely chastened and were now ready to accept subjugation by the Germans. The Ngoni leadership which had been decimated was to be replaced by a new one, one more accommodating than its predecessor, yet one still as legitimate as ever. With its followers, this new leadership was to rebuild the Ngoni kingdoms out of the ruins of the Maji Maji rebellion.

---

(6) p.350 Kozak, op cit, p.104, quoting Häfliger.

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid., p.105.

(3) This is the number that Fr.Trossman had estimated had died of starvation in Ungoni by early 1907, Missbl., v.XI, n.11, p.161. This number is quoted by Ebner, History, and Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.27.

## Chapter 6

## The Transition to Administrative Control, 1907-1925

## I

The severity of the repression of the Maji Maji rebellion in German East Africa and of the contemporary Herero rebellion in Southwest Africa had had a considerable impact on political life in Germany. Strong criticism of the government's handling of the colonies brought on a national election, in the wake of which, administration in the colonies underwent many changes. The most important of these changes for German East Africa was the appointment of a new Governor, Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenburg, under whose administration, writes one historian of this era, "the minimal aims of early colonial rule gave way to a purposive colonial policy"(1). In Songea, the new policy meant a number of modifications in aspects of local administration.

Among the most important changes on the district level was the devolution of greater freedom to District Officers in the running of their districts. Local officials were given the power to make many day-to-day decisions without having to refer to the central administration in Dar es Salaam. This enabled them, among other things, to remedy local grievances before they developed too far and, generally, ensured a more efficient administration.

---

(1) John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912, (Cambridge, 1969), CUP, p.28.

Secondly, district administrators appear to have been an improvement on their pre-rebellion counterparts. One authority praised this improvement with reference to another district in the territory: "Perhaps the greatest achievement of German colonial rule in the last decade before World War 1 was the production of field administrators capable of managing local political, economic, and social development on an independent and responsible basis".(1) Evidence that Songea had some good administrators is found in the actions of various District Officers who served there after 1907. Among the more noteworthy of these officials was Herr Keudel, who appears to have given consistent support to the Ngoni against people who sought to denigrate or exploit them, as, for example, when he condemned a small group of local settlers who sought to restrict Ngoni labour migration, so that they might obtain cheap local labour.(2)

A further improvement in administration appears to have come in the formation of a district advisory council (Bezirksratssitzung).(3) No mention was found of the district having had such a council before 1905 and, indeed, the only references to it found at all were notes on meetings held in 1907 and 1908.(4) In 1908,

---

(1) R.A.Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule, (London, 1968), Yale UP.

(2) MDA, Blohm file, Blohm to DO, c.II.287 of 11.1.1912 and c.II,323 of 6.3.1912, which is partially refuted by earlier complaints of shortages, as in DOAZ, v.XI n.35, 5.5.1909.

(3) TNA/G4/114, Bezirksratssitzung, 22.11.1907 and 30.11.1908.

(4) Ibid.

the council's membership comprised members of the government's district staff, a missionary and a trader. They appear to have advised the District Officer and appraised his actions.

A fourth change appears to have been the transfer of some duties formerly carried out by the Sultans and Jumbes to clerks and other officials hired by the government. These duties, according to one reference, were the collecting of taxes and the carrying out of messenger work.(1) Little data was found on the numbers of these clerks or the amount of responsibility they acquired. Both seems to have been limited. For example, the five of 1904 increased to eight by 1909(2), and they appear to have merely assisted the local leaders in collecting taxes.

While changing aspects of its administration in the above ways, the German colonial government retained the basic political structure of pre-1905 society. The reasons for this are numerous and complex. First of all, the Germans appear to have wanted a leadership which would be acceptable to the people. Consequently, legitimacy of leadership was of some importance, a reality which had, undoubtedly, become quite clear to the Germans in Maji Maji, when they saw the powerlessness of their imposed akidas and other leaders in contrast to the continuing strong power of the Ngoni

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.12.

(2) 1904: DKE, v.XVI, n.11, 1.6.1905; 1909: TNA/G4/114, Financial Statement, 1909, notes, p.108.

leaders. Moreover, men who had traditional standing in the community could be more effective than those who did not. As the men with highest standing in Ungoni were from the same families which had led before 1905, the Germans decided to continue having them.(1)

Secondly, those families, although the same ones which had brought about rebellion, were acceptable to the Germans because their members now available were those who had either remained neutral during Maji Maji or supported the Germans. Moreover, in many vacant Sultanates, it was possible to select amenable, young members of the royal families. For example, when they were available, youths who had been educated were appointed. In this way, Mwanawalifa Tawete succeeded Chabruma at Gumbiro, and Msawani Songea Mbano succeeded Songea at Mkwera.(2) According to a British official, Songea himself had nominated Msawani to the Germans.(3) In some other areas, those sons of participants who themselves had remained neutral or had supported the Germans were selected. Kazibure Soko, who replaced his father Mpambalioto, was one of these. The few Sultanates which had been under akidas continued to be governed by these. For example, Rashid continued to have jurisdiction over Kikole, while the akida of Likuyu, who had been killed in the rebellion, was replaced by another akida. In at least one area, royal family

---

(1) DOAR, v.III, n.14, 19.2.1910; see also E.Ebner, History of the Wangoni, p.183.

(2) O.B.Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara, The Maji Maji Wabombi in Ungoni, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), p.29.

(3) TNA/SEC/13484, DO to PG, 97/135 of 29.12.1930.



leadership was replaced by a local 'sutu' leadership. This area was Mbunga which, before 1905, had been under Palangu Tawete. After 1905, it was split and one half was given to a 'son' of Palangu, while the other half went to an Ndendeule, named Msolinjonga.(1)

Thirdly, the Germans retained existing leadership for economic reasons. After Maji Maji, the whole of southern East Africa was relegated to a position of economic backwardness and stagnation, a reversion quite the opposite of what one might have expected from Rechenburg's supposed belief that another rebellion would be prevented by economic advance.(2) The reasons for this changed policy included disillusion with the region which had shown itself capable of rejecting attempts at development; the availability of only limited finance and the more fruitful use that could be made of this in other regions; and the fact that the region was on the periphery of the colony. The first important manifestation of this change in policy was the cancelling of the proposed southern railway.(3) Stagnation was an inevitable result of this cancellation, for without any means of exporting her produce, Songea could not hope to develop her agricultural potential. Since the Germans had no economic motives for staying in Songea, the only reason for retaining it in the colony

- 
- (1) D.B.Dudbridge papers, (R.H.), History of Palango as told by Palango; Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.29 incorrectly state that it was Mkomelangani. He was one who surrendered in Maji Maji, apparently, see above, p. 270.
  - (2) Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.54.
  - (3) TNA/G12/74, article in Der Tag, n.27, 16.1.1907; this file has other material on the southern railway. The scheme of a southern railway was officially postponed rather than delayed, and alternative plans for one were published after 1907.

must have been political. A peaceful administration which, as shown above, could be expected by supporting the traditional administrative structure, was the cheapest way of achieving this end.

Although they recognized the value of retaining the existing political structure, the Germans still had to be very careful to prevent another rebellion. Accordingly, they appear to have diluted the powers of the Ngoni leaders and increased their control over them while allowing them sufficient power to be considered leaders by their people. The result was a preserving of the structure of Ngoni society by a gradual decline in the powers of the elite dominating it.

One way the Germans achieved their aim was by lessening the number of followers, and hence influence, each Sultan had by increasing the numbers of Sultans. Iliffe goes so far as to say that Sultanates were abolished in Mshope. However, this appears to be a mistake for there were some there after 1907, for example, the Sultanness Namabengo.(1) Examples of the dilution of Sultanates include Palangu's, which was divided into two, and Chabruma's former central area, which now became at least two Sultanates: Gumbiro and Njuga(2). In Njelu, it is not known if many new Sultanates were set up. One was at Ndirima for the successor to Mputa, Usangila.(3)

---

(1) She persuaded the Germans that she had remained neutral during Maji Maji and accordingly, continued to rule into the 1920s, see TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.A; Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.151 also notes that akidas were abolished, but this also is incorrect, see PRO/C0691/29, 8917, evidence of Shausi Ali, akida of Luwegu after 1907.

(2) MMR/6/68/4/3/10 and TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.A has

Secondly, the powers of the mankosi were conclusively removed, as neither were now recognized. They, along with the other manduna who were recognized as Sultans appear to have held power as the Germans wished them to. Thus it appears that the most powerful of the Ngoni élite after 1905 might have been sons of military leaders rather than members of the royal families. This is suggested by a German tradition which states that Msawani Songea Mbanu and Kazibure Soko were very important and tyrannical Sultans after 1905.(1)

The loss of official power was made worse by the loss of traditional military power. A strong basis to the power of the Ngoni leadership had been, before 1905, their control over a functioning military system. After Maji Maji, this was no longer in existence. This brought many changes, such as the ending of the formation of age regiments(2) and the complete stopping of military exercises(3). Gulliver went so far as to claim that because the Ngoni leaders lost their military basis to power, the legitimacy of their rule had come to an end.(4) Gulliver's claim, however, appears to be far-fetched. Admittedly, the leaders did lose much of their authority. However, they were as able as leaders in other African military societies to change the basis of their authority from a military to an administrative one. As

---

(2) p.357 contd. notes on Namabengo and the Njuga Sultanate.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.12. (p.357)

(1) PRO/CO691/29, 8917, p.140 evidence of Songea Africans.

(2) Ebner, History, notes the last being formed by 1905.

(3) All weapons were confiscated, see above, p.337.

(4) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Songea District, typescript UDSM, 1954, p.114-5.

the political leadership of other such societies, for example, the Swazi(1), is considered legitimate, despite the transition, so ought the political leadership in Songea to be considered legitimate. This was certainly the view held by the people of Songea who now began to glorify the Ngoni past(2) and, as part of it, to give support to the families which had formerly led them in military glory.

The Germans appear to have reduced the powers of the Sultans in many aspects of the administration they were called upon to participate in. Lack of data on the details of administration makes it impossible to give examples of this decline. That it happened, however, is suggested by a report of 1911 which noted: "The influence of the old tribal chiefs was very great in time of war. The rising destroyed their power and the influence of the new chief is trifling".(3) But dilution of power had its limits, as there was no point in recognizing chiefs if they were to be given no power, and it appears that in many aspects of administration, they continued to play an important role. Among other administrative duties, they represented their people to the Germans, whom they had to keep informed of goings-on in their areas(4); they called up labour when it was needed(5); and they had an important

- 
- (1) Ebner, History, p.221, quoting Schapera, The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of Southern Africa, (Cape Town, 1953), p.84.
  - (2) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, pp.114-5.
  - (3) A Handbook of German East Africa, (London, 1916), Admiralty, T.D.1055, HMSO, (henceforth HGEA), p.61.
  - (4) TNA/1733/1, Annual Report Songea, 1919/20, notes that the Sultans continued to inform them of day-to-day events as they had done with the Germans.
  - (5) PRO/C0691/29, 8917, p.144 evidence of Nasoro bin Litunu, free work was done yearly on the roads, bridges, etc., the headmen were responsible for providing the labour.

say in education, since schools which were to be established in their areas had to be approved by them.(1)

In the judicial sphere, they retained much the same powers in civil cases which had been allotted them before 1905. These included hearing cases of adultery and assault and the passing of sentences of whipping and/or fines, while graver offenses, such as murder and larceny were handled by the Germans.(2) Many leaders may have had less influence than their predecessors due to their youth, but this was only a temporary condition. In the financial sphere, they still had a role to play in tax collecting if the limited increase in numbers of clerks after 1905 is any indication.(3)

There are indications that the Germans tried to support the authority of the leaders. For example, in one case of general administration, when a Jumbe complained that missionaries had established a school in his village against his wishes, the District Officer visited the village and partially wrecked the school, thereby shaming the missionaries who, some people gleefully assumed, were about to be expelled from the district.(4) Another time, in a matter involving judicial authority, a European resident took an African to a lower court to complain of his disrespect, only to receive no sympathy and little satisfaction. He complained that he had been treated in a shameless manner, but the District Officer appears to have upheld the decision of the leader hearing the case.(5)

---

(1) TNA/G9/8, H.Kaiser to DO, 4.9.1912, et seq.

(2) PRO/CO691/29, G917, p.141 evidence of Shausi Ali, akida of Luwegu.

(3) TNA/G1/6, Songea Annual Report 1908, has notes on tax change.

(4) Source as fn.1.

(5) MDA, Blohm file 1912, Blohm to Govt., 31.3.1912.

In addition to supporting the leaders, the government seems to have sought to restrict the decline in their traditional powers. They did so in Mahenge(1) by allowing Sultans to claim free labour and though no confirmation of a similar permission being given in Songea was found, it is known they were receiving free labour by the time the British entered. A second manifestation of support was the attempt by one District Officer to persuade Sultans and Jumbes to acquire cattle herds to replace ones which had been lost or stolen during Maji Maji. Though an economic move, it was nonetheless done through the leaders, whose prestige it would have boosted.(2)

Here some mention must be made of John Iliffe's statements that, after Maji Maji, the ndunate system in Mshope was destroyed; the 'old Ngoni way of life ended'; the territorial organization of political authority weakened; and the administration depended on clerks and leaders who had become agents of the district office; and, finally, that "the local compromise between the German authorities and a functioning tribal system collapsed under the pressures of revolt".(3) It has been shown above that much of this is debatable.

The ndunate system in Mshope, made a Sultanate one before 1905, appears to have been weakened rather than destroyed, as there were <sup>some</sup> Sultans in Mshope in 1916. Again, while <sup>some</sup> aspects of 'the old life' did end, others, such as administration, did not. Thirdly, the Germans continued to depend on members of the traditional ruling families. The considerable powers that men such as Kazibure Soko and Ali Songea Mbano retained, indicate this(4) as does the

---

(1) MDA/2/4, Von Grawert to Ifakara mission, 18.6.1914. I am grateful to Lorne Larson for this information.

(2) DOAR, v.III, n.14, 19.2.1910.

(3) Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.152.

(4) This power is noted in the evidence collected in PRO/CO691/29, 8917.

limited importance apparently given to clerks. Nor can it easily be accepted that these leaders were 'agents of the district office'. They may have been educated or trained by, or allied with the Germans before Maji Maji, and may have co-operated with them after it, but it is unlikely that they were merely agents. Certainly the British were never to consider men like Usangila Gama and Putire Gama as such.(1) Finally, it can be suggested that there had not been a compromise between the Ngoni leaders and the Germans before 1905, but rather, only a forced acceptance of German military dominance. After the Maji Maji rebellion and the crushing of the Ngoni military system, the ruling families did compromise with the Germans, presumably because they knew it was essential to their maintenance of influence and power within Ngoni society.

Ngoni leaders appear to have accepted the duties imposed upon them, at least according to various reports which indicate that administration functioned well during these years. For instance, one report of 1906 suggested that leaders handled their duties in tax collection well when it complained of the poor collections made in areas which were not under royal family control.(2) Moreover, available reports on the district make no mention of difficulty in administration, something which presumably would have been mentioned had there been any. That the leaders wished to retain their powers is suggested in various ways. One was

---

(1) As shown below, this chapter, section III and Chapter Seven.

(2) TNA/G4/114, Memorandum on 1907 budget, 14.11.1906, clerks were hired in areas where Jumbes were found to be unreliable.

their efforts to preserve their control over their people. One way in which this was done was in their demand, in 1907, that their subjects give them a specified amount of free labour each year. This demand had been made because the Sultans lost slaves in the rebellion and were now short of labour.(1) It was economic but showed their concern with preserving authority over their people. Their slaves could become free through paying between ten and twenty goats.(2) Secondly, the leaders continued to show considerable interest in their status, even over positions which the Germans had officially abolished. For example, around 1910 Palangu Tawete, probably the most senior of the Ngoni leaders to survive Maji Maji, returned from Portuguese East Africa to claim the nkosi-ship following Chabruma's death in exile. However, his bid was resisted. Senior elders from among Chabruma's supporters also returned to the district and, after implicating Palangu in Chabruma's death, led a successful fight against his bid.(3) Palangu appears to have then tried to re-assert his control over Mbunga. He failed in this as well, either because the Germans or the people of the region would not accept him. He had to content himself with being a Jumbe over a number of villages in the Kitanda area.(4)

---

(1) DKB, v.XVIII, n.13, 1.7.1907.

(2) DKB, v.XVIII, n.15, 15.7.1907, H.a.d.Richter, "Rechtsgewohnheiten der Wangoni".

(3) MMR/6/68/4/1, analysis by Mapunda and Mpangara; TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B.

(4) TNA/155/SDB. v.2, p.B.



A second probable occasion for a struggle arose in Mshope in 1915, following the death of Mwanawalifa.(1) Though extremely little information was found on this succession, it appears that Mwanawalifa's son was opposed in his bid by the dead nkosi's brother, Likotiko. Likotiko won, presumably because he was older and more experienced. Palangu Tawete does not appear to have contested this succession for reasons unknown. He and Likotiko appear to have had amiable relations with each other, at least for a while when the British entered.(2)

The 'sutu' appear to have acquiesced in the preservation of an autocratic leadership strictly controlled by the Germans. One reason for this appears to have been a desire to preserve some sign of their military past which was now gone forever. This desire was strengthened by the fact that, following Maji Maji, the distinction between 'true Ngoni' and 'sutu', with all its negative connotations, appears to have gradually ended. It is referred to for a while in various reports which talk of 'slaves' and the Sultans(3). But Maji Maji had brought the death of many of the adult 'true Ngoni' and those remaining were, within a generation to become sufficiently integrated through marriage and common customs into the 'sutu' population that the two classes became one, known only as 'Ngoni'. This was reflected in ways such as the change of the name of 'Kisutu' to 'New Kingoni'(4), and in the adoption of

---

(1) Rafiki Yangu, v.VI, n.2, 2.1915 stated that he died at the beginning of the year; and see TDB, v.4, p.226.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.125, Palangu's life as told by D.M.M.Tawete.

(3) HGEA;

(4) Ebner, History of the Wangoni: Revised Edition, (Peramiho, 1968), typescript, SOA, p.118.

the paying of brideprice by the 'sutu'.(1) With the gradual ending of distinction, everyone became relatively equal under the German colonial rulers and there may have been a tendency to remember the best of the old order, and to personify it in the persons of the members of the royal families. Moreover, there appears to have been a tradition of loyalty which carried on after the rebellion. Gulliver claims this was a reason for the continuing acceptance of the royal families.(2) Contemporary reports suggest how this loyalty was shown when talking about 'slaves' who continued giving their masters a portion of their earnings, free labour and beer.(3) Kuper, in her study of a similar society, offers some reasons for this type of loyalty:

"In a society where noble birth is accepted as synonymous with leadership, there is little possibility of innovations being introduced by commoners. Few societies give much scope to individual ability; in most, people are trained to the duties and privileges of a rank ordained by birth, sex or age. The more stable a society, the less desire and usually the less opportunity there seems to be to break loose from these restrictions. Free competition for the highest positions is often a sign of disintegration of an established order."(4)

Thirdly, economic realities may have fostered continuity. There were few ways of earning money within the district and so people had to turn to labour migration, an activity

- 
- (1) H.Kuper, An African Aristocracy, (London, 1947), OUP, p.113 also describes how the distinction between Ngoni and Suthu was obliterated through marriage.
  - (2) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, pp.114-5.
  - (3) DKE, v.XVIII, n.14, 15.7.1907, H.a.d.Richter, "Rechtsgewohnheiten der Wangoni".
  - (4) Kuper, op cit, p.7; see also, M.Read, "Tradition and prestige among the Ngoni", Africa, v.IX, (1936), n.4, p.467, commenting on tradition supporting rank.

which they willingly accepted(1), after it had been forced on them in the aftermath of rebellion(2). Labour migration appears to have done the same thing for the Ngoni of Songea district that Van Velsen has shown it to have done for the Tonga of Nyasaland: it increased the desire to preserve the traditional life at home.(3) Finally, royal families were accepted by the 'sutu', or general population, because the latter had no choice in the matter. The German administration decided to promote their rule, and the people merely had to acquiesce. However, the Germans did take care to see that the people were not too mistreated. For example, they are recorded as having curtailed the legal powers of Sultans when it was found that many were abusing their right to administer corporal punishment in cases of adultery and assault.(4) Again, they acted to protect the financial right of the people through, for example, taking up the case of some African workers who complained about non-payment for work against the planter, Emil Blohm.(5)

Only one section of the Ngoni population appears to have taken steps towards establishing a separate identity during these years. This section comprised the Ndendeule of north-east Mshope who, after 1905, appear to have begun developing a separate consciousness. By 1910, some were distinguishing themselves from the Ngoni.(6) Most were

---

(1) Fr. Trossman, Missbl., v. XIV, n. 10, p. 150 states that cash replaced cows as dowry. Cash was earned through migration. T.O. Ranger doubts that such freedom of action is possible when claiming that "the migrant labourer, for example, can be seen as little more a voluntary agent than the slave", in I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, A History of Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), EAPH, p. 161.

(2) As noted above, Chapter Five, p. 262.

adopting Islam, thereby further distinguishing themselves from the Ngoni who were at this time turning to Christianity.

While apparently remaining satisfied on the political level and generally frustrated on the economic level, the people now began changing their social attitudes. The most noticeable manifestation of this change was the acceptance of Christianity, an acceptance possibly related to the destructive effect of Maji Maji on traditional beliefs. The numbers of Christians rose from 400 in 1906 to 1,860 in 1914 at Peramiho and from 130 in 1907 to 629 in 1914 at Kigonsera.(1) The spread of education paralleled that of Christianity as schools and pupils at Peramiho increased from 1 and 70 respectively in 1907 to 41 and 2,657 in 1914 and from 2 and 102 respectively at Kigonsera in 1907 to 14 and 2,123 in 1913.(2) The growth of Christianity and European education was to make the mission a future centre of power in the district. Until 1914, its main value was providing an alternative to the Ngoni past on social and cultural levels.

In all, the German period was one in which the 'true Ngoni' military control over Ngoni society was destroyed, then replaced by an administrative control which, though new and kept weak by the Germans, provided something through which the 'true Ngoni'

- 
- (3) p.292 J.Van Velsen, "Labour migration as a positive factor in the continuity of Tonga tribal society", in A.Southall & D. Forde, Social Change in Modern Africa, (London, 1961). I am grateful to Michael Twaddle for bringing my attention to the article.
- (4) p.292 PRO/CO691/29, 8917, p.140 evidence of Songea Africans.
- (5) p.292 MDA/Blohm file 1912, DO Songea to Sec.Scheffer, 8.1.1912, et seq.
- (6) p.292 B.Suter, CA, v.XXVIII, n.336, 12.1910.
- (1) Missbl., XI, 5, p.68; XII, 7, p.7; XVIII, 9, pp.72-3.
- (2) Ibid.

could maintain their power. It was a period when the royal families and their associates were at their lowest in terms of the amount of power exercised over Ngoni society. Still, the same families were in power. In their ability to preserve their status, the royal families and their associates seem to come, more than any other group or individual in Ngoni society, into the category John Iliffe has termed of the 'age of improvement'. They had responded to German education and religion, and had been willing to change the basis to their power. By doing so when some members of their families were sacrificing themselves to preserve the old order, they showed remarkable willingness to change to improve themselves in their societies. Shortly, they were to be asked to change again. In 1914, the German power to which they were accommodated themselves, became involved with other European nations in a struggle for world power. From this struggle was to emerge a new and much better future for the royal families and their associates.

## II

Shortly after the war began in Europe, East Africa became a theatre of operations, as both Germans and British in East Africa decided to support their home causes. Because the British forces were stronger than the German ones, most of the war was fought in German East Africa. Till 1916, Songea district remained quiet and isolated, disturbed only by occasional actions along the lake.(1)

---

(1) General von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa, (London, n.d.) 2nd.ed., p.83.

Not that it was an unimportant area. Rather the British wanted to bring Portugal into the war on their side and so left Songea free for it to conquer.(1) However, Portugal was not interested and in late 1916, after the Germans had consolidated themselves in this region, the British had to move in to remove them. The German forces had left Songea boma lightly defended to release forces for action elsewhere so in September 1916, when the Rhodesia Native Regiment attacked the boma, it took it without difficulty.(2) The Germans had retreated into Mshope and the lands to its north-east and from these areas made three unsuccessful attacks on the boma during October and November 1916. In early 1917, the German western command at Mahenge decided to evacuate, and five companies under Major Kraut moved through Songea en route to Portuguese East Africa. Though plundering the peoples of western and southern Songea, they avoided an all-out battle against the British.(3) In late 1918, General von Lettow-Vorbeck led the entire army up from Portuguese East Africa through Songea and around the north end of Lake Nyasa. Though it once again plundered where it could, it fought no major battles against the British.

During the war, the Ngoni supported both sides politically and economically - though not always willingly - as each held power in the district. The Germans demanded political acquiescence and economic support. Political acquiescence appears to have been

---

(1) PRO/WO/95/5334, entries 2.6.1916, 5.8.1916, 5.9.1916 in diary of Brigadier-General E. Northey.

(2) Ibid., entries 26.8.1916, 5.9.1916, 14.9.1916.

(3) Ibid., relevant entries; Lettow-Vorbeck, op cit; L. Deppe, Mit Lettow-Vorbeck Durch Afrika, (Berlin, 1919).

readily given as it increased the powers of Ngoni leaders.

by giving them a firmer control over their society.

Restrictions on many of their powers appear to have lessened as the administration became preoccupied with the military effort. For instance, it seems that fulfillment of the requirement that local affairs should be frequently reported to the boma was demanded less often as less attention could be paid to these affairs. Moreover, the handling of court cases must have come increasingly under the control of local leaders as German officials could not spare time for these. Finally, leaders were probably given increased powers over their people to permit them to meet the increased economic demands made on the people by the Germans.

The economic support demanded by the Germans was for labour and food. As regards labour, the Germans wanted soldiers and porters. Some time before 1914, the Ngoni had begun entering the army for by that time they appear to have largely replaced the Sudanese(1). They were highly regarded by the Germans(2) and a good number must have been demanded. No statistics on numbers were found other than a reference to the existence of a Wangoni Company.(3) A few Ngoni, mainly mission and government school-leavers, were conscripted.(4) Among the German soldiers were a few future leaders, notably Dominikus Missoro Tawete. The response to the demand for porters appears also to have been

---

(1) C.Hordern, Military Operations in East Africa, (London, 1941), v.1, p.578.

(2) Ibid., p.578; Deppe, op cit, p.77; HGEA, pp.202 209.

(3) Each company had 160 soldiers in 1914, though later it was raised to 200.

(4) MDA/KA-M, Kwirow, lists of soldiers stationed in Mahenge requiring references prior to marriage.

quite high. The Ngoni were quite renowned for this work, were generally very willing to undertake it and must have appreciated the financial returns it brought them. Again, no statistics on numbers were found. Lettow-Vorbeck became dependant on them and was to express keen disappointment when they deserted his army in the 1918 march through Songea district.(1)

The demands for food were very great, particularly after the German army was pushed to the southern part of the colony and Songea's supplies became critically important. Statistics available on German purchases in 1916 showed that everything which could possibly be obtained was bought/as far more was purchased than had been bought for export in 1914.(2) The people appear to have sold willingly as prices were fair(3) However, when the Germans began plundering food in early 1917, the people started forcibly resisting them.(4) The food purchases in the autumn of 1916 and the military plundering of early 1917 led to food shortages in the district in 1917.

The British, when they entered in 1916 wanted political stability and some economic support. In terms of political response, Ngoni leaders appear to have given a guardedly neutral response at first, as least as indicated by the rather small number of senior leaders listed in British reports as early supporters. This was presumably because many leaders had received their positions as a result of their activities in the Maji Maji rebellion or because they had been German trained and they must have felt it to their advantage to

---

(1) Lettow-Vorbeck, op cit, Preface and p.305.

(2) MDA/Blohm file 1916, Blohm to Schulz, 24.10.1916; to Grawert, 18.9.1916.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Lettow-Vorbeck, op cit; Deppe, op cit.



remain strictly neutral or even pro-German. Only two senior leaders are known to have become pro-British fairly early. They were Likotiko Tawete and Palangu Tawete.(1) One important reason for their support of the British appears to have been their anger at the Germans' plundering for food in late 1916 and early 1917, which affected their lands particularly hard.

Gradually, however, this attitude began to change. Reasons for the change appear to have been a growing awareness by the leaders of the Ngoni that the British were there to stay and, apparently, conscious efforts by the British to foster stable political rule in the district. The British were aware of the centralized political structure among the Ngoni in Songea district from, among other things, their familiarity with their own Ngoni states in Nyasaland, the reports of their Nyasaland Ngoni soldiers who were stationed in Songea and other intelligence reports. It appears the British sought the Ngoni leaders and vested in them the political authority needed to run the district. The Ngoni leaders were not entirely passive in this respect. They, apparently, identified themselves with the British and convinced them that they were the only legitimate leaders within the society. Their general acceptability to the people and the natural role of leadership they assumed within the society seem likely to have helped to assure the British that they were the legitimate leaders. The British were themselves interested in supporting the élite, for they were uncertain about the

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.125 Palangu's life as told by Dominikus Missoro Tawete.

future status of German East Africa and were interested mainly in maintaining law and order and some semblance of colonial authority until something definite was known.

From late 1916 until 1918, the leaders of the Ngoni appear to have regained much of their pre-1905 control over the people. They were lightly supervised during this period and often assumed almost complete responsibility over their followers. This was reflected, for example, in courts, where they appear to have become the final arbiters; in finance, where they were the only ones receiving tribute from the people, taxation by the Europeans having ended; and in general administration, where they became quite independent in deciding the affairs of their people.

When the British started actively supporting the leaders, their control was extended to a few areas whose people had been removed from their jurisdiction by the Germans. Of these areas, north-east Mshope was the most important. In 1918, Palangu Tawete convinced the British that he was the rightful leader of Mbunga, a large part of this region and managed to persuade the newly-appointed District Political Officer (later District Officer)(1) forcibly to install him as leader, despite the bitter opposition of the Ndendeule of this area who had been given control by the Germans after Maji Maji. Palangu appears to have received the support of Likotiko(2), a support which, if true, was one of the very rare instances of co-operation between these two important branches of the Tawete ruling family.

---

(1) In the 1940s this was changed to District Commissioner. However, for convenience sake, District Officer will be used.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.125, Palangu's life as told by D.M.M.Tawete.

Palangu replaced the Ndendeule leader and the 'son' of his who had taken over after 1905, thereby reuniting the Mbunga Sultanate. The Ndendeule reacted strongly to the ending of their separate administration. A number of Jumbes refused to co-operate with Palangu, and the District Political Officer, Turnbull, visited the area, deposed some of the more truculent Jumbes and installed more compliant ones in their place.(1) Still refusing to acquiesce, a large group of Ndendeule left the district and moved to Mahenge.(2) But Palangu, the most senior veteran leader of Maji Maji still alive, had succeeded in putting himself back in power.

The economic support demanded by the British during the war was limited. As regards labour, they had no need for soldiers, though they did accept specialized support, such as intelligence and guide work.(3) They did need men for portage and recruited a great number. The people were willing to co-operate to some extent but the demands were so great that by the end of the war there were widespread rumours circulating that those accepting work as porters came to no good end.(4) The British had little need of food but, to prevent the Germans from getting any, they bought large quantities.(5) This led to serious food shortages in the district in 1918. They did want cattle and began forcible buying of all available stock.(6) To preserve their cattle,

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, file C, p.2; v.2, p.125, Palangu's life as told by D.M.M.Tawete.

(2) Ibid.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, files A, C name some who helped the British.

(4) TNA/155/SDB, file A, sheet series 12, Higgins tour report, 23.11.1925; PRO/WO/95/5334, Northey diaries, entry 31.12.1916.

(5) PRO/WO/95/5334, Northey diaries, entries 29.9.1916, 1.2.1917.

(6) TNA/SEC/1733/1, Annual Report Songea 1919/20.

which were being rapidly depleted in numbers, owners moved them to Ubena, out of the reach of the military.(1)

In all, by 1918, the British were well established in the district, the people were slowly recovering from the disruptions of war, and the leaders had succeeded in reversing their low power status. Soon the leaders were to go further.

### III

Once the Great Powers decided that the former German East Africa would become a mandate territory of the newly-formed League of Nations which Britain was to administer until its inhabitants were ready for independence(2), the administration of the territory, now known as Tanganyika Territory, took a firmer grip and assumed some direction. One of the first administrative steps taken to have effect on the district level was the delineation of internal administrative units. In Songea district, few changes were made to the boundaries delineated by the Germans. Songea town remained the administrative centre, while Lipumba and Milo remained sub-centres until 1922, when the latter was abolished and the former abandoned in favour of Lipumba.(3) Within the district, six subdivisions were set up: Njelu, with apparently sixteen Sultanates; Mshope with six(4); Ubena, with five; Matengo, with two; the Lake Shore, with three; and the Ruvuma Yao, with four.(5)

---

(1) TNA/SEC/1733/1, Annual Report, Songea 1919/20.

(2) Details in Smith in P.Gifford and W.R.Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa, (London, 1967), p.281; W.R.Louis, Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914-1919, (Oxford, 1967).

(3) TNA/SEC/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1922.

(4) Excluding Ubena and Upangwa.

(5) As fn.3; the Ruvuma Yao subdivisions appear to have been part of Njelu.

Within each Sultanate, there were Jumbeates and villages under wanyapara, which was the name now given to the alumuzana. The sizes of these units varied considerably. Akidates had between 1,000 and 4,000 registered taxpayers, Sultanates, between 50 and 500 and Jumbeates, between 15 and 200.(1)

By 1921, the wartime policy of retaining, with as few changes as possible, the German-appointed leadership gave way to a policy of selection aimed at producing an efficient administration with qualified African leaders where possible.(2) The basis of the new policy was the supporting of a centralized political administration. This move marked a break from the patterns of political life prevalent under German rule in which a weak autocratic leadership was fostered. The Ngoni royal families and their associates, who had worked hard to retain their power during the previous fifteen years, were now to find power given readily to them. During the next four years, district representatives of the colonial government occupied themselves with the consolidation of autocratic rule among the Ngoni.

Among the first moves to be made in improving efficiency was the reduction of the numbers of leaders at all levels of administration. Accordingly, some of the Sultanates were

---

(1) TNA/SEC/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1922.

(2) This is shown in notes on leaders found in TNA/155/SDB, file A, eg, sheet series 10 on Sultan Usangila; O.Guise-Williams to Redmond, interview 30.9.1971, stated that District Officers had considerable powers and freedom to administer as they wished. They could hire and fire chiefs at their discretion, this being done generally according to how they worked.

eliminated. A District Officer, justifying the action, wrote in 1922:

"A few of the Sultanates in point of numbers of adherents are quite unworthy of the dignity of administrative entity, while subdivisions into Jumbeates are frequently too minute. Some of these junior authorities are nothing more than small village heads and this does not appear to be in the best interests of the administration of the areas."(1)

Size was not the only criterion for reduction in numbers of administrative entities at various levels. The competence of leaders was another. Of changes in the numbers of Sultanates, Njelu had its numbers reduced from sixteen to twelve, while Mshope's was reduced from six to four.(2) Among those to be affected in Njelu was the Sultanate of Kikole, which had once been led by Rashid and appears to have been under another Arab after the war. In Mshope, Njuga was joined to Likuyu(3), while Gumbiro and Mahanje were amalgamated.(4)

On a lower level of administration, many Jumbeates were amalgamated. Some of the ones abolished were extremely small and hardly viable. For example, Jumbe Mirambo, one of Sultan Likotiko's men, had under him his son, one mnyapara and one follower.(5) Incomplete data makes it impossible to be exact about how many Jumbeates were abolished. The few figures available suggest that a good number were. For example, in 1922 eight Jumbeates were abolished or had their

---

(1) TNA/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1922.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.A; v.4, p.13.

(3) Ibid.; TNA/155/SDB, file C, sheet 4. Njuga was led by Sultanness Namabengo. The British considered her incompetent and replaced her with Kangasimba, a Thonga of the Nkuna clan, see Ebner, History, p.23.

(4) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.A; v.4, pp.E, 13.

(5) As fn.1.

Jumbes replaced.(1) The anomaly of the 'Sultan's men' was also tackled but not fully resolved. The 'Sultan's men' comprised those people who paid allegiance directly to the (unofficial) nkosi, no matter where they lived, rather than <sup>through</sup> an nduna. This complicated administration for the British who wanted all people to be responsible to the Sultans (manduna) within whose area they lived. The nkosi was reluctant to forego the allegiance of these men, however, and though a report of 1923 suggests that he had agreed to abolish the category(2), it continues to be recognized after that year.

After consolidating the size of Sultanates and Jumbeates, the colonial administration then intervened to change the leadership in some. Because it had become committed to supporting the traditional leadership in African societies,(3) it generally supported these where they held power. It tended to be stricter for other leaders. For both traditional leaders and recently appointed ones it adopted criteria and gave full support to leaders who had these. These criteria included willingness to obey, receptiveness to change and competence. Those lacking full support could be removed. Only one traditional leader was replaced. This was Sultanness Namabengo who was removed in 1924 because she was inefficient. She was replaced by a certain Kangasimba who, according to one official, was popular in the area.(4) The British


---

(1) TNA/SEC/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea 1923.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Report on Tanganyika Territory, (London, 1921), p.37.

(4) TNA/155/SDB v.2, p.A.



SULTANS  
AND  
LOCATION  
OF SULTANATES  
1922

SOURCE: TNA/1733/22  
RE 1922



colonial administration used the occasion of the change of leaders to demote Njuga from the status of a Sultanate to that of a Jumbeate, an action which caused Kangasimba considerable anger and bitterness.

In one instance, the colonial administrators were able to interfere upon the ascension to power of a Sultan from a traditional ruling military clan in order to demote the 'Sultan'. This was at Mgazini, where a member of the Gama royal family, Mperembe, replaced the grandson of Mpambalioto Soko who was to take over the Sultanate. Gulliver was later to use this instance of the takeover by the royal family of a Sultanate controlled by a military clan as an example of the illegitimate assumption of power by the royal family in Njelu.(1) However, as the Soko family were later to be on good terms with the Gama family(2), their removal from power may have been inspired by the British rather than by the Ngoni. Certainly it fitted in with the administration's policy of handing power over to the royal family and of amalgamating small units. If there had been any interference from the Gama family in favour of the takeover of the Soko Sultanate, it may have been because of the role played by Mpambalioto's son, Kazibure, who became Sultan after 1905. He was a German ally who had become very powerful during his reign, a fact that may have angered the royal family. Moreover, as an ally of the Germans, he may have curried little favour with the British.

---

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.20-5.

(2) In the 1949-50 succession, they played an important role, see Chapter Eight, section IV. They did, however, protest the change, and some were sent to prison, see Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.25.

Where traditional leaders were in power and could not be removed without forcing the government to act against its stated plans, colonial officials had to content themselves with futile complaints about the quality of various Sultans.(1)

In dealing with Jumbes, the government had considerable freedom of action, for though many men selected for these positions had traditional justification and legitimacy, their rank was low enough to permit some manipulation. Consequently, a number that were found to be unsatisfactory were dismissed, while others were reprimanded or disciplined. Few statistics were found which referred to the numbers affected. One report of 1922 notes that three were fined and two publicly reprimanded(2), so interference seems to have been reasonably frequent.

Though the British colonial administration were anxious to return power to the traditional ruling group in Ngoni society, it did not do so to its logical conclusion by officially recognizing the nkosi, or chief, of each kingdom. Colonial officials knew that these positions existed and were recognized by the people.(3) However, they were not especially enamoured by the two men, Usangila Gama and Likotiko Tawete, who held these posts in the two kingdoms and consequently saw little justification for acknowledging their status

---

(1) For example, TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.126 has the comment on Palangu taken from a 1921 report: "Sultan Palangu... drunken and useless...reprimanded constantly for neglect of duty."

(2) TNA/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1922.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, file A, sheet 10, has: "There is no doubt he (Usangila) is the father of the Zuru group. All look up to him and like him."; see also, TNA/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea 1923.

possibly increasing their powers.(1) Perhaps they felt that the leadership which had so recently been returned a considerable amount of the status it held before 1897, might become too independent if every aspect of this position of power was recognized.

The duties and powers allotted by the colonial authorities to the leaders were in many ways similar to those they had had under the Germans. The leaders varied in their response to these duties and powers. In general administration, the Sultans and Jumbes were required to represent the government before their people and vice versa. They passed on the orders they received(2). They were required to hold occasional meetings with their Jumbes, at which they were to discuss local problems and resolve these as well as to be informed of the problems and concerns of the people.(3) From 1922 onwards, general barazas were held at Songea boma twice a year. Many Sultans continued the practice, acquired under German rule, of sending in information on their areas. The 1919/20 report noted that "hardly a day passes but at least two short notes are received from some portion of the district".(4)

The Sultans appear to have been conscientious in performing some of their duties. For example, they appear to have been quite prompt in providing labour when it was needed, either by local government officials for road work or portage or by private recruiters for the sisal

- 
- (1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.46, states that until 1926, Usangila was recognized as "scarcely primus inter pares".  
 (2) TNA/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1922.  
 (3) TNA/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea 1923.  
 (4) TNA/1733/1, Annual Report, Songea 1919/20.

plantations. In the case of private recruiters, incentive was often provided through the offer of money or gifts.(1) However, in other duties, the leaders were not very helpful to the administration. One example was in agricultural innovation. In 1924, when the District Officer was trying to promote use of the plough by demonstrating one to various Sultans, he met with little positive response and despaired:

"They were not moved to emulation, and (were) only passively interested. It was understood that they would not raise any serious objection if the government ploughed their lands for them yearly. Otherwise, our fathers and our fathers' fathers have used a jembe (hoe) - why alter?"(2)

The district report for that year noted that the Native Tribal Authorities, as the leaders were called, were lethargic.(3)

The financial duties of the Sultans were largely confined to the collection of taxes and court fees. Regarding taxation, the Sultans had to ensure that all their men paid hut-and-poll tax. This was done through supervising Jumbes, who in turn supervised wanyapara, who collected the money. In return for their work, the Sultans received a monthly salary, the Jumbes received a rebate of three percent of the amount collected(4), while the wanyapara received nothing.

The judicial responsibilities of the Sultans comprised holding courts. Until 1923 these were unconstituted in that they were held without written judgment.(5) After that date, they were made to record the particulars of each case and to note the judgment. In the courts the Sultans were advised by two or more

---

(1) This became quite important in the late 1920s.

(2) TNA/SEC/1733/9:71, Annual Report, Songea 1924.

(3) Ibid.

(4) TNA/SEC/1733/5, Annual Report, Songea 1920/1, expenditure list.

(5) TNA/SEC/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea 1923.

Jumbes. Initially, local officials found that Sultans tended to submit difficult cases to the boma for consideration rather than risk alienating an offended party.(1) However, this was stopped by decisions to hear only appeals.(2) Constituted courts were run at Songea town, Lipumba and, until 1921, Milo, by European administrators, while an Arab was made, in 1919, Liwali at Songea town and given authority over a second class court.(3) Shortly afterwards, the four akidas in the district, of which one, that at Likuyu, was in Ungoni, were also allotted constituted courts.

The administration gave general support to the leaders in ways other than the allocation of powers and responsibilities. For example, they tried to boost their status. One official wrote how the leaders "are encouraged to build themselves larger houses, and to plant a flag staff before it. Stensilled boards with the name of the chief upon it are provided to all who ask for it. Lime for washing the house can also be provided".(4) Finally, they supported the leaders against challenges to their authority, as described below.

---

(1) TNA/SEC/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea 1923.

(2) Ibid.

(3) TNA/SEC/1733/1, Annual Report, Songea 1919/20. The Liwali was reported to command the "respect of all Sultans" along with having "much influence with the Mohammedan population at Songea".

(4) TNA/SEC/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea 1923.

The leaders appreciated and willingly accepted the political rights and responsibilities which they had been given by the British administration. They handled some duties well - such as listening to orders, managing courts, and collecting taxes - while ignoring others - such as assisting in occasional development schemes. In return for what co-operation they gave, the Sultans regained positions of considerable authority over the people. They benefited in prestige and power and gradually recovered their economic pre-eminence over Ngoni society. They received free labour, earned revenue rebates and received food and other goods for their services(1). When the right to demand free labour was removed in 1924(2), they received increased rebates in replacement.

The people varied in their reaction. Some were distinctively unreceptive. Probably the first dissenting group had been the Ndendeule. However, after their failure in 1918/19 to preserve their independence, they quieted down for a while. A second dissenting group was the Yao living in Kikole. These Yao had long been part of the trading community in the district and had considered themselves quite distinct from the Ngoni. Before 1897, they had been under Rashid, and after 1897, remained under him, then his successor. When the British abolished this distinction, and placed the Yao of Kikole under an Ngoni Sultan and demanded that they observe the same practices towards that Sultan as did the Ngoni - these including the giving of free labour - the Yao reacted strongly. They

---

(1) TNA/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea 1923.

(2) The reason for the change nationally is described cuttingly by R.A.Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule, (London, 1968), Yale UP, p.150.

bitterly resented what was, to all effects, a conscious attempt by the British to retribalize a people who had become quite removed from their tribal background and environment. They were vociferous in their dissent. A report of 1922 noted that they were troublesome and "expected more favourable treatment compared with the Wangoni".(1) In 1923, some of them submitted a list of grievances. But the British had no intention of allowing an independent group of Africans living in an area that was being rejuvenated as a tribal entity. Consequently, they dealt harshly with the Yao. The grievances were summarized cursorily by the District Officer: "1) they considered themselves free from the Angoni tribal service of one day's cultivation for Sultan; 2),3),4), trivial and insubstantial affairs"(2). The Yao were told to follow the local custom or leave the district. Those who had complained then acquiesced, but only after burning the house of the Jumbe appointed over them.(3) Though no reference to negative reaction by other groups was found, it is possible that the Matengo also dissented. They certainly were to voice their dissent shortly.

For the majority of the Ngoni population, the return of the autocratic rule of the royal families appears to have been acceptable. They had known little else, many seemed satisfied with the status quo(4), and most had recourse to the British authorities if their leaders were found to be

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.D; TNA/1733/5, Annual Report, Songea 1920/1. The above paragraph is based on these sources.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.D.

(3) Ibid.

(4) As suggested in p.307, fn.3.

(1)  
unsatisfactory. They appear to have appreciated aspects of the administration given them. For example, on their attitude to the legal system, one District Officer wrote:

"...they respect the conduct of their cases. They are impressed with the fact that both sides have the right of hearing and more so because the evidence is written down. They feel, however, that the course of justice is slow. They profess to rejoice that the era of stripes is passed, but they cannot understand why their opponent should be let off with a trifling fine, or imprisonment, particularly in adultery cases. It is a lasting wonder to them why the women should not be equally punished with the men in such cases. Also why, what is so obvious to them that it needs no proof (eg. that a man is a wizard), should be set aside for lack of witnesses."(2)

Finally, they may have been content because they tended to be isolated and little disturbed by the leaders.

Autocratic rule became important during these years because, in addition to having official and some popular support, it lacked any important opposition. There were no powerful economic groups within the district. Trade was in the hands of the Indians who remained outside politics, while no other economic activity was able to emerge in this isolated and backward district. The only important economic activity at all was labour migration(3), and this, as noted above, tended to reinforce rather than threaten, traditional society.

There was a powerful social group in the district. This was the mission. However, by 1926 they were still only recovering from the setbacks of the war. In 1922, Swiss Benedictines were permitted to enter Songea to take

- 
- (1) Sultan Likotiko appears to have been disliked by a number of his people, see TNA/155/SDB, file C, notes on Sultan Likotiko.  
 (2) TNA/1733/9:71, Annual Report, Songea, 1924.  
 (3) TNA/1733/12:84, Annual Report, Songea, 1925; by 1924, there were an estimated 6-7,000 men away - some 20% of the male population of the district, see TNA/1733/9:71, Annual Report, Songea 1924.



over the mission and educational work begun by the German Benedictines before the war. They were followed in 1925, by the German Benedictines who were permitted to return.(1) Once these were back, European religion and education began a firm expansion in the district. The missionaries were exultant about the prospects for Ungoni. Some saw it as a second Uganda, which could be completely Christian within a few decades.(2) One described the openness of the people towards religion as a sign of a popular movement towards the Church.(3)

But the growth of Christian influence and education was not to become much of a threat to the Ngoni leaders. Many were themselves Christians, while a number of them expressed a genuine interest in allowing the expansion of the Christian presence. Statistics available on the establishment of schools show where the missionaries went and which Sultans were most receptive:

	1922	1924	
Njelu: Sultan Usangila	9	12	
Ali Songea	7	7	
Fusi	2	4	
Mperembe	3	3	
Zamtanga	3	2	
Kapungu	1	2	
Mhomakilo	1	2	
Putire	1	1	
Mgendera	2	2	
Mtekateka	1	0	
Kikole	1	0	
Mshope: Sultan Likotiko	9	8	
Palangu	5	1	
Mkangasimba	1	4	
Rashid Salim	1	0	
Mhakambewa	0	1	(4)

- 
- (1) On entry of the Swiss, see C. Leubuscher, Tanganyika Territory: A Study of Economic Policy under Mandate, (London, 1944), OUP, p.18; SAO, Peramiho Chronicle, 1935, n.3, p.15; J. Richter, Tanganyika and its Future, (London, 1934), WDP, pp.44-5; J. Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, (London, 1965), Chatto & Windus, p.87.
- (2) Missbl., v.XXVI, (1921), n.9, p.170.
- (3) Richter, op cit, pp.46, 57.
- (4) TNA/155/23/10, DO to Asst.DO, 723/7/12/2/1 of 30.6.1926.

Those leaders who were not receptive to the advent of the Christian influence, tended to be supported by the government in their efforts to keep the missionaries out of their areas(1), unless most of ~~their~~/followers felt otherwise(2). By 1925, there were some 8,000 pupils in Peramiho parish and 2,728 in Kigonsera parish.(3)

The groundwork for the rise of a large educated class was being well laid. By 1926, those who had been educated appear to have been concentrating on furthering religion and education rather than on engaging in district politics, possibly because the district administration was distinctly unreceptive ~~to~~/political activism and there were few career possibilities outside the government and the missions to support anyone wishing to enter politics. Moreover, it is quite possible that very few had any interest in politics.

By 1925, thus, the two royal families and their associates had begun emerging from their rather weak position under German rule to reach a position of power and status. Moreover, this was only a beginning. Greater days lay ahead for them under the system of Indirect Rule which was now to follow.

## Chapter 7

## Indirect Rule and the Apex of Royal Family Control

1925-1939

## I

Following the appointment of Sir Donald Cameron as Governor of Tanganyika in 1925, the colonial administration of that territory formally implemented the policy of Indirect Rule, which it had favoured since the early 1920s. While Indirect Rule fascinated many in the Colonial Service after its successful implementation in Northern Nigeria and seemed a good, inexpensive political system to implement in a poor colony such as Tanganyika, it could rarely live up to its expectations. First of all, the ground on which it could develop was not present, even in embryonic form, in the political structures of most of the societies in Tanganyika. These societies lacked the centralized structures which were desired for Indirect Rule. Secondly, in those societies which did have centralized structures, the policies of Indirect Rule were oriented towards consolidating these rather than developing the 'political consciousness' of the 'African native' as Cameron wished.<sup>(1)</sup> Because Indirect Rule could generally not live up to its expectations, it was to be of considerable benefit to leaders of societies, such as the two Ngoni kingdoms, which had centralized political structures.

---

(1) Quoted in B.T.G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, (London, 1961), p. 118.

This was because such leaders were to be granted the full recognition of their status, something which had been denied many since German colonial entry.

The implementation of Indirect Rule on the district level involved the consolidation of effective political units. In Songea, four were recognized and given support: Njelu, Mshope, Matengo and Nyasa. Other political entities in the district, being considered too small or uninfluential to merit recognition, were joined into the four major units or placed in neighbouring districts. The Ngoni kingdoms absorbed three entities: Njelu took the Ruvuma Yao, while Mshope took the Ndendeule region of Likuyu and part of the Bena area.

Within the two Ngoni political units, the political structure which had been recognized for practical purposes since 1922 was given formal recognition and its leaders, their traditional ties. The chief, or nkosi of each kingdom was recognized. In Njelu, this nkosi was Usangila Zulu Gama. In Mshope, acknowledgement was more complicated as Likotiko, the unofficial nkosi since 1915, died in 1925. His title was contested by two candidates: Palangu, the veteran leader of Maji Maji, and Mapoli, a son of Mwanawalifa, the unofficial nkosi from 1906 until 1915. Although Palangu was easily the more senior applicant, having been eligible in 1878, his election was not wanted by many in Mshope who believed, whether true or not, that he had been responsible for Chabruma's death in Portuguese East Africa following Maji Maji and disliked him because of it.(1) Consequently, Mapoli was selected. Palangu protested about the choice and began stirring up opposition to

---

(1) See above, p.289.

Mapoli. This led the colonial government to intervene and give Mapoli only provisional recognition. Permanent recognition would only be given a year later conditional to his being an efficient ruler. Mapoli proved unsatisfactory to the government and was denied permanent appointment.

Accordingly, the Mshope looked around for another candidate. An excellent replacement was found in Dominikus Missoro, a son of Chabruma, who had been educated by the Benedictines, then served in the German army and, after British takeover, in the British forces. At the time of his nomination, he was serving in north-east Tanganyika. When offered the nkosiship, he agreed to accept it.(1) He was very acceptable to the colonial administration(2), though to the unsuccessful candidate, Palangu, he was an usurper.(3) Subsequent political rivalries between the two men were to be intense. Dominikus Missoro Mbonani Tawete was to rule until 1952 and Usangila Zulu Gama until 1941. These two men were, thus, to lead their people through most of the years of Indirect Rule and, as we shall see, through the finest years of the administrative rule of the royal families during the colonial period.

Below the mankosi were the manduna who were selected from among the Sultans. A few Sultans who had small numbers of adherents were amalgamated into larger ones. Thus the twelve

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, file C, notes on Paramount Chief, Mbonani group.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.126.

(3) TNA/155/24/1/1, confidential report by B.J.Dudbridge, 17.3.1938 on relations between Palangu and Missoro. Palangu looked upon Missoro as mtoto wake (his child) and so expected respect from him.

Sultanates in Njelu were reduced to eight as the four Yao Sultanates were amalgamated into the Federation of Ruvuma. Headmen and Usangila relinquished jurisdiction over a particular group on being elected nkosi. The four Sultanates in Mshope were reduced to three as Msindo was joined to, apparently, Likuyu.(1) When delineating ndunates, the administration tried to set up boundaries for each. However, it was unable to do this because the Ngoni leaders, particularly in Njelu, were firmly opposed to them and refused to co-operate in their implementation.(2) Their reasons were understandable. As far as they were concerned, the power of a leader depended on the number of his adherents, and no one wished to surrender any no matter where they lived. This would have been necessary were boundaries established. More important, adherents who lived distant from their leader would have to be replaced by people living near him who lacked the historic ties of allegiance which followers had. This would have led to the emergence of government-supported rather than indigenous-supported leadership. Moreover, it would put a leader in a vulnerable position should many people emigrate to other ndunates. The problem of implementing internal boundaries was to arise again later and, throughout British colonial rule, was to remain one of the most persistent grievances of administrators in Songea.

Below the manduna were the Jumbes. When Indirect Rule was established, the numbers of Jumbes were reduced considerably

- 
- (1) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Songea District, (1954), p.23; within Gumbiro, the leading Jumbe, Simana, was called nāuna by the nkosi, though this status was not recognized by the British, see TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.74.
- (2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.C.

as smaller ones were amalgamated into larger units. For example, the number on Mbunga was reduced from eleven to seven, while those in Likuyu dropped from seventeen to eleven.(1) These amalgamations helped to standardize the number of taxpayers in each Jumbeate. The average, in the sample year of 1934, was 329, with variations from 976 for one in Mkurumusi to 198 for one in Mgazini.(2) A second result of amalgamation, probably unforeseen by the British, was the weakening of the authority of the Jumbe over the people he led. This happened when Jumbes were appointed over people whom they had no traditional right to lead, for these gave little respect and obedience to merely nominal leaders. After the initial selection of Jumbes, the government appears to have remained generally neutral with regard to the appointment and support of Jumbes. According to one District Officer, Jumbes were selected by senior Ngoni leaders in consultation with the people, a happening about which the government knew little.(3) When selecting Jumbes, senior leaders appear to have preferred ones who were supported by their people, as these would be the easiest and most efficient to rule through. Thus, in the largely Ndendeule-populated ndunate of Likuyu, nine of the eleven Jumbes in 1926 were Ndendeule,(4) while in the mixed 'true Ngoni'-well assimilated 'sutu' ndunates, such as Ndhirima, five out of six were Swazi.(5) At times the Ngoni tried to install their own Jumbes over distinct, separate groups. One

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, file C, sheets 2,3,C.


(2) TNA/155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 222/114 of 15.5.1934.

(3) O.Guise-Williams to Redmond, interview, 23.11.1971.

(4) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.74.

(5) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, pp.72, 116, 192.





# SKETCH MAP OF THE SONGEEA DISTRICT

Legend

- District Boundary ---  
Main Road ==  
Secondary Road \_  
Town ●  
N.A. Headquarters ■

District Divisions MS...

Ngoni Ndanates  
MARCH

\* NO DEFINITE BOUNDARIES  
WERE DELINEATED

BASED ON INTERNATIONAL MAP  
OF THE WORLD, SERIES 1301  
SC-36 Songora; SC-37 Lundu



example was when nkosi Usangila installed an Ngoni Jumbe over some Ruvuma Yao. Their hostile reaction, described below, may have discouraged its further practice, as no other instances of its being done were found. Below the Jumbes were the wanyapara. These do not appear to have been affected much by the implementation of Indirect Rule as their level of administration was too low to be of interest to the colonial administration.

## II

The reaction to the implementation of Indirect Rule varied. The leadership and, in particular, the royal families, welcomed it as it was a boost to their prestige to be recognized once again for the leaders they were. However, because they believed their status in Ngoni society to be something natural and unquestioned, they probably did not feel any overwhelming gratitude to the British for recognizing it.

The leaders appear to have worked to consolidate their power once given it. One way in which this was done was by supporting each other. Two important manifestations of this support are known. The first, lasting much of the 1930s, occurred after the District Officer, W.C. Morgans dismissed two manduna, Zamtanga Gama and Laurenti Fusi Gama, the first for petty peculation and the latter for participating in the 'Ngoja' witchcraft movement which swept through the district in 1929-30.(1) Both men received strong support from their fellow leaders and their followers and, in the mid-1930s, the two were reinstated. Zamtanga's return was appreciated as his temporary successor had lacked influence and backing(2), while Fusi's return did "much to consolidate the area".(3) The second instance, discussed below was the

(1) TNA/SEC/19415, PCAR Mahenge, 1930; /13484, PC to ChSec, 1/C16 of 4.6.1930; /11679, PCAR Lindi, 1934.

(2) TNA/SEC/13796, ActPC to ChSec, 1/114/221 of 12.6.1933.

(3) TNA/SEC/11679, PCAR Lindi, 1934.

resistance given by the Njelu leadership to the transfer of Liganga Ndunate to Umatengo in 1931, and the successful attempt after that to establish a new Ndunate of Liganga for Putire, the royal family member who lost the first one.(1) The appointment of Sakamaganga as nduna of Likuyu by the nkosi of Mshope appears to have been a means of rewarding him for alliance, as his family had no connection with Likuyu in the late nineteenth century. However, the Ngoni leaders were not always successful in support of their fellows. For example, in 1937 the colonial administration wanted to form a new Ndunate to facilitate the handling of the increased court work in the area of Songea town following the abolition of Federation.(2) Nasoro Songea Mbano, the nduna of the Ndunate around the town bitterly opposed the establishment of the new Ndunate since some of his land would have to be relinquished. However, the administration wanted its establishment and the nkosi had to concur. He may have been ameliorated by the knowledge that he would select the new nkosi. The Ndunate established was Mfaranyaki(3) and the nduna appointed over it was a brother of Usangila, named Korofindo.

A second way of consolidating power was through opposing non-Ngoni leaders. When Indirect Rule was established, only one of these was allowed to retain power. He was the akida of Likuyu, Rashid Salim. The

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.102; file C, notes on Putire; Kigonsera Chronicle, 1927, n.4, p.17.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.182; and see below, pp.350-2.

(3) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.64.

leaders of the Ngoni had protested at his retention when Indirect Rule was established, but had been unable to obtain his removal, because he was popular with the administration.(1) This did not mollify them and they continued to press for his removal. A major opportunity appears to have arisen in 1929, when Morgans first entered the district. Shortly after his arrival, he had to deal with one of the periodic benevolent witchcraft movements which swept the district, this one called the Ngoja movement.(2) The British colonial administration feared movements such as this as being possibly subversive(3), and acted to suppress it. This gave the leaders their chance to remove Rashid. They, in a fairly common and acknowledged practice(4), 'advised' the relatively uninformed newcomer and implicated Rashid in the movement. The District Officer who at first believed that Rashid was in it "with some ulterior motive, possibly to get evidence against these people[sprea<sup>(5)</sup>ding the movement]", nonetheless believed the Ngoni and had Rashid removed from office and imprisoned. When the Ngoni proceeded to implicate Rashid in charges<sup>(6)</sup> of corruption, the gullible official complied and brought him to trial at which he was found guilty of misappropriation of funds and fined. Suggestions were later made that

---

(1) TNA/SEC/13484, PC to ChSec, 694/8 of 25.4.1930.

(2) TNA/SEC/18682, PCAR, Native Affairs, 1st draft. The cult was spread by agents living in Liwale.

(3) TNA/155/175, PC to DO, 132/6 of 1.3.1930; and Order under Section 8 of NAO, 18/1926, passed 7.12.1929.

(5) TNA/155/37, DO to PC, 5/5/2/2 of 6.4.1929.

(9) TNA/SEC/13484, Rashid to Governor, 14.6.1930; 155/SDB, v.2, p.B.

(4) TNA/SEC/13796, PC to ChSec, 37/8/53 of 18.12.1934.

witnesses for the prosecution had perjured themselves. The leaders continued to rouse support against Rashid and had the duped official calling for his removal from the district and for the complete elimination of any trace of his presence, particularly through the take-over of his coffee farm.(1)

By this time, Rashid had contacted the Governor and presented his case. This led to a severe criticism of the District Official by the provincial administration. The Provincial Commissioner wrote to the Chief Secretary and dem<sup>a</sup>anded an inquiry:

"I regret to inform you that I have formed the impression after full consideration of all the facts that the procedure adopted by the District Officer in this case has been hasty and most unwise, and I shall be grateful to learn if you will allow me to give him full opportunity of removing that impression at an inquiry to be held on the spot at the earliest possible moment."(2)

This inquiry was duly held, and the District Officer was reprieved for the time. His act of removing Rashid was upheld, but his demand for the expulsion of Rashid from the district was refused.

After Rashid's removal, Likuyu was taken over by Sakamaganga, a cousin of Missoro's. The replacement of Rashid by a member of the Tawete ruling family was probably one of the most important achievements of the ruling families of the Ngoni in their consolidation of control during Indirect Rule. It marked the all but

---

(1) TNA/SEC/13484, PC to ChSec, 694/25 of 4.7.1930.

(2) Ibid., and see PC to DO, 694/23 of 4.7.1930.

LEADERS OF UNGONI IN 1930

GAMA ROYAL FAMILY

MBANO

MAGAGURA

NANGURU

MILITARY CLANS

NIELU

MAFUD

NIELU  
ZULU

SONGER

MAGAGURA

CHIKUSE

MASESE  
ALI

MHONAKILO II \*

KAPUNGU

NASORO \*

GWAZATO KAPUNGA \*

MAYIPU

KISHASHA

MPOCU

PURIREI MKULULETWA

TITUS

GUASEKAPASI MKUZO HAWAI MHAKULE MBEMESA FUSI MLAMULO MBOCHO MOWASO

BUBWA MBUZI

BONIFACE \*

USANGULE KODOFINDO

LAURENTI ZANTADIGGA \*

MZAMALE

YUSUF MGEWDERA \*

MSHOPE

MBONANI

MDENGA

SAKAMAGANGA \*

CHABRUMA

MISSORO \*

CHIPETA

PALANGA \*

complete takeover by the rpyal families and their associates of the political structure in the two kingdoms. The only area that remained outside their immediate control was southern Njelu, but this does not appear to have mattered much.

While willing to consolidate power, the leaders appear to have been somewhat ambivalent about assuming the responsibilities it brought them. These responsibilities fell into three categories: financial, judicial and general administrative. In finance, the leaders were responsible for collecting taxes, then for supervising the spending of part of these through their participation in the Native Treasuries. As regards collecting, the senior leaders did little. The manduna generally merely called the wanyapara to bring their followers to the villages of the manduna where tax clerks collected the money. Colonial officials placed constant pressure on them to ensure that all followers paid taxes and reductions in revenue from one year to the next could result in the reduction of a leader's salary, or other punishment.(1) Officials furthermore sought to register all taxpayers by replacing the traditional system of allegiance to men by an allegiance to land. This remained as distasteful to Ngoni leaders throughout these years as it had before 1925 and they refused to have anything to do with it. On one occasion, a District Officer ignored their feelings and forcibly introduced internal boundaries dividing ndunates. This increased the number of taxpayers(2), but so alienated the Ngoni leaders from the administration that the latter decided to rescind the legislation and return to the old method of tax identification.(3)

---

(1) Eg. TNA/155/SDB, v.4, pp. G,55.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.C.

(3) TNA/SEC/20476, PC to ChSec, 49/4/15 of 30.11.1931.

Little again was done by leaders in deciding how to spend the money allocated to them to use through the Native Treasuries. There were two reasons for this. First, the amount of money available to the Native Treasuries rarely met more than what was needed for the recurrent expenditures accruing to them, these being the paying of the Native Administration and the handling of projects in medicine and sanitation, education, agricultural work, road and bridge building and repairing.(1) So there was little to have an interest in. Secondly, the budget had to be approved by the District Officer who, himself, was responsible to senior officials.(2) Thus, he had a close interest in the budget and often drew it up himself, only bothering to seek comments and approval from the leaders.(3) The leaders could make suggestions and these were sometimes carried out. For example, the leaders wanted and gained the improvement of the Songea-Njombe road to permit bus and lorry transport for labour migrants.(4) But this was the exception and throughout these years, the leaders, having little responsibility and minute funds, showed little or no interest in the workings of the Native Treasuries.

The judicial responsibilities of the leaders comprised operating a more complex legal system than that available before

- 
- (1) As shown in Statements of the Native Treasuries, eg. 1937: TNA/155/64, Native Treasury Approved Estimates, pp.44-7.
  - (2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.256; one instance when a request was refused is TNA/64/7, DO to PC, 64/14 of 1.1.1936.
  - (3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.32, the NT was controlled by the NT agent at the district office.
  - (4) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview 13.9.1971; on road suggestions, see TNA/155/53/6/I.

1925. The manduna were given 'B' courts which handled civil cases, such as marriage and adultery(1), in which they could issue fines and/or imprisonment for up to one month. The mankosi and, for a short while during its lifetime, the Federation, had 'A' courts which heard appeals from the 'B' courts and handled minor criminal cases. They were empowered to impose heavier fines than the 'B' courts and to give sentences of imprisonment for up to three months. The mankosi and manduna welcomed the increased authority they were given through the courts for it helped to consolidate their power over the people.(2) They were willing to do the court work demanded of them and the administration seemed satisfied with the operation of the legal system. One District Officer, when appraising the efficiency of the leaders, wrote that some manduna confined their activities mainly to court work.(3)

The administrative responsibilities included receiving and passing on orders from the district office(4) and holding regular mass meetings to keep themselves informed of what was going on in their areas. In 1927, these meetings were held once a month.(5) Every so often, general district meetings were held to which all leaders were invited. The leaders seemed willing to attend and hold meetings as demanded, though they must have felt little need to do so as their court work must have made them aware of all they had to know. They were reluctant to represent the administration

- 
- (1) Many leaders wanted this to be declared a criminal issue as it was an extremely important social issue, see TNA/155/175.
  - (2) Various colonial officials commented that the increased jurisdiction of the courts reversed the declining power of the leaders, eg. TNA/SEC/10900, PC to ChSec, 663/65/4 of 24.9.27.
  - (3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.6; PCAR 1932, p.37.
  - (4) This had been a general responsibility since 1918.
  - (5) Kigonsera Chronicle, 1927, n.4, p.16.



too closely, and local officials were frequently dissatisfied with the way in which instructions were carried out. This dissatisfaction was to lead colonial officials to relegate much of the administrative work done by the chiefs to the secretary of the federation, once this body was formed.

To some extent, the leaders were required to innovate. New economic, social and educational policies were formulated from time to time by the administration and the leaders were pressed to see that these were adopted. Their response to pressure varies according to their attitudes towards change. As the mankosi were the most important forces for or against change, their attitudes are noteworthy. The nkosi of Njelu, Usangila Zulu Gama, a conservative man with a firm belief in preserving traditional aspects of Ngoni society, was unwilling to support every new idea proposed by local officials. So, such issues as internal boundaries, marriage regulations, new farming methods and the growing of famine crops were considered by him but not forced on the people.(1) Recommendations which he felt to be useful, such as orders regulating the annual burning of fields, restricting the export of foodcrops in times of district shortage, reporting the arrival of locusts, restricting game traps and forbidding fishing with poison, were implemented.(2) However, his general attitude of reluctance to innovate led him to be cajoled, pushed, persuaded and complained about by every District Officer who worked in Dongea during his rule.

Contrary in many ways to Usangila was nkosi Dominikus Missoro Mbonani Tawete of Mshope. A young and progressive man who had fewer

---

(1) Shown in reports on these and other issues, see relevant files in TNA/155...series.

(2) See TNA/155/14/1 for the circulars on these.

## List.4

## Ndunates and Manduna, 1926-1939

Njelu	
Maposeni	nkosi Usangila (1906-41)
Mgazini	nduna Mperembe (1906-29) - Bwanambuzi (1929-34) - Boniface Mperembe (1934-...)
Mkwera	nduna Ali Songea (1906-29) - Leonard (1929) - Nasoro Songea (1929-...)
Marra	nduna Mhomakilo (1920-50)
Liganga	nduna Putire (18..-1931) (abolished 1931, reconstituted 1938)
Majimahuhu	nduna Mzamara (1907-20) - Yusuf Mgendera (1920-...)
Mkurumusi	nduna Gwazayo Kapungu (1906-44)
Mpitimbi	nduna Zamtanga (1906-30) - Uledi (1930-5) - Zamtanga (1935-44)
Council of Ruvuma Headmen	Halifa Mbaraka Bwana Ali (1926-30) - Mwenyikeri bin Kitesi (1930-...)
Mfaranyaki	nduna Korofindo (1937-41)

## Mshope

Gumbiro	nkosi Dominikus Missoro (1926-52)
Mbunga	nduna Palangu (1918-30) - Safi Palangu (1930) - Tokamshenzi bin Mbaru & Mfaume bin Toyimone (1930-1) - Saidi Palangu (1931- 35) - Palangu (1935-38) - Saidi Palangu (1938-53)
Likuyu	akida Rashid Salim (1921-30) - nduna Sakamaganga (1930-50)
Mahanje	jumbes (1935-39) - Mapoli (1939-...)

sources: Gulliver, An Administrative Survey; Ebner, History.

had so bitterly resented Palangu's takeover in 1918 by supporting them under him.(1)

But the attempt to end forever the challenge of the Palangu family did not work. An angry and bitter Palangu went to Dar es Salaam to see the Governor. He met the Chief Secretary, apparently, and gave him a statement, part of which read: "I wish to know why I have lost my country? I am the rightful chief and I wish that another son of mine named Saidi should take the place of Safi. I now appeal to the Government to assist me in this request."(2) The Chief Secretary did help him. Palangu was restored to his position of power in Mbunga. Palangu then handed over the ndunaship to his son, Saidi. Four years later, after complaining that his son was not giving him the respect which was his due, Palangu took over the ndunaship of Mbunga again.(3)

Four years later, another dispute arose between Palangu and Chabruma. This concerned the Ndunate of Likuyu. In 1930, after expelling Rashid from his akidate there, the nkosi had installed his cousin, Sakamaganga, as nduna of Likuyu. Eight years after that, Palangu submitted a protest claiming that Likuyu was part of his country and that the nkosi had had no right to appoint Sakamaganga there. He demanded that Sakamaganga be removed and his son Saidi be installed in his place. He threatened to take the case to the Governor if his demands were not met. Both the district and provincial administrations became involved in this dispute. Officials asked Palangu why

---

(1) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview 26.1.1972. He states that Missoro would not have tolerated the Ndendeule becoming independent of him.

(2) TNA/SEC/13484, ChSec to PC, 13484/239 of 17.6.1931.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.126.

he had waited eight years before making his protest and were told that he had been shamed by the torture affair of 1930-1 and allowed time for it to be forgotten. The administration rejected his claim. It decided that the nkosi was responsible for selecting manduna and, moreover, that Sakamaganga was a very good leader who did not deserve deposition.(1)

At least one difficulty over an ndunaship occurred in Njelu in addition to the two of Zamtanga Gama and Laurenti Fusi Gama mentioned above. This was over the Mkwera Ndunate, ruled by the military Mbanu family. The problem this time was over the selection of a desired successor to Ali Songea who died in 1929. The senior leaders wanted Masese, the eldest grandson of Songea, to succeed. However, he was in Dar es Salaam at the time and seemed to be enjoying himself too much to be interested in returning to village life, for when offered the post, he declined it. The leaders had to settle for Leonard, a younger grandson, who was better educated and somewhat out of accord with most leaders.(2) He became secretary of the Federation shortly after election, in which post he was to have very poor relations with the leaders, as will be shown below.

Signs of the continuing importance of traditional political structures, such as the nkosi's 'houses', helped show how fully the traditional structures had reemerged. On the 'houses', one District Officer wrote that nkosi Usangila had many wives who "naturally act as intelligence agents. Their position commands considerable respect".(3)

---

(1) TNA/155/24/1/1, series of letters.

(2) TNA/SEC/13484, ActChSec to PC, 13484/3 of 26.9.1929 et seq; TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.164.

(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.48.

## III

Though the leaders were pleased with the implementation of Indirect Rule, not all their followers were. A few groups strongly opposed its implementation, generally because they considered themselves separate from the Ngoni and resented the control which Indirect Rule gave its leaders over them.

Occasionally their protests achieved the desired result. High on the list of dissenters were the Matengo of Liganga. Though the separate subdivision of Umatengo had been set up in 1925, it did not comprise all the Matengo. The northeastern Matengo, who had, prior to 1897, been settled in country dominated by the Ngoni of western Njelu, became part of the Ndunate of Liganga in Njelu. This Ndunate, according to a 1929 report, contained 700 Matengo and 249 Ngoni(1) and the former, who were in the majority, protested strongly over their relegation to Njelu and not Umatengo and over the appointment of the Gama royal family member, Putire, over them. Putire's family had controlled this region for decades. To strengthen their demands that Liganga be joined to Umatengo, the Matengo began a campaign of passive resistance by not paying taxes. This was a very effective form of protest against the colonial administration and soon led to an inquiry. This recommended the transfer of Liganga to Umatengo and a change of its name to Lipumba, yet the retention of Putire as nduna.(2) The Gama royal family and the families of ruling military clans bitterly

---

(1) TNA/155/37, DO to PC, 710/2/22 of 3.5.1929.

(2) TNA/155/37, DO to PC, 710/2/22 of 3.5.1929; /155/SDB, file C, notes on Putire.

criticized the government decision and a strong delegation visited the District Officer to demand that the Ndunate be returned to Njelu. However, the administration, which presumably was primarily interested in mollifying the Matengo for tax purposes, refused to accede to the Ngoni demand. Instead, the delegation was dismissed, in reports to superiors, as "ranting and raving" troublemakers.(1)

The settling of the Liganga dispute to the dissatisfaction of all concerned insured that the problem festered. The Matengo continued to see the overlordship of Putire as a sign of the detested Ngoni control over them, and they pressed the administration to replace Putire with one of their own people as nduna. In 1931, after much pressure, Putire was removed from the ndunaship and replaced by a traditional religious clan leader of the Matengo, Gabriel. The Ngoni leaders were very unhappy about this action but again, protests had no effect. Putire returned to Njelu and became a minor leader at Ndirima, while retaining his title of nduna.(2) When he left Lipumba, a number of his followers, presumably most of the Ngoni, left with him. In the late 1930s, the Ngoni leaders succeeded in having a new Ndunate, called Liganga, established and made Putire a functioning nduna once again.

A second group to protest Ngoni control was the Ndendeule from Mbunga. In 1932, a group of Ndendeule, led by Kazipiga and Masudi bin Teuka, lodged a formal protest against Palangu's control over them. Little was learned about these two men. They were either quite intelligent men in their own right or

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.102; Kigonsera Chronicle, n.4, 1927, p.17.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.102.

had good contacts, for their claim was a quite sophisticated one. They may have been moved to action by the brief experience, in 1931, of having Ndendeule leaders in Mbunga, before Palangu reasserted his control, as discussed above. When field research is conducted, more may be learned about these men and the background to their action, though a recent oral history on Ndendeule politics did disclose some, albeit, very limited data.(1)

According to the District Officer who handled the protest, the Ndendeule had prepared well. They made reference to the "self-determination principle of Indirect Rule" and asked for emancipation from Ngoni domination. To replace the rule of Ngoni chiefs, they suggested the appointment of village councils. The proposed councils were similar to their traditional ones, though they may have seemed radical or outlandish to colonial officials in the 1930s. A general meeting was called to hear their demands, and they were instructed to bring their supporters along. Bearing in mind that the Tawete family had considerable power and prestige in Mshope, the claimants, nonetheless, managed to persuade three hundred people to attend. But when the matter was put to the vote, only six gave their support. A few of the participants, interviewed some time later, lamented this lack of unity and said that some Ndendeule still wanted to be ruled by the Ngoni.(2) As a result of the adverse vote, the claim, which the District Officer called "fanatical", was rejected and the claimants

---

(1) J.B.M.Newa, The Ndendeule Struggle against Ngoni Feudalism and British Imperialism, BA dissertation, Political Science Dept., UDSM, 1970.

(2) Ibid., pp.19-20.

"laughed out of court" and reproved.(1) They were told that the government had no intention of removing the chiefs, that they must co-operate and that, if they had an adequate following, they could gain office, but only under the Ngoni.(2) The Ndendeule later renewed their claim, but to no avail. Thus, only a few years after they had gained firm control over this important, anti-Ngoni area, the Tawete ruling family had managed in the face of opposition to keep the people firmly in check. The Ndendeule now remained quiet for a couple of decades until a renewed bid could be made for independence.

A third group to protest against the control of the Ngoni was the Yao, Arab and other Muslims of Songea town. A number, led by Yusufu Mwachande, demanded that they be independent of nkosi Usangila. They were bitter because they felt they received unfair treatment from him. The unfairness concerned Usangila's tendency to ignore Muslim legal tenets, particularly in cases involving marriage and infidelity. Usangila, apparently pressed by the administration, was unwilling to apply the severe punishment which the Muslims demanded for offenders. He had done so before, only to have the District Officer quash the sentence as excessive.(3) The District Officer to whom the Muslims brought their complaint was unreceptive. The administration was determined to preserve uniform standards among the different ethnic groups, so the bid was rejected. A Provincial Commissioner commented: "His Excellency's attitude in the matter is that if

---

(1) Newa, op cit, pp.11-2; TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.D; /155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 222/114 of 15.5.1934.

(2) Ibid.

(3) TNA/155/37, DO to PC, 5/5/22 of 6.4.1929.



alien natives are not contented and happy under the native authority and courts of the area in which they live they should go back to their own country".(1)

Despite the number who protested about the consolidation of power by the Ngoni royal families and their associates, it should be pointed out that these were the ones whose allegiance to the Ngoni was doubtful at best. Most of the people in Njelu and more than half those in Mshope accepted the political structure. There were several reasons for this continued acceptance of autocratic royal families some three decades after their military domination had ended. One was the fact that the royal families and their associates had been ruling since the kingdoms had been established. Because of this they were seen, according to one District Official who served in Songea through most of the 1930s, as natural leaders accepted without question rather than as imposed leaders.(2) Moreover the overwhelming majority of the population had never known as complex a political system as the one the Ngoni had, so may have seen the Ngoni leaders as being of a level higher than that of their traditional political representatives, many of whom still had authority on the village level. Secondly, the people had a pride in their leadership and the former power which it represented and had little wish to change it.

Gulliver was very cutting about this attitude:

"(Most people in Ungoni) had little tradition to be proud of or to perpetuate and they were conscious that they were not even real Ngoni. They depended on their masters, the chiefs, to lead them as they always had done. When the chiefs gave up leadership the people were helpless, bereft

...

---

(1) TNA/155/37, PC to DO, 32D/4/29 of 22.4.1929.

(2) A.S.Stenhouse to Redmond, interview 4-5.10.1971 stated respect was given to all Swazi.

... of inspiration and example. They then discovered that they could increasingly ignore their chiefs, who anyway had little taste for bothering them. There was no restraint against sitting back, merely making a bare living supplemented by labour migration."<sup>(1)</sup>

Some comment must be made here. The leaders did not give up leadership. They merely changed the basis to it. Moreover, the people looked up to them and if it was only to a limited degree, it may have been more because people were isolated and dispersed than for any other reason.

A final reason for the acceptance of the Ngoni leadership was satisfaction at knowing that misrule could be protested against and generally remedied. For instance, if the people found a leader to be oppressive, they could complain about him and have him removed. One instance of this was with regard to Safi Palangu who was removed from power after the torture case. Again, if a leader was incompetent, he was not given respect. For example, nduna Uledi, who replaced Zamtanga for a while in Mpitimbi, was unable to hold his appointment because he was a "junior member of the family... (who lacked) sufficient influence over the people and... the backing of the wazee (elders)".<sup>(2)</sup> Zamtanga, who had been dismissed for mismanagement, had to be reappointed. Furthermore, if leaders were appointed over people with whom they lacked traditional ties of allegiance, they were ignored. This happened to many Jumbes who were deserted by people over whom they had been appointed.<sup>(3)</sup> Again, if a leader fulfilled his duties in an unsatisfactory manner, the people could look for

---

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.115.

(2) TNA/SEC/13796, ActPG to ChSec, 13.6.1931.

(3) Eg., TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.162.

someone else, as for example, by attending the court of another nduna. Then if they felt a leader was overextending his authority, they could apply pressure to restrict him. For example, when nkosi Missoro tried to implement radical changes in the marriage law, the people protested and he had to back down. Finally, people could leave the district if they found the atmosphere too restricting.

Various economic and social activities replaced participation in political life. One was tobacco-growing, which by the mid-1930s had become sufficiently large to support a co-operative movement. This movement failed to generate political activity during these years because colonial officials kept a firm control over it. It did have economic and social importance and the more successful growers became influential within the district. Though this sometimes annoyed the government(1), the Ngoni leaders did not worry about it as they maintained close contacts with the movement and treated its more successful members more as worthwhile associates than possible competitors.(2) The other major economic activity in the district, labour migration, appears to have fostered the support of autocratic, traditional rule rather than destroy it. A few reasons for this have already been given. Another included the indirect support given to leaders through the problems emerging from labour migration. The main problems concerned marriage, and involved desertion and adultery. The resolving of these issues kept the courts busy and the leaders, through their control of the courts, were able to preserve a very effective voice over the running of the society. A further way in

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.1, pp.261-2.

(2) Ibid.; the author has written an analysis of the co-operative movement in Songea which is to be published shortly.

which labour migration supported traditional society was through fostering tribal identity among migrants, an identity which found one expression in the rise of utani relationships between migrants and neighbouring peoples. Utani relationships involved contact of a friendly or a scornful nature with neighbouring peoples based, to some extent, on historical contacts.(1) These helped to foster Ngoni consciousness of and pride in their illustrious military past and must have been reflected in tolerance of and support for the traditional leaders.

One important potential alternative to the political control of the royal families and their associates to arise between 1926 and 1939, and about which, unfortunately, little is known, was the challenge of the Catholic Church. During these years, the influence of the Church became considerable as the people turned en masse to the religion and education they offered. Mission representatives became an alternative source of authority to political leaders one which, according to one official, was more influential among its followers.(2) Still, the Church took care to abstain from political activism and to restrict itself to the religious and educational matters which interested it most. Accordingly, very little political alternative appears to have emerged. Moreover, the leaders of the Ngoni generally maintained good relations with the Church(3) presumably because they appreciated its influence and the fact that this could be used to their benefit.

---

(1) For more information on utani, see R.R. Moreau, "Joking relationships in Tanganyika", Africa, v.XIV, (1944), n7; E. Spiss, "Observations on Utani customs among the ngoni of Songea district", TNR, n.16, 1943, pp.49-53.

(2) O. Guise-Willaims to Redmond, interview 13.9.1971; TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.117.

(3) A.H. Pike to Redmond, interview, 13.9.1971 notes that Laurenti Fusi Gama seemed to use them to his advantage.

The only known instance of the Church having an anti-colonial political effect on the people, and this indirectly, was a complaint by some people about the lack of certain types of education. This complaint, noted by Iliffe(1), offers no details and it was not possible to learn more of the background to or the result of it. These results, however, appear to have been minimal, judging from the lack of government increase in expenditure on education in the late 1930s.

#### IV

The final group to have an interest in the new political administration was the colonial government itself. Initially, the attitude was favourable. Colonial officials took considerable interest in the Ngoni autocratic state and fostered the consolidation of the powers of the leaders. They were intolerant to the wishes of minority groups such as the Yao and Ndendeule who did not want to be integrated into the Ngoni states. They sought to increase the status and prestige of leaders that they might stand out from the rest of the population and be readily identifiable as the elite in the society. Once the system went into operation and colonial officials experienced the results of their efforts, attitudes began changing. Officials frequently found themselves dissatisfied with the performance of leaders they had supported. The powers they had given the royal families and their associates did not bring the changes and improvements which many wanted in

---

(1) Iliffe in Kimambo and Temu, op cit, p.133.

administration. In financial matters, they wanted the leaders to participate more(1) by taking a greater interest in the way in which Native Treasuries' money was spent, particularly through suggesting expenditures which would be of use to their people. More important, they wanted methods of tax collection facilitated through the establishment of tax registers on which people would be listed according to where they lived rather than who they were under, and strongly resented the leaders' refusal to have anything to do with such a scheme. In judicial matters, though generally satisfied, they criticized things such as the carefree attitude by which people could take their cases to any nduna and they lamented the unwillingness of leaders to change traditional laws on issues, such as marriage, in which existing laws seemed imperfect. In general administration, they were frequently unhappy at the lack of interest shown in schemes introduced from time to time and at the general reluctance of leaders to become innovative forces in their societies.

In all, there was a general feeling that Indirect Rule was not operating as well as it might. From time to time efforts were made, thus, to improve it. In some cases, District Officers took it in their hands to forcibly improve administration. Probably the most renowned instance of this was during the period of administration of W.C. Morgans. A strong-willed, determined and confident man, Morgans was determined to make leaders undertake changes which were good for their societies. Accordingly, where leaders showed themselves incapable of or unwilling to change or to work efficiently, he fired them. During his hectic years

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.256.

of administration, five leaders were dismissed: Zamtanga Gama, Laubenti Fusi Gama, Safi Palangu Tawete, Rashid Salim and a Yao headman. The first two were subsequently reinstated. He tightened up on tax collections by making all plural wives and most old men pay taxes - an action which was bitterly resented - and, more important, forcibly instituted internal boundaries. He wished to improve the agricultural economy through ensuring the end of future shortages and so forced the people to grow cassava, a durable famine crop but one which few wanted in their regular diet. His policies so alienated the leaders and people in Ungoni that most had to be undone following his departure. No other District Officer went as far as Morgans, though various ones sought, from time to time, to introduce minor schemes for the improvement of administration and the betterment of the people in their eyes.

A second way in which attempts were made to improve administration and one which, in its duration and impact, was to prove much more important than isolated interference in aspects of administration, was the formation, in 1929, of the Ngoni Federation. The possibility of a union of the Njelu and Mshope kingdoms had been suggested as early as 1925 by Cameron(1), then by numerous other officials though it was only in 1929 that it was established. Officials in the district questioned the leaders on the possibility of union and learned, incorrectly, that the kingdoms had united in pre-colonial days under a person known as a lipanga in times of serious external threat. The lipanga was identified as Songea Mbano, making the then contemporary holder, Leonard

---

(1) D.Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria, (London, 1939), pp.59-60.

Songea Mbano.(1) They were incorrect insofar as all known historical data, including that noted in previous chapters, makes no mention of such a person. Nor did Songea ever lead the combined armies in their known campaigns against the Maseko and Hehe. Nonetheless, satisfied that they had found a legitimate, traditional means to unify the kingdoms into one great state, the colonial government proclaimed the birth of the Federation in 1929. It is not clear why Ngoni leaders acquiesced in the formation of the Federation. It appears they were subjected to considerable pressure, particularly as officials admitted the Ngoni preferred secession to unity.(2) One official said the whole thing was one of Morgans' ideas.(3) However, though he could have pushed this through, his successors were sufficiently interested in it and his predecessors sufficiently anxious to push it to make it more than one man's scheme. Possibly, the leaders were told, or felt, that it could do little harm and could even be beneficial by reducing their duties.(4)

Though the Federation was set up as a restricted body, meeting four times a year to discuss financial and other matters(5) and which had an 'A' court, it soon took over many of the day-to-day affairs of district administration. One official commented:

"The tendency arose for the District Officer to look upon the Lipanga as the Executive head of the Angoni Federation. Indirect administration through the chiefs (Ma-Nkosi) became submerged in a more Direct, tho' efficient, method thro'

---

(1) PCAR 1929, Mahenge, p.62; TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.14; /SEC/18693, Extract from PCAR 1929/30, Mahenge Native Affairs.

(2) TDB, v.4, p.237.

(3) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interviews.

(4) TNA/155/133, PC to ChSec, 119/9 of 25.11.1929.



the salaried...Lipanga, who gradually tended to issue directions to the Sub-Chiefs direct. Also appeals were attracted to his court; ostensibly relieving the two chiefs of routine."(1)

Moreover Leonard, who appears to have been efficient, worked hard to consolidate his position and, in the course of this, became a threat to the leaders he had been appointed to serve.

In the running of the Native Treasury, he made many of the decisions on the allocation of money. In the courts, he dominated legal affairs.(2) In general administration, he began issuing regulations for the running of the district.(3) Finally, within a year of his appointment, he began to wear the feathers of the 'Ludonga' bird, the symbols of leadership in Songea Ngoni society.(4)

The leaders of the Ngoni soon became aware of what they had allowed to happen and began to resent ever having agreed to federation in the first place. There had never been a federation before and each nkosi questioned the intents of the other in this union.(5) Their suspicions and fears were gradually to be realized in the development of a serious boundary dispute, discussed further below. In the meanwhile, they let it be known that they would not stand for any diminution of their powers.(6) In 1930, to enforce his point, nkosi Usangila began boycotting sessions of the Federation court.(7)

Worried about the negative feelings which were building up towards the Federation, yet anxious to preserve it as it had

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.33; TDB, v.4, p.238.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.17.

(3) TNA/155/133, PC to ChSec, 133/25 of 17.10.1929; /155/175, ChSec to PC, 12964/24 of 29.5.1931.

(4) TNA/155/222, DO handing over notes, 29.5.1933.

(5) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview 13.9.1971.

(6) TNA/155/37, PC's report on Songea, 7.8.1929; TDB, v.4, p.238.

(7) TDB, v.4, p.238.

become useful to them, colonial officials took steps to remove some of the leaders' complaints. The Federation court lost much of its powers, while those of the mankosi gained increased powers.(1) Leonard was reprimanded for exceeding his powers in issuing administrative regulations and these were restricted. His salary was then reduced in proportion to those of the mankosi.(2) In 1934, the lipanga's name was changed to shangweni, as the latter expressed "the functions of the office, which is that of principal secretary to the Ngoni Native Administration".(3) In that same year, the mankosi were given Empire medals for the "invaluable services rendered" in soundly establishing the Ngoni Native Federation.(4)

Despite all the above conciliatory activity, the administration retained the Federation which the Ngoni leaders did not want and so they continued to be unhappy. In 1937, these leaders brought matters to a head by submitting a list of grievances condemning the lipanga's independence, insolence and aggregation of nontribal powers, etc., and demanded his dismissal and the abolition of the office.(5) The mankosi were aware that if Leonard alone were dismissed and the post not abolished, that they would again be challenged and their powers and authority encroached upon.(6) Faced with no alternative because the leaders absolutely refused to go back on their demands, the colonial administration abolished the lipangaship.

Around the same time, the Federation itself came under attack.

---

(1) TNA/155/133, PC to DO, 112/3 of 15.1.1931.


(2) See comparison of salaries in RH, O.Guise-Williams Papers, Songea 10.10.1932 and TNA/155/64, NT Approved Estimates 1937, pp.44-7.

(3) PCAR 1934, Southern, p.33; PCAR 1933.

(4) PCAR 1935, Southern, p.73.

(5) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.33.

(6) TNA/SEC/13796, PC to ChSec, 1/114/291 of 5.5.1937.



BOUNDARIES  
BETWEEN KINGDOMS  
1928-1937

# SKETCH MAP OF THE SONGEA DISTRICT

- Legend
- District Boundary - - -
  - Main Road =
  - Secondary Road - - -
  - Town ●
  - N.A. Headquarters ■

The issue was boundaries. The mankosi were unable to resolve the delineation of a section of the boundary between the kingdoms in the late 1920s and throughout the years of Federation, this problem festered. A 'verbal agreement' had been reached in 1927, but after its rejection by Usangila a second conference in 1928 met and resolved a further agreement, acceptable at the time to both parties. In 1931, apparently after pressures from nkosi Missoro, new discussions were held and the boundary once again returned to the 1927 limits. The 1931 agreement complicated issues for both mankosi now had followers in the disputed area. Missoro had thirty to sixty there while Usangila had two to three hundred in 1938.(1) In 1937, nkosi Missoro complained that some people in the area, which had been given to him in 1931, were paying their taxes to Usangila. Usangila responded by denouncing the verbal agreement of 1931. He made it clear that he adhered only to the written agreement of 1928 and added that, as far as he was concerned, federation had been the cause of all the boundary troubles:

"I am convinced that the cause of the trouble of my losing my territory is the federation. Consequently, I reject the federation with Chief Mbonani and do not wish to have anything to do with it. If government does not grant my request I wish my representative to speak to the Governor."(2)

The colonial authorities arranged a meeting to discuss the boundaries problem and it was decided there to return once again to the 1928 boundary. Though the contentious boundary issue had been resolved, it could not save the Federation as nkosi, Usangila had no intention of returning to it. Having

---

(1) Paragraph based on TNA/155/SDB, v.4, pp.17, 359-60.

(2) Ibid; v.2, p.C; TNA/SEC/15796, Zulu to DO, 15.9.1938 and PC to ChSec, 1/180/39 of 7.10.1938.



no alternative, a reluctant administration agreed to abolish a union which had been very helpful to it.(1) A few officials wanted the administration to admit that Indirect Rule was a failure and to replace it by a more direct form of administration based on clerks. However, they were overridden by an administration which was, apparently, more interested in preserving a theory than with achieving maximum efficiency of rule.(2)

District officials now had to contend themselves with operating within the system of Indirect Rule, a rule which the Ngoni leaders and not themselves, wanted. They were to accept it for another decade, at which time they would again seek to modify or replace it.

At this point it is useful to comment on Gulliver's claims about the Ngoni leadership. Gulliver was very disparaging about the leadership when writing:

"(Nothing new emerged after Maji Maji, and) the introduction of Indirect Rule merely formalized a dying system...The basis of chiefly power was gradually eroded away, the only thing that was learnt was the loss of the old discipline. Chiefly dignity, authority, pride of status and feelings of superiority dwindled for lack of understandable expression; but whilst a pre-European generation of men remained the process was slow and difficult to discern. By the early thirties, a new generation was growing up which had not known the 'good old days' but had lived only in a world of frustration and stagnation. There was nothing or very little to keep those newcomers going, to give them spirit and ambition. Indirect Rule delivered authority into hands fashioned for quite a different purpose. Chiefs were persuaded, even harried, into improving tax collection and speeding up court work; they accepted this as an unfavourable necessity and shirked it when and where they could."(3)

---

(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, pp.17,32.

(2) Ibid., v.4, p.6.

(3) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.115.

Certainly some of this is correct. The military basis to the rule of the chiefs did come to an end after Maji Maji. The young generation of the 1930s did live in a world of stagnation. Finally, chiefs were often harried into doing work they were not interested in. However, much, particularly the general interpretation, is wrong. For example, though the military basis to rule had ended, it had been replaced by an administrative one, which became increasingly stronger after 1905. The 'basis of chiefly power' had not been eroded away by the 1930s. It was probably stronger than ever due to Indirect Rule. Moreover, though feelings of superiority may have had fewer means of expression, dignity, authority, and pride of status were still very strong and capable of expression. Again, the young generation were frustrated by the isolation of their homeland not the political system, which appears to have been of little concern according to contemporary records. Finally, chiefs may have been harried into doing much of the work demanded of them because they felt this work to be trivial, or only to the benefit of the colonial government, or to be incompatible with traditional structures and practices, as for example, the changes demanded in tax collection. Gulliver was more an apologist for the changes his contemporaries wanted than an accurate analyst of the Ngoni political system of the 1930s.

In conclusion, in 1939, on the verge of a world war in which many Ngoni were to fight, political life in Ungoni continued to be the firmly autocratic one which it had been since the 1860s. But change was soon to press on it as in the next decade the British colonial power was to confront the royal families and their associates with political democracy and economic development. This confrontation was to be a serious one which was to bring considerable change to one of the kingdoms.

## Chapter 8

## Democracy and Ndendeule Nationalism, 1940-1954

## I

As far as the colonial government seems to have been concerned, the main issue during most of the years of the Second World War was the mobilizing of local resources to support the British side. This involved, as far as Songea was concerned, the promotion of policies which would guarantee African material and psychological support. Consequently, the Ngoni leaders were supported as long as they carried out the demands made upon them. One aspect of this support was respecting the leaders by laying to rest the implementation of policies which would adversely effect Indirect Rule and those which could alienate leaders, such as 'internal boundaries'. A second aspect was the supporting of leaders, such as Korofindo Gama, who might have been rejected earlier. A third aspect was supporting leaders in any conflicts with the people. For instance, when some soldiers complained, in 1943, about the service rendered them by the Native Authorities and demanded that the District Officer handle their affairs in future(1), the government responded by requiring all family matters to be reported to the Native Authorities rather than be sent directly to soldiers.(2) This may have been done as

---

(1) PCAR 1943.

(2) TNA/155/14/1.

much to boost the morale of the soldiers as to support the leaders. No other overt instances of opposition to the leaders during the war was found.

Associations or groups which could have become troublesome to the leaders were controlled by the government. Probably the most important of these was the co-operative movement. In 1940 the government held an inquiry into the industry after various problems within it had come to a head.<sup>(1)</sup> These problems included the frustration of members of the Department of Agriculture at their declining influence within the industry, and the clash of personalities of those interested in co-operation. The inquiry recommended that the government place the co-operative in the hands of a tobacco board dominated by government officials. Two growers, one the royal family member, Laurenti Fusi Gama, were also on the board, though their influence was to be minimal. The board and the Department of Agriculture were incompetent in managing the industry and throughout the war years it remained in a state of decline. Consequently, tobacco-growers were prevented from becoming a political power at the same time that they were losing their economic status. The only important development in the tobacco industry during the war years was the increased production of growers in eastern Ungoni - particularly the Ndendeule region - vis-a-vis that of those in other regions. This was to have considerable effect following the war.

Teachers and students comprised a second group which could have provided some challenge to the Ngoni leadership. However, they were prevented from doing so by the demands of

---

(1) This paragraph is based on the separate paper, soon to be published, written by the author on the co-operative movement. On the inquiry, see TNA/155/coop27/I, 1940 report.



the war and particularly by their vulnerability to the draft due to the Armed Forces' preference for educated soldiers.(1) Though a few people from among the general population had some political aspirations, most did not. These appear to have been satisfied with their leaders. What concerned them were the demands which the war made on their supplies of food and their labour, the first referring to the demand for district self-sufficiency, the latter to the demand for soldiers and plantation workers.(2)

The leaders of the Ngoni appear to have responded well to the demands made upon them by the colonial government for the war effort. They supplied labour for the Armed Forces and the sisal plantations when asked to do so. They supported measures for agricultural control, passing appropriate laws, and prosecuting people who disobeyed them(3). They identified themselves with the war effort. For instance, nkosi Missoko attended military ceremonies in Nairobi in 1944 and, in 1945, went on a six-months' tour of South-East Asia to visit Ngoni and other troops fighting in Burma and Madagascar.(4) Finally, they saw that taxes were paid regularly and in full. In return, they remained in challenged control of Ngoni society in Songea.

---

(1) TNA/155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 20.7.1944, states that only educated soldiers were being taken.

(2) Various details on these are found in TNA/SEC/19415, PCAR 1941, first draft; PCAR, Southern; 1943; /155/14/1; PCAR 1945, Southern.

(3) TNA/155/Group X, Annual Report, n.d., app.1945 has examples.

(4) TNA/155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 20.7.1944; RH, J.R. Johnston, PCAR 1945, p.6.

Some Ngoni leaders responded to the relative tranquility of politics by preoccupying themselves with internal family disputes. In Njelu, the death, in 1941, of the long-reigning nkosi, Usangila Zulu Gama, brought a succession issue which kept the royal family and lesser senior officials fully occupied for most of the war-years. The colonial administration did not lament Usangila's passing. As far as they were concerned, this man who had ruled since 1906 had been incompetent and uncooperative in his later years. One official now wrote:

"[Usangila] was much respected by his people, but he had reached an age when he was content to leave much of his work to the sub-chiefs; he was of an uncompromising disposition and it must be admitted that the Native Administration of the Ngoni portion of the district will be made much more harmonious by his death."(1)

As this succession was the first one to be decided by the leaders in Njelu since 1889, it was a major event within the kingdom. There were two candidates who presented themselves: Mtazama, a nephew of Putire Gama(2), and Korofindo, son of the long-deceased nkosi, Mharule (1874-1889). Few details were found on this succession. Those that were show that it was an interesting departure from previous successions in some ways. Mtazama's bid

---

(1) TNA/SEC/19415, PCAR 1941, Southern province, first draft; 155/SDB, v.4, pp.48-9.

(2) According to one contemporary report, that is, TNA/155/SDB, v.4, pp.48, 52, Mtazama was of Gwaserapasi's branch of the Gama family; However, the writer mentioned this to Ebner in the course of interviews on 17-21.10.1971, and the latter stated that Mtazama definitely was not from this branch, but rather, was from the Putire (Mayipu) branch of the Gama family. Ebner's identification is that used here. He was in Songea at the time and is well acquainted with various members of the Gama family.

for the nkosiship was fascinating in that it was the first known one to have been made by the Mayipu branch of the Gama clan. The nkosiship had always been held by members of the Zulu branch and it seems quite clear that Mtazama was not eligible in terms of blood line to make a bid. He did so, however, for two reasons. First, according to Ebner, he was "trying his luck".(1) He was, according to one Provincial Commissioner, the "oldest and leading nduna"(2), and may have been trying to capitalize on the ignorance of colonial officials of Ngoni succession laws. Secondly, he may have felt that the criteria for succession were changing and that matters such as competence in administration were more important than seniority of descent. As interesting as Mtazama's candidacy was his list of supporters. They included Kapunga, son of Hawaii (1864-1874), and Zamtanga and Kalubeya, sons of Mlamilo (1889-1899).(3) Why they, senior members of the ruling Zulu branch of the Gama family and sons of former mankosi, supported a candidate from a non-ruling branch is not known. One reason may be that they resented the control which Mharule's family had over the throne. Another possibility is that they saw personal advantage in supporting Mtazama. Until field research is done, the complete answer to what seems to have been a very interesting succession is unlikely to be known.

---

(1) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10.1971.

(2) PCAR 1942, Southern province, p.42.

(3) TNA/155/SBB, v.4, pp.48-9.

The succession was resolved in favour of Korofindo. This was probably inevitable as he was from the senior, Mharule, branch of the royal family and must have benefited from the influence this branch gained during the long reign of Usangila.(1) Korofindo appears to have had the support of most manduna. The colonial government, preoccupied with the war effort, duly approved Korofindo although they appear not to have thought too much of him. "He is not a forceful character and is not strong physically"(2) minuted one British administrator disparagingly. Internal dissension in Njelu continued after the succession as Mtazama and, apparently, a few associates refused to accept Korofindo as the legitimate nkosi.(3) As the nkosi was physically weak and unlikely to rule for a long time, they schemed in the hope that Mtazama would eventually be able to replace him.(4) However, Korofindo had the advantage of power and used it to consolidate his position. Thus, he transferred Mtazama from the centrally-located Ndunate of Mgazini to the isolated one of Ruanda. When Mtazama failed to build a residence there, Korofindo sought, but failed, to have his ndunaship removed from him. In 1945, Mtazama was appointed nduna over the newly-established, isolated Ndunate of Makoro.(5) Then, to let everyone know whom

---

(1) TNA/SEC/19415, PCAR Southern province, first draft; 155/SDB, v.4, pp.48-9.

(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.48.

(3) Ibid.

(4) As, for example, by pushing schools of the UMCA when Korofindo was limiting these, see TNA/155/23/7, Korofindo Zulu to E.T.Dickson.; PCAR 1944, p.67 notes "Njelu Ngoni were much unsettled by bickering between their Chief and...Mtazama".

(5) RH, A.W.Wyatt, Songea 14.11.1944.

he wanted to be his successor, Korofindo nominated Xavier, the son of Usangila, as his deputy.(1)

Compared with Njelu, Mshope was quiet during the war years: there was no comparable crisis of succession. Towards the end of the war, the colonial government began a number of changes in its administration of the territory. These initiated a short period of heightened activity after the war which markedly contrasted with the tranquility of the war years.

## II

The changes introduced by the territorial administration were the most important of all those to affect Songea after 1945. If successful, they could have brought considerable change to the district. However, almost without exception, they were to fail for reasons which will be discussed as the changes themselves are described.

The first major change of policy was a plan to replace Indirect Rule by more representative government. These were to be based on councils whose powers varied in districts from full control to merely advisory status.(2) In Songea, the plan, known generally as Local Government, came to naught. The Ngoni leaders had no desire to have their powers diluted, so refused to support the plan. As late as 1953, there was nothing in the district.

---

(1) TNA/155/127/IV, PC to DO, 15/49/72 of 24.11.1944; PCAR 1944, p.67.

(2) B.T.G.Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, (London, 1961), ch.5; A.J.Temu in Temu and I.N.Kimambo, A History of Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), ch.8; J.G.Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde, (Evanston, 1971) has a good study of the various schemes introduced into Umakonde after 1945.

A second territorial change involved in the implementation of a number of schemes for the economic development of the country. Though the implications of these schemes were considerable, their realization was to be less than expected. One of the more important schemes nationally was an educational plan aimed at educating one out of four children to Std.I-IV, then in diminishing proportion until Std.IX-XII which would be given to one out of every 850 children.(1) To make this possible, the government assumed responsibility for paying a large portion of the educational bill(2) and for improving the educational climate through, for example, enforcing select compulsory attendance at schools(3). While commendable nationally, the scheme offered little to Songea, a district with one of the highest percentages of educated people in the country. Already in 1945, when the ten-year plan was announced, the educational standards in Songea had virtually reached the levels which other districts were to reach in 1955.(4) Consequently, few opportunities were offered to the people. Indeed, the educational plans for Songea were, if anything, destructive. This was because, by 1952, the territorial government realized that it could not afford the commitment it had made to African education, so in that year, transferred a large portion of the cost to the Native Treasuries of the districts.(5)

---

(1) DEAR 1945, App.A.

(2) TNA/16/27/20, ActPC to Bishop, Peramiho, 27/20/16 of 25.8.1945; /155/10/32, PCs conference, minutes 28-30.5.1947.

(3) TNA/SEC/19415, 1947 Compulsory Attendance at Registered School.

(4) According to the schedule in TNA/16/21/59, DEAR 1945, Songea was to have 25 village schools in 1955, though it already had 45 in 1945; 5 district schools, while it then had 3; and one specialist school, hilew it had two, a Teacher Training College and a Technical School.

(5) TNA/155/428/1, Memorandum n.3 for PCs Conference, 1.1952.

The effect was a devastating one. The Songea Native Treasury suddenly had to allocate between thirty and fifty percent of its recurrent expenditure to educational costs(1) and, as a result, was forced to cut down severely on all its plans for district development.(2) From then on there were strong pressures in the district to restrict education as much as possible in order to conserve revenue for other necessary works.

A second major territorial scheme involved the improvement of the agricultural economy through the pushing of cash crops, the introduction of new foodstuffs and improved seed types and the teaching of new methods of cultivation. Of these, the most important in Songea district was the last, which involved an intensive programme to end soil erosion. This was to be done through changing the methods of cultivation from slash and burn and irregular hoeing to tie-ridging.(3) What the government failed to appreciate was that shifting agriculture, which the people practiced, was effective in preserving fertility, while tie-ridging would restrict shifting agriculture, thereby intensifying the problem of erosion. The scheme might have succeeded nonetheless had not the government made a serious error in failing to explain to the people what was expected of them in the new plan. Because of poor instruction, the people were put under the impression that they were being made to adopt the Matengo 'ngoro' system of cultivation which, though good for retaining water for the cultivation of steep hills,

---

(1) TNA/155/16/1, DCs Conference, Memorandum on Education.

(2) See letters complaining of this in TNA/155/64/6.

(3) For comments on the problem as the Department of Agriculture saw it, see DAAR 1948, p.141; and for some idea of the reaction to tie-ridging, see TNA/155/127/V, particularly monthly diaries and reports of the Agricultural Assistant.

was impractical for their flat lands, since it caused them to retain too much water and led to the flooding of the crops.(1) Thus, the people, not wishing to lose their crops and possibly suffer a famine as a result, refused to adopt the new method of cultivation.

Annoyed that no one was obeying its orders to adopt tie-ridging, the officials of the Department of Agriculture resorted to punishing offenders, which it did on a large scale. For example, in February 1950, some 1,525 people were fined in Ruanda and Ngaka alone. The people angrily wrote to the Chief Secretary explaining their objections to the new scheme and stating they would have nothing to do with it.(2) The appeal had little effect though, for in 1951 the Department of Agriculture pressed the scheme with greater determination than ever. It mobilized the Agricultural Assistants into a sort of police force and sent this throughout the district to fine anyone who failed to cultivate with tie-ridges. A great many people were harassed as a result. For example, on one occasion an Agricultural Assistant, unable to force some people in Likuyu to use tie-ridges, called in the District Officer who, after a hostile reception, fined hundreds of people.(3) Manduna were fined along with their people for refusing to co-operate.(4)

---

(1) TNA/16/15/47, vol.III, AA safari diary, 2.1951, notes that a missionary, informing him of the peoples' anger, also thought 'ngoro' cultivation was being enforced; for further information on territorial policy, see John Iliffe, Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika, (Dar es Salaam, 1971), p.34.

(2) TNA/16/37/8, vol.III, Rais wa Songea to PC, ccChSec, 19.2.1950.

(3) TNA/155/AGR/1/10, AA monthly reports, Feb. and Mar. 1951.

(4) Ibid.



The people wrote to the Governor this time and after a series of official exchanges between the central and district administrations, the infamous tie-ridging campaign came to an end.

The peoples' campaign against the government was very beneficial to the leaders, who knew the feelings of the people and supported them rather than the government which wanted them to assist the implementation. Indeed, according to reports from government officials, the leaders played an important role in the resistance by ordering the people not to adopt tie-ridging.(1) Only one important leader seems to have adopted the government cause for a while. This was Laurenti Fusi Gama who adopted it in 1950 as part of an effort to ingratiate himself with the government, for reasons discussed further below. But his plots failed and in 1951 he joined the other leaders and people in opposing it. One result of the leaders' actions appears to have been a firm identification of the people with them(2), a happening quite different from that in areas such as Sukumaland, where the leaders lost their identification with the people through their support of the colonial government in similar, extremely unpopular campaigns.(3)

In the sphere of general economic development, the territorial government pushed mineral explorations, offered development loans to Africans, and pushed European settlement. None of these schemes were very beneficial. A considerable amount

---

(1) TNA/16/15/17, vol.III, AA safari diary; /155/24/6/1, Missoro to DO, 17.7.1951.

(2) As shown below in the successions, section III.

(3) G.A.Maguire, Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation, (Cambridge, 1969), analyzes the Sukuma troubles.

of money was spent in prospecting and vast reserves of coal were found, but these could not be exploited as communications were, and remain, undeveloped.(1) The development loans failed because the district administration, after encountering some difficulties in repayment, decided that the scheme was more a bother to them than a benefit to the Africans, and stopped its application.(2) The scheme for settlers, in itself a very dubitable one in terms of benefit to Africans, failed because it had been poorly organized with the area selected for settlement being most unsuitable, lacking, among things, almost any communications.(3)

There were other forces, in addition to the central colonial government, which initiated change in Songea after the war. One, albeit minor, was the returning soldier. At the end of the war there were fears, ascerbated by the political complaints of soldiers during the war, that those returning, over one thousand in number(4), would be reluctant to accept the limited political and economic opportunities in Songea.(5) However, fears for adverse post-war political activity proved unwarranted, apparently because the Ngoni regarded military service as

- 
- (1) For further details, see Tanganyika Atlas, (1942), p.17; DLM AR 1951, paras. 20,22-5; 1952, paras.19-20; 1953, paras. 15,17; TNA/155/22/8; J.F.Harris, Summary of the Geology of Tanganyika, Pt.4, Economic Geology, (Dar es Salaam, 1961), p.41.
- (2) TNA/155/D3/5 and /155/4/1/1; /155/D3/5/II;
- (3) TNA/155/L2/EST; /155/1/18/d; /155/1/18/1.
- (4) The exact figures were not found. One report of late 1945 noted that 200 had been discharged and another 850 would be discharged before November 1945, in TNA/155/10/6; DO handing over notes, 15.11.1945; /155/Group X, AR 1945; DLAR 1946, p.28 notes that some were still returning in 1946.
- (5) TNA/155/10/32, PC to DOs, 11/229/73 of 23.11.1945.

little different from labour migration, from which they had always returned to integrate successfully.(1) The returned soldiers did make some economic demands however. Many wanted good jobs(2) though, when nothing was available they made no trouble. They also wanted guns so that they might become hunters and make profits from the game meat industry(3), but these were denied them as well.(4)

A third force for change was the co-operative movement. Following the war the industry was reorganized and given added stimulus by the hiring of a number of Europeans and Africans who should have been capable of running a very efficient industry and by the opening up of the English market to the tobacco of Songea. However, the Europeans were incompetent and as growers became increasingly critical of the low prices they received and of the shoddiness of the methods of processing at the factory, many began quitting the industry. Others, including the heads of the co-operative societies and Africans working in the factory and running the union, began demanding African control. By 1952, the African critics had gained the upper hand and Europeans in the industry were making concessions on control and participation. In 1954, the Europeans withdrew from the industry. Until the African takeover, activists in the co-operative movement appear not to have become involved in political life, presumably because they were preoccupied with wresting control of an economic force from the Europeans.

---

(1) TNA/155/10/32, DO to PC, 428/16 of 10.12.1945; /155/Group X, AR 1945; RH, J.R. Johnston, AR 1945.

(2) TNA/155/Group X, app. AR 1945.

(3) TNA/155/10/32, DO to PC, 428/18 of 2.4.1946.

(4) TNA/155/1A/1, NAO Orders.

Then, unfortunately for them, after that time they were preoccupied with making the industry an economically viable entity as the last years of European control had so disillusioned growers that most had left it and the industry had gone into a serious decline. Accordingly, they provided no challenge to the leaders of the Ngoni who, instead, offered them assistance in rebuilding.(1) This was to distinguish the co-operative movement in Songea from those elsewhere in the territory which became important political forces within their societies.(2)

Though the tobacco co-operative never became a political force in itself, it did foster political activism in the district and indeed was responsible for the most important political change to take place during these years, that of the rise of Ndendeule nationalism. The expansion of tobacco-growing into the Ndendeule areas during the 1940s was very successful as conditions for growing were good and the people interested in the financial benefits it brought, and, by the late 1940s, the Ndendeule were producing a considerable proportion of all the tobacco grown in the district. This production fostered wealth and self-confidence among the people and led to the resurgence of periodic Ndendeule nationalism. One early major manifestation of this resurgence came in 1950 when a successor was being chosen for the Ndunate of Likuyu following Sakamaganga's death. As customary, the nkosi decided on a successor. He selected Zondwako, a son of the deceased Sakamaganga. However,

- 
- (1) TNA/155/coop27/II, NMCMU meet. 21-3.5.1952; A large number of files have data on this transition. Some are listed in the bibliography. This period is studied in a separate article written by the author and to be published shortly.
- (2) G.Liebenow in H.W.Stephens, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika, 1920-1967, (New York, 1968), p.47 re. Chagga.

the Ndendeule were not prepared to accept him. They demanded a free election in which they could choose their own nduna. The Palangu family, seeing an opportunity to gain increased authority, proposed a different solution. They wanted Likuyu abolished as a separate Ndunate by being split in two, with half going to them and half to the nkosi. (1) When nkosi Missoro rejected this suggestion, they supported the Ndendeule demand. The Ndendeule demand was heeded by the government, which seemed to be sympathetic to them because they worked hard in tobacco production and seemed to be trying to develop themselves than were the Ngoni. It decided on a compromise. Likuyu was to be split, a large section becoming the Ndunate of Luegu, over which the Ndendeule were to be given the right to elect their own nduna, and the remainder staying as Likuyu, over which nkosi Missoro would elect an nduna. The Ndendeule chose a certain Bilali, a member of a leading family in the area and the Chairman of the Litola Co-operative Society. Missoro retained Zondwako. Missoro was bitter at the loss and only recognized Bilali "with very bad grace". (2) There was little else he could do.

Around the same time, some Ndendeule manifested political independence of the colonial administration as well. The district administration had customarily asked for and received porters from any region which an officer visited. In 1950, it found considerable difficulty obtaining any in the region of the Litola Co-operative Society. This was because most men in that region grew, and profited from, tobacco so had little need to perform casual labour and generally refused to offer it. This complicated visits by officials and so infuriated the District

(1) TNA/155/21/1/1, Saidi Tawete to Mbonani, 20.2.1951, et seq.

(2) Paragraph based on TNA/155/ARs 1940-9, AR1951; /16/1/41/D, DO to PC, 530/9 of 14.3.1951.

Officer that he brought a motion before the tobacco board to have the Litola Co-operative Society struck off the register for "anti-social behavior". His motion was, however, vetoed by the board, which recognized that it had no powers in this matter.(1) Soon the force of Ndendeule nationalism was to have a much greater impact on Ngoni society.

A fifth force for change was the educated class in the district. While little data was found on it during these years, that which was found suggests that they were politically aware, economically influential and sometimes politically involved. One district official commented on its political awareness when writing in 1945: "The younger intelligentsia are not necessarily confined to the ranks of the returning African soldier, they have been here for some time, especially in this district with its many Mission educational facilities, great and small".(2) He offered no comments on its importance. A second reference, this time to economic power, comes from a 1949 meeting of the district education committee in which officials, concerned at the expense of teachers' salaries, stated these were much above those of the people among whom they worked inducing teachers to "consider themselves a class apart not owing allegiance to the Native Authorities".(3) Despite their political and economic challenge, teachers appear to have rarely entered the political arena. Only one instance of political involvement was found. In 1947, a Pangwa mission teacher, Joachim Luoga wrote to nkosi Korofindo demanding that a Pangwa nduna be installed in

---

(1) TNA/155/84/3, CCh SNTB to ExO SNTB, 84/3/289 of 19.8.1950.

(2) TNA/155/10/32, DO to PC, 428/16 of 10.12.1945.

(3) TNA/155/Education Committee, meeting 4.5.1949.

his area of Mgazini. Korofindo ignored the first letter so he wrote another. When this too was ignored, he pressed the District Officer for action. The District Officer, in turn, pressed the nkosi, who then brought Luoga to court on a criminal charge. Luoga was sentenced to five months' imprisonment, later changed to Shs.50/- fine. The District Officer, finding this an excessive punishment for voicing an opinion, quashed the sentence. He then wrote to the mission authorities telling them that Luoga was "writing letters about matters which do not concern him" and advising them to warn him to "confine his activities to the proper channels".(1) Luoga appears to have taken note, for nothing further is heard from him.

A final force for change in the district was the Native Administration itself. Directed by the territorial government and encouraged by local officials, the Native Administration began a programme of development in Songea around 1947.(2) It was financed by rebates from local taxes which increased more than threefold between 1945 and 1952, going from Shs.6/- to Shs.20/- respectively.(3) The programme concentrated on improving the infrastructure of administration through, for example, building court houses, improving markets and expanding the housing facilities for officials. However, it also improved the services given by its departments to the people. For example, in medical work, employees increased from 7 dressers in 1947 to 11 dressers, 9 market-sweepers, 2 sleeping sickness scouts, 5

---

(1) TNA/155/24/3/14, Joachim Luoga to nkosi Korofindo, 20.7.1947, et seq; see also /NA24/1/2/II, letters from a student.

(2) TNA/155/64/6, contains some of the development plans.

(3) TNA/SEC/19415, PCAR 1945; /155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 15.11.1945; /155/428/I, DCs conference, 10.12.7.1952.

village sanitation experts and 4 trainee dressers in medical schools in 1951, while in agricultural work, employees increased from 10 instructors in 1947 to 13 instructors and 11 vermin destruction guards in 1951.(1) However, though development looked promising in 1951, it looked very bad a year later when the central government asked the Native Treasuries to bear education expenses, as mentioned above, a burden which effectively forced the cancellation or postponment of further development.

Complicating the failure or underachievement of most forces for change and development as factors frustrating the consolidation of any change in the district during these years was the continuity of traditional life. For most people, the development projects following the war brought little change beyond annoyance at increased taxation and the demands by colonial officials for them to change life styles in ways such as using new cultivation methods in agriculture. Earnings had increased but so had the cost of goods and people generally had little more than before. Education was improving but there were few opportunities locally of making use of it. Politically, the leaders may have been facing increased criticism from the colonial administration, but to most people they seemed the same as ever. They responded to the increased needs of their people, as for example, in the establishing of the Ndunate of Makoro once its population became sufficiently large. Their court work seemed satisfactory, as did their collection of taxes. They appear to have had little interest in the government plans

---

(1) Taken from annual reports of the Native Treasuries in files TNA/155/26/3/2, /155/64/5 and /155/64/6.



for Local Government. They had never participated in politics before and saw little reason to do so now(1). They failed to appreciate the schemes which the government wished to introduce. Had councils been chosen from elders rather than elected representatives, then the situation may have been different, though even here, elders who readily offered their views in courts may have considered other matters outside their jurisdiction. Most must have seen no benefit to change, indeed possibly a distaste for subservience to someone who had not earned power historically or in other ways. Moreover, according to one official, the leaders were regarded "as very much of the people themselves".(2) With the exception of the Ndendeule, who have been a particular case through much of Ngoni history, it seems that the only people who would have benefited from Local Government were those who would have been given positions of responsibility by it. At least this is indicated by the only non-Ndendeule call for more representative government during these years. This was the one by the Pangwa, Joachim Luoga. After Luoga's protest was stilled, absolutely nothing further appears to have happened, indicating that he made the request for his own ends. The Pangwa were the largest, and among the best-integrated, of the ethnic groups comprising the Ngoni, and it appears that they preferred royal family rule to that of a young man who had little in his favour beyond a good educational background and his ethnic origin.

---

(1) Suggested in TNA/155/1956 Songea District Agricultural Programme, 1955 ...Report (Brookbank).

(2) PCAR 1948.

In conclusion, the many policies promoted by various agents, particularly the central and district administrations, since 1945 had, by the early 1950s, come to naught because they had been poorly prepared or managed and by the early 1950s, the leaders of the Ngoni had retained their powers virtually unchanged. Only one force had brought any change. That force was the rising national identity of the Ndendeule, which had brought the establishment of an Ndendeule Ndunate in 1950-1 and was soon to bring further change.

Now came the turmoil of succession, as the nkosiships of both kingdoms became vacant upon the deaths, in 1949, of the long-ailing Korofindo and, in 1952, of the powerful Missoro. Ndendeule nationalism became a major issue in Mshope, though other issues, such as centralization of authority, modernization, and the continuing independence of Ngoni royal family rule all came to the fore.

### III

Nkosi Korofindo Zulu Gama died on 12.9.1949. In the course of the succession struggle which followed, four members of the royal family were, at one time or another, to claim the throne; age and education were to become important issues; the colonial government was to become deeply involved; and the people were to speak out on matters affecting the way they were ruled.

The first step in the selecting ~~of~~ a successor was the convening of a meeting of the traditional selectors: the senior members of the royal clan and of the military clans which had formerly been important. At their meeting, held on

20-2.9.1949, the electors chose Laurenti Fusi Gama, the eldest member of the Gama family and the main adviser to the former nkosi Usangila. Two royal family manduna, Putire and Kalubeya, refused to sign the statement confirming this. The dispute now began.(1)

Besides the support of various members of the electors, Fusi had good European support. The district administration, led by its District Officer, Risley, firmly supported Fusi. They liked him because he was a strong and capable man with forceful character and considerable qualifications. Other candidates were less capable. Unfortunately for the administration, Fusi was not the senior eligible candidate since, as government officials appear to have known(2), his branch of Zulu's family had never held the throne. The missions also supported Fusi, apparently because he had been a long-time friend who had co-operated closely with the Church since the 1920s. What is uncertain about the support of the missionaries, though, was the strength of it. While it may have been considerable in the beginning, it could well have diminished once the missionaries became aware of the feelings of the majority of the people.

Shortly after the election meeting, various leaders and people began making known their dissatisfaction with the choice, forcing the government to convene a second meeting rather than approve Fusi immediately. At the meeting, held on 17.10.1949, Nasoro Mbano, representative of the senior military clan in Njelu and, apparently, chairman of the selection committee, told of

---

(1) TNA/155/24/2/5. This file contains all the letters and reports of this succession and, unless otherwise stated, is the source of the data used in this analysis.

(2) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview 13.3.1971. Pike was Provincial Commissioner of the Southern province in 1949-50 and was involved in the succession issue.


Fusi's selection and of the hostile reception this had received.

The people wanted Xavier, the son of Usangila, and the man whom Korofindo himself had selected to succeed. However, the selection committee, Nasoro concluded, remained determined to support Fusi, whom it considered the only remaining member of the older generation and, consequently, the man with the better claim. Mtazama and Kapungu, leading opponents of the deceased Korofindo and hence, of his nominee, Xavier, said they agreed with Nasoro.

Xavier's supporters then recommended other candidates. Sakrani, Xavier's brother, proposed himself. He presented a will drawn up by Korofindo on 7.8.1949, recognizing him. However, no witnesses had signed it and two elders whom a clerk had claimed were there, denied that they had been present. So the will was discounted. Nonetheless, Sakrani's nomination was still considered. He received the support of Zinganga, an elder who had assisted in the selection, the military clan elder, Mpambalioto, and the manduna Boniface, Mgendera, Putire and Salehe. The failure of the two sides to agree on a successor forced an inconclusive dissolution of the meeting. The District Officer, when closing the meeting, announced that he would now have to decide the matter.

Fusi's opponents, unsure of the impartiality of the District Officer, kept up the pressure against Fusi following the meeting. In September, a number of manduna and elders wrote to the District Officer inquiring about developments in the selection issue. They made it clear that they did not want a leader imposed on them. Risley, in a curt reply, said that had the leaders themselves

LIST. 5  
1949-50 NJELU SUCCESSION:  
KNOWN SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF FUSI GAMA



KEY: \* SUPPORTERS OF FUSI  
\* OPPONENTS OF FUSI

had forced a delayed succession by failing to come to a decision. He denied that government was making an imposition but rather it was merely making a decision which the people had been unable to make.

In February 1950, with the matter still not resolved, a number of manduna, all apparently of the faction opposing Fusi, held another meeting. At this meeting, or a little later, it was decided to approve two candidates, Simon bin Kitambira bin Mharule and Xavier bin Usangila bin Mharule. Fusi complained to the District Officer about this meeting, writing that the people involved were neglecting their jobs to promote the interests of their candidates. The District Officer seems to have investigated the complaint, though without result.

On 5 April, 1950 the government announced informally that a provisional decision had been made. Fusi was to be recognized as 'Regent' until a successor could be decided upon. The District Officer, when announcing his decision also sent a warning to the manduna Mgendera, Boniface, Salehe and Mhomakilo and to the Jumbes and people, telling them not to agitate against the decision.

The unofficial announcement was followed by a formal one on 12 April, at a general meeting to which some two hundred people came. The District Officer took precautions against any disruptions by bringing police to the meeting. After announcing the appointment of Fusi, the District Officer added that, until a successor was decided upon, Fusi would receive the full support of the government. He then added that, whereas formerly, the people had decided on a successor, now they were to be limited

to suggesting candidates, for the government was ultimately to be free to choose the most capable man. He was to some extent correct, for the government could accept or dismiss as it pleased. However, only certain levels of government could do this and these levels were above that of district administration.

After insisting that Fusi would be supported, the District Officer variously dismissed, threatened and offered palliatives to members of the faction opposing Fusi. He first dismissed Sakrani, saying that he was a sick man and that the government was unlikely to support him.(1) Then he threatened that the time had come for the government to insist on efficiency in its leaders and that those who had taken no interest in the welfare and the progress of the people were to be dismissed unless they showed considerable improvement. In order to make his point, presumably, he thereupon dismissed from their ndunaships two of Fusi's leading opponents, the manduna Putire and Mhomakilo. He added that the Deputy Provincial Commissioner and Fusi had concurred on the dismissals. He then offered palliatives to the remaining candidates. Xavier was to replace Mhomakilo, while Simon was to replace Putire. Till that time, Simon had been Jumbe at Liparamba. With his appointment, this area was to be joined to Liganga. The appointments were, ostensibly, probationary, but, in actuality, they would have removed both men from the centre stage and, in addition placed them in the vulnerable position of having to live up to the expectations of the District Officer and Fusi.

---

(1) He had leprosy.

Fusi followed the District Officer's speech with one of his own. He affirmed that the selecting of a chief had always been in the hands of a few responsible elders and, while he agreed that the masses should be consulted, he warned that intimidation would not be countenanced. He warned manduna against holding secret meetings and threatened to prosecute a few who had been troubling him.

During this succession, the issue of whether 'brother' had precedence over 'son' arose again, apparently with a vehemence that had not been known since the 1889 succession. Numerous reports in the district books refer to this problem, as do Gulliver, Ebner and Komba (1), all of which grant precedence to the 'brother'. It is doubtful that they are correct in their precedence. As discussed above in Chapter Two, succession by 'son' is the traditional Ngoni method of succession, though claims by 'brothers' could be, and have been, made. This has commonly been done in other Ngoni societies.(2) This particular succession was a classic one of powerful 'brothers' opposing the selection of a 'son'. As shown on list 4, p.376, Fusi's known supporters were mainly his cousins, who could be classified as 'brothers' and they were opposing the 'son' line of Mharule which had held power for fifty-eight out of the eighty-six years since the Maseko Ngoni expulsion. Confusing the problem in Njelu, was its historical irregularities in succession, in which brothers have succeeded five times, sons, three. The

- 
- (1) TNA/155/SDB, file G and v.4, p.E; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, pp.iii, 32-6; Ebner to Redmond, correspondence 2.2.1970; J.Komba, God and Man, PhD, Pontifical U., (Rome), p.17.  
 (2) Eg. among the Swazi Nguni, see H.Beemer, "The development of the military organization in Swaziland", Africa, v.X, (1937),p.64.



reasons were either because sons were too young, due to premature departure of an nkosi, as with Hawai's ascension (1864), to the premature death of mankosi, as with Mharule's (1874) and Usangila's (1906) ascensions, or naturally, as with Korofindo's (1941) ascension, or because a 'brother' had greater power than a 'son', as with Mlamilo's (1889) ascension. So, though the 'brother' had a strong claim to the nkosiship, he still was not the most legitimate successor. Xavier, later in the dispute, accused some of Fusi's supporters of being deceitful by claiming otherwise. It appears that Fusi was trying to gain a throne which he knew he was not strictly entitled to, supported by a government which thought he could best serve its interests.

This intervention by the colonial government in the Njelu succession was a blatant attempt to impose a desired style of government on the Ngoni. It revealed a determination to gain firmer control over a kingdom which had become uncooperative, while preserving the facade of Indirect Rule, which itself was under attack.(1) There were numerous reasons why firmer control seemed desirable to the colonial government. First, it might enable the drawing up of internal boundaries, for which the district administration had been calling since the 1920s, and towards which steps were being taken at the time of the crisis(2). Secondly, it might bring greater receptiveness to the schemes for development which were also being undertaken

---

(1) TNA/155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 29.9.1948; PCAR 1947, p.94.

(2) Eg., see TNA/16/3/10, vol.III, J.J.Tawney, handing over notes, 29.9.1948; boundaries were accepted in Mshope during the 1950s, see TNA/155/ARs1940-9, AR 1951, though apparently not in Njelu, if K.Stahl, Tanganyika: Sail in the Wilderness, (Mouton s' Gravenhage, 1961) is correct in her comments on Songea tax collection.

at the time. In particular, the tie-ridging campaign was failing because the leaders were supporting the opposition. Presumably, it was hoped that, with a more pliable leadership, the new methods might be more easily imposed.

Had Fusi become a puppet of the administration? It seems not. He wanted to be nkosi and his ability and status gave him a strong claim. His alliance with the government seems to have been one of convenience, made by a candidate who was quite willing to use a powerful ally to advance his claim. His tough stance at the second general meeting on the succession and his co-operation with the District Officer tended to confirm this. For example, he agreed to use tie-ridges for cultivation in 1950, but after finding that they were a miserable failure, refused to use them in 1951. However, he would not agree to internal boundaries as they were too basic an attack on Ngoni traditional ties of allegiance.(1)

Growing opposition to the government on agricultural and, possibly, taxation issues and the resentment at the way in which the government was trying to impose its will, now led to concentrated efforts to agree on a successor. The first move came from Xavier, who refused to accept the Ndunate which was being offered him. In a strongly worded letter to the District Officer, he asked why Fusi and Zamtanga were pushing for supremacy of 'brother' over 'son' when in their own Ndunates sons had succeeded deceased leaders. He followed this with a

---

(1) Nkosi Missoro, who was certainly no friend of Fusi's, the latter having been adviser to nkosi Usangila, nonetheless wrote in support of Fusi's opposition to boundaries, see TNA/155/24/6/1, Mbonani to DO, 17.7.1951.

denunciation of the government's decision. His letter was followed by one written by Sakrani, on 28.4.1950, to the Provincial Commissioner. In his letter, Sakrani complained strongly about the atmosphere at the general meeting of 12.4.1950, and the fact that only manduna were permitted to speak. He criticized the District Officer for having brought so many policemen with guns, as there had been no question of going to war. He castigated the District Officer for his injustice in excluding him from the succession, particularly since, he added, the people had favoured him unanimously. He noted that he had wanted nkosi Missoro to attend, but that the District Officer had forbidden it, and he ended by saying that the same had broken his promise to select fairly and he asked the Provincial Commissioner to come and rectify the situation. In replying to Sakrani, the Provincial Commissioner justified the government's delay in deciding on a successor by saying that the issue was a complex and important one which necessitated it. Privately, he forwarded a letter to the District Officer, who explained that Missoro had not been invited as he did not get along with Fusi. He added that he had brought twelve policemen along but denied that there had been any attempt at intimidation. Meanwhile the two vacant Ndunates were filled by Anton, son of Sakamaganga Gama, who took Marra over from Mhomakilo, and Simon, who took over in Liganga.

As the year dragged on, Ngoni leaders tried harder than ever to resolve the succession. They were urged on by various interested parties, including labour migrants from Mombo and Tanga, who wrote home demanding Xavier, as he was educated and would be of comparable stature to other leaders in the territory.

Within Songea, dissension amongst tobacco-growers over the delay in payments for their crops and general dissatisfaction with government legislation and restrictions did little, presumably, to maintain or increase Fusi's popularity. After various meetings, the Ngoni leaders announced, on 18.9.1950, that a selection had been made which had the agreement of all. Xavier was to be nominated the next nkosi of Njelu. Fusi and his supporters had acquiesced and Fusi had withdrawn his nomination. The Member for Local Government in Dar es Salaam closed the issue by announcing that this important chief should be recognized through the Governor.

A difficult and divisive succession had finally been resolved. Whole-hearted intervention by the colonial government in support of a determined and capable nduna had failed to accomplish its aim of making him nkosi. The young, untested and less competent Xavier had been elected by leaders who respected legitimacy of line above most other considerations and who took into consideration the feelings of people dissatisfied with a troublesome colonial administration.

The succession in Njelu had been troublesome, but not destructive. That which was to follow in Mshope was to be. Dominikus Missoro Mbonani Tawete died on 5.11.1952.(1) The determining of his successor brought out not only a struggle for power between the long-feuding Chabruma and Palangu branches of the royal family, but also the determined push by the Ndendeule for their independence from a century of Ngoni domination. Their push, manipulated by the contentious

---

(1) TNA/155/B/2, 4th meet. STB, 3-4.11.1952.

Tawete family, and approved of by a reform- and development-minded colonial administration, culminated the changes of this first post-war decade.

Dominikus Missoro had been an excellent ruler. He had gained full control over the Ndendeule in 1929, as Indirect Rule consolidated his control in Mshope. From then on, because of his effective and constructive leadership, he had retained a generally accepted dominance over them. An Ndendeule, who had been his adviser, then became a leading exponent of Ndendeule nationalism after Missoro's death, praised Missoro while at the same time showing his people's determination, when writing:

"Missoro was a good and wise ruler...He appointed me as his important adviser especially in boundary affairs...so I felt like a chief myself, and I was accorded the honours of the Nkosi even when I went to Gumbiro (Missoro's capital). I made the best use of my position; I used this chance to understand and study the Ngoni, so that I could later effectively put up a case for our independence."(1)

According to Nwa(2), the issue of succession in Mshope was complicated by the youth of Missoro's sons, the eldest of whom was Wilhelm, a lad of sixteen. Other claimants were, however, available. These were Albert Kangara, a nephew of the deceased nkosi, Saidi, the son of Palangu, and a certain Kassian. According to available data, neither Wilhelm nor Kassian were serious candidates. Kangara and Saidi were.

- 
- (1) Nwa, op cit, pp.20-1; Nwa's text provides the main source of data for the analysis of this succession. Though biased, in favouring the Ndendeule side, it is well researched and is quite useful.
- (2) Ibid.

Saidi's bid brought once again to the fore the seventy year long struggle for the leadership between his father's family and Chrabuma's branch of Chipeta's family. Once more, the Palangu family was to suffer the distrust and disrespect of much of the kingdom. However, this time, unlike before, it was not to accept defeat placidly.

Each of the main contenders had strong bases of support. Kangara had the firm backing of the people in Gumbiro and Mahanje Ndunates, as well as isolated support from some in Likuyu Ndunate, while Saidi appears to have been given the backing of the people in Mbunga, Luegu and, to a lesser extent, Likuyu Ndunates. Those who backed Kangara appear to have been very determined that he should win. Gulliver, who was conducting research in the kingdom at the time, wrote: "Wild statements are current that if he does not become chief his supporters will migrate en masse to Njelu, Upangwa and Ubena." (1) Though no clear reasons for the intense dislike of Saidi were found, it is most probable that he was opposed for historical reasons, mainly because his opponents believed that his father had murdered their great leader, Chabruma, following Maji Maji. (2) Moreover, the Palangu family had always been troublesome and opposed the nkosi, Missoro, on most issues. Those who supported Saidi appear to

---

(1) TNA/16/37/105, Memorandum on the Mshope (Ngoni) Chiefdom, by P.H.Gulliver, WR/1/537 of 11.7.1953.

(2) See above, Chapter Six, p.364.

have done so primarily to foster dissension among the Ngoni as they were Ndendeule nationalists, who wanted neither Kangara nor Saidi to rule over them. A smaller, unknown, number would have supported Saidi because they had always been under the Palangu family.

Little data was found on the actual procedures used to determine the succession. As in Njelu, a selection committee, comprising the descendants of the former military manduna and members of the royal family, appear to have decided who would be the heir. According to Gulliver, the total number of members of this committee was between fifteen and twenty. It was led by Amri-Mbaya, the descendant of Chabruma's famous military nduna, Manjoro(1), and a long-time adviser to Missoro. There appears to have been pressures for the democratization of the procedures of selection, though, in this selection, they were ignored.(2) The committee selected Kangara. No reasons for their making this choice were found, though one appears to have been the fact that Kangara had a majority of the total population on his side. Gulliver's statistics on the composition of Mshope note that the Ndendeule and their supporters, the Ngindo, were in the minority.(3)

---

(2) TNA/16/37/105, Gulliver, Memorandum; An Administrative Survey, p.25.

(1) Also called Chilembo, see above, p.244.

(3) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.23 has these as:

Swazi	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ %	Manda	5-10%
Other Ngoni	c.20%	Bena (Other)	c.5%
Ndendeule	20-30	Matengo	c.5
Ngindo	15-25	Yao	c.5
Pangwa	15-25	Others	c.5-10
Bena (Ndonde)	5-10		

Saidi refused to acquiesce in the decision. Bitter towards the society which had, once again, rejected the claim of his branch of Chiepta's family, he denounced his Tawete clan name and adopted the Ndendeule ones of Ponera and Ngonyani(1), thereby forever severing ties with the people who had mistreated his family. He then determined, apparently, that if the Mshope kingdom would not have him as its ruler then it would not remain as it was. He entered into an alliance with the Ndendeule, by which he was to support their claim for independence in return for their recognition of him as their chief. Whether the Ndendeule agreed to this or not is not known. Little has been discovered about Palangu's actions after this alliance. He seems to have campaigned actively for the Ndendeule cause, for he was later to have an important position in the Ndendeule division - though he was not to be chief. As to how effective his campaigning was, it is not known. The District Officer, D.C.Hill, who handled the government's case in the succession crisis, minimizes Saidi's importance(2), as does also the main source of the data on the succession, Nawa. He may have helped to mobilize the Ndendeule, only to become a minor force once their struggle for independence was reaching its climax.

It may be useful here to restate some of the reasons for the dissatisfaction of the Ndendeule. First, they

---

(1) Nawa, op cit. He identifies clan as kibongo.

(2) D.C.Hill to Redmond, interview 10.11.1971.



had a long-standing dislike of Ngoni control. In the 1860s, they had tried to become independent of the Maseko Ngoni by allying with the Njelu and Mshope to oust them, only to find themselves subjugated by the Ngoni victors. Then, in 1897, they were partly separated from the Mshope kingdom to be ruled through an independent Sultnante of Likuyu. After Maji Maji another portion was separated when the Sultnanate of Mbunga was taken from the Ngoni. However, both were brought back under Ngoni control, Mbunga in 1918 and Likuyu in 1930. In the early 1930s, some tried again to break free, but without success. Missoro's death gave them a further opportunity to separate. Secondly, the Ndendeule areas had stagnated economically and politically under Mshope rule. No roads were built into their lands by the Native Administration, few and political jobs were given to them by the Ngoni, tobacco and other cash crops were only introduced into their lands some time after being in Ungoni. It was only through self-help and their determination to do well in the tobacco industry that they had become strong and able to voice their feelings. Finally, being Muslims, they failed to identify with the Christian Ngoni.

In their initial attempts at separation, both Saidi and the Ndendeule leaders wrote to the District Officer demanding a review of the situation in Mshope and a consideration of their feelings. Palangu wrote that, because an illegitimate successor had gained the

nkosiship in Mshope, the Ndendeule no longer had true leadership and he demanded independence from Mshope for them.(1) The Ndendeule, after a mass meeting in November 1952, apparently comprising peoples from Luegu, Nchomoro, Mgombasi, Mbunga, Likuyu, Mkongo and Namtumbo, had resolved to inform the District Officer that they no longer wanted a foreign chief. Their actions soon led to further consideration of the whole succession issue.

The District Officer announced that a meeting would be held at Gumbiro on 18.12.1952 at which the issue of Ngoni rule over the Ndendeule was to be discussed. In preparation for this meeting, the Ndendeule began to organize large meetings throughout north-east Mshopem informing people of their aims and soliciting support. The leading activists in the Ndendeule struggle were, according to Newa, Saidi Palangu Tawete, Amiri Hinduka, Tanitatu (Nasoro Kaswera) and Hasan Mang'unyuka. Amiri Hinduka was a sheikh who gave the movement guidance and blessings. Tanitatu, the former adviser to Missoro, was the leading activist. He was a major force in pressing home to the people the advantages of separation and led the delegation which negotiated separation. Hasan Mang'unyuka was another adviser to Missoro. He had been actively involved in the 1932-3 attempt at separation, according to evidence as told to Newa, and

---

(1) Newa, op cit, pp.24-7.

during the 1952-4 attempt at separation, became an important worker behind the scenes.

At a mass meeting, held at Nahoro on 9.12.1952, the people decided upon demanding secession from Mshope and appointed a delegation to attend the Gumbiro conference and work for this. The delegation comprised Amiri Hinduka, Nasoro Kaswera and Hasan Mang'unyuka. The Ngoni delegation was led by Amet Mbaya, who was acting as Regent until the official installation of Kangara. At the meeting, held on 18.12.1952, each side presented its case and as neither was prepared to compromise, the conference ended in stalemate. The government now decided to take the initiative.


In early 1953, the District Officer conducted a fact-finding tour through central and eastern Mshope. He found in the Ndendeule a widespread desire for separation from the Ngoni. He then called a second conference, this time at Songea. It resolved nothing.

During this period, the Ndendeule put forth some interesting proposals for replacing the existing political system with another. They noted that they had no special right to govern, as all men were equal, but they pressed the Ngoni to abolish their form of rule "which does not bring us developments and progress". They recommended that the elite structure of Ngoni rule be replaced by a more egalitarian one in which each person would be equal to any other. This appears to have been an interesting application of history as politics. Traditional, pre-

## List.8

## Ndunates 1954

	Ndunate	Holder
Njelu:	Ndirima	nkosi Xavier Gama
	Mpitimbi	manduna Kalubeya Gama
	Mkwera	Nasoro Mbano
	Ngazini	Boniface Gama
	Likuyu Fusi	Laurenti Fusi Gama
	Mkurumusi	Zawayaye Nanguru
	Marra	Anton Gama
	Liganga	Titus Gama
	Majimahuhu	Yusuf Mgendera Gama
	Mfaranyaki	Sakrani Gama
	Makoro	Mtazama Gama
	Maposeni	Yusuf Mpangiduka Gama
Mshope:	Gumbiro	nkosi Albert Kangara
	Mahanje	manduna Mapoli
	Mshindo	
Undendeule:		nahota nkorogwe Nasoro Kaswera
		vice-president Saidi Palangu
	Mbunga	nahota Mselemu
	Likuyu	Taraja
	Luegu-Litora	Amiri



# NGONI NDUVATES 1954 SKETCH MAP OF THE SONGEA DISTRICT

- Legend
- District Boundary - - - -
  - Main Road - - - -
  - Secondary Road - - - -
  - Town - - - -
  - N.A. Headquarters - - - -

KEY - NGONI (+VVO) MARRA  
NDENDEULE LIKUYU

Ngoni, Ndendeule society had been egalitarian and the people, in wanting to return to this, were taking advantage of contemporary calls by the colonial government for increased democracy in Songea. As the Ngoni found this concept quite alien to their own, they found it impossible to accept.

The issue dragged on through 1953. Meanwhile, for various reasons, British colonial and official opinion was swinging quite decisively behind the Ndendeule. First, colonial officials wanted to acknowledge what they saw to be a genuine, popular movement for separation. Secondly, the Ndendeule appear to have been more receptive to development than the Ngoni. They had shown considerable interest in tobacco production throughout the 1940s and were now dominating the industry. Presumably, it was desirable for the government to support progressive forces wherever they existed.

Gulliver, who was in Songea at the time as a government sociologist, came out in support of the Ndendeule.(1) He was an idealistic and progressive-minded official who disliked the autocratic Ngoni rule. He recommended "a broadening of the basis of Local Government and reduction of the monopoly of the true Ngoni minority...for the whole region"(2), so was thinking of a much more encompassing change than just that in Undendeule.

---

(1) At the Njelu meeting of 12.4.1950 (see p.516) it had been stated that an anthropologist was to visit the district to investigate the hereditary rights of all candidates. Though this refers to Njelu, he did the

(1) same for Mshope.

(2) TNA/16/37/105, Gulliver, Memorandum.

In late 1953, the government decided that Mshope would be split in two, with the eastern Ndunates of Mbunga, Likuyu and Luegu becoming a new Undendeule subdivision, and the remaining Ndunates of Gumbiro, Msindo and Mahanje continuing to be in Mshope. The population of each subdivision was approximately of equal size.

In Undendeule, councils were set up in each of the former Ndunates. The representatives to each were elected by the people. Each council was to be headed by an elder called a nahota. Mselemu was elected at Mbunga, Faraja at Likuyu and Amiri at Luegu. Over these councils was established the Ndendeule Council, with headquarters at Namtumbo. It was also an elected body, whose members comprised a Great Elder, called nahota nkorungwa, a Vice-President, and several councillors from each council. A chief adviser to the council was also elected. Nasoro Kaswera became the nahota nkorungwa, Saidi Balangu became the Vice-President, and Hasan Mang'unyuka became the chief adviser. All members were to be elected every three years.

The Ndendeule system was considerably more democratic in concept than the Ngoni one. As befitted a politically decentralized society, it was organized in such a way as to prevent any consolidation of unmerited power. The Ndendeule were very pleased with what they had accomplished. Newa exuded: "For the Ndendeule it was the beginning of a new era in their history: a period of self-rule by the Ndendeule".(1)



Unfortunately, democracy did not last long in Undendeule. In the mid-1950s, the elections which were due and which would have been the first in the new subdivision, were cancelled, apparently because of political unrest. Nasoro Kaswera remained as nahota nkorungwa. A number of people from the area, including some who were later to achieve national prominence, bitterly resented the cancellation and Kaswera's remaining in power. However, there are indications that he was genuinely popular among his people and might have won the election.

In the remaining area of the old Mshope kingdom, Kangara was elected nkosi. His official inauguration was held on 23.1.1954. He and his people felt bitter about the colonial government's handling of the succession in such a way as to cost them half their kingdom. From then on, they frequently, but unsuccessfully demanded its return.(1) Bitterness seems to have coloured relations between Mshope and the colonial government for the next decade.

# V

Thus, by 1954, the Ngoni kingdoms had undergone difficult and complex successions. The political,

---

(1) p.534 Newa, op cit, pp.59-61.

(1) Ibid., pp.69 notes their dissent over boundaries in later years; however, Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.117 claims that they meekly accepted the loss of Undendeule, because they knew where they stood and that traditionalism was the only basis to their continued control.



economic and social changes which had greatly affected Ngoni society during the previous nine years had produced a divided society in Njelu, a much-reduced Mshope which now had to accommodate itself to a confident Ndendeule section, and strained relations between the people of both kingdoms and the colonial government, Njelu because its leadership was not wanted and Mshope because its corporate identity had been roughly treated. Both kingdoms managed to resolve internal divisions and to manipulate successfully relations with their now-independent former subjects. Neither, however, appears to have been able to manage to restore good relations with the colonial administration, and throughout the 1950s, the Ngoni kingdoms were to be looked down upon by the colonial administration for their unwillingness to accept the schemes for economic development being fostered by the district officials nor to accommodate to the plans for political democratization which officials had in mind. The political disillusionment of colonial officials was frequently made obvious. Officials lamented the lack of deep involvement by the people in their political life. The Member for Local Government wrote in 1953 that though the chiefs and people of an area discussed every appointment, selection was inevitably based on closeness of relationship between the candidate and the ex-office holder.(1) Another tried to explain lack of involvement when writing that "people find it strange that they should be invited to consult with their chief on public affairs".(2) Gulliver sought to assure fellow officials that the advent of democracy was inevitable:

---

(1) TNA/155/L5/13, MLG report, 50071/2/19 of 5.3.1953.

(2) TNA/155/L5/13, DO to PC, 16/6/148 of 5.9.1954.

"...the nkosi will have to yield in part to the popular demands for a share in local government at the highest level. Present policy to retain the nkosi as sole Native Authority in each chiefdom does not, of course, and should not, preclude the institution of some kind of representative council to advise and to check him. Such popular expression is almost bound to arise even were it not encouraged by the Administration. Despite the traditional nkosi's authority and the modern nkosi's increasing power, yet at neither time has he been able to become entirely independent of advice, pressure and restrictions."(1)

What Gulliver and other officials failed to appreciate was that the Ngoni had a form of democracy which, though not overt, was certainly present. In Ungoni, the power of the nkosi derived from identification with the people and not from independence from them.

Gulliver reflected the thinking of many administrators of his day, and his hopes for the establishment of a democracy weakened his ability to understand the society which he was studying. It is possible that he failed to appreciate the change which had taken place in the basis of power after Maji Maji. Before that disastrous event, the leaders were powers because of their abilities. They did not depend on the people for their position. Rather, the people were forced to adapt to them. However, after Maji Maji, which destroyed their military power base, they learned to adapt to the sensitivities of their followers, whom they increasingly came to represent. Ngoni political structures, by the 1950s, were representative, though not in the way in which colonial administrators understood.

Though the colonial government was unable to implement change among the Ngoni, a new force was entering that would be able to. This force was the territorial political party, the Tanganyika African National Union(TANU). An interesting relationship was

---

(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.39.

now to emerge between TANU and the leaders of the Ngoni based on co-operation for mutual benefit, which was to assist the advent of independence in Songea. Unfortunately, for the leaders of the Ngoni, co-operation was to be based on a misunderstanding, which was to end in 1962 with the demise of royal family rule over the Ngoni. But that is another story.

# Appendix A Age-Regiments

1	2
time	time
	Mahuhu
	Makesa
	Makwimbi
pre- 1858	
Magidi (members included Zulu)	
Mahehehe (m.i. Nyaunyau)	
Mapanga (or Machalshembe) (m.i. Hawai, Songea, Mpambalioto)	Machalshembe
Ngombezulu (m.i. Mtekateka, Fusi, Mbocho)	
after 1858	
Mnyanyawantu (m.i. Ndembo, Kanyoka, Msukumbi)	
	Gaza Mnyama (Gaza Munyama)
	Mahehehe
	Vikwangani
Mabula (m.i. Mharule, Mbemesa)	c.1880 Mabulla
Mahio (m.i. Putire, Mguli)	Mahoyi
Mangengezayo (or Makana) (m.i. Guuza)	Mangengezayo
Maduwuya (m.i. Towatowa, Kapungu, Mgendera)	Maduwuya
Manyonga (m.i. Chabruma Gama, Kimanimoto b. Mbocho)	Mayanda
Mahorosa (m.i. Mhomakilo b. Mbocho)	Mahoroza
Mageremira (or Mzaliwa) (m.i. Mtopa Ntara, Bwanambuzi b. Mbocho)	
after 1897	
Maburumawaha (m.i. Marawandu)	
Mbusizimbomvi	
	Mijingati 1905 Kaloli Gani

1. Ebner, History of the Wangoni, p.189.
2. Dominikus Missoro Tawete, in O.Guise-Williams papers.

## Bibliography

## A. Oral sources.

## 1. Tanzania

His Excellency Bishop J.Komba, Roman Catholic Bishop of Peramiho. interviewed 2.1970.  
 J.Stirnimann, R.C. missionary in southern Tanzania, doing research on the Pangwa. interviewed 2.1970.

## 2. United Kingdom

B.J.Dudbridge, A.D.O. Songea, 1935-8. interviewed 24.8.1969, 14.6.1971.  
 A.H.Pike, A.D.O., Acting D.O. Songea, 1931-7; P.C., Southern province, 1950. interviewed 13.9.1971, 22.9.1971, 15.11.1971, 26.1.1972.  
 O.Guise-Williams, D.O. Songea, 1931-3. interviewed 30.9.1971, 23.11.1971.  
 A.S.Stenhouse, Ag.A., A.O. Songea, 1928-30, 1931-4, S.A.O., 1941-5. interviewed 4-6.10.1971.  
 G.T.Scott, D.O. Songea, 1957-9. interviewed 6-7.10.1971. some correspondence.  
 D.C.Hill, D.O. Songea, 1950-3. interviewed 10.11.1971.  
 R.Ibbott, adviser to the Ruvuma Development Association, 1962-9. interviewed 8.11.1971.

## 3. Federal Republic of Germany

E.Ebner, missionary in Songea, 1930-continuing, historian. interviewed 17-21.10.1971.

## B. Written sources.

## 1. Archival

## i. Tanzania National Archives.

## a. German

G1/6	Akten des Kaiserl. G. von DOA Betreffend Jahresberichte 1908, Ssongea.
/25	Handels-Niederlassungen.
/65	Streitsache: Jumbe Kiondomari u. Gen. NA Wisliceny.
2/4	Anwerbung von Soldaten für die Schutztruppe.
3/77	(Abwicklung von) Entschädigungsansprüchen (aus dem Aufstand im Jahre 1905 im) Ssongea.
/93	Kassen- und Inventarien-Revisionen 1891-99.

- G3/98 Kassenbetrieb bei der Bezirkskasse  
Ssongea (1916).
- 4/112 Angelenheiten der Kommune Ssongea (1903-  
05).
- /113 (Wirtschaftsberichte und) -Pläne der  
Kommune Ssongea (für die Rechnungs-  
jahre 1905-12).
- /114 Ibid.
- 7/190 (Planung, Errichtung, und Unterhaltung  
der) Gouvernementsbauten (im Bereich  
des Bez.) Ssongea.
- /189 Ibid.
- 8/20 (Angelegenheiten der) Landwirtschaft  
(1899-1906).
- /130 (Angelegenheiten der) DOA Gummi-Handels  
und Plantagen Gesellschaft...Ssongea.
- 9/6 St.Benediktus Missionsgesellschaft. Bd.  
2...Angebliche Gewaltsame Unterdrückung  
der heidnischen Religion durch die  
katholische Mission in Ssongea.
- /8 St.Benediktus Missionsgesellschaft. Bd.4  
Streitkeiten zwischen der Berliner und  
Benediktiner Mission.
- 12/74 (Allgemeine Korrespondenz sowie Denkschrift  
des Stadsarztes a.D. Dr.Wilhelm Arning  
über die Planungen zum bau einer)  
Eisenbahn Kilwa-Wiedhafen.
- 21/661 Ermittlungungssache gegen den Haufmann Emil  
Blohm Ssongea wegen Vergehens gegen die  
höch Stpreisverordnung (für Baumwoll-  
waren vom 18.3 und 29.6.1915).

b.District of Songea.

- 155/1/10/1 Agriculture - annual report, 1937-54.  
18/1 " non-native tobacco  
growing.
- 18/d " European tobacco develop-  
ment, Mgwila area.
- 19/1 " wheat crop, 1949, prices  
and distribution.
- 19/b " wheat seed, production  
and prices.
- 23/A Social welfare centre - civil.  
2 Dept. Ag. - monthly reports.
- 4/1/1 Agriculture - local development loan  
fund (improvement schemes).
- 7/7 Missions - corr. re. govt. policy.
- 10/6 General - handing and taking over dist.  
/32 Provincial Commissioners' Conference.
- 13/1/2/II Labour - misc. (gen.) corr.
- 15/15 Lands - appl. for lands - corr.re.
- 22/6 " and Mines - mines and minerals staff.
- /7 Mines - Litiwala - Mohuchuma coalfield -  
communications & transport.

155/22/8	Mines - Ngaka coalfields.
23	Land - certificate of occupancy.
/5	Missions - Benedictine, re. village schools without right of occupancy.
7	Missions - UMCA catechical centres - churches - without rights.
10	Mission schools - for which no rights of occupancy are reserved.
24/1/1	Native affairs-claims of ndunaship, Likuyu.
/7	" " bush fire.
2/5	" " successor to nkosi Korofindo Zulu.
3/14	" " complaint-Wapangwa against Ungoni
3/18	" " closer settlement.
4/3	" " native courts-revision and reports.
4/4	" " native census, 1931.
6/1	" " district boundaries.
33	Lands - application for.
/1	Veterinary - tsetse.
34/7/II	" reports, fees, etc.
11	" rinderpest & corr., re.
37	Reports - district (1929-31).
42/18	Lands - claims for compensation.
53/V	Communications - classification of roads & corr.
6/I	Songea - Njombe road.
II	" " "
64	Native affairs - Native Treasury est.1937.
/1	" " " " " 1933.
3	" " " " " Angoni.
4	" " " " " (1941).
5	Songea Native Treasury Estimates (1950).
6	" " " " " , 5 yr.plan.
7	Annual report, 1936.
84/3	Agriculture - Songea dist. Native Tobacco Board, corr.
/1	" Ibid.
91	Land - Benedictine mission - RC.
/V	" Roman Catholic - right of occupancy.
107/IV	Expenditure - Provincial administration estimates.
118/2	Administration - handing over Manda section to Njombe dist.
127/IV	Agriculture - reports & production.
133	Native courts.
139/1	Annual reports - provincial administration.
166	Veterinary - cattle & markets.
175	Native affairs - orders made under sec.8 of the NAO.
197	Certificate of occupancy to natives for building purposes.
222	Misc. - handing and taking over district.
274	Native affairs - co-operation societies in Songea dist.
428/I	Provincial administration - District Commissioners' conference(s) at Lindi.
437	Native affairs - Songea dist. - NA market bye-laws.

155/501 Agriculture - wheat & wheat flour.  
 A3/11 " misc. & corr.  
 A3/22 " coffee.  
 A6/1 Societies - application for registration.  
 4 TANU.  
 7/1 Association - trade unions.  
 AGR/1/10 Agriculture - monthly report on food  
 and other crops.  
 18/6/11 " tobacco growing.  
 B/2 Songea Native Tobacco Board - minutes.  
 C2/2 Native affairs - co-op. societies.  
 7D Ngoni-Matengo Co-op. Marketing Union.  
 8 Co-op. Societies - Gumbiro c.s.  
 16 " " Matogoro c.s.  
 17 " " Mbangamano c.s.  
 18 " " Mbinga c.s.  
 19 " " Mlali c.s.  
 20 " " Msindo c.s.  
 22 " " Tingi c.s.  
 C5/3 Provincial administration - councils,  
 conferences.  
 Co-op27 Ngoni-Matengo Co-op. Marketing Union Ltd.  
 /(II) Ibid.  
 I " "  
 II " "  
 VI " "  
 VIII " "  
 IX " "  
 X " "  
 XI " "  
 Co.46 Financial estimates of expenditure.  
 COM/3/6A Communications - roads and bridges.  
 D3/5 Development - loan funds.  
 /II " " " , policy & report  
 E1/1 Education - policy and central.  
 22 " adult education.  
 83 " mission secondary schools.  
 105 " Makerere College - Uganda.  
 E3/4/5/II " estimates, 1954.  
 EDU137/6 " government secondary school,  
 Southern prov.  
 FIN7/3/3/53 Finance - estimates 1953.  
 L1/3 Labour - applications for employment.  
 L2/EST Land - Mgwina tobacco plots.  
 L4/1 Local courts - policy & instructions.  
 L5/13 Local government - African government  
 progress reports.  
 LC/1/II Mashitaka ya Kila aina, (1953-4)  
 II Ibid, (1955).  
 M1/11 Medical & Sanitation - sleeping sickness.  
 5/6 Misc. - complaints & shauris.  
 NA24/1/2/II Native affairs - misc. corr.  
 3/4/I " " tribal dressers &  
 medical staff, corr.  
 NT26/3/2 Native treasuries - corr. re. estimates.  
 64/3/1 " affairs - annual final financial  
 statement, 1954-5.  
 Annual reports.  
 Cash book (1919-1924).



155/Circulars to Native Authorities - Matangazo  
ya watu.

Minutes of Songea district education committee  
meetings, 1946-61.

Songea District Book, volumes 1,2,3,4.  
files A,C.

loose papers, Group X.

Songea district - minutes of district team  
meetings.

Songea district - suggested agricultural programme.  
Songea local treasury estimates, 1961.

c.Mtwara Province.

- 16/1/41/D Native administration - native courts, Songea.
- 354E Five year plan Native Treasury; Songea.
- 3/10 Statements of handing over and taking over  
of stations and provinces, vols.VIII,IX.
- 5/7 Witchcraft.
- 13/6 Labour rates of wages.
- 9 " supply, vol.III.
- 23 " , reports and returns of requisitioned.
- 25 Annual labour reports.
- 48 Contract labour recruited from Songea dist.
- 57 Conscription of labour for sisal.
- 58 Quarterly returns of conscript labour.
- 15/13 Tobacco growing, four volumes.
- 14 Coffee growing.
- 28 Cotton ginnery - Songea.
- 47 Agricultural monthly reports - Songea  
dist., two vols.
- 62 Agriculture - co-op. societies.
- 78 Minutes of the meetings of the Songea  
District Native Tobacco Board.
- 124 Songea Native Tobacco Board Annual Report.
- 18/1 Markets.
- 21/9 Government primary schools, Southern Prov.
- 37 Grants-in-aid to African schools (Native  
Administration).
- 43 Native administration schools - Southern  
province, vols.I,II.
- 59 Education - annual report.
- 26/20 Mission trading.
- 27/2 Missions, general.
- 9 Village (or bush) schools - Songea dist.
- 10 Mission spheres of influence.
- 20 " teachers' and govt. teachers'  
salaries.
- 34/16 KAR recruits.
- 37/8 Native complaints, five vols.
- 29 Native report of 1905 (Maji Maji - R. Bell's  
study of Maji Maji in Liwale district).
- 55 Religious disputes between the Mohammedan  
communities at Songea.
- 105 Sociology.
- 44/1 Development - general policy.

d.Other

468/11/6 Correspondence re. Wangoni research.

## e. Secretariat

## 1. Early Series.

1733/1	Annual reports, districts, southern area, 1919-20.
3	Tanganyika Territory, annual reports, 1922.
5	...Songea...annual report, 1920-1.
6	Tang. Terr. annual reports 1926.
11	" " " " 1925.
15	Songea annual report, 1923.
22	" " " " 1922.
7:61	Mahenge province annual reports, 1926.
9:71	Songea, " " 1924.
12:84	" " " 1925.
19:104	" , supplement " " 1925.
2587	Native law and customs, 1919.
2860/36	Native courts, Songea district, 1925.
2895	Estimates, 1921-2, Songea district.

## 2. Five Digit.

10078	Rights of occupancy - Mahenge province - lease of agricultural land.
10388	European settlement - Mahenge province.
10683	Summary of Provincial Commissioner's annual reports.
10900	Mahenge province - half yearly report.
11267	" " rates of hut and poll tax and contributions to Native Treasuries.
11548	African staff - Mahenge province.
11552	Labour agents permits.
11679	Annual report, 1934, Southern province. 1932, 1933 Lindi province.
11725	Annual report, Labour department.
11828	Tobacco industry.
13075	Agricultural development - Mahenge province.
13484	Native chiefs - Mahenge province.
13659	Competition between UMCA and Roman Catholic Benedictine society mission schools.
13796	Native chiefs, etc., Southern province.
18648	Labour matters, Mahenge province.
18693	Provincial administration, annual reports, 1929.
18866	Cotton growing, Mahenge province.
19359	Tanganyika Territory Traders Protection Society, vol. III.
19415	Annual report for Provincial Commissioners for 1929 to 1959.
19895	Disposal of tobacco crops in Lindi and Eastern provinces, three vols.
20476	Report by Provincial Commissioner Mahenge on inspection of Songea district.
21008	Labour matters, Southern province.
22385	Tobacco growing in Biharamulo district, vol. I.

- 22943 Co-operative society, Songea district,  
vols.I,II.
- 23217 Provincial administration, annual report  
1935, labour section.
- 24789 Annual reports 1936, labour section.
- 26563 Board, Southern province, native tobacco.
- 28209 Recruitment and training of Africans for  
military service.
- 30350 Native wheat industry, Songea district.
- 34186 Markets: other than cattle markets -  
establishment and bye-laws by native and  
township authorities: Songea district.
- 35011 Establishment of Native Authorities:  
Southern province.
- 36816 Population census, 1948, classification of  
tribes and territorial tribal map.
- 38637 Incentive to labour, Southern province.
- 41254 Development plan, 1950-60, Southern province.
- 41996 Petition of Mr.G.A.Wood, factory manager of  
the Songea Native Tobacco Board, Songea.

ii. Potsdam Central Archives.

Expedition der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe.  
Häuser- und Huttensteuer in Deutsch Ostafrika.  
Hilfeleistung und Anlage der Unrufenhen in  
Deutsch Ostafrika.  
Politische Zustände in Deutsch Ostafrika.  
Unruhen in Ostafrika im Jahre 1905.  
...des Aufstandes in Deutsch Ostafrika im Jahre  
1905.

iii. Public Records Office.

a.War Office.

- W.O./95/5331 Colonel Baxter's column and Colonel  
Hawthorn.
- 5332 1 E.A. Infantry Brigade, inc. 2 Batt.  
Rhodesian Regiment.
- 5334 Songea column.
- 5329 Brig.-Gen. E.Northey, war diary.

b.Colonial Office.

CO/691/29 Tanganyika Territory, 1919.

iv. United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel,  
(Archives of the Universities Mission to Central  
Africa), (London).

- A1.I Bishop Mackenzie and Bishop Tozer, 1861-73.
- II Misc. letters, 1861-73.

- Al.III Bishop Steere, 1874-82.
- IV Misc. letters, 1874-82.
- V Bishop Smythies, 1883-94.
- VI Misc. letters, 1883-94.
- VII Bishop Richardson, (Zanzibar), 1885-1900.
- VIII Misc. letters, 1895-1900.
- IX Bishop Hornley and Bishop Maples (Nyasaland), 1892-95.
- X Misc. letters, (Nyasaland), 1892-95.
- XI Bishop Hine, (Nyasaland), 1896-1901.
- XII Misc. letters, (Nyasaland), 1896-1901.
- A4.IV "Charles Janson", "Chauncy Maples", (Nyasaland).
- A5 Letters from Africans.
- C1 German East Africa.
- Tin Chest Drawers A5 Ngoni raid.

v. Diocese of Mahenge, (Kwiro, Tanzania).

Emil Blohm letters, 1912. (removed to Tanzania National Archives).

" " " 1916. Ibid.

Rafiki Yangu, 1910-16.

Ostafrikanische Zeitung, August 1914 - December 1915.

Kwiro - marriage file - life stories of soldiers.

Kiberege chronicle - family lists of Sultan Kiberege.

Chronicles - Peramiho, Kigonsera.

vi. Rhodes House, (Oxford).

- MSS.Afr.r.32-39 Waller, Horace. Collections of letters and private papers, the property of the Rev.H.Waller; correspondence with David Livingstone, General Gordon, etc, together with 29 books of notes and sketches illustrating the life of the first Universities Mission to Central Africa, 1862-1884.
- s.27 Thornton, Richard. Letters to his family. Concerning his voyage to East Africa and his subsequent explorations, 1858-1863, together with other letters, 1863-1866, dealing with Von der Decken's expedition.
- s.28-46 Thornton, Richard. Notebooks, partly in diary form, August 1857 to March 1863, nineteen volumes.
- s.452 Bell, R.M. The Maji-Maji rebellion, 1905-1906. (typescript copy of original, 1941, in district office at Kilwa, Tanganyika).
- 446 Gunzert, Theodor. Memoirs, in German. Extracts dealing with service in German East Africa and the German Foreign Office, 1902-1933.

- MMS.Afr.s.1010 McGregor, C.J. Papers, as Agricultural Officer, Tanganyika, 1928-51, including report on the Songea Tobacco Industry and Ngoni-Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd., by McGregor and the Acting Director of Lands and Mines, 1940.
- s.585 Mbonani, Chief. Account of the Wangoni, Tanganyika, in Swahili. (1937); the story of the Likuyu area as related by Jumbes Mabukusera and Hangahanga, 1938; history of Nduna Palango, 1938.
- s.417 Stenhouse, Andrew Strachan. Report on tobacco growing in Nyasaland, 1928; Memorandum on agriculture, tobacco, groundnuts, etc, in Tanganyika, 1933-48.
- s.631 Williams, Oscar Guise. Miscellaneous papers concerned with service in Tanganyika; incl. extracts from native court book, Songea district estimates, etc, 1920-39.  
Wyatt, Albert William. Volume of notes on tribal history and customs, Tanganyika; four official notebooks of service in the Territory; two unpublished articles, typed entitled The installation and recognition of a tribal chief and Mkalama, the back of beyond. six volumes, 1938-1946.

vii. Benedictines of St. Ottilien.

a. St. Ottilien, (Germany)

Ebner, Elzear History of the Wangoni: Revised Edition, (1968), typescript.  
Texte in Neu-Kingoni, (vol.1)  
Erzählungen, Fabeln, Rätsel,  
Sprichwörter, (1969); (vol.2)  
Sitten und Gebräuche im Lande  
Ungoni, (1971).

Chronicles - Peramiho.  
Kigonsera.

Echo aus Afrika.  
Missionsblätter.

b. Peramiho, (Songea, Tanzania).

Chronicles - Peramiho.

Kigonsera.

St.Scholastika, Peramiho.

MS. Die Benediktinermission in der Aufstand in Deutschostafrika von Jahre 1905 oder Stellungnahme der Benediktinermission zur Denkschrift über die Ursachen des Aufstandes in Deutschostafrika u. Anderes. (Thomas Spreiter).

viii. Tanzania African National Union, (Dar es Salaam).

RESC/4/64 Questionnaire, Habari za TANU,  
Songea District.

ix. Library of the University of Dar es Salaam, East  
Africana Section.

Betanyisako, Maron N. "Labour migration and the  
family structure in Ruhonwa:  
Kigezi", Research paper, 3.1968,  
Sociology Dept., Makerere  
University.

Central Development Committee: Reports of Provincial  
Committees, (1939).

Conference on the history of Tanzania, University  
College, Dar es Salaam, December 1967.

Convention of Representative Chiefs of Tanganyika:  
(first) to (sixth).

Cory Papers: Gulliver, P.H. "An Administrative Survey  
of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli  
of Songea District", (1954)  
sociological research,  
provincial administration,  
Tanganyika.

Ibbott, Ralph "The Songea Development Association,  
1962, Appeal for Funds".

Local Government Progress Report, Secretariat,  
Dar es Salaam, 1952-1958.

Maji Maji Research Project, Collected Papers, 1968,  
History Department.

Syracuse University Village Settlement Project  
Reports, 1 to 43. (not for publication).

Many of the journals and magazines listed in D.2.iii  
are available here.

x. O.Guise-Williams Papers.

Various reports, district estimates, court cases and  
the like from Songea District, 1931-3.

## 2. Unpublished Written Works.

### i. Theses.

Alpers, E.A. The Role of the Yao in the Development  
of Trade in East-Central Africa, 1698-  
1850, PhD, London University, 1965.

Crosse-Upcott, A.R.W. Social Structure of the Ki-  
Ngindo Speaking Peoples, PhD,  
Cape Town University, 1956.

- Iliffe, John The German Administration in Tanganyika 1906-11; The Governorship of Freiherr von Rechenberg, PhD, Cambridge, 1965.
- Komba, James J. God and Man: Religious Elements of the Ngoni of South-West Tanganyika Viewed in the Light of the Christian Faith; PhD, Pontifical University of the Propagation of the Faith, (Rome), 1959.
- Kozak, Igor G. Two Rebellions in German East Africa: Their Study in Microcosm, MA, Howard University, 1968.
- Liesegang, Gerhard J. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im südlichen Mosambique, 1820-1895, PhD, Koln University, 1967.
- Morris-Hale, Walter British Administration in Tanganyika from 1920 to 1945, PhD, Geneva University, 1969.
- Redmayne, Alison H. The Wahehe People of Tanganyika, D.Phil, Oxford, 1965.
- Szczypior, Franz Die Sozialwirtschaft von St.Ottilien für auswärtige Missionen in apostolischen Vikariat Daressalam, seit der Gründung daselbst bis zur Ausweisung durch die Engländer, 1888 bis 1920, Julius-Maximilians University, (Würzburg), 1923.

## ii. Official.

- Republic of Tanganyika (Tanzania).  
Ministry of Agriculture, Southern Research Conference, 1960, 1961.  
Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Agricultural Division; reports, 1961-66; monthly reports, Ruvuma Region, 2.1967 to 12.1969.
- Tanganyika Territory, Tanganyika District Book, v.4.

## iii. Unofficial.

- Confidential Prints (Box 1), n.7420, Report on the German Colonies for the year, 1898/9.
- Ebner, Elzear "The population between the Matengo Mountains and the Ruvuma", 30.11.1962, History Department, UDSM.
- Gillebrand, M.G. "The Maji Maji Uprising in German East Africa, 1905-1907", seminar paper, SOAS, 1970-1971.
- Gugler, Josef "The theory of labour migration", Makerere Inst. of Soc. Res., conference 1968, (copy in UDSM library).

- Hornung, Clodwig "Historia za Wangoni". (once at Songea district office).
- Iliffe, John "Agricultural Change in modern Tanganyika - an Outline History", 1970, Universities of E.A. Soc. Science Conf., Dar es Salaam, 27-31.12.1970.
- Kihaulu, Mr. "Wangoni wa Wilaya wa Songea", conference paper, Kiwanda cha Wapandisha wa Historia, UDSM, 1970.
- Komba, James "Uisharisho wa Kingoni", Kiw.Wa. Hist., UDSM, 1970.
- Michongwe, G.M.T. "Wangoni wa Tanzania" Kiw.Wa. Hist., UDSM, 1970.
- Musilawe, S.S. "The Maji-Maji war for freedom in the Namtumbo area, Undendeule", Songea district", History Dept., UDSM, 1969. (part of Maji Maji research project, n.R/S/1/69..)
- Mwendo, Edward T. "Ubena wa Tanzania", History Dept., UDSM, n.d.
- Newa, John B.M. The Ndendeule Struggle against Ngoni Feudalism and British Imperialism, BA dissertation, Pol.Sc. Dept., UDSM, 1970.
- Nyagali, J.B. "Historia ya Wamwera (Nyasa)", Kiw.Wa.Hist., UDSM, 1970.
- Redmayne, Alison H. "A preliminary report on a Hehe community", conf. paper, E.A. Inst. Soc. Research, 1962.

### 3. Published Written Works.

#### i. Official.

##### East African Statistical Department.

East African population census, 1948: Analysis of civil population by District, and Race, Main Tribes, Population, Density, EA Econ & Stat Bull, Sept., 1955.

African Population of Tanganyika Territory, Geographic and Tribal Studies, (Nairobi), 1950.

Tribes of East Africa, Statistical Analysis of the Tribal Distribution in East African Territories, EA Econ & Stat Bull, March 1951.

Great Britain. Admiralty: Handbook of Portuguese Nyasaland, 1920.

A Handbook of German East Africa, 1916, I.D.1055, War Office, Intelligence Division.



Great Britain. Colonial Office. Memorandum on  
Native Policy in East Africa,  
June 1930, London.

Foreign Office. Tanganyika, (London,  
1920), HMSO, FO Handbooks, 113.

Tanganyika Territory.

Annual Report: Department of Agriculture,  
1928/9-1958.  
on Co-operative Development, 1949-  
1960.

Department of Education, 1923-1960.

Department of Lands and Mines,  
1946-1954.

Department of Labour, 1927-1960.  
of Provincial Commissioners,  
1929-1956.

Atlas of Tanganyika. Compiled, drawn, and printed  
by the Survey division of the Department of  
Lands and Mines, Dar es Salaam. - 1942  
1946  
1956, 2nd.ed.

Blue Book for the year ending...1930-1950.  
(London).

Census of the native population of ... 1931,  
(Dar es Salaam, 1932), govt. printer.

General African Census, 8.1957, Statistics  
Department, 1958.

Statistical Abstract, 1938-1951, (Dar es Salaam,  
1953).

(United) Republic of Tan ganyika (Tanzania).

Annual Report. on Co-operative Development,  
1963-65.

Department of Education, 1961-1962.

Department of Labour, 1961-63.

District Data, 1967, Min. Economic Affaris and  
Dev.Plan., (Dar es Salaam, 1968).

Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic  
and Social Development, 1.7.1969 - 30.6.1974,  
(Dar es Salaam, 1970).

## ii. Unofficial.

### a. Ngoni Works.

Albinus, 1st.Lt. "Über eine Bereisung seines  
Bezirks August bis November,  
1904, Bericht der Stationschef",  
DKB, v.XVI, (1905), n.11, pp.  
347-51.

"Bericht über die Expedition des Gouverneurs von  
Deutsch-Ostafrika in das Gebiet  
des Rufiji und Ulanga, am  
Nyassasee und in das Hinterland  
von Kilwa", DKB, v.V, (1894), n.11.

- Booth, John "Die Nachkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) in Deutsch Ostafrika", Globus, lxxxviii, (1905), pp.197-201, 222-226.
- Ebner, Elzear History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), mission press.
- Gulliver, Philip H. "A History of the Songea Ngoni", TNR, n.41, (1955), pp.16-29.  
Labour Migration in a Rural Economy, (Kampala, 1955), E.A. Inst. Social Research.
- Häfliger, Johannes "Land und Leute von Ungoni", Missbl., v.V, (1901), pp.14-7, 43-8.
- Hall, R.de Z. "Angoni Raids in the Rufiji", African Studies, v.IV, (1949), n.2; TNR, n.27, (1948), pp.69-71.
- Hatchell, G.W. "The Angoni of Tanganyika Territory", Man, v.35, (1935), n.73, pp.69-73; TNR, n.25, (1948), pp.69-71.
- Haule, Cosmas Bantu 'Witchcraft' and Christian Morality, (Schöneck-Beckenreid, 1969), Nouv.Rev.Sc.Miss.
- Ibbott, Ralph "Ruvuma Development Association", Mbioni, (Kivukoni College, Dar es Salaam), v.III, (1966), n.11.
- Komba, Jacob T. Die Frommigkeit des heidnischen und christlichen Mangoni, (St. Ottilien, 1953), EOS Verlag.
- Kusters, Meinulf "Das Familienleben der Wangoni", Koloniale Rundschau, v.32, (1941), pp.160-82.
- Lamburn, R.G.P. "The Angoni Raid on Masasi in 1882", TNR, n.66, (1966), pp.207-13.
- Lieder, G. "Reise von der Mbampa-Bai am Nyassa-See nach Kisswere am Indischen Ocean - nach dem Tagebuch des Geologen...", MadS, v.X, (1897), pp.95-142.
- Mapunda, O.B. & G.P.Mpangara The Maji Maji War in Ungoni, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), EAPH, Maji Maji Research Paper, n.1.
- Mpangara, G.P. as Mapunda, O.B.
- Porter, William Carmichael "The Magwangwara", J. Manchester G.S., v.II, (1886), pp.265-282.
- Prince, Tom von "Geschichte der Magwangwara nach Erzählung des Arabers Rashid bin Masaud und des Tussi, Bruders des vor drei Jahren verstorbenen Sultans der Magwangwara", MadS, v.VII, (1894), n.3, pp.213-24.
- Richter, Franz "Rechtsgewohnheiten der Wangoni", DKB, (1907), pp.672-8.
- Richter, H.a.d. "Ackerbau und Viehsucht in Ungoni, aus einem Bericht des ...", DKB, v.XVIII, (1907), n.13.

- Speis, Eberhard "Observations on Utani customs among the Ngoni of Songea District", TNR, n.16, (1943), pp.49-53.
- Spiss, Cassian "Kingoni und Kisutu", MSOS, 1904.
- Stirnemann, H. Nguni und Ngoni: Eine Kultures-geschichtliche Studie, (Vienna, 1963), Osterreichische Ethnologische Gesellschaft.
- Toroka, S. "Education for self-reliance - the Litowa experiment", Mbioni, v.IV, (1968), n.11.
- Trossman, Simon "Ungoni und die Mission Peramiho nach dem Aufstand", Missbl., v.XIV, (1910), n.10, pp.149-52.
- Wehrmeister, C. Vor dem Sturm, (St.Ottilien, 1906).

#### b. General Works.

- Abdallah, Y.B. The Yao, ed.&tr. by M.Sanderson, (London, 1919).
- Abdul Karim bin Jama Liddini "Utenzi wa vita vya Maji Maji", J.E.A. Swahili Committee, June, 1957, tr. W.H.Whiteley.
- Adams, Alfons Gustav "Aus dem Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Mission", D.Koloniale-Gesellschaft, 1898/9, n.3.  
Im Dienste des Kreuzes, (St. Ottilien, 1899).  
Lindi und sein Hinterland, (Berlin, 1902), Dietrich Reimer.  
"Das mittlere Flussgebiet des Lukuledi", MadS, v.XV, (1902), n.3.
- Ade Ajayi, J.F. "The continuity of African institutions under colonialism", in
- Allen, J.W.T. see Hemedi, (1955).
- Alpers, Edward A. The East African Slave Trade, (Nairobi, 1967), EAPH, Historical Association of Tanzania, n.3.  
"The 19th century: Prelude to colonialism", in Ogot & Kieran, (1968).  
"Trade, State and Society among the Yao in the Nineteenth century", JAH, v.X, (1969), n.3, pp.405-20.
- anon. Porter, William Carmichael - Missionary, (London, 1910), UMCA, Bytler & Tanner.
- Arning, W. "Die Wahehe", MadS, v.IX, (1896), pp.233-46; v.X, (1897), pp.46-60.
- Austen, Ralph A. Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939, (London, 1968), Yale UP.

- Balt, Detelf Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1900-1914,  
(Munich, 1970), Weltforum Verlag.
- Baltzer, T. Die Kolonialbahnen mit besonderer  
Berücksichtigung Afrikas, (Berlin,  
1916).
- Barnes, Bertram Herbert Johnson of Nyasaland, (London,  
1933), UMCA.
- Barnes, J.A. Politics in a Changing Society,  
(Manchester, 1967), 2nd.ed., Man.UP.
- Beachey, R.W. "The East African Ivory Trade in  
the nineteenth century", JAH, v.VIII,  
(1967), n.2, pp.269-90.
- Beardall, William "Exploration of the Rufiji River  
under the orders of the Sultan of  
Zanzibar", PRGS, v.III, (1881),  
n.11, pp.641-56.
- Becker, a., etc Hermann von Wissman: Deutschlands  
Grösster Afrikaner, (Berlin, 1907),  
Alfred Schall.
- Beemer, Hilda "The development of the military  
organization in Swaziland", Africa,  
v.X, (1937), pp.55-75, 176-206.
- Behr, Lt. von "Geographische und Ethnographische  
Notizen aus dem Flussgebiets des  
Rowuma", MadS, v.V, (1892), pp.15-20.  
"Die Völker zwischen Rufiji und  
Rowuma", MadS, v.VI, (1893), pp.69-87.
- Bell, R.M. "The Maji Maji rebellion in Liwale  
District", TNR, n.28, (1950), pp.38-  
57.
- Bericht über Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Deutsch-  
Ostafrika, (Heidelberg, 1904/6),  
v.2.
- Berry, L. A Preliminary Sub-Division of Districts  
into Rural Economic Zones, (Dar es  
Salaam, 1968), Bureau of Resource  
Assessment and Land Use Planning, n.4.
- Birmingham, David see Grey, (1966).
- Blood, A.G. The History of the Universities'  
Mission to Central Africa, (London,  
1957), UMCA, 3 vols.
- Brown, Richard see Stokes, (1966).
- Bryant, A.T. Olden Times in Zululand and Natal,  
(London, 1929).  
The Zulu People, (Pietermaritzburg,  
1967), 2nd.ed., Shuter & Shooter.
- Burton, Richard F. The Lake Regions of Central Africa,  
(London, 1860), Longmans, 2 vols.
- Burton, Lady Isabel Life of Captain Sir Richard Burton,  
(London, 1893).
- Busse, Walter "Bericht über eine im Anfrage des  
kaiserliche Gouvernements von Deutsch-  
Ostafrika ausgeführte Forschungsreise  
durch den südlichen Thiel dieser  
Kolonie", DOAZv, v.IV, nos.26,  
(28.6.1902); 27, (5.7.1902); 28,  
(12.7.1902); 29, (19.7.1902); 30  
(26.7.1902); 31, (2.8.1902).

- Butler, J. & A.A. Castagno Boston University  
Papers on Africa, (New York, 1967), Praeger.
- Campbell, W.Y. Travellers Records of Portuguese  
Nyasaland, (London, n.d. (pre. 1899)).
- Cameron, Sir Donald My Tanganyika Service and Some  
Nigeria, (London, 1939).
- Caplan, G.L. The Elites of Swaziland, (London, 1970), Hurst.
- Castagno, A.A. see Butler, (1967).
- Catholic Directory of Eastern Africa.
- Chadwick, Owen Mackenzie's Grave, (London, 1959), Hodde & Stoughton.
- Chibambo, Y.M. My Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1942), United Society for Christian Literature.
- Chidzero, B.T.G. Tanganyika and International  
Trusteeship, (London, 1961), OUP.
- Church Missionary Society The Slave Trade of East  
Africa, is it to continue or  
be suppressed?, (London, 1868).  
The Slave Trade of East Africa,  
(London, 1869).
- Cliffe, Lionel One Party Democracy, (Nairobi, 1967), EAPH.
- Colson, E. "African society at the time of  
the Scramble", in Gann & Duigan,  
(1969).
- Cornevin, R. "The Germans in Africa before 1918",  
in Gann & Duigan, (1969).
- Coupland, R. The Exploitation of East Africa,  
1856-1890, (London, 1939), Faber.
- Culwick, A.T. "A method of studying changes in  
primitive marriage, in Bunga,  
Ngoni, Bena, Ndamba", J.R.Anthrop.I.,  
v.65, (1935), pp.185-93.  
Ubena of the Rivers, (London, 1935),  
George Allen & Unwin.
- Cunningham, G.L. "Ruvuma Development Association-  
an Independent critique", Mbioni,  
v.III, (1966), n.11.
- Deppe, L. Mit Lettow Vorbeck Durch Afrika,  
(Berlin, 1919).
- Die Deutsche Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Sudsee,  
1909/10, (Berlin, 1911), 1911/12,  
(Berlin, 1913).
- Development of Local Government in Tanganyika, (Dar  
es Salaam, 1966), Min, Local Govt.  
& Administration.
- Doerr, Lambert "Afrikaner und Missionar", in  
Renner, (1971).
- Dorman, M.H. "Pottery among the Wangoni and  
Wandendehule, Southern Tanganyika",  
Man, v.38, (1938), pp.97-102.
- Dryden, Stanley Local Administration in Tanzania,  
(Nairobi, 1968), E.A.Pol. Studies, n.5.
- Duigan, P. see Gann, (1969).

- Eberlie, R.F. "The German achievement in East Africa", TNR, n.55, (1960).
- Ebner, Elzear "Die Wangoni - einst Krieger, heute friedliche Bauern", in Renner, (1971).
- "Stammessprachen und Glaubensverkündigung in der Diözese Songea", in Renner, (1971).
- Economic Development of Tanganyika, The, (Baltimore, 1961), John Hopkins B., International Bank for Reconstruction & Development.
- Elmslie, W.A. Among the Wild Ngoni, (London, 1899)
- Introductory Grammar of the Ngoni (Zulu) Language as Spoken in Mombera's Country, (Aberdeen, 1891). Fraser.
- Elton, J.F. Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa, (London, 1879)
- Expedition der s. Kompagnie d. Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika in das Hinterland v. Lindi u. Mikindani, DKB, (1897), pp.632-3.
- Fields are Ripe to Harvest. A Glance into Missionary Work under the Swiss Benedictines in East Africa, The, (Uznach, 1925).
- Fontes, M. & E.E.Evans-Pritchard African Political Systems, (London, 1962), OUP.
- Fraser, D. Winning a Primitive People, (London, 1914), Seeley Service.
- Freeman-Grenville, G.S.P. The East African Coast, (Oxford, 1962), OUP.
- Friedland, William H. "Co-operation, conflict and conscription: TANU:TFL relations, 1955-1964", in Bulter & Castagno, (1967).
- Vuta Kamba: The Development of Trade Unions in Tanganyika, (Stanford, 1969), Hoover Inst. P.
- Fuchs, Paul "Die Wirtschaftliche Erkundung einer Südbahn", Beihefte Tropenpflanze, v.VI, (1905).
- Fülleborn, Friedrich Das Deutsche Nyassa und Ruvuma Gebiet, (Berlin, 1906), Reimer.
- "Über die Darstellung der Lebensformen bei den Eingeborenen im Süden der Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Kolonie", Z.für Ethnologie, v.32, (1900), pp.511-33.
- Gann, L.H. & P.Duigan eds. Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, (Cambridge, 1969), CUP.
- Gardner, B. German East: The Story of the First World War in East Africa, (London, 1963), Blackwell.
- Gifford, Prosser & W.Roger Louis eds., Britain and Germany in Africa, (London, 1967), Yale UP.
- Gluckman, Max Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society, (Oxford, 1965), Blackwell.

- Goldthorpe, J.E. An African Elite: Makerere College Graduates, 1922-60, (Nairobi, 1965), E.A. Social Research, E.A. Studies, n.7.
- Götzen, Graf von Deutsch Ost-Afrika im Aufstand, 1905-06, (Berlin, 1909).
- Gray, Sir John "A journey by land from Tete to Kilwa in 1616", TNR, n.25, (1948), pp.37-47.
- Grey, Richard & David Birmingham Pre-Colonial African Trade, (London, 1970), OUP.
- Gulliver, Philip H. Neighbours and Networks: The Idiom of Kinship in Social Action among the Ndendeuli of Tanzania, (Berkeley, 1971) U.Cal.P.
- "A tribal map of Tanganyika", TNR, n.52, (1959), pp.61-74.
- Gwassaa, G.C.K. "The German intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania", in Kimambo and Temu, (1969).
- & John Iliffe Records of the Maji Maji Rising, Part 1, (Dar es Salaam, 1967), EAPH, Hist. Ass. Tanzania.
- Hance, William A. The Geography of Modern Africa, (New York, 1964), Columbia UP.
- Hammond-Tooke, W.D. "Segmentation and fission in Cape Nguni political units", Africa, v.XXXV, (1965), pp.143-68.
- Harlow, V. et al. eds. History of East Africa, (Oxford, 1965), Clarendon P., vol.II.
- Harris, J.F. Summary of the Geology of Tanganyika, Pt.IV, Economic Geology, (Dar es Salaam, 1961).
- Harris, Marvin "Labour migration among the Moçambique Thonga: cultural and political factors", Africa, v.29, (1959), n.1.
- Henderson, W.O. "German East Africa, 1884-1918", in Harlow, (1965).
- Studies in German Colonial History, (London, 1962), Frank Cass.
- Henning, E. "Erfahrungen mit Eingeborenen im südlichen Deutsch-Ostafrika", Afr. Nachrichten, v.23, (1942), n.7, pp. 105-9.
- Hine, J.E. Days Gone By, Being Some Account of Past Years Chiefly in Central Africa, (London, 1924).
- Hitchcock, Sir E. "The sisal industry of East Africa", TNR, n.52, (1959).
- Hoernle in Schapera, (1953).
- Hordern, Charles Military Operations in East Africa, v.1 August 1914 - September 1916, (London, 1941), HMSO.
- Hornung, Clodwig Laurenti der Jumbesohn, (Munsterschnar-zach, n.d.), Abtei V.
- Hurst, H.B.G. "A survey of the development of facilities for migrant labour in Tanganyika during the period, 1926-1959", BIALI, v.6, (1959), n.4, pp. 50-91.

- Iliffe, John Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika, (Nairobi, 1971), EAPH.  
 "The age of improvement and differentiation", in Kimambo & Temu, (1969).  
 "The organization of the Maji Maji rebellion", JAH, v.VIII, (1967), n.3.  
Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912, (Cambridge, 1969), OUP.
- Ionides, C.J. "Studies of the Wangindo", TNR, n.31, (1951), pp.81-2.
- Janson, C.A. The Rev.C.A.Janson's Diary of his Journey to Lake Nyassa, 1822, (Zanzibar, 1883?), UMCA.
- Jensen, A. Regional Economic Atlas: Mainland Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, 1968), Bureau of Resource Allocation & Land Use Planning, Research Paper, n.1.
- Johnson, William Percival My African Reminiscences, 1875-1895, (London, 1924), UMCA.  
Nyasa, The Great Water, (Oxford, 1922), OUP.  
 "The Rev.W.P.Johnson's Journeys in the Yao country, and discovery of the sources of the Lujende", PRGS, v.IV, (1882), n.8, pp.480-4.  
 "Seven years' travel in the region east of Lake Nyasa", PRGS, v.VI, (1884), pp.313-36.
- Johnston, A.K. "Native routes in East Africa, from Dar es Salaam towards Lake Nyasa", PRGS, v.I, (1879), n.7, pp.417-22.
- Kawawa, R.M. "Rural development in Tanzania", Mbioni, v.II, (1966), n.11.
- Kersten, Otto Baron Carl Claus von der Decken's Reisen in Ost-Afrika in Jahren 1859 bis 1861, (Leipzig, 1869), 3 vols.
- Kiepert, R. "Begleitworte zur Karte der Nyasa-Expedition", MadS, v.VII, (1894), pp.296-305.
- Kilekwa, Petro Slave Boy to Priest, (London, 1937), UMCA, tr.K.A.N.Smith.
- Kimambo, I.N. & A.J.Temu A History of Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, 1969), EAPH.
- Kirk, John "Notes of two expeditions up the River Rovuma, East Africa", JRGS, v.XXXIV, (1865), pp.154-66.
- Krapf, J.Ludwig Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours During an Eighteen Years' Residence in Eastern Africa, (London, 1860).
- Künster, Clemens "Die Zustände im südlichen Missionsgebiete nach dem Kriege", Missbl., v.XI, (1906), n.3, pp.36-3.
- Kuper, Hilda An African Aristocracy: Rank Among the Swazi, (London, 1947), OUP.
- Lamburn, R.G.P. "The Angoni Raid on Masasi in 1882", TNR, n.66, (1966).



- Lancaster, J.D. "Tentative chronology of the Ngoni", JRAnthS, v.1xii, (1937), pp.77-90.
- Lane-Poole, E.H. "The date of the crossing of the Zambezi by the Ngoni", J.Africa Soc., v.29, (1930), n.115, pp.290-2.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott A History of the Expansion of Christianity, (New York, 1943), v.5, 1800-1914, v.6, 1914-1943, Harper.
- Leberle, Linus Martyrblut, (St.Ottilien, 1930).
- Lechaptois, A. Aux Rives du Tanganyika, (Alger, 1913), Peres Blancs.
- Lettow-Vorbeck, Gen. von My Reminiscences of East Africa, (London, n.d.), 2nd.ed. Hurst & Blackwell.
- Leubuscher, C. Tanganyika Territory: A Study of Economic Policy under Mandate, (London, 1944), OUP.
- Lewis, I.M. Islam in Tropical Africa, (London, 1966), OUP.
- Liebenow, J.Gus Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde, (Evanston, 1971), Northwestern UP.
- Liebert, Ernest von Aus einem Bewegten Leben, (Munich, 1925).
- Listowel, Judith The Making of Tanganyika, (London, 1965), Chatto & Windus.
- Lieder, G. "Zur Kenntnis der Karawanwege im südlichen Thiele des Ostafrikanischen Schutzgebietes", MadS, v.VII, (1894), n.4, pp.278-281.
- Livingstone, David David Livingstone and the Rovuma, A Notebook edited with Introduction and Related Documents by George Shepperson, (Edinburgh, 1965), Edin.UP.
- Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambezi and its Tributaries; and of the Discovery of the Lakes Shirwa and Nyassa, 1858-1864, (London, 1865), John Murray.
- Lonsdale, John "The Tanzanian experiment", African Affairs, v.67, (1968).
- Louis, W.R. Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914-1919, (Oxford, 1967), OUP.
- <sup>8</sup> Maguire, G.Andrew Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of Anticipation, (Cambridge, 1969), OUP.
- Maples, Chauncy "Makua land, between the Rivers Rovuma and Luli", FRGS, v.IV, (1882), n.2, pp.79-90.
- "Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa", PRGS, v.II, (1880), n.6, pp.337-53.
- Maples, Ellen, ed. Journals and Papers of Chauncy Maples, (London, 1899), Longmans, Green & Co.

- Mathew, Gervase  
Mayer, Ambrosius see Oliver, (1963).  
"Wie 1905 in Matumbi der Aufstand begann", Missbl., v.XVIII, (1914), n.8, pp.225-34.
- Meinecke, Gustav Die Deutschen Kolonien in Wort und Bild, (Leipzig, n.d.).
- Merensky, A. Deutsche Arbeit am Njassa, (Berlin, 1894), Berliner Evang. Missionsges.
- Meyer, Hans Das Deutsche Kolonialreich, Erster Band: Ostafrika und Kamerun, (Leipzig, 1909), V. des Bibliographischen Inst.
- Moffett, J.P., ed. Handbook of Tanganyika, (Dar es Salaam, 1958), 2nd.ed., Govt.P.  
Tanganyika: A Review of its Resources and their Development, (Dar es Salaam, 1955), Govt.P.
- Mohiddin, Ahmed "Ujamaa: a commentary on President Nyerere's vision of Tanzanian society", African Affairs, v.67, (1968), n.267.
- Moreau, R.E. "Joking relationships in Tanganyika", Africa, v.XIV, (1944), n.7.
- Mumford, W.B. "Hehe-Bena-Sangu peoples of East Africa", American Anthropologist, v.36, (1934), n.2.
- Murdock, George Peter Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History, (New York, 1959).
- Nigmann, E. Die Wahehe: Ihre Geschichte, Kult, Rechts, Kriegs und Jagd- Gebrauche, (Berlin, 1908), E.S.Mittler.
- O'Conner, A.M. An Economic Geography of East Africa, (London, 1966), Bell.
- Ogot, B.A. & J.A.Kieran Zamani, A Survey of East African History, (Nairobi, 1968).
- Oliver, Roland "The problem of Bantu expansion", JAH, v.VII, (1966), n.3, pp.361-76.  
"Reflections on the sources of evidence for the pre-colonial history of East Africa", in Vansina, (1964).
- & G.Mathew History of East Africa, vol.1, (Oxford, 1963), OUP.
- O'Neill, Henry E. "A three months' journey in the Makua and Lomwe countries", PRGS, v.IV, (1882), n.4, pp.193-213.  
"East Africa, between the Zambezi and the Rovuma Rivers", PRGS, v.VII, (1885), pp.430-55.  
"Journey in the district west of Cape Delgado Bay, September-October, 1882", PRGS, v.V, (1883), n.7, pp.393-404.  
"Journey from Mozambique to Lakes Shirwa and Amaramba", PRGS, v.VI, (1884), n.11, pp.632-55.  
The Mozambique and Nyassa Slave Trade, (London, 1885), BrForanti-Slavery Soc.
- Paasche, Hans Im Morgenlicht. Kriegs-, Jagd- und Reise- Erlebnisse in Ostafrika, (Berlin, 1907).
- Omer-Cooper, J.D. "Aspects of political change in the nineteenth century Mfekane", in Thompson, (1969)  
The Zulu Aftermath, (London, 1966).

- Pike, Andrew H. "Soil conservation amongst the Matengo", TNR, n.6, (1938), pp. 79-82.
- Pike, John G. "A pre-colonial history of Malawi", Nyasaland J., v.xviii, (1965), n.1, pp.22-54.
- Portuguese Nyasaland: An Account of the Discovery, Native Population Agriculture and Mineral Resources, and Present Administration of the Territory of the Nyassa Country, (1899).
- Prince, Tom von Gegen Araber und Wahehe, (Berlin, 1914), Mittler Sohn.
- Ramazani, Mzee bin DOAZ, 12.1.1907.
- Ramm, A. Germany 1789-1919, A Political History, (London, 1967), Methuen.
- Rangeley, W.H. "The Amacinga Yao", Nyasaland J., v.XVI, (1962), n.2, pp.40-70.
- "The Ayao", Nyasaland J., v.XVI, (1963), n.1, pp.7-27.
- Ranger, Terence O. "African reactions to the imposition of colonial rule", in Gann & Duigan, (1969).  
ed. Emerging Themes of African History, (Dar es Salaam, 1968), EAPH.
- "The movement of ideas, 1850-1939", in Kimambo & Temu, (1969).
- Read, Margaret Children of their Fathers: Growing up among the Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1959), Methuen.
- "The moral code of the Ngoni and their former military state", Africa, v.XI, (1938), n.1, pp.1-24.
- "Native standards of living and African culture change, illustrated by examples from the Ngoni highlands of Nyasaland", Africa, v.XI, (1938), n.3, supp.
- The Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1970), 2nd.ed., Cass.
- "Tradition and prestige among the Ngoni", Africa, v.IX, (1936), n.4, pp.453-85.
- Rebman, John Dictionary of the Kinyasa Language, (St.Chrischona, 1877), CMS.
- Recorded Population Changes, 1948-1967, (Dar es Salaam, 1968), Central Statistical Bureau.
- Redmayne, Alison H. "Mkwawa and the Hehe wars", JAH, v.IX, (1968), pp.409-36.
- "The Hehe", in Roberts, (1968).
- Rennie, J.K. "The Ngoni states and European intrusion", in Stokes, (1966).
- Renner, Frumentius Der fünfarmige Leuchter, v.2, (St. Ottilien, 1971), mission press.
- Report on Tanganyika Territory, (London, 1921).
- Richter, J. Tanganyika and its Future, (London, 1934), World Dominion Press.
- Rios, Romanus Benedictines of Today, (Stanbrook, 1946), S. Abbey Press.

- Rita-Ferriera, A. "Labour emigration among the Mocambique Thonga - comments on a study by Marvin Harris", Africa, v.30, (1960), n.2, pp.141-52.
- Roberts, Andrew "Political change in the nineteenth century", in Kimambo & Temu, (1969).  
ed. Tanzania Before 1900, (Dar es Salaam, 1968), EAPH.
- Rotberg, Robert I. "Resistance and rebellion in British Nyasaland & German East Africa: A tentative comparison", in Gifford & Louis, (1967).  
see Kilekwa, (1937).
- Sanderson, M. The Handbook of Tanganyika Territory, (London, 1930), Macmillan.
- Sayers, Gerald F. Die Katholische Missionschule in Ehemaligen Deutsch-Ostafrika, (Paderborn, 1937), Ferdinand Schöningh.
- Schaeppi, Franz Solan ed. The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa, (Cape Town, 1953), Maskew Miller.
- Schapera, I. "The hard death of imperialism: German and British colonial attitudes, 1919-1939", in Gifford & Louis, (1967).
- Schnee, Heinrich Als Letzter Gouverneur in Deutsch-Ostafrika, (Heidelberg, 1964), Quelle & Meyer.
- Shepperson, George see Livingstone, (1965).
- Skinner, Elliot P. "Labour migration and its relationship to socio-cultural change in Mossi society", Africa, v.30, (1960), n.4, pp.375-401.  
The Mossi of Upper Volta, (Stanford, 1964), SUP.
- Slade, Ruth English-Speaking Missions in the Congo Independent State, (Brussels, 1959), Acad.R.d.Sc.Colonialles.
- Smith, A. "The southern sector of the interior, 1840-1884", in Oliver & Mathew, (1963).
- Smith, Chase Stewart "Explorations in Zanzibar dominions", JRGS, supp.papers II, (1887/9), pt.II, pp.99-126.
- Smythies, C.A. A Journey from Matope on the Upper Shire to Newala on the Rovuma, (Zanzibar, 1885), UMCA.  
A Journey from Zanzibar to Lake Nyasa and Back in the year 1887, (London, n.d.), UMCA.  
A Journey to Lake Nyasa and Visit to the Magwangwara and the Source of the Rovuma in the year 1886, (Zanzibar, n.d.), UMCA.
- Southall, Aidan & Daryll Forde, eds. Social Change in Modern Africa, (London, 1961), OUP.
- Stahl, Kathleen M. Tanganyika: Sail in the Wilderness, (Mouton S Gravenhage, 1961).

- Stenhouse, A.S. "Agriculture in the Matengo Highlands", EAAgricJ, v.X, (1944), n.1, pp.22-4.
- Stephens, Hugh W. The Political Transformation of Tanganyika, 1920-1967, (New York, 1968), Praeger.
- Stewart, James "Lake Nyassa, and the water route to the lake region of Africa", PRGS, v.III, (1881), n.5, pp.257-77.
- Stokes, Eric & Richard Brown eds. The Zambesian Past. Stories in Central African History, (Manchester, 1966), ManUP.
- Sutton, J.E.G. "'Ancient civilizations' and modern agricultural systems in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania", Azania, v.4, (1969), pp.1-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Habitation sites on the Liganga-Maganga Ridge", Southern Highlands of Tanzania, Azania, v.2, (1967), pp.201-2.
- Temu, A.J. see Kimambo, (1969).
- Tew, Mary Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region, (London, 1950), Eth.Survey of Africa. East-Central Africa, OUP.
- Thomson, Joseph "Notes on the basin of the River Rovuma, East Africa", PRGS, v.IV, (1882), n.2, pp.65-78.
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Notes on the route taken by the Royal Geographic Society's East African Expedition from Dar-es-Salaam to Uhehe, May 19th to August 29th, 1879", PRGS, v.II, (1880), n.2, pp.102-22.
- Thompson, Leonard, ed. African Societies in Southern Africa, (London, 1969), Heinemann.
- Vansina, J. ed. The Historian in Tropical Africa, (London, 1964), OUP.
- Van Velsen, J. "Labour migration as a positive factor in the continuity of Tonga tribal society", in Southall & Forde, (1961).
- Van Warmelo, in Schapera, (1953).
- Wakefield, Thomas "Routes of native caravans from the coast to the interior of Eastern Africa", JRGS, v.40, (1870), pp. 303-39.
- Waller, Horace The Last Journals of David Livingstone in Central Africa, (London, 1874), 2 vols.
- Weise, C. "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Zulu im Norden des Zambesi, namentlich der Angoni", Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, v.32, (1900), pp.181-201.
- Werner, Alice "The native races of German East Africa", JAFrSociology, v.10, (1910), n.37, pp.53-63.
- Weule, K. Wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse meiner Ethnographischen in dem Sudosten Deutsch-Ostafrika, (Berlin, 1908), Mittler. (English translation: Native Life in Africa).

- Whiteley, W.H. "Southern Province rock paintings",  
TNR, n.31, (1951), pp.58-60.
- Wilson, George Herbert A History of the UMCA,  
(London, 1936), UMCA.
- Winterbottom, J.M. "Outline histories of two  
Northern Rhodesian tribes",  
Rhodes-Livingstone Inst.J., v.ix,  
(1950).
- Wood, Alan The Groundnut Affair, (London, 1950),  
Bodley Head.
- Wright, Marcia "Chief Merere and the Germans",  
TNR, n.69, (1968), pp.41-9.  
German Missions in Tanganyika  
1891-1941, (Oxford, 1971), OUP.
- Yarborough, J.C. The Diary of a Working Man in  
Central Africa, (London, n.d.).
- Young, E.D. The Search after Livingstone,  
(London, 1868).
- Young, T.Cullen A History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga  
Peoples, (London, 1932).

#### c. Journals and Magazines.

Africa.  
African Affairs.  
African Studies.  
Afrikanische Nachrichten.  
American Anthropologist.  
Anthropos.  
Azania.  
Bulletin of the International African Labour Institute.  
Central Africa.  
Der Tag.  
Deutsches Kolonialblatt.  
Deutsches Kolonialgeschichte.  
Deutsch Kolonial-Gesellschaft.  
Deutsch Ostafrikanische Rundschau.  
Deutsch Ostafrikanische Zeitung.  
East African Agricultural Journal.  
East African Economics and Statistics Bulletin.  
East African Standard.  
Echo aus Afrika.  
Globus.  
Journal of the Africa Society.  
Journal of African Sociology.  
Journal of the African Swahili Committee.  
Journal of the East African Swahili Committee.  
Journal of the Manchester Geographic Society.  
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.  
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society.  
Journal of the Royal Geographic Society.  
Koloniale Rundschau.  
Man  
Mbioni  
Missionsblätter

Mitteilungen von Forschungsreisenden und  
Gelehrten aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten.  
Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische-  
Sprachen.

Nyasaland Journal.

Ostafrikanischen Nachrichten.

Our Past.

Petermanns Mitteilungen.

Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society.

Rafiki Yangu.

Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Journal.

Tanganyika (Tanzania) Notes and Records

The Standard. (Dar es Salaam).

Usambara Post.

Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.

Journal of African History.

#### C. Maps.

German East Africa, Songea, G.G.D.g.4, Ordinance Survey,  
1915, Great Britain.

International map of the world, series 1301, sc-36,  
Songea; sc-37, Lindi.

Atlas of Tanganyika, 1942, 1946, 1956.